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The strategic air offensive against Germany during World War II formed a major 
part of Britain’s wartime military effort and it has subsequently attracted the 
attention of historians.  Despite the attention, historians have paid little attention 
to the impact of the strategic air offensive on Britain. This thesis attempts to 
redress this situation by providing an examination of the economic impact on 
Britain of the offensive.  The work puts the economic cost of the offensive into its 
historical context by describing the strategic air offensive and its intellectual 
underpinnings.  Following this preliminary step, the economic costs are described 
and quantified across a range of activities using accrual accounting methods.  The 
areas of activity examined include the expansion of the aircraft industry, the cost 
of individual aircraft types, the cost of constructing airfields, the manufacture and 
delivery of armaments, petrol and oil, and the recruitment, training and 
maintenance of the necessary manpower.  The findings are that the strategic air 
offensive cost Britain £2.78 billion, equating to an average cost of £2,911.00 for 
every operational sortie flown by Bomber Command or £5,914.00 for every 
Germany civilian killed by aerial bombing.  The conclusion reached is the 
damage inflicted upon Germany by the strategic air offensive imposed a very 
heavy financial burden on Britain that she could not afford and this burden was a 
major contributor to Britain’s post-war impoverishment. 
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Introduction 
 
In August 1943, the Prime Minister of Britain, Sir Winston Churchill, advised 
Clement Atlee, the Deputy Prime Minister, that when dealing with the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) he should be aware that: 
 
In this case, as in other matters, you will find the whole Air Ministry headed by 
the Secretary of State for Air will hold together.  They consider themselves the 
salt of the earth and that nothing should be denied them.  They are so accustomed 
to having everything for which they ask that they have forgotten any other 
services exist in the whole world1. 
 
Churchill’s advice to Atlee was an early, if somewhat indirect, acknowledgement 
of the wealth and resources that Britain had committed to conducting air war 
during World War II.  To date, the historical record lacks a well-researched 
estimate of the financial cost Britain incurred in carrying on an air war between 
1939 and 1945.  The reasons for this are many, but the most significant is that the 
wartime accounts are partial and only deal with direct government expenditure.  
This thesis begins the process of addressing the gap in the historical record by 
providing an estimate of the financial cost for one part of Britain’s air war, the 
strategic air offensive against Germany.   
 
The strategic air offensive against Germany is the most logical starting point for 
any estimate of the financial cost of Britain’s air war in World War II.  The 
offensive was the longest and largest single air campaign undertaken by Britain 
                                                 
1  PRO CAB 120/291, NOCOP Minute Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister, 6th August 
1943. 
during the war and it consumed by far the greatest proportion of the resources 
dedicated to fighting in or from the air.  The analysis of the financial cost of the 
strategic air offensive provided below is a first step in calculating just how much 
it cost the people of Britain to fight an air war during World War II. 
 
The air war conducted between 1939 and 1945 required a massive expansion of 
the British aircraft industry, which increased domestic production from 893 
aircraft in 1935 to 26,461 aircraft in 19442, a massive 2,963% increase in less than 
nine years.  If this increase in production is measured in terms of the structure 
weight of the aircraft produced, the increase is an even more massive 10,916%, 
with production increasing from 1.91 million lbs in 1935 to 208.5 million lbs in 
19443.  Yet, this extraordinary increase in aircraft production and the British 
aircraft industry is only one part of the story.   
 
In order to conduct the air war Britain also had to recruit and train over a million 
men and women to serve in the RAF.  Of these men and women, somewhere 
between 100,000 and 150,000 personnel were required to operate Bomber 
Command, whilst untold thousands may have been assigned to roles in other 
organisations closely supporting Bomber Command.  The Air Ministry had to pay 
for the feeding, clothing and accommodating of these men and women.  There 
were further costs as well.  Both the aircraft built for Bomber Command and the 
                                                 
2  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, Tables 130-131, Aircraft Production 
by Main Groups, HMSO, London, 1951, pp.152. 
3  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, Table 131, Aircraft Production by 
Structure Weight, HMSO, London, 1951, pp.153. 
people who worked within it needed large bases to operate from.  Britain had to 
build these airfields, with their paved runways and taxiways, their hangars, 
workshops and accommodation.  She had to manufacture the bombs and the other 
ordnance required to inflict injury on the enemy.  Finally, she had to find and 
import the fuel to power all of these aircraft, men and munitions to their targets in 
Germany and Europe.  In February 1944, the Secretary of State for Air, Sir 
Archibald Sinclair, told the House of Commons that the largest share of the 
resources dedicated to the air war went to Bomber Command4.  With very few 
exceptions, Bomber Command was to be the RAF’s main effort throughout 
World War II and identifying the size of the resources devoted to it is, as has 
already been said above, the subject matter of this thesis.  Given the size of the 
resources dedicated to the strategic air offensive, it is the contention of this thesis 
that the economic cost of the strategic air offensive may have contributed to the 
problems faced by the British economy as it attempted to return to civilian 
production after World War II. 
 
The seriousness of Britain’s economic problems became obvious after the 
election of the Labour government in 1945.  The situation was so bad that in 
March 1946, Canada quietly cancelled British debts of £101 ($CAN425) million 
after Britain had failed to meet her commitments for the Empire Air Training 
Scheme (EATS)5.  By the 20th January 1947, a British government White Paper 
                                                 
4  Sir A. Sinclair, 396, H.C.Deb.5s, 29 Feb 44, Column 1275 
5 Rachel L Heide, ‘The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan: How Canada’s Contribution to the 
Second World War Affects Us Today’, www.vac-acc.gc.ca/general/sub.cfm?source=history 
/secondWar/bcatp/page4, 10th January 2004 
was issued acknowledging the ‘extremely serious’ position of the post-war 
economy6.  By March of 1947, Britain the critical state of the British economy 
forced the new government to inform the United States in a blue diplomatic note 
that she was incapable of continuing support to Greece and she would be unable 
to assist the United States in supporting Turkey7.  The British blue note may have 
helped prompt the Truman administration to establish the Truman Doctrine and 
develop the Marshall Plan8.  Britain’s financial plight drew attention to the fact 
that her economy had suffered significant damage during the war, perhaps just as 
much as Germany’s, and that both countries were in danger of economic collapse 
raising the threat that they would bring the whole of Western Europe’s economy 
down with them.   
 
Alan Sked and Colin Cook estimate that between 1939 and 1945 Britain lost 
approximately £7 billion from her national wealth9.  During that period, total 
British government spending had amounted to £28.7 billion of which £22.8 
billion (79.4 percent) was spent on defence10.  The analysis in this thesis shows 
that Bomber Command’s share of the expenditure was at least £2.78 billion.   
This amount equated to 9.4 percent of total British government spending during 
World War II and 12.1 percent of her spending on defence during that time.  
                                                 
6  R.J. Donovan, The Second Victory: The Marshall Plan and the Post War Revival of Europe, 
Madison Books, Boston, 1987, p.21 
7  Donovan, Second Victory, p.22 
8  Donovan, Second Victory, p.23 
9  A. Sked and C. Cook, Post-War Britain: a Political History, Pelican Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1979, p.27 
However, £2.78 billion was equivalent to 46.77 percent of total British 
government expenditure outside of defence which underlines the size of the 
government’s expenditure on the strategic air offensive against Germany.   
 
The significance of this expenditure also lies in the unfortunate fact that unlike a 
dockyard, which can manufacture different types of ship or a harbour, which 
takes both civilian and military vessels, the factories and airfields built for the 
strategic air offensive were single use assets.  In 1945, the aircraft factories, 
bomber airfields and all of the personnel and services created to operate and 
sustain them, began the process of decommissioning, closing and scrapping.  
They were not to contribute to the future economic welfare of the country and 
subsequently a large proportion of the investment made by Britain in the 
industries required to supply the strategic air offensive became absolute losses, 
and as such, they were a significant contribution to the impoverishment of the 
country. 
 
In analysing the financial costs incurred by Britain in conducting the strategic air 
offensive, it is important to keep in mind the fact that the wartime accounts put 
together by the British Treasury were compiled using cash accounting techniques.  
Such an approach only details the amount of cash spent on an activity and not the 
opportunity costs associated with the activity.  In order to obtain a clearer picture 
                                                                                                                                  
10  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, Table 173, Central Government 
Expenditure (Exchequer Issues), p.195. 
of the true costs of the strategic air offensive, I have made extensive use of 
modern accounting practice, particularly the accrual accounting method.   
 
The reason for using an accrual method is that it provides a better evaluation of 
the total costs incurred in an activity than does the older cost accounting method, 
which the British Treasury and business used prior to the 1990s.  The cash 
accounting method that was previously used focussed attention on the movement 
of money into and out of the accounts controlled by business or government 
entities.  It more easily allowed managers and officials to ignore the total cost of 
an activity; and it encouraged cross-subsidisation11.  Cross-subsidisation leads to a 
risk of underestimating the true cost of an activity.  It is a contention of this thesis 
that the financial cost of the strategic air offensive was much higher than 
previously shown. 
 
Assessing the cost of the strategic air offensive has been difficult due to the lack 
of consolidated data and the way in which the government accounted for 
expenditure.  This thesis is one of the first works to address the subject of real cost 
and it does so by conducting a partial cost-benefit analysis of the strategic air 
offensive using tools from economics and accounting12.  The tools used to arrive 
                                                 
11  Cross-subsidisation is where money from one area of an enterprise is used to subsidise the 
operation of another area.  For example; the lowering of the price of electricity supplied to 
domestic users by charging commercial users a higher price. 
12  The cost-benefit analysis being conducted here is concerned solely with the financial costs of 
the strategic air offensive and not its military or political benefits.  The aim of the thesis is to 
arrive at an estimate of cost only and not to become involved in the arguments over whether 
the strategic air offensive was worthwhile as a military campaign.  
at the cost-benefit analysis include the use of direct and indirect costing methods 
of evaluating total financial costs incurred.  This approach gives a clearer picture 
of the total financial value of the cost of strategic bombing on Britain.  Before 
looking at the usefulness of this approach, it is necessary to clearly state that the 
thesis uses the term ‘cost’ in an economic sense only.  ‘Costs’ is used here as a 
measure of the strictly financial value of the direct and indirect inputs required to 
support Bomber Command in the strategic air offensive.  Direct cost refers to the 
price paid for goods and services, whilst indirect costs include the cash value of 
such things as the loss of shipping tankers used to carry high-octane fuel or the 
value of agricultural production displaced by Bomber Command’s airfields. 
 
The benefit of using this approach is that it provides a more accurate evaluation of 
the economic impact on Britain of strategic bombing.  The cash accounting 
system used to assemble the British National Accounts did not clearly identify all 
the costs of an activity and, as has already been pointed out, it encourages cross-
subsidisation, which makes it very difficult to identify the real costs of an activity.  
In the area of British aircraft production, Treasury did not factor in the cost of 
additional infrastructure or services supplied to manufacturers by the government.  
Indeed, the manufacturers’ prices were unilaterally reduced by Treasury to take 
into account the grants, loans, goods and some services supplied to the 
manufacturer at government expense.  This had the effect of making British 
aircraft appear cheaper than they actually were.  The accuracy of the costings 
were further reduced by the habit of the time which ignored the value of inputs 
such as transport, government supplied fuel and storage facilities.  The overall 
effect was that the cost of the strategic air offensive is markedly lowered.    
 
This thesis will provide an estimate of the financial cost to Britain of the strategic 
air offensive that will show that it was much higher than previously thought.  The 
argument propounded here is that the resources consumed by the strategic air 
offensive against Germany imposed a financial cost on Britain that, whilst fully 
justified in political and military terms, would adversely affect her standing as an 
economic power in the post-war period.  The importance of identifying the size of 
the expenditure involved is that it allows a comparison between the economic 
damage inflicted on both Germany and Britain by the strategic air offensive.  The 
result is a more effective comparison of the usefulness of strategic bombing as an 
economical means of conducting war.  It is worth stating at the outset that the 
importance of the study does not lie in producing another list of figures showing 
the size of the resources required to conduct the strategic air offensive.  The real 
importance lies in the potential distortion of the British economy that the size of 
the investment in strategic bombing may have caused.  This distortion may help 
in explaining Britain’s poor economic performance in the decades following the 
end of the war.   
 
In analysing the financial cost of the strategic air offensive, the first step is to 
describe the conduct of the strategic air offensive.  This is the point of Chapter 
One, ‘The Strategic Air Offensive 1939 to 1945’.  Chapter One provides a 
chronological description of the offensive so that the expenditure made by the 
British government is seen within the historical context of wartime military 
operations.    The description covers the three stages covering of the offensive 
consisting of the initial period extending from September 1939 until February 
1942; the period of increasing weight of attack from February 1942 until June 
1944; and the Crescendo of the campaign between June 1944 and May 1945.  The 
purpose of the chapter is to outline the conduct of the strategic air offensive and to 
lay out before the reader the military situation to which Britain was responding.  
 
Following this description of the offensive, Chapter Two, ‘Air Mindedness and 
the Development of a British Theory of Air Warfare’, examines the intellectual 
underpinnings of Britain’s strategic air offensive against Germany.  The 
chronology extends from the late Victorian period, when imaginative writers such 
as H.G. Wells began to produce books and articles describing the joys and horrors 
of aircraft flight, to the end of World War II.  Based on the analysis of documents 
on British air power theory, which finds little evidence of a critical evaluation of 
strategic bombing, chapter two will argue that the mood created by writers like 
Wells had a much greater effect on British thinking on air power than the more 
rigorous military thinking portrayed by men such as Douhet and Mitchell.  The 
evidence supports the belief that British thinking on air power was more of a blind 
faith in the effectiveness of technology than any rigorously reasoned theory.        
 
The analysis of British thinking during the period 1900 to 1945 shows a notable 
lack of rigour in the consideration of the effectiveness of strategic bombing.  The 
government, Parliament, Air Ministry and the RAF, the aircraft industry and the 
public all assumed that bombing by aircraft would result in a catastrophic 
outcome for civilised life in cities.  The reasons for these assumptions were 
manifold, however the desire of the Air Ministry and the RAF to bolster their 
position and their prospects of increased government funding appear to have led 
to an over-emphasis on the dangers of letting potential enemies become more 
powerful in the air.   
 
The claims that there was a lack of rigor in the evaluation of strategic bombing is 
supported by the behaviour of the RAF during the 1930s, when evidence showing 
that bombing may be more difficult than expected was deliberately ignored or 
downplayed.  When the air exercises demonstrated that bomber formations would 
suffer severe casualties during attacks on London, the umpires reversed the results 
on the basis that the bombers were attacking and the fighters were not.  These 
early indications of the vulnerability of bombers, which came before radar, should 
have induced some reassessment of the viability of bomber attacks, however, 
there are no indications that such a reassessment occurred.  The result was that as 
Britain faced the growing threat of war in the late 1930s, an unfounded fear of 
strategic bombing unduly influenced the government and reinforced the appeal of 
appeasement.  In 1941, Sir Winston Churchill levelled such an accusation, 
charging that the Air Ministry and Air Staff had undermined the determination of 
the pre-war governments to resist Nazi expansion ‘by the pictures they painted of 
the destruction that would be wrought by air raids’13.  
 
Amongst the leading advocates of the effectiveness of air power were the aircraft 
manufacturers who hoped to build the advanced bombers necessary to conduct 
the proposed strategic air offensives.  The way in which the British aircraft 
industry developed and the effectiveness of its operations from 1920 till 1945 are 
examined in Chapter Three, ‘The British Aircraft Industry’.  The comparative 
analysis of the technological and commercial activities of the British aircraft 
industry clearly showed that Britain’s interwar aircraft industry was a large and 
vibrant industry that dominated the world by insinuating itself into the fabric of 
foreign aircraft industries.   
 
The analysis conducted in Chapter Three demonstrates that Britain’s aircraft 
industry relied on an aggressive programme of developing joint ventures within 
overseas markets rather than attempting to export domestically-produced aircraft 
and aircraft components to these markets.  Any attempt to build their businesses 
through simple exporting would have failed in the face of the trade barriers 
erected by foreign governments to protect their own nascent aircraft industries.  
The British aircraft firms used licensing agreements and joint ventures with 
foreign governments and aircraft companies to get around these barriers. 
 
                                                 
13  PRO CAB 120/300, Minute Churchill to CAS, 7th October 1941.  In the original minute 
draft Churchill had originally used the word ‘terrified’ but replaced it with depressed. 
What appears to have made the British attractive to foreigners was the promise of 
technological transfer.  The British aircraft firms’ willingness to enter joint 
ventures or to license foreign companies to produce British designed aircraft 
made them attractive to foreign governments wishing to quickly create their own 
aircraft industries for reasons of national security or prestige.  The commercial 
benefit to the British aircraft companies was that they collected royalties on these 
technologies and techniques or made profits through their joint venture 
arrangements.  The only apparent loser in the arrangement appears to have been 
the British taxpayer who funded the aeronautical research and design that the 
firms were then exporting for profit.  
 
The analysis of the interwar British aircraft industry shows that it was strong, 
technologically proficient and commercially and politically astute.  This is 
contrary to the more widely accepted view of the industry as being technically 
backward, relative to the American industry, and commercially dependent upon 
Air Ministry orders.  This latter view arises from basing the analysis of the British 
aircraft industry on the measurement of domestic production without taking into 
account, as this thesis does, the wider international commercial activities of 
Britain’s aircraft firms.  The final part of Chapter Three focuses on the extent of 
government financing needed to fund the extension of factories and plant in the 
aircraft industry to meet the demands of war.  Estimating the extent of this 
funding is essential to establishing the true costs of aircraft used by Britain in the 
strategic air offensive, as the British government reduced the price paid to reflect 
the extent of their investment in expanding the manufacturing capability of the 
individual firms involved.  
 
Chapter Four, ‘The Aircraft of the Strategic Air Offensive’, deals with the costing 
of the fifteen aircraft types that Bomber Command used during World War II.  It 
describes the various aircraft and identifies the cost of their production before 
combining all of these to produce an overall figure.  The most important finding 
made in this analysis was that the price paid by the British government for British 
aircraft and aircraft components was substantially below that paid by the British 
or American governments for equivalent American products.  The best example 
of this price differential is shown by a comparison of the prices paid for a Merlin 
engines manufactured by the American company Packard as against that paid for 
one made by Rolls Royce.  The Packard variant of the engine was more than 
twice as expensive as the Rolls Royce version.  My analysis of the discrepancy 
suggests that the American price represented the true cost of production plus 
profit, whereas the British price had deductions made to offset government loans 
and investment in plant and equipment for Rolls Royce.   
 
The suspicion that the cost of British aircraft production was consistently 
underestimated is further supported by comparing the price of similar American 
and British aircraft types.  For example, Boeing’s B-17 and the A.V. Roe’s 
Lancaster were similar aircraft but the price of the B-17 was more than twice that 
of its British counterpart.  This discrepancy cannot be explained by profiteering or 
a lack of efficiency on the part of Boeing.  Most likely it is due to the price of the 
Boeing aircraft being a more realistic appraisal of the true cost of production.  
This is further evidence that the cost of British aircraft has been consistently 
understated making them appear cheaper than they were.  From the analysis here, 
it appears that the price data in the MAP price books is not dependable when it 
comes to evaluating the true cost of an aircraft and the evaluation of the 
government’s investment in factories and plant.  The analysis in Chapter Three 
offers essential data which will assist in correcting this problem.     
 
The aircraft, which Britain built at such great cost, were part of a wider 
production campaign in infrastructure, petroleum and armaments.  In Chapter 
Five, entitled ‘Airfields’, the construction of airfields is described and the cost 
identified.  The construction effort required to provide Bomber Command with 
enough all-weather airfields stands as one of the greatest works of civil 
engineering in British history.  In size and scope the airfield construction 
programme of World War II rivals the building of the canals, railways and roads 
that now cover the nation.  The fundamental differences between Bomber 
Command’s airfields and Britain’s canals, railways and roads is that the former 
were built in a period of five years and, with a handful of exceptions, were only 
ever used during the strategic air offensive.  The cost to provide Bomber 
Command with airfields is estimated here as being at least £193.95 million, which 
is little short of the £212.7 million that Britain spent on providing factories and 
plant for bomber production. This makes the provision of airfields one of the 
more expensive undertakings during World War II. 
 
Construction of so many airfields in such a small space as the British Isles 
provided did not just involve a massive effort but it imposed a level of logistical 
complexity.  In constructing airfields sites had to be surveyed, land cleared and 
levelled, drainage and conduits for communication systems laid, tarmac and 
concrete laid and buildings constructed.  The job of building these airfields 
required the recruitment of a large workforce, and the movement by road of 
enormous quantities of soil, fill and cement to and from the work sites.  It also 
included detailed surveying to ensure that the maximum number of usable 
airfields were crammed into the available usable space.  In this thesis, for the first 
time, the indirect costs of building airfields are included in the calculations.  
Amongst the most notable of these indirect costs are the opportunity costs of the 
value of the crops lost as airfields covered arable land.  The work in this chapter 
provides an insight into the wider economic impact of Bomber Command’s 
operations and adds to an understanding of just how expensive it was to conduct 
the bomber offensive.     
 
Another area of major expenses was that of petroleum production, which is the 
subject covered by Chapter Six, titled ‘Petrol, Oil and Lubricants’.  This chapter 
describes the extensive programme of works undertaken to provide Britain and 
the Allies with supplies of high-octane petrol and other petroleum products.  The 
chapter examines Britain’s unsuccessful attempts to develop her own high-grade 
petroleum industry and it describes how America underwrote the lion’s share of 
the cost required to provide petroleum products to the Allied war effort.  In 
assessing the costs of petroleum to the strategic air offensive, the analysis in this 
chapter is unique, in that it takes into account indirect costs of the loss of 
petroleum and tankers at sea.  The chapter covers an area of endeavour that has 
received little attention in the history of the offensive and attempts to show that 
ensuring access to high-grade fuels was a major cost to Britain and the United 
States. 
 
Chapter Seven, ‘Armaments’, analyses the cost of the bombs and pyrotechnics 
dropped by Bomber Command during World War II.  Surprisingly, this is a 
subject which does not seem to have received much attention in the history of the 
strategic bombing campaign.  The most important finding in this area is that the 
historical record indicates that there were substantial on-going problems with 
failure rates in British aerial bombs.  The indications are that many aerial bombs 
actually blew up prematurely, that is in the air, and many others failed to detonate 
after hitting the ground.  The significance of this finding is that the failure of a 
bomb negates the entire effort that went into getting it to its target.  That is all of 
the investment in factories, plant, airfields armaments factories, fuel and 
manpower is lost if the bomb does not function.  In Chapter Seven, the evidence 
suggests that a high proportion of bombs failed.  It is hoped that the preliminary 
findings on the failure rates in this chapter will prompt further research into the 
subject of aerial armaments used during World War II, as it is important to 
evaluate the impact of faulty weapons, particularly fuses, on the effectiveness of 
British strategic bombing. 
 
The final chapter, ‘Manning the Offensive’, describes and analyses the cost of 
manpower in the strategic air offensive.  It focuses on identifying the costs 
associated with the individual activities including recruitment, selection, training, 
accommodation and feeding and clothing the people who served in Bomber 
Command during the war.  The analysis also identifies the size of Bomber 
Command during the war and confirms the number of aircrew as having served in 
it as being approximately 125,000, the figure which has been widely accepted.  
The analysis of cost in this area shows that manpower was the second highest cost 
after the cost of buying aircraft and investing in the aircraft industry.  However, 
the costs identified here are conservative and it is likely that manpower may have 
been the highest cost, especially as no account could be made of those personnel 
serving in other RAF commands who were fully committed to directly supporting 
the strategic air offensive. 
 
My analysis of the cost of the strategic air offensive is a continuation of the 
historical examination that began in the years immediately following the end of 
the war.  A detailed survey of this history prefaces the analysis in each chapter.  
However, it is important, briefly, to discuss some of the more important sources 
which I have used in the study overall.  Of these works, the foundation stone was 
the Statistical Digest of the War, compiled by the Central Statistical Office of the 
War Cabinet Secretariat.  The information collected in the 193 tables is the most 
reliable available on Britain’s economic and industrial activity during World War 
II and it is essential to any study of British economic history during this period.   
 
The next most important work is Sir Arthur Harris’s official despatch on Bomber 
Command’s operations14.  Harris’s despatch is a very important source for this 
thesis.  It is an official report written by Harris’s staff at High Wycombe and it 
covers all aspects of the strategic air offensive against Germany from the point of 
view of those who conducted that offensive15.  The Despatch on War Operations 
has its limitations, amongst which is a complete disregard for everything that 
occurred within Bomber Command prior to Harris’s taking command in February 
1942.  The effect of this is that much of the history of the strategic air offensive 
appears to accept that the initial period of the strategic air offensive, that is the 
period before February 1942, is not really part of the offensive.  A major purpose 
of this thesis is to show that the strategic air offensive described by Harris could 
only have occurred in 1942, when all of the resources such as aircraft, aerodromes 
and men, became available.   
 
Sir Arthur Harris also wrote the third important source used here.  In 1947, Harris 
published his unofficial record of the campaign, Bomber Offensive16.  The book 
was one of a number written by senior officers of the RAF or by others closely 
involved with the strategic air offensive.  The importance of Harris’s book is that 
it set much of the tone for the other books written by authors who were prominent 
actors in the drama of the air offensive.  Harris’s own Senior Staff Officer at 
                                                 
14  Sir A. Harris, Despatch on War Operations 23rd February 1942 to 8th May 1945, Frank 
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Force Sir Arthur Harris, The Wartime Chief of Bomber Command, Greenhill Books, 
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16  Sir A. Harris, Bomber Offensive, Greenhill Books, London, 1998 
Bomber Command, Sir Robert Saundby, produced a history of strategic 
bombing17, while Sir John Slessor18 and Lord Tedder19 produced memoirs20.  Sir 
Winston Churchill, P.M.S. Blackett21, G. Bulman22, Sir Alex Cairncross23, Ely 
Devons24, Roy Fedden25 and Solly Zuckerman26 also produced works that dealt in 
part with the air offensive.  Many of these authors, particularly those such as 
Harris, Saundby, Tedder and Zuckerman, expressed strong and often contrary 
opinions on the way in which the RAF conducted the strategic air offensive.  
They have continued the wartime debates and disputes in their post war writings.  
In light of this debate, it is necessary to be careful to be aware of their potential 
biases when using these sources.   This qualification aside, these sources are 
important in any work on the strategic air offensive against Germany   
                                                 
17  R. Saundby, Air Bombardment: The Story of its Development, Chatto and Windus, London, 
1961 
18  Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force who served as the Air Officer 
Commanding 5 Group Bomber (Apr 1941 to  May 42), the Air Officer Commanding in 
Chief Coastal Command (Feb 43 to Jan 44) and Deputy Air Commander in Chief 
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (Jan 44 to Apr 45). See 
www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Slessor.htm 
19  Lord Arthur Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air Force who served as Air Officer 
Commanding in Chief RAF Middle East (Jun 41 to Feb 42), Air C-in-C Mediterranean Air 
Command and Mediterranean Allied Air forces ( Feb 42 to Jan 44) and Air C-in-C and 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, SHAEF (Jan 44 to Jan 46).  See 
ww.rafweb.org/Biographies/Tedder.htm    
20  Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections, Cassell, London, 1956; Lord 
Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, Cassell 
and Company, London, 1966 
21  P.M.S. Blackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic 
Energy, Whittlesea House, McGraw Hill, New York, 1948 
22  G. Bulman, An Account of Partnership-Industry, Government and The Aero-engine, Rolls Royce 
Heritage Trust, Derby, 2002 
23  Sir A. Cairncross, Planning In Wartime: Aircraft Production In Britain, Germany And The USA, 
Macmillan, London, 1991 
24  E. Devons, Planning in Practice: Essays in Aircraft Planning in War-Time, Cambridge University 
Press, 1950 
25  Sir R. Fedden, Britain’s Air Survival: An Appraisement and Strategy for Success, Cassell and Co., 
London, 1957 
 A further group of works of high significance are the official histories, of which 
William Hornby’s excellent Factories and Plant  provides the best detail on the 
economic activity underpinning the strategic air offensive27.  In describing the 
provision of factories and plant by the British Government to private industry, 
Hornby ranges across all of the industrial sectors of interest to this thesis.  The 
other official histories, W.K. Hancock’s and M. Gowing’s British War Production, 
Richard Sayers, Financial Policy 1939-45 28 and Peter Inman’s, Labour in the 
Munitions Industries 29 and The Design and Development of Weapons, co-authored 
by M. Postan, D. Hay and J.D. Scott30, all provide some detail.  The lack of 
footnotes is a drawback in all of these histories but they are essential reading for 
anyone working on the British wartime economy.   
 
The next most important official history was the official history of the military 
campaign written by Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland31.  The first 
volume of this work provides a detailed description of Britain’s preparations for 
the strategic air offensive.  The most important contribution made by Webster and 
Frankland is the detailed description they make of the offensive and the way in 
which it changed as more and more resources became available.  The work of 
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28  R. Sayers, Financial Policy 1939-1945, 1939-1945, HMSO and Longmans Green, London, 1956 
29  P. Inman, Labour in the Munitions Industries, HMSO and Longmans Green, London, 1957 
30  M. Postan, D. Hay and J.D. Scott, Design and Development of Weapons: Studies in Governmental 
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Webster and Frankland has been expanded on by a large number of authors who 
have written on the military aspects of strategic bombing.   
 
One of the most useful modern works is The Bomber Command War Diaries, 
written by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt32.  The book is a compilation of 
all of Bomber Commands’ operational records on flights during the war.  It has 
been organised to provide the reader with a clear and concise record of each 
operational sortie, the reasons for it and the outcomes as well.  The detailed 
information that Middlebrook and Everitt offer provides researchers of the 
offensive with a valuable resource allowing precise calculations of activity.  Other 
useful sources include the works of Richard Overy33, Sebastian Ritchie34, David 
Edgerton35 and Erik Lund36.   
 
In researching this thesis, the most important archives, not surprisingly, were 
those held by the Public Record Office at Kew in London.  However, use was 
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Macmillan And Centre For The History Of Science, Technology And Medicine, University Of 
Manchester, Macmillan, London, 1991. 
made of materials held by British Petroleum in their archives at BP House in 
London.  These files provided most of the detailed information on petroleum 
prices and the shipping costs involved for British companies dealing with 
American suppliers of high-octane fuels.  The Churchill Archives Centre at 
Churchill College, Cambridge holds many documents of interest including the 
papers of Sydney Bufton, the wartime Director of Bomber Operations at the Air 
Ministry.  Finally, much use has been made of the electronic archive of the 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library and Museum at Marist University, New 
York37.   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the financial cost of the strategic air 
offensive against Germany in order to provide a starting point for future work on 
the impact of World War II on Britain’s subsequent economic performance.  
Understanding the impact of the strategic air offensive on Britain is important in 
analysing the contribution the offensive made to Allied victory.  Today, there is no 
clear agreement on the value of Bomber Command’s contribution to Allied victory 
over Germany in 1945, in spite of there having been almost no evaluation of the 
economic price paid by Britain to carry out the offensive.  This thesis provides an  
appraisal of the financial cost involved in providing the factories, aircraft, airfields, 
manpower and other resources required by the strategic air offensive in an attempt 
to quantify the economic cost of the strategic air offensive against Germany.  The 
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37  http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu, 12th June 2003. 
investment demanded by the strategic air offensive ensured that its consequences 
would be serious for both Germany and Britain.  A great deal of historical research 
has gone into measuring the impact of strategic bombing on Germany but almost 
no attention has been paid to the impact in Britain.  This thesis begins the work of 
evaluating both sides of the strategic air offensive against Germany so that its true 
value can be more reliably ascertained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
C h a p t e r  1  
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE 
In 1934, Sir Edward Ellington told his colleagues on the Chiefs-of-Staff 
Committee that victory in the next European war would go to the nation that 
could most quickly launch heavy and sustained air attacks on its opponents.  Sir 
Edward described how hostilities would open with a series of heavy bombing 
attacks on the capital cities of the belligerents within the first 24 hours.  These 
attacks would continue for four or five weeks until both sides became exhausted.  
The victory would go to the side that had the reserves to recover and regroup 
more quickly to bomb their defenceless opponent into submission1.  When the 
next European war came in 1939, neither side would have the air power necessary 
to conduct such rapid and large-scale attacks and it would take the RAF two and a 
half years to build up the forces and infrastructure necessary to begin and sustain 
such a campaign.  It would take another two and a half years and the defeat of the 
German armies on the ground by the combined armies of Britain, the Soviet 
Union and the United States before Germany would be defeated.   
 
At first glance, there is a marked similarity between Sir Edward Ellington’s 
description of strategic air warfare and the vision first proposed by General Guilio 
Douhet.  Douhet was an early advocate of strategic air warfare and, unlike many 
of his contemporaries, he was an unapologetic advocate of using unrestricted 
                                                 
1 N.H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, History of the Second World War, Military Series, Vol 1, HMSO, 
London, 1956-1976, p.590. 
bombing to induce terror in an enemy civilian population by killing and maiming 
undefended civilians.  Despite the superficial similarities, the British advocates of 
strategic bombing were not as radical as Douhet.   
 
The differences between Douhet’s vision and the aspirations of the RAF are 
clearly shown in the minutes of a conference held in Sir Hugh Trenchard’s office 
at the Air Ministry in July 19232.  At this conference, Trenchard, the Chief of the 
Air Staff (CAS) discussed the legitimacy of strategic bombing as a means of 
conducting war.  The CAS is minuted as stating that ‘factories in which war 
material (including aircraft) is made’ constituted a legitimate target for air attack 
because the rules of armed conflict already allowed armies and naval forces to 
bombard defended cities and ports, even if such bombardment inflicted 
unintended civilian casualties3.  However, Trenchard clearly enunciated that the 
‘indiscriminate bombing of a city for the sole purpose of terrorising the civilian 
population’ was ‘illegitimate and contrary to the dictates of humanity’4.  For the 
RAF, attacking a factory was not equivalent to attacking a population.  
Terrorising munitions workers into not going to work ‘was an entirely different 
matter’ from simply bombing civilians in their homes5.  Although the distinction 
was to be more theoretical than practical, the RAF initially attempted to confine 
its attacks to identified military targets, whether they were munitions factories, 
                                                 
2 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. IV, pp. 66-73 
3 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. IV, p. 73 
4 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. IV, p. 73 
5 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. IV, pp. 66-73 
docks or military establishments.  The strategic air offensive that the British Air 
Staff planned was not intended to carry out Douhet’s vision.  
   
This chapter describes the strategic air offensive conducted by Bomber Command 
during World War II in order to set the economic cost of the offensive into its 
military and political context.  As such, this chapter will not provide a detailed 
analysis of the military or political effectiveness or otherwise of the strategic air 
offensive or its outcomes.  As a result, the description of the offensive is 
chronological and divided into three stages with stage one being from 3rd 
September 1939 to 1st January 1942, stage two from 1st January 1942 to 6th June 
1944, and stage three 6th June 1944 to 18th May 1945.   
 
One of the most notable things about the history of the strategic air offensive is 
just how influential the earliest sources are.  The sources in question are Sir 
Arthur Harris’s The Despatch of War Operations6, 1945, The United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), reports of 1945 and 19477, Sir Arthur 
Harris’s 1947 book, Bomber Offensive and the British Bombing Survey Unit’s, 
1946 report, The Strategic Air War Against Germany, 1939-19458.  The 
significance of these sources lies in the fact that they were written by individuals 
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who had first hand experience of the strategic air offensive, either as senior 
officers like Air Marshal Harris, or as official researchers of the offensive.  
Adding to their importance is the fact that the official historians of the strategic air 
offensive, Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, drew upon them when they 
wrote The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939-19459.  The central role 
played by the official history in much of the subsequent writing and research 
further increased the influence of these early sources. 
 
Despite the heavy reliance of the official historians on the early sources, the 
official history they produced was controversial.  Many ex-RAF officers and Air 
Ministry officials expressed reservations over the description of the air offensive.  
Senior officers, including Lord Portal, Sir Arthur Harris and Sir Robert Saundby, 
believed that the Air Ministry and the RAF should have had editorial control over 
the history.  The story of the internal battles that raged around the publication of 
the official histories are well described in Noble Frankland’s 1998 book, History 
at War10.  Such was the angst that Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, who 
commanded Bomber Command from 1940 to January 1942, threatened to sue the 
authors for defamation.  Lord Portal, CAS from 1941 until 1945, was furious that, 
contrary to the accepted practice in British official histories of not naming 
officials, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, openly used his demi-
official correspondence with Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris.   
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HMSO, London, 1961 
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 Another senior officer, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, who had served as 
Harris’s Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) in Bomber Command, launched a 
sustained and determined attack on the official history in an attempt to have it 
changed.  Amongst the changes, he wanted the official history to attribute some 
blame for Bomber Command’s early ineffectiveness in 1940 to ‘frugality by 
Treasury’ and the ‘loss of territory in Northern France’11 and he wanted the 
‘Battle of Berlin’, rewritten to show it as a draw rather than a British defeat.  Both 
Saundby and Portal attempted to have the authors remove all reference to Portal’s 
failure to force Harris to comply with his orders in 194412.  Harris himself 
claimed that he wanted nothing to do with the official history believing that the 
Air Ministry should have maintained tighter control over the history.  All in all, 
the sustained criticism of Webster and Frankland’s work have served to provide it 
with an aura of historical legitimacy that it may not have otherwise won.  
 
Other early writers who dealt with the strategic air offensive included P.M.S. 
Blackett who wrote Fear, War, and the Bomb, in 194813.  Professor Blackett, the 
winner of the 1948 Nobel Prize for his work in physics and nuclear research, 
provided a critique of the strategic air offensive as part of his argument against the 
use of nuclear weapons in war.  Blackett’s book, unlike the official histories or 
Harris’s memoir provides footnotes and a bibliography, which cite a number of 
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other useful contemporary works including the United Strategic Bombing 
Survey’s reports.     
 
Another important source is Sir Winston Churchill’s six-volume wartime memoir, 
The Second World War, published between 1948 -195414.  Although Churchill’s 
work needs to be treated with care, it provides a useful insight into his view of the 
events in which he was intimately involved.  Churchill, one of the most significant 
figures of World War II, provides a frank description of how he responded to these 
events and to the decisions made by his government15.  Despite the fact that 
Churchill’s work is self-serving, it remains an important source on the inner 
workings of the British Government and the mind-set of its leader during the war. 
 
Other important offerings include the official history, The Royal Air Force, 
written in 1953 and 1954 by Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders16, 
and  John Herington’s official Australian history of the war, Air-War against 
Germany and Italy 1939-4317, published in 1954 and Air Power over Europe18, 
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which appeared in 1963.  Herington’s works are very useful in that they provide a 
more detached view of the strategic air offensive and the problems it encountered.   
 
A large number of other general histories have followed.  The most prolific writer 
on the air offensive has been Martin Middlebrook whose works include The 
Nuremberg Raid19, (1973), The Battle of Hamburg20, (1980), The Peenemünde 
Raid21, (1982), The Berlin Raids22, (1988) and the valuable reference book co-
authored with Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries, (1995) 23.  The 
latter has provided much of the raw data used in this thesis to calculate fuel usage 
and other operational activity.  Dennis Richards, who wrote a sympathetic 
biography of Lord Portal, Portal of Hungerford, (1977) produced a 1994 history 
of Bomber Command in the Second World War called, The Hardest Victory, 
(1994)24. 
 
A final authority on the strategic bomber offensive is the academic historian 
Richard Overy, who has written a number of significant works on the strategic air 
offensive.  The first was a comparative analysis of the relative efficiency of the 
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aircraft industries of Britain, Germany, Italy Japan and the United States during 
WW II.  The book, The Air War, 1939-194525, published in 1980, was one of the 
first to challenge the idea that the British aircraft industry was less efficient than 
its German or United States counterparts.  Overy has followed it with War and 
Economy in the Third Reich26, (1991), Why the Allies Won27, (1995) and Bomber 
Command, 1939-194528, (1997).  The latter work provides a useful analysis of the 
achievement s of the strategic air offensive.  
 
The Beginnings - 3rd September 1939 to 23rd February 1942 
 
The initial phase of Bomber Command’s war lasted from 3rd September 1939 
until 23rd February 1942, when Sir Arthur Harris took command of the 
organisation.  Bomber Command started the war as a small force of 
approximately 26,000 men, operating from 27 airfields29.  On average, this small 
force launched seven sorties and dropped an average 52.7 tons of bombs per day 
against selected targets.  Over the entire period, Bomber Command launched 
58,381 sorties over 903.5 days and dropped 47,660 tons of bombs on a range of 
targets in France, the Low Countries and Germany30.   
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Bomber Command carried out its first operation on 3rd September 1939 when one 
Blenheim, nine Wellingtons and 18 Hampdens, were sent to look for German 
warships near the German coast.  It was during this operation that Blenheim, 
N6215, crewed by Flying Officer A. McPherson, Commander Thompson RN and 
Corporal V. Arrowsmith, became the first British aircraft to fly over Germany 
during World War II31.  On the following day, 4th September, 15 Blenheims and 
14 Wellingtons attacked shipping at Wilhelmshaven and Brünsbuttel32.  Of the 29 
aircraft despatched, ten Blenheims and nine Wellingtons found their targets.  
Light damage was inflicted on the German Battle cruiser, Admiral Sheer, which 
was hit by three bombs, all of which failed to explode.  The only damage inflicted 
was on Emden, when a Blenheim crashed onto it33.  Two Danish civilians died 
when the Danish town of Esbjerg, 110 miles north of Brünsbuttel, was 
accidentally bombed34.  British losses included five Blenheims and two 
Wellingtons shot down35. 
 
This operation brought into sharp relief many of the problems that would afflict 
the strategic air offensive.  Even though these early attacks occurred in daylight, 
navigational difficulties, poor bombing accuracy, failure of bombs and heavy 
losses amongst the attacking bomber aircraft were apparent.  This first raid set a 
precedent that would continue for much of the subsequent offensive until the 
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introduction of electronic navigational devices, such as GEE and H2S in 1942 and 
1943, and the destruction of the German defences in late 1944.     
 
A further problem shown up by these early raids was the unreliability of British 
bombs.  This problem would remain unsolved at the end of the war and the high 
failure rates that were to persist may have greatly reduced the overall 
effectiveness of the strategic air offensive.  The raid showed that a bomber attack 
designed to avoid civilian deaths could kill civilians in a neutral country over 100 
miles away from the target.  Finally, the operation indicated that, despite pre-war 
hopes, local air defences could inflict high casualty rates upon attacking bomber 
forces.     
 
Take for example the attack on September 4th 1939.  The seven aircraft lost during 
the attack constituted 23.3 percent of the total Bomber Command sorties for that 
day36.  Calculating losses as a percentage of total daily operational flights was a 
useful management tool for working out attrition rates for the force.  A side effect 
of this method of calculating losses was that it produced lower casualty ratios.   
For example, on the 4th September 1939, of the 30 aircraft sorties conducted 29 
were against the targets at Wilhelmshaven and Brünsbuttel.  The loss rate from 
the 29 attacking aircraft is marginally higher at 24.1 percent.  If the casualty ratio 
is restricted to the 19 aircraft that arrived near Wilhelmshaven and Brünsbuttel, 
where they were subject to direct enemy attack, the seven lost aircraft constituted 
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a casualty rate of 36.8 percent.  Bomber Command was to calculate its daily loss 
rate as a proportion of total operational daily sorties flown throughout the period 
of the war.  The effect of this method was that it minimised the true level of risk 
inherent in attacking defended targets.     
 
The extent of these early casualties may have been a considerable shock to the Air 
Staff as they realised that attacking bombers were very vulnerable to both fighter 
and anti-aircraft artillery defences.  A number of fundamental assumptions upon 
which the Air Staff had based their plans were wrong.  When World War II 
started, Bomber Command was beginning the task of mobilising for the future 
war.  It did not have the aircraft, the personnel, airfields or the technology 
available to enable it to carryout the heavy and sustained strategic attacks that Sir 
Edward Ellington had spoken about in 1934.   
 
The aircraft operated by Bomber Command were the latest available aircraft, but 
they had been designed for a daylight war against France and not for a night 
offensive against a much more distant Germany37.  The Wellingtons, Hampdens 
and Blenheims would have made up for their poor bomb-carrying capacity 
through the precision of their daytime attacks and the fast turn-around time that 
French targets would have allowed.  Germany was a different matter, particularly 
after Germany defeated France and the Low Countries and established her 
forward air defences there.  
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 Britain was not alone in having short-range tactical aircraft.  In 1939, none of the 
major belligerents could conduct sustained, heavy, long-range air raids against 
enemy targets.  Neither France nor Germany had any heavy bomber formations or 
organisations such as Bomber Command and their air forces were subordinate to 
the army.  The Luftwaffe and the French air force were to provide operational and 
tactical fire support to the armies on the battlefield with some attacks being 
directed against the immediate rear areas of the opposing enemy forces.  In 1939, 
no operational aircraft had the range, navigational capability, bomb load or 
defensive armaments to reach distant targets safely and to inflict the damage that 
pre-war commentators had feared.  In the case of Germany, there was only the 
Fokker Wulf 200c Kondor, a maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft, which 
was capable of covering the 600-mile distance from Germany to Britain38.  On the 
British side, only the Wellington had the capacity to reach Berlin39. 
 
The ability of Bomber Command to launch attacks against Germany was also 
limited politically by the fear of German retaliation.  The French Government,  
greatly influenced by such fear, obtained a virtual ban on strategic air attacks by 
Bomber Command during the Anglo-French Staff Conversations in London in 
April 193940.  The joint memorandum issued by the parties stated that: 
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The Allies would not initiate air action against any but purely ‘military’ 
objectives in the narrowest sense of the word, i.e., Naval, Army and Air 
Forces and establishments, and as far as possible would confine it to 
objectives of which attack will not involve loss of civil life41.  
 
These fears prompted the western Allies to pressure Poland to ensure that ‘no 
impetuous action on their part gives Germany an excuse for indiscriminate 
retaliation against them or us’42.   
 
The restrictions on bombing were lifted once Winston Churchill became Prime 
Minister and on the night of 11 May 1940, Bomber Command launched its first 
attack on a German target, the town of Mönchengladbach43.  The attack 
specifically targeted road and rail communications within the town and resulted in 
the deaths of four civilians, one an Englishwoman resident there.  Two Hampdens 
and one Whitley were lost44.   
 
From the very beginning of the strategic air offensive Churchill noted the poor 
striking power of Bomber Command.  The small striking power of the bomber 
force frustrated Churchill and on November 1st, 1940, he sent a minute to the 
CAS: 
It is deplorable that so few bombers are available even on good nights.  I 
made various suggestions for increasing the bomber force.  If instead of 
simply turning all these down, you and the Secretary of State recognised 
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the need of increasing the bomb delivery, and set to work to contrive the 
means, of doing so, it would be a very great help45.   
 
Churchill’s frustration with Bomber Command’s poor striking power continued 
over the next three years.  Bomber Command would consistently fail to achieve 
the weight of attack that the Prime Minister desired, particularly as he saw ‘the 
criterion of bomber strength’ being the weight of bombs dropped46.  
 
As the operational experience of Bomber Command gradually increased, 
suspicions over the effectiveness of the strategic air offensive began to grow.  By 
early 1941, the intelligence system was finding very little evidence that bombing 
was having a decisive effect on the German war effort.  The feedback from 
intelligence was disappointing to an Air Staff that had worked hard to develop a 
well co-ordinated intelligence as a fundamental part of air warfare47.  The 
problems became more apparent in 1941, when flash photography of bomb 
explosions undermined the validity of post-operational crew debriefing reports.  
The discrepancy between the information contained in the photographs and the 
claims made by returning aircrew allowed Lord Cherwell to have one of his staff, 
Mr. D.M.B. Butt, conduct an analysis of bombing results.  In the 1951 volume of 
his wartime memoirs, The Hinge of Fate, Churchill tells how he finally gave 
approval for Lord Cherwell to task his statistical staff with an investigation into the 
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strategic air offensive.  He talks of this decision as coming after a period of 
growing questioning of the effectiveness of the air offensive48.   
 
Mr. Butt’s investigation analysed 650 photographs taken on 100 raids against 28 
targets inside Germany, which Bomber Command attacked on 18 nights, from 2nd 
June to 25 July 1941.  He found that only 33 percent of the aircraft recorded as 
attacking their specified target in Germany dropped their bombs within five miles 
of the planned aiming point.  Nights with full moon increased to 40 percent the 
proportion of aircraft dropping their bombs within five miles of their assigned 
target.   The investigation also disclosed that strong defences, such as those in the 
Ruhr, reduced to 10 percent the number of aircraft dropping their bombs within 
five miles of the target.  Against lightly defended targets in France 33 percent of 
attacking bombers were able to drop their bombs within five miles49. 
 
The evidence collated by Butt eroded the confidence of the Air Staff and Bomber 
Command in the effectiveness of the attacks.  The investigation only considered 
those aircraft, which ‘were recorded’ as attacking their target and not the total 
number of aircraft that were despatched to the target50.  Of the 6,103 aircraft 
despatched, 66 percent made an effective attack, leaving 33 percent unaccounted 
for in Butt’s findings.  This means Butt’s calculations of one third of aircraft 
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finding the general area of a target is much higher than it really was51.  A further 
problem was that, as Butt said, ‘by defining the target area ... as having a radius of 
five miles, an area of over 75 square miles is taken’52. Such an area would have, in 
Butt’s opinion, contained a significant proportion of open countryside with Berlin 
being the exception.  Given this fact, Butt suggested that ‘the proportion of aircraft 
dropping their bombs on built up areas must be very much less’53. 
 
The unflattering findings of the Butt investigation had a sobering influence upon 
British expectations of their air policy.  Significantly, Churchill, who had been a 
strong advocate of striking back through bombing, began to demand a more 
economical use of aircraft and aircrew by Bomber Command.  In July 1941, 
Churchill wanted more aircraft attacking Germany and he had asked CAS to check 
on Coastal Command’s employment of Boeing B-17 aircraft, suggesting they be 
diverted to bombing attacks on Germany.  Churchill’s rationale for the request was 
‘the C-in-C Bomber Command says he is very short and not expanding’54.  By 
August, after Butt’s report was available, Churchill began to express concern over 
losses, particularly an attack on merchant shipping in Rotterdam Harbour, in which 
seven out of the 17 attacking Blenheim aircraft were lost.  Churchill complained to 
the CAS that the ‘most severe’ losses were ‘disproportionate to an attack on 
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merchant shipping not engaged in vital supply work’55.  Churchill expressed 
further concern over Bomber Command losses, which had been ‘very heavy this 
month’ and that while he greatly admired the bravery of the pilots he did not ‘want 
them pressed too hard’.  He considered it necessary to ask the CAS to find ‘Easier 
targets giving a high damage return compared with casualties’56. 
 
Churchill’s concerns about bombing continued into September and in a letter to 
the CAS, dated 15th September, Churchill suggests ways of improving accuracy, 
including the use of master-bombers.  The tone of the letter is subdued and 
Churchill is not demanding ‘action this day’ in his normal gruff manner.  There is 
an air of disappointment that the air campaign was not living up to expectation.  
The letter closes with Churchill saying, ‘It is an awful thought that perhaps three 
quarters of our bombs go astray’57.  It would be interesting to have seen the impact 
upon his opinion if he had also been aware of the high failure rate of the fuses in 
the remaining quarter of the bombs dropped.   
 
Things did not improve quickly for Bomber Command.  On 5th November 1941,  
CAS minuted Churchill that analysis of further night photographs over the last 
three months showed no increase in bombing accuracy since Butt’s findings in 
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June and July.  Portal did his best to explain that the weather over the period had 
been consistently bad.  He also took the opportunity to inform the Prime Minister 
that ‘complete plans have been made for a trial attack with a special fire raising 
force’, which was ready to be used when favourable weather was forecast58.  
 
Portal’s attempts to raise Churchill’s confidence in the air offensive were not 
overly successful.  On one day, 11th November, Churchill sent three minutes to 
Portal.  The first told Portal to cut the number of fighter sweeps in France from 
four per month to two and to refrain from launching attacks into Germany during 
periods of bad weather.  The reason given by Churchill for this action was that 
Britain ‘cannot afford losses on that scale’; particularly on what are routine 
missions without decisive military objectives59.  The second minute demanded 
returns on aircraft lost or damaged each day.  The third minute requested the 
reason for the drop in Bomber Command’s casualties60.  Bomber Command was 
clearly in the Prime Minister’s unhappy sights. 
     
The disappointment pervading the government may have prompted the Air Staff 
to put a more aggressive commander in charge of Bomber Command.  On 23 
February 1942, Sir Arthur Harris replaced Sir Richard Peirse.  By January 1942, 
the Air Staff and the Air Ministry knew that if the RAF was to retain the strategic 
campaign it had to demonstrate greater striking power.  Luckily, by early 1942 the 
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first of the heavy bombers were becoming operational, the airfields were being 
enlarged and improved and the flow of trained manpower was moving into 
operational service.  Bomber Command was able to look forward to providing the 
government with the victories that it desperately needed.  
 
By early 1942, the size of Bomber Command had grown to approximately 
100,000 personnel in 37 operational and 18 non-operational squadrons61 from 79 
stations.  They now had paved all-weather runways and improved facilities and 
accommodation62.  The Halifax, the first of the four-engined heavy bombers to 
show real promise, had overcome its early technical problems and there were now 
two operational Halifax squadrons available to the Command and another three 
squadrons undergoing conversion.  A further two squadrons were converting to 
the new Lancaster aircraft63.  In addition, Bomber Command had over two years 
of experience in conducting bombing operations mostly at night and it was ready 
to start a new form of attack against German cities and their civilian populations.   
 
Increasing Weight of Attack:  23rd February 1942 until 1st April 1944 
 
 
Sir Arthur Harris was the luckiest of Bomber Command’s five wartime 
commanders in that his appointment coincided with the improvement of Bomber 
Command’s capabilities in a whole range of areas.  He had inherited an 
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organisation that had now completed its formative phase.  The expansion of the 
manpower base, the completion of new airfields with better systems for air traffic 
control and the delivery of the improved Halifax and Lancaster aircraft, are good 
indicators of the growing effectiveness of Bomber Command in early 1942.   The 
Lancaster made its operational debut on 3rd March 1942 when four of these 
aircraft conducted a mining mission off the German coast64.  Another major 
milestone that Bomber Command accomplished was the bringing into service of 
the first in a series of more sophisticated and effective electronic navigational 
aids.   
 
By February of 1942, Bomber Command was finally in a position to conduct a 
strategic air offensive.  For Britain, early 1942 was the nadir of her wartime 
fortunes and the increasing capability of Bomber Command could not have come 
at a better time.  As Bomber Command prepared for its new commander, British 
forces were being defeated in the Western Desert, Hong Kong, Malaya and 
Singapore.  The German U-Boats were inflicting increased casualties against the 
unprotected coastal shipping on the eastern coast of the United States, a second 
‘happy time’ in the protracted Battle of the Atlantic.  At home, Churchill was 
facing a vote of no confidence and a cabinet reshuffle.  Internationally, Australia 
was accusing Britain of considering the ‘inexcusable betrayal’ of evacuating 
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Singapore and Malaya65.  Finally, on February 12th, the German battleships 
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen dashed unscathed up the 
English Channel from Brest to Germany.  On the 15th, Singapore fell.  The 
Japanese Army captured 85,000 Allied prisoners of war including 35,000 British 
and 17,000 Australians66.  
 
Sir Arthur Harris had no doubt about his objectives.  He saw his ‘primary 
authorised task’ as being to inflict the most severe material damage upon German 
industrial cities’67.  The Air Staff had developed these tactics as an answer to the 
findings of the Butt Report.  Wing Commander Sydney Bufton, the director of 
Bombing Operations at the Air Ministry, signed off on the area attack policy on 
25th August 1941.  Bufton identified cities as being targets because the 
‘probability of effecting serious and lasting damage to specific key points as a 
result of area attack is, without doubt, extremely problematical’68.  The focus for 
the area attack was ‘the people in their homes and in the factories, the services 
such as electricity, gas and water upon which the industrial and domestic life of 
the area depends’ and ‘to focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil 
population and, in particular, of the industrial workers’69.   
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The main weapon of this attack would be the 4lb incendiary bomb, which, 
entering buildings through the holes created blast from high explosive bombs, set 
them on fire.  The original intention behind the greater use of incendiaries does 
not seem to have been fire raising but target identification.  In his policy draft of 
‘Night Bombing Policy’  the Director of Bombing Operations at the Air Ministry 
described the Germans as  using incendiaries dropped by experienced crews as 
target markers for the following main force aircraft70.  Bufton described the job of 
these experienced crews as ‘the difficult task of finding the selected target area’71.  
By 5th November 1941, Portal was telling Churchill that ‘complete plans have 
been made for a trial attack with a special fire raising force’72.   
 
The first major attack launched by Harris was, ironically, a precision attack 
against the Renault factory at Billancourt on the night of 3rd March 194273.  It was 
the first centrally controlled attack launched by Bomber Command and only the 
second time that more than 200 aircraft had been despatched to a single target 
along a set route and with a set time of attack.   The official Australian historian 
called the attack ‘a land mark’ for Bomber Command74.  The damage inflicted on 
the works was substantial but the losses included 367 French civilians killed and 
9,250 made homeless from bombs hitting the apartment blocks which surrounded 
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the factory75.  The number of French dead was double the death toll that Bomber 
Command had so far inflicted on any German city76.  
 
At Billancourt, Bomber Command used the tactic of forming the attacking aircraft 
into a bomber stream of three waves.  This enabled the Command to get 121 
aircraft over the target each hour and concentrated the destruction into a shorter 
timeframe77.  The benefit was that it enabled the attacking force to be more 
closely co-ordinated and easily defended.  It limited the time available to the 
defenders to inflict casualties and it delivered a more formidable psychological 
blow. 
 
Over March 1942, Bomber Command launched eleven attacks against the 
German city of Essen.  They failed to accomplish much other than the 
reinforcement of the local anti-aircraft defences.  Only 50 high explosive bombs 
struck the city inflicting little damage and 35 aircraft were lost to the defences.  
However, a notable success was achieved in a successful fire-raising raid against 
Lübeck on the night of 28th March.  This attack was carried out in good visibility 
and, because of light defences the attacking force was able to operate from low 
level, around 2,000 feet.  Of the 234 aircraft despatched against the target 191 
crews claimed to have successfully attacked the target.  The bomb tonnage 
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dropped was approximately 304 tons of which 144 tons were incendiaries78.  The 
fires, which started in the centre of Lübeck, burned out an estimated 190 acres of 
the city destroying 1,425 buildings and damaging 10,387, 1,976 of them 
seriously79.   
 
The next major attack against a German city took place the following month.  The 
target was Rostock, a city with a high proportion of wooden buildings.  The 
Official History describes this series of four raids, lasting from the 23rd to the 
26th of April 1942, as being as being ‘a masterpiece’ and ‘another great 
victory’80.  At Rostock, Harris identified three questions he wanted answered:  
could the defences of a vital industrial area be swamped by a large scale attacks, 
could Bomber Command field the large numbers of aircraft needed, and could 
Bomber Command overcome the limitations imposed by weather81?  The answer 
was yes and it allowed the first ‘Thousand Plan’ raid against Cologne82. 
 
Cologne was the first German city attacked by a massive force of bombers83.  
Harris achieved his concentration of force by drawing upon all available aircraft, 
including aircraft brought from operational and training units and Flying Training 
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Command.  By doing this Bomber Command was able to muster 1,047 aircraft84 
of which 868 were able to reach Cologne.  They dropped an estimated 970 tons of 
incendiaries and 485 tons of high explosive bombs on the city in ninety minutes, 
constituting a concentration of 578 aircraft per hour over the target85.   
 
The raid destroyed 3,300 buildings and damaged 9,510 more86.  It also caused a 
drop in production in 328 firms with 36 large firms reporting a complete loss of 
production; 70 a drop of between 50 to 80 percent and 222 who reported less than 
a 50 percent loss87.  The series of raids on Cologne, Essen and particularly 
Lübeck were seen as successes and, as Churchill pointed out to Roosevelt in a 
letter dated 1 April 1942, all of these raids were on a ‘Coventry scale’88.  In a 
statement to the House of Parliament on 2nd June,, Churchill used the Cologne 
raid of 30th May and the Essen raid of the previous night to balance the bad news 
of Rommel’s successes in the Western Desert.  He flagged them as ‘a new phase 
in the British air offensive against Germany’89. 
 
A second ‘thousand’ raid followed against Essen on 1 June but this raid was not 
as successful.  The GEE equipment did not work as well over the land-locked and 
heavily defended Ruhr and the bombing was widely scattered with bombs falling 
                                                 
84  Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p.272 
85  Sir A. Harris, Despatch, p.13 
86  Harris, Despatch, p.13 and Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p.272 
87  Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p.272 
88  Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p.174 
89  Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p.296 
on Essen and 11 other towns in or near the Ruhr90.  The poor results were noted 
by Churchill, probably because he had called it a ‘great bombing’ raid in his 2 
June statement to the House.  On 7 June 1942, he minuted the CAS stating that 
‘the relatively disappointing results of our second big raid’ made it ‘it doubly 
urgent’ that the H2S ground reading radar device be made operational91.   
 
The H2S ground reading radar was under development throughout most of 1941 
and the first part of 194292.  The biggest problem with H2S was that it used the 
highly secret cavity magnetron to achieve its 9cm bandwidth.  The sensitivity of 
the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the cavity magnetron delayed the 
employment of H2S until July 1942, when two squadrons of aircraft were 
equipped with it.  The Air Ministry maintained a ban on these aircraft flying over 
enemy occupied territory until January 194393. 
 
The first operational use of H2S occurred on the night of 30th January 1943 in an 
attack on Hamburg.  H2S showed itself to be relatively reliable though a number 
of sets broke down during the flight to the target.  Of the remainder, six 
navigators reported being able to identify the target as expected and the Stirlings 
carrying H2S used it to navigate the entire journey owing to incorrect GEE 
settings94. 
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 In addition to the undoubted benefits the use of H2S posed a number of problems 
for Bomber Command.  The most significant was the inexperience of the crews in 
using them.  As well the crews were concerned that as an active radar emitter 
attached to the aircraft the H2S betrayed the position of the aircraft to the German 
defenders.  The concern of Bomber Command’s crews was justified, as it was not 
long before German night fighters were equipped with NAXOS intercept 
equipment which allowed them to home onto British aircraft in the dark.  It is 
unknown how many Bomber Command aircraft the German fighters destroyed 
through the detection of their H2S emissions, but the Luftwaffe made wide use of 
NAXOS intercept sets95.   
 
The third ‘thousand’ bombing raid was directed against Bremen on 25th June 1942 
and consisted of 1,067 aircraft and included 102 Coastal Command aircraft, listed 
separately from the Bomber Command effort96.  The raid was not as effective as 
the Cologne raid but it was far more successful than the Essen raid97.  Bomber 
Command continued its efforts in attacking a range of German cities including 
Essen, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Duisburg.  The next major raid was against 
Düsseldorf on the night of 31st July.  In this attack, 630 aircraft, including 113 
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Lancasters, were despatched and 484 aircraft claimed to have attacked the city, 
although some of them had photographed open countryside as the target98.    
 
Throughout the period, the casualty rate of Bomber Command increased due to 
the high level of operations against Germany.  Many of the losses, particularly 
those on the ‘thousand’ raids, were due as much due to accidents as to enemy 
action.  The rise in the casualty rate was a sustained one and, at times, it surpassed 
four percent of the despatched force, the level at which the strength of Bomber 
Command declined in absolute terms, as losses at this level outstripped 
replacements99.   
 
 
A further technical advance occurred on December 20th 1942, when Bomber 
Command first used OBOE, a tight radar beam that the attacking force flew along 
to the target.  Sir Arthur Harris suggests that OBOE led to significant 
improvements in the weight of attacks delivered by Bomber Command100.  The 
advantages of OBOE were that it improved navigation and accuracy and allowed 
even greater concentration of aircraft over the target.  However, its major 
disadvantage was that the attacking aircraft flew in straight lines, which allowed 
the defenders to easily track them and predict their targets.  The successful 
prediction of targets enabled the defenders to concentrate fighters over the radio 
beacons closest to the track in time to intercept the attacking bombers.   
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Increasing Intensity 
 
The next stage of the strategic air offensive began on the night of 5th March 1943 
with 442 aircraft despatched to attack Essen.  Approximately 160 acres of the city 
suffered substantial destruction with 3,018 buildings destroyed, and 2,166 
seriously damaged101.  Bombs also hit 53 separate buildings within the Krupp 
works, making this a particularly effective raid102.  The raid also set a new record 
for civilian deaths in Germany with around 482 people killed.  As the first attack 
in the Battle of the Ruhr, which raged until 24th July 1943, it was an ominous sign 
of Bomber Command’s increasing capability.   
 
The major targets for Bomber Command during the Battle of the Ruhr were 
Bochum, Cologne, Dortmund, Duisburg, Düsseldorf, Essen, Frankfurt, 
Gelsenkerchen, Hamburg, Mannheim and Wuppertal103.  During this time 
Bomber Command did attack other targets, including Berlin, Stetting, Turin, and 
La Spezia104, however the main effort was directed against the Ruhr.  The average 
loss rate for this period of the war was 4.3 percent105, which was on the borderline 
of being prohibitive. 
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It was immediately after the Battle of the Ruhr that Bomber Command, supported 
by the United States 8th Air Force, launched the most successful air attacks of the 
strategic air offensive against Germany. These attacks on Hamburg took place 
between 24th July and 3rd August 1943106.  The attacks on Hamburg were an 
around-the-clock operation with Bomber Command attacking at night and the 
USAAF attacking during the day.  During these attacks, Bomber Command 
successfully jammed German radar defences by dropping WINDOW, bundles of 
aluminium strips cut to a length which overwhelming the German radar with false 
returns.  Bomber Command launched 3,091 aircraft against Hamburg and they 
dropped 10,815 tons of bombs107.  The loss rate for this series of attacks was 3 
percent108.  These raids resulted in over 43,000 deaths in Hamburg and the 
evacuation of approximately 1.2 million people from the city109.  Around 16,000 
multi-story residential buildings were destroyed and the productive capacity of the 
city was reduced by about 80 percent for almost a month as workers stayed at 
home to look after their families110. 
 
A large number of other raids, mainly focussed on the Ruhr, followed up the 
successes at Hamburg.  These operations were in preparation for the next big 
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offensive, the ‘Battle of Berlin’.  Bomber Command’s proposed attack on Berlin 
may have been seen as an opportunity to achieve a decisive outcome before the 
forthcoming invasion was launched.  Planning for the invasion of Northern 
Europe was progressing and the Western Allies were making significant headway 
against the Germans in the Mediterranean.  Harris had put the idea for the battle to 
both Portal and Churchill in November 1943, claiming that for the cost of 
between 400-500 aircraft, Bomber Command could defeat Germany111.       
 
The ‘Battle of Berlin’ was a defeat for Bomber Command and it marked the end 
of the Command’s ability to operate outside a wider strategic, joint-service 
environment increasingly influenced by the needs of Allied ground forces112.  The 
period of the battle saw 33 large attacks against a variety of targets in Germany, 
with 17 attacks on Berlin itself.  The loss rate of Bomber Command during this 
offensive was a very high 5.69 percent, 1.69 percent above the level whereby 
Bomber Command could not replace its losses.  Sir Arthur Harris estimated the 
loss rate even higher at 6.2 percent of aircraft despatched on 16 raids.  He claims 
that this loss rate ‘could not be regarded as excessive in relation to the magnitude 
of the task’113.   
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In a number of the secondary sources, there is frank discussion of the impact of 
the casualty rates on the aircrew serving in Bomber Command114.  There were 
concerns raised at the highest levels within Bomber Command itself, with Air 
Vice-Marshal Bennett writing to Bomber Command HQ of the ‘very large 
number of crews failed to carry out their attacks during the Battle of Berlin in 
their usual determined manner’115.  The judgement of the Official History on the 
Battle of Berlin has coloured much of the subsequent history.  Many British 
sources denied that the battle was lost or they attempted to justify the losses using 
an attritionist argument that ‘every pane of glass broken in Berlin was a tiny drain 
on Germany’s economy’116.   
 
As the Battle of Berlin progressed, the necessities of the wider war began to divert 
aircraft to other objectives.  The most significant of these was a defensive battle to 
destroy flying bomb sites in France and the Low countries.  The first raid against 
a specific flying bomb site took place on 22 December 1943 with 51 aircraft, 
including 11 Lancasters and eight Mosquitoes, attacking sites at Abbeville and 
Amiens.  These two targets alone absorbed 723 sorties during the period of the 
Battle of Berlin and represent an increasing demand for Bomber Command 
efforts to be committed to the defence of Britain and the preparatory attacks 
leading up to the invasion.     
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Crescendo 
 
On the night of the 30th March 1944, when the Battle of Berlin ended, the 
invasion of Europe from the West was less than ten weeks away.  Bomber 
Command was committed to direct its full resources to preparatory attacks in 
France.  These attacks cost 525 aircraft over 63 days117.  The success of Bomber 
Command attacks during this phase of the war was much better than expected and 
good results obtained against quite small targets showing a significant increase in 
targeting capability.  Aircraft losses also began to trend downwards as the shorter 
raids into France prevented the German defenders from decisively engaging 
British aircraft and as the USAAF daylight raids caused increasing casualties 
amongst the German night fighters118.   
 
Bomber Command’s major role in the pre-invasion attacks was the destruction or 
disruption of 37 railway centres.  In 13,349 sorties, Bomber Command aircraft 
dropped 52,547 tons of bombs for a loss of 2.6 percent of the dispatched 
aircraft119.  The accuracy of these attacks was so good that Harris stated that they 
were ‘of an outstandingly high order’120.  Bomber Command was very successful 
in achieving its mission to isolate the battlefield in Normandy from outside supply 
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and reinforcement.  The main rail junctions attacked were Nantes-Angers-Samur-
Tours-Orleons, Orleons-Chateauudun-Chatres-Estampes-Drux, Paris and Rennes-
Pontaubault121.   
 
The programme of air attacks in support of the invasion continued until after the 
6th of June.  Bomber Command carried out many attacks against targets including 
troop positions, railways, coastal batteries and supply dumps.  The launching of 
the first V weapons on June 12th interrupted the impetus of these attacks as the 
government ordered the diversion of a substantial part of Bomber Command’s 
strength to destroy the launch sites for these weapons.  The attacks on V weapons 
continued until August of 1944 and the German V1 offensive against London was 
successful in diverting 28.9 percent (13,540) of all Bomber Command sorties 
away from the main battlefront and the German logistical system onto the flying 
bomb sites122.  By 10th September 1944, with Allied armies on the borders of 
Germany, the areas used to launch the V1 and V2 weapons were under Allied 
control and Bomber Command could return to the attack on Germany proper. 
 
In the last part of the war, from 16th August 1944 until 8th May 1945, Bomber 
Command’s effort grew enormously and the fact that 46.85 percent of the total 
wartime bomb tonnage despatched by Bomber Command was dropped during 
this period underlines this fact.  Although the priority of attack remained oil 
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targets and transportation, Bomber Command continued to launch attacks against 
German cities when it could.  These attacks raised concerns at the Air Ministry 
that Bomber Command was concentrating too much effort on bombing cities.  
Some of this concern may have been due to a fear that Bomber Command was 
destroying infrastructure that Britain would need, once she took over her zone of 
occupation in Germany.  Churchill was undoubtedly aware of the impact of 
British bombing.  He certainly referred to the destruction of infrastructure when 
he sent a somewhat fatuous request to Stalin to, ‘let me know in plenty of time 
when we are to stop knocking down Berlin so as to leave sufficient billeting 
accommodation for the Soviet Armies’123. 
 
By January 1945, the Air Ministry and a number of other government agencies 
were becoming increasingly hostile to Bomber Command and the strategic air 
offensive.  It was during this winding down of the war that Churchill moved to 
distance himself from the strategic air offensive by issuing a minute decrying the 
continued attack on German cities.  The vigour with which Harris had pursued the 
strategic air offensive has led to an unfair belief that he alone was responsible.  
Harris was a strong advocate of strategic air attack and was undeniably an 
advocate of attacking the civilian population of the enemy, but he was only one of 
many commanders carrying it out.  The notoriety that Harris achieved has allowed 
other individuals to avoid responsibility.  Amongst these are Sir Winston 
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Churchill who, as Prime Minister, must take a significant degree of responsibility 
for the campaign, and Sir Charles Portal, the CAS through most of the war.  Much 
of the history of the offensive overlooks the substantial role that both these men 
played in the planning and conduct of the strategic air offensive.     
 
Conclusion 
 
Prior to the outbreak of war in September 1939, the concept of a strategic air 
offensive as a new and cheaper way to fight a war had gained considerable 
currency within the RAF, Air Ministry, the British Government and wider British 
society.  The Air Staff stated that such an offensive would begin within 24 hours 
of the declaration of war and would consist of a series of major bombing attacks 
on the enemy’s capital, which would continue for four, or five weeks until both 
sides became exhausted.  Victory would go to the side better prepared with the 
reserves necessary to allow them to recover first and launch the second series of 
bombing attacks against their now defenceless enemy.   
 
The period between 3rd September 1939 and 23rd February 1942, the beginning of 
the strategic air offensive, was the period when operational experience influenced 
the aspirations of the Air Ministry and the Air Staff.  It was during this time that 
the RAF identified aircrew reports as being unreliable and that the accurate 
navigation and bombing accuracy of their aircraft were as bad as was feared.  
They also realised that civilian morale would not break easily and that very heavy 
weights of explosives and incendiaries would be required to destroy urban areas.   
 The Air Staff and Bomber Command spent this time building operational 
experience whilst waiting for the airfields and infrastructure, the heavy bombers 
and the aircrews and the ground staff  which would allow a strategic air offensive 
of sufficient size to be undertaken.  They also had to wait whilst the technology 
was developed that would enable those bombers to identify their target areas and 
to defend themselves against the increasing technical proficiency of the German 
defences.  This period ended at the beginning of 1942, when Sir Arthur Harris 
became the Air Officer Commanding in Chief of Bomber Command. 
 
When he took command in February 1942, Harris’s predecessors had done most 
of the preliminary work.  Bomber Command now had the personnel, aircraft, 
airfields, aircraft, technology and operational experience that made it possible to 
launch strategic air attacks on the scale envisaged by Sir Edward Ellington in 
1934.  Under Harris’s command, Bomber Command entered a period of maturity, 
which lasted from February 1942 until March 1944.  During the early part of this 
period, Bomber Command stood alone as the one British military organisation 
able to inflict apparently substantial damage on what appeared to be the victorious 
Germans.  In 1942, Britain faced an unprecedented series of military failures and 
defeats.  As the Germans and Japanese advanced and British military prestige 
crumbled in the Middle and Far East, Bomber Command was able to carryout its 
first ‘thousand’ bomber raids.  Whilst the military value of the thousand bomber 
raids may have been questionable, their role in maintaining British domestic 
morale and international prestige was not.  In a time of darkness, the strategic air 
offensive was the only effective means that Britain had of striking back at the 
enemy. 
 
Towards the end of 1942, as Britain and the Soviet Union gained the victories of 
El Alamein and Stalingrad and as American military and industrial power began 
to show itself in Europe, the importance of the strategic air offensive began to 
decline as other options for action became available.  With the invasion of Sicily 
and the advance of the Red Army to the west, the importance of a second front in 
northern Europe grew and again the importance of the strategic air offensive 
declined.  Once the commitment to invasion was made, strategic bombing was 
subordinated to the needs of the ground forces and the opportunity had passed for 
it to prove itself a war-winner in its own right. 
 
In June 1944, the western Allies finally launched the ground operations that the 
Soviet Union had been demanding and from this time until the end of the war in 
May 1945, the decisive military actions were those conducted on the ground.  
Where it could, Bomber Command diverted resources from bombing military 
objectives in France and the Low Countries to strike at the industries and civilian 
populations of Germany.  Nevertheless, these efforts were not sufficient to 
achieve the dramatic victory that the Air Staff and Air Ministry hoped for, and 
besides, it was far too late to disentangle the effects of strategic bombing from 
those inflicted by the ground forces invading Germany from the East and West.  It 
was during this final stage of the war that the operational activity of Bomber 
Command reached its crescendo.  With the capture and destruction of the German 
early warning radar system and its advanced air defences, Bomber Command was 
able to carryout 46.6 percent of its 387,416 wartime sorties and dropped 59 
percent of the 955,044 tons of bombs it despatched during World War II124.   
 
Bomber Command efforts during this last stage of the war  was spread over a 
wide variety of targets including major industrial centres, oil refineries, 
transportation net works, V Weapon sites and storage facilities and specific 
military, civilian and political targets.  The destruction was significant, but 
Bomber Command achieved it after it was obvious that Germany had lost the war.  
The continued destruction, coupled with the hyperbole of the arguments over to 
which plan, transportation, oil or city attack, Bomber Command should commit 
has led to a wide spread perception that Bomber Command was solely interested 
in killing as many German civilians as it possible could.  This perception is very 
simplistic and is wrong. 
 
While it is true that Bomber Command did target German civilians, military 
necessity prevented the majority of such attacks.  Bomber Command dutifully 
attacked higher priority targets in the form of German military forces, V Weapon 
sites, oil refineries and transportation networks when directed to do so.  Sir Arthur 
Harris may have ensured that his bombers attacked as many cities as possible, but 
he did not carry out such attacks at the expense of higher priority targets.  The 
result was that, in the last year of the war, Bomber Command directed much of its 
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effort at more conventional military targets than had been the case up until that 
time.  The reality is that the attack on Dresden, terrible though it was, was rather 
the exception than the rule.  By mid-1944, the strategic air offensive was a 
subordinate activity in a larger war effort by Britain and her American and Soviet 
Allies.  In the end, it was the overall effort that defeated Germany.   
 
The strategic air offensive against Germany did not deliver the decisive victory 
that Sir Edward Ellington outlined to his colleagues on the Chief of Staffs Sub-
Committee in 1934.  After the Air Staff initiated the strategic air offensive in 
September of 1939 it took Britain two and a half years to achieve a scale of attack 
that even approached the bottom end of Sir Edward’s predictions.  It took another 
two and a half years to develop the offensive into a major military undertaking, 
and it took the defeat of the German armies in Russia, the Mediterranean and 
France, before Bomber Command and the USAAF achieved the sort of aerial 
dominance for which the Air Staff of the 1930s had hoped.  The financial cost of 
Britain’s  strategic air power was much higher than anyone expected and it did 
not defeat Germany, it did not even contribute the most significant military effort 
in that defeat.  That honour belongs to the Red Army.   
The size and ferocity of the fighting in the East diminishes any claim that the 
strategic air offensive was the major contributing factor to the Allied victory.  
From the evidence examined so far, the intention behind the strategic air offensive 
was that it would lead to the quick and economical defeat of the enemy through 
damage to the enemy’s industrial and social systems.  Measured against this 
intention the strategic air offensive conducted between 1939 and 1945 was a 
failure.  Measured however as a means of keeping British soldiers off European 
battlefields, there is no doubt that the strategic air offensive was a substantial 
success, though it did not make the strategic air offensive a major factor in the 
military defeat of Germany.  The question that now needs answering is what was 
the intention behind the strategic air offensive.  Did Britain have a theoretical 
framework for a doctrine of strategic air warfare or was the strategic air offensive 
simply a handy means of striking back at a powerful continental enemy?  This is 
the subject under examination in the next chapter as the need for an analysis of 
British military thinking on air power is vital to an understanding of the historical 
and intellectual context in which Bomber Command functioned.   
 
C h a p t e r  2  
AIRMINDEDNESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BRITISH THEORY 
OF STRATEGIC BOMBING 
 
At the outbreak of World War II, the British Air Staff had some vague plans on 
how they were going to conduct a strategic air offensive.  Initially, the intention 
was to ensure that these plans did not generate overwhelming German retaliation.  
However, Britain was not alone in looking at strategic air war as more threat than 
support.  Despite enthusiastic public interest in aircraft throughout Europe, no 
national military establishments had developed a practical capability for the 
strategic framework they had developed for using bomber aircraft as stand-alone 
war winning weapons.  On the continent, the predominant concept was that 
aircraft would fulfil the auxiliary roles of reconnaissance, ground attack and local 
attacks on military objectives in support of their own surface forces.  The French, 
German and Polish military saw the air forces as an extension of their artillery 
arms, able to bring heavy firepower to bear at critical points and times on the 
battlefield.  The British were slightly different.   
 
In Britain, public interest in air power had developed into a distinctive body of 
thought, an ‘air-mindedness’, which allowed the new Royal Air Force (RAF) to 
establish for itself a strategic role independent of the Army and Royal Navy.   The 
development of the concept of an independent strategic air offensive grew out of 
this British air-mindedness and the initial attempts to conduct a strategic air 
offensive in the closing months of World War I.  These aspirations of the RAF 
did not amount, however, to a practical methodology for conducting military 
operations.   
 
This chapter will argue that, between 1919 and 1939, Britain had developed no 
unified theoretical framework for strategic bombing.  The doctrine that did exist 
developed from ideas expressed in a wide range of sources.  These included ideas 
expressed by imaginative writers and the theoretical ideas of military thinkers 
such as Duhet, Mitchell and Liddell-Hart, and concepts gleaned from the limited 
experience the RAF had gained in using air power to police the Empire.  In 1939, 
British thinking on strategic air power was disorderly, with little holding it 
together other than a blind faith in the effectiveness of technology and a lack of 
faith in the ability of civil populations to withstand danger and deprivation.  As 
Tami Davis Biddle has said, World War II would force the British Air Staff to 
reduce the gap between ‘imagined possibilities and technical realities’1.  
 
One of the major characteristics of British thinking on air power was the impact 
of the ideas of the imaginative writers of the Edwardian Era, of whom H.G. Wells 
was the exemplar, upon the development of air power policy.  The first step taken 
in this chapter is to survey the ideas expressed in popular writing on air power and 
discuss the way in which these may have influenced government policy.  The next 
step is to describe how British military doctrine changed as the military gained 
experience in air operations during World War I, the inter-war period and during 
World War II.   
 
British air mindedness has been the subject of a number of substantial works of 
which the earliest was Robin Higham’s, The Military Intellectuals in Great 
Britain 1918-1939, (1966) 2.  Higham’s book was the first critical analysis of 
British military planning in the interwar period and it preceded by ten years, Barry 
Powers’s excellent description of the personalities who dominated British 
strategic thinking during the same period3.  Another writer, H. M. Hyde, provided 
a thorough analysis of the development of official attitudes to air power and the 
efforts of Sir Hugh Trenchard and Lord Swinton, to develop an offensive bomber 
arm for the RAF.  Neither Powers nor Hyde are as critical of possible intellectual 
failings in inter-war British military thinking as is Higham4, but their analysis 
provides substantial support for Higham’s thesis.  
 
On a broader canvas, Uri Bialer has written about how the British Chiefs of Staff 
approached the question of attacking civilian populations5.  Bialer takes his 
argument further when he explored the way in which the ‘imagined possibilities’ 
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of air warfare reduced the British Government’s capacity to stand up to Hitler6.  
Possibly taking his lead from Churchill, Bialer argues that the fear induced by the 
threat of bombing led Britain to develop an inherently defensive doctrine, which 
attempted to use air defences and bomber attack, to keep the nation out of a larger 
European war.   
 
Other writers who have dealt with the subject include Brian Bond7, Malcolm 
Smith8, Alfred Gollin9 and David Edgerton10.  The last two are more critical of 
the way in which the British Government allowed public expectations to guide the 
development of air power policy.  Gollin argues that there was a significant level 
of ‘hysteria’ in the response of both the British public and the government to the 
threat posed by bombing attacks.  Edgerton, who proposes the thesis that the 
British were attracted to air power because of an inherent reliance on technology,  
similarly describes British public responses to air power as ‘over enthusiasm’.  In 
his view, the commitment of England to the aeroplane exemplifies a commitment 
to armed force, science, technology and industry.  
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Michael Paris11 and Tami Davis Biddle12 are among the most perceptive of the 
recent writers on this subject.  Paris emphasises the influence of Social 
Darwinist and imperialist ideas in the development of British military thinking 
on how civilian populations would react to aerial bombardment.  Davis Biddle 
describes how British and American advocates of strategic bombing drew upon 
the work of the imaginative writers to bolster their arguments for organisational 
and institutional independence from the older military services in both countries.  
Davis Biddle provides a substantial analysis of how the advocates of strategic 
bombing attempted to convince their governments to use this form of warfare as 
the sole means of defeating the enemy.  She argues most convincingly that the 
focus of the RAF and the USAAF on the ‘knockout blow’ led to a ‘near 
catastrophic failure’ of air strategy during World War II13.    
 
The lack of a clear success for strategic air power during World War II, what 
Davis Biddle calls ‘near catastrophic failure’, may be a reflection of the gap that 
existed between pre-war expectations and wartime accomplishment14.  Strategic 
bombing did not cause social, economic or military collapse in any of the 
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belligerent countries and the contribution that it made to the Allied victory 
remains unclear.  The major difficulty in assessing the efficacy of the strategic air 
offensive is that it adopted many guises during World War II.  The period from 
September 1939 to February 1942 was, as the official history written by Sir 
Charles Webster and Noble Frankland describes it, a period of preparation.  It was 
also a period of failure.  The major problem confronting Bomber Command was 
that the majority of its attacking aircraft could not even find their target cities let 
alone hit them and even where bombs struck populated areas the civilian 
population did not panic as predicted.    
 
The period from February 1942 to May 1944 saw the efficacy of the strategic air 
offensive most nearly approached the ideas of the pre-war theorists.  During this 
time, Bomber Command could launch attacks against German cities without 
having to deal with competing claims on its resources.  By April 1944 all of this 
had changed and Bomber Command found itself subordinated to the overall 
planning of the Supreme Commander in Europe and its bombers were diverted to 
attacks on tactical targets including German troop concentrations, lines of 
communication and even to flying bomb sites.  This diversion of bombers from 
the strategic attacks on German cities to tactical support of ground forces led to 
the famous confrontation between the CAS, Sir Charles Portal, and the Air 
Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command, Sir Arthur Harris.   
 
The operational support that Bomber Command provided to Allied ground forces 
in France and the attacks against German flying bomb bases diverted substantial 
resources away from the strategic bombing of German cities.  There is no doubt 
that Bomber Command proved itself a valuable tool in reducing German military 
effectiveness in France and Northern Europe during 1944 and 1945.  There is also 
little doubt that that the 1944-45 attacks on oil production and communications 
severely damaged Germany’s war making capability.  Despite these successes, 
the fact is that Bomber Command’s attacks on German cities, the concept that 
formed the kernel of the Air Staff’s strategic air offensive, did not produce the 
results that they had predicted.  This failure was absolute.  Germany fell after the 
largest ground invasions in history.  Millions of soldiers and civilians on all sides 
died and the fighting devastated vast areas of Europe.  Whatever else can be said 
about the theory of strategic air warfare, it cannot be claimed that it was anywhere 
decisive in defeating Germany.  This honour still belongs to the infantry and 
ground forces of the Red Army and its allies. 
 
The Intellectual Framework 
 
Although it is hard to accept at times, one of the most influential British writers 
on air power was, and is. H.G. Wells.  Wells was the most popular and prominent 
writer of science fiction in the world of his day.  His description of air warfare 
reached large audiences and helped generate the belief in social collapse that 
fuelled British efforts to place themselves amongst the leading air powers.  In 
1908, Wells published First and Last Things, one of the first serious works on the 
possibility of strategic air warfare.  In the book, Wells described air raids on cities 
that left them ‘red with destruction while airships darken the sky’15.  It would be, 
Wells believed, the first time in the history of warfare that ‘the rear of the fighting 
line becomes insecure, assailable by flying machines and subject to 
unprecedented and unimaginable panics’ and in which ‘No man can tell what 
savagery of desperation these new conditions may not release in the soul of 
man16.  Wells’s vision was apocalyptic and lacked faith in the resilience of 
humanity to overcome adversity.  He reiterated this vision in his next book, one of 
pure imagination, The History of Mr. Polly and the War in the Air17.  These two 
books laid the foundation for what became a wider acceptance of the Social 
Darwinist vision that the lower orders of society would revert to primeval 
behaviour under the stress of air attack18.  The view coincided with the growing 
concern of conservatives that the working class were weak and unreliable and that 
the social and political equality they demanded would inevitably weaken the 
nation.   
 
Others, many others, followed Wells and they were given plenty of space for their 
views in the columns of the newspapers, especially Lord Northcliffe’s Daily Mail 
and in London Times.  In 1909, a serious thinker, Sir Hiram Maxim, the inventor 
and armaments manufacturer, wrote that ‘if a thousand tons of pure nitro-
glycerine were dropped on to London in one night, it would make London look 
like a last year's buzzard’s nest19.  Major B.F.S. Baden-Powell, founder of the 
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Boy Scouts, and a prominent member of the Aeronautical Society of Great 
Britain, advocated for increased government funding of air defence20.  By 1911, a 
broad interest in aeronautical matters had produced over 300 books and 25 
periodicals21.  A rapid growth in the popular literature demonstrated that the 
British public had developed an apparently unquenchable interest in aeronautical 
information, which may have reflected an underlying mood of insecurity within 
Britain at that time22.  Indeed, David Edgerton has argued that this late Edwardian 
interest in  aviation was an anti-liberal push by conservative forces to undermine 
the growing acceptance of increased involvement by working people in the 
government of the nation23. 
 
At the same time as Wells’s was writing his book official interest in air power 
was growing.  This interest grew out of unease in official circles that the 
development of aircraft by Germany and, to a lesser extent, France posed a threat 
to the British Isles that neither the Army nor the Royal Navy could counter.  In 
October 1908, the Committee of Imperial Defence formed a Sub-Committee 
under Lord Esher to investigate the ‘dangers to which we would be exposed on 
sea or on land by any developments in aerial navigation reasonably probable in 
the near future’24.  The Esher Committee found that Britain did not face ‘any 
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serious danger’ in the immediate future from the developments in aeronautics but 
there was a danger, which when it came, would come from bomber aircraft25.   
 
It is likely that the official concern about strategic bombing was a reaction to the 
growing popular interest in the destructive possibilities of aircraft, which, in turn, 
were growing out of the writings of H.G. Wells and other imaginative writers.  
Although there is no evidence to suggest that the imaginative writers directly 
influenced British official policy, there was a confluence of popular and official 
concern at exactly the same time and the two became mixed together.  The later 
conviction of Air Staffs that aerial bombardment would bring about social 
collapse seems to reflect more of H.G. Wells than it does a systematic and 
rigorous evaluation of the potentialities of bomber aircraft between 1914 and 
1939.    
 
Official thinking on air power continued with a second official investigation by 
the Aerial Navigation Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence.  
This investigation recommended in November 1911 that the government establish 
a Central Flying School and a Flying Corps, consisting of naval and military 
wings.  The ‘Technical Sub-Committee’, which evaluated the recommendations, 
supported the recommendations and emphasised Britain’s backwardness in 
comparison to her continental adversaries.  According to Neville Jones, the report 
of the Technical Sub-Committee is one of the more important, if curious 
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documents, on the early development of British ideas on the use of aircraft26.  It 
suggested that the functions of aircraft included reconnaissance, counter-
reconnaissance, inter-communication, the observation of artillery fire and the 
‘infliction of damage’ upon the enemy army27.  The government adopted the 
recommendations, and in April 1912 established the Royal Flying Corps. 
 
Strategic Bombing, World War I and Britain 
 
Within three weeks of the outbreak of World War I Britain undertook her first 
strategic air attack when, on 27 September 1914, Royal Naval Air Service 
(RNAS) aircraft bombed the German Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf28.  Three 
further attacks followed with Cologne being bombed on 8 October, 
Friedrichshaven on 21 November, and Cuxhaven, deep within enemy territory, 
attacked on 25 December 191429.  These raids attempted to destroy Germany’s 
Zeppelins on the ground where they were more easily located.  In effect, they 
were a defensive act and, as such, they were successful, in that they damaged the 
Zeppelin programme enough to halt production.  However, they also galvanised 
the Germans into using their Zeppelin fleet before they were destroyed by further 
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enemy action and this led to a series of Zeppelin raids on London and Britain 
throughout 191530.   
 
The Zeppelin raids of 1915 further strengthened the arguments for strategic 
bombing.  Winston Churchill, who had ordered the RNAS raids of 1914, Admiral 
Fisher and Field Marshal Kitchener advocated bomber attacks on German 
industrial and military targets.  The debate about the efficacy of bombing 
continued until well after the first Zeppelin raids of 1915.  The lack of retaliatory 
action may have reflected the limited damage that the raids accomplished.  All of 
this changed on 13th June 1917, when Gotha Bombers conducted the first daylight 
bombing raids on London.   
 
The Gotha raids enraged British public opinion and Lord Northcliffe’s 
newspapers, led by the Daily Mail, took up a loud cry for revenge by advocating 
that British forces carry out retaliatory attacks against Germany31.  The British 
press used graphic descriptions and photographs of the child victims killed in the 
raids and the Daily Mail even printed a reprisal map of Germany32.  A number of 
prominent individuals, including the Members of Parliament, Pemberton Billings 
and Joynson-Hicks, led the charge in the Commons, while Lord Northcliffe used 
his position as a member of the House of Lords to promote the retaliatory 
bombing of German cities in that Chamber.  To these voices were added those of 
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the public whose views were expressed by the attendees at a public meeting 
organised by the Lord Mayor at the London Opera House on 13th June 1917: 
 
That this meeting of London's inhabitants hereby expresses its utter 
abhorrence of the German method of warfare by the murder of innocent 
women and children in air raids on open towns and cities, and is of the 
opinion that the only means of bringing the inhumanity and cruelty of 
these dastardly and criminal attacks home to the German people is by 
systematic and ruthless reprisals.  It, therefore, calls on the Government to 
initiate immediately a policy of ceaseless air attacks on German towns and 
cities in order that their population may experience the effects of such 
methods of warfare and thus be induced to force the German authorities to 
cease this wanton and useless destruction of life and property33. 
 
David Lloyd George, the politically astute Prime Minister, reacted quickly and on 
11th July 1917, he formed the Prime Minister’s Committee on Air Organisation.  
The Committee comprised Lloyd George, General Smuts, who would write the 
report, and representatives from the Admiralty, the General Staff and the Staff of 
the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces34.  The make-up of the Committee shows 
the impact of the public mood on the government and, in his 1937 memoir, 
Lloyd-George frankly admits he formed the Committee in order ‘that we should 
not be held up, in the adoption of measures to put our growing air strength to its 
fullest use’35.  The outcome of the Committee’s deliberations was the handing 
down of two reports, the first on the 19th July 1917 and the second on the 17th 
August 1917.  The second report dealt with the organization of the independent 
air force that would attack the heart of Germany36.     
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 The RFC formed the new Independent Air Force (IAF) in October 1917 by 
transferring control of 41 Wing, based at Nancy in France, from General 
Headquarters, Western Front (GHQ) to Colonel Cyril Newall37.  The force 
comprised three squadrons: a day bombing squadron; a night bombing squadron; 
and a Handley Page squadron from England38.  The IAF conducted its first raid 
on 17 October 1917 against an iron foundry near Saarbrucken39.  The first night 
raid occurred three weeks later.  However, General Haig, the Commander-in-
Chief, did not welcome the creation of the new force and neither did his 
supporters, amongst whom was Major General Sir Hugh Trenchard, the new 
Chief of the Air Staff.  The infighting caused by the formation of the IAF was so 
great that even the carefully written Official History could not gloss over the 
difficulties.  The official historian, W. Raleigh commented: 
 
It will be enough to say that Major-General Trenchard took a much wider view 
of the responsibilities of the Chief of the Air Staff than it appeared to him the 
Secretary of State was willing to accord, but it is clear, also, that there were 
differences of temperament40.  
 
Sir Hugh Trenchard, who Lloyd-George had appointed as the first Chief of the 
Air Staff, resigned his commission and, with Major Sir John Salmond, locked 
himself in the Hotel Cecil, where they orchestrated a campaign of destabilisation 
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against their Secretary of State.  In the end, their campaign was successful and the 
new Supreme Commander on the Western Front, General Foch, regained control 
of the force.  General Foch, the new Supreme Commander in France, made it 
clear that he would not tolerate an Independent Air Force and he demanding that 
it be placed under his supervision or be removed from French soil.  It is possible 
that Haig put Foch up to this, but whatever the case, Foch got his way and on 26 
October 1918, the British Government plac ed the IAF under his command as the 
Inter-Allied IAF.  The force was to `carry the war into Germany by attacking her 
industry, commerce and population', but, the Western Front had first call on its 
services41.   
 
Despite the arguments over who controlled the air forces at the end of the war, 
Britain was a leading air power.  The new RAF had 22,171 aircraft on charge, 
with 20,100 pilots and observers serving as aircrew42 and a further 270,900 
officers and men working as ground support staff43.  The wartime demand for 
aircraft had created an industry of 122 firms with a workforce of 112,00044 and an 
annual production 26,685 airframes and 29,561 aircraft engines45.  The First 
World War however ended before the new Independent Air Force had an 
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opportunity to provide ‘convincing proof of the offensive power of aircraft’46.  
The effectiveness of strategic air warfare remained a theoretical construct.   
 
The Official Position 1919 - 1939 
 
When the war ended, the RAF all ideas about strategic warfare took second place 
to the development of ideas on how to develop a meaningful peacetime role for 
the RAF.  The answer lay in policing the empire.  The RAF’s first success in the 
new role of imperial police force occurred in 1919, when the simple expedient of 
lying aircraft over Kabul forced the Amir of Afghanistan to the negotiating 
table47.  Later the same year, Sheikh Hassan, the `Mad Mullah’, was defeated in 
Somaliland by the RAF at a cost of only £77,00048.  The Air Ministry and the Air 
Staff promoted the RAF as a cheap imperial police force and were able to 
convince a financially pressed government to maintain the Air Ministry and the 
RAF.  The RAF therefore found itself being widely used in the 1920s and 1930s 
in Iraq, Aden, India and Palestine49.   
 
The problem for the Air Staff was that imperial policing did not going provide the 
experience necessary for the development of a theory of strategic air warfare 
applicable to European warfare.  In 1923, the search for a doctrinal enemy led the 
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Air Staff and the new Secretary of State for Air, Sir Samual Hoare, to choose 
France as the likely enemy air power50.  According to Colin Sinnott, this choice 
had serious ramifications for British air policy and planning51.  Sinnott argues 
convincingly that the selection of France as the doctrinal enemy led to the design 
and development of bomber aircraft suitable for conducting short-range daylight 
attacks on Northern France rather than on the longer-range targets in Germany and 
Italy that were to be the targets for Bomber Command in 1939.  The problem arose 
from the fact that the function of doctrinal enemies extends beyond military 
exercises into the design and development of weapons systems and the choice of 
France led to the development of short range, light bombers with quick turn-
around times that could operate under RAF fighter protection.  Such aircraft were 
not suitable against an enemy like Germany.  The long lead times needed to raise a 
specification, produce a prototype and put an aircraft into production inevitably 
meant that the aircraft designed to attack France in 1923 would be coming into 
service in the early 1930s.  For Sinnott, the fact that the aircraft available for 
operations in 1939 were unsuitable for bombing Germany was due to strategic 
assessment and not to poor design or bad specifications52.   
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By 1928, the Air Staff was beginning to extend its claims to include that the RAF 
could defeat an enemy’s field forces by bombing the enemy’s industrial centres53.  
Trenchard formulated the idea of the RAF being able to defeat an enemy by 
attacking their industrial centres in a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff Sub-
Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in May 192854. The First Sea 
Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Madden, and the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, Field Marshal Baron Milne of Salonika and Rubislaw, challenged 
elements of Trenchard’s memorandum.  Madden strongly attacked strategic 
bombing as being ‘a departure from the principles of war which cannot be 
justified by experience’55.  He argued that there was no evidence to support the 
Air Staff’s claims that aerial attack on centres of production, transportation and 
communications would paralyse ‘the life and effort of the community’56.  The 
hostility forced Trenchard to tone down his claims and in a speech to the Imperial 
Defence College in October 1928, he accepted that co-operation between services 
was essential in war.  However, he maintained that offensive bombing attack 
against industrial cities would be the crucial strategy in any future war.  
 
As has been already been alluded to, British view of strategic bombing had a lot 
in common with the ideas of the Italian General, Guilio Douhet57.  Like Douhet, 
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who advocated the unrestricted use of terror upon an enemy population, even the 
British Air Staff held that such an attack was ‘illegitimate and contrary to the 
dictates of humanity’58.  This reluctance in unrestricted attack on civil populations 
did not extend to workers in munitions factories, stevedores in ports or rail 
workers at rail yards.  These were legitimate targets for air attack because they 
were supporting the military forces of their nation through their work59.  Even 
with these reservations, as seen above other British military leaders were highly 
uncomfortable with the watered down proposals being put forward by the Air 
Staff.    
 
Review But No Reform, Air Staff Thinking 1931 to 1939 
 
Britain had used the threat of the French air force as a notional enemy in order to 
provide a framework for the development of the RAF in the 1920s, but by the 
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early 1930s, even before the Nazis’ took power, Germany was beginning to cause 
concern for some British officials.  British concern with Germany began to grow 
as German officials and leaders betrayed increasingly belligerent attitudes 
towards their neighbours60.  Amongst the incidents that caused concern was the 
public celebration by German government leaders and officials of the French 
withdrawal from the Rhineland61.  Actions like these prompted British officials to 
investigate German intentions and capability.  In 1930, General G.F. Milne, the 
British Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), presented a memorandum to 
Cabinet detailing how the German government ‘in contravention both of the spirit 
and the letter of the Treaty of Versailles’ was increasing the efficiency of the 
armed forces62.  It is notable that such concerns were prompting a military 
commander as senior as the CIGS into signing a memorandum literally accusing 
Germany of bad faith and breaching its agreements under the Versailles Treaty.  
By 1932, the British Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) did not need a 
notional French enemy. 
 
The British military establishment’s concerns very quickly spread to other areas 
of government, as did their assessment of German capabilities.  In 1932, the 
Home Defence Committee was using the Air Staff’s estimates of German 
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capability to plan for attacks that would see between 600 and 1,000 tons of bombs 
per day dropped on London, with occasional attacks delivering up to 3,500 tons a 
day63.  The most striking thing about the Home Defence Committee’s calculations 
lies in the fact that, at the time they made them, Germany had no aircraft capable 
of flying to London with the bomb tonnages required.  Despite this glaring fault, 
the estimates provided to the Home Defence Committee led them to conclude: 
 
It is obvious that the weight of attack...is so great that even if unlimited 
money and resources were available it would be impossible to prevent 
heavy casualties and great destruction of property64. 
 
The impact of these estimates on British official thinking was profound.  The 
professional advisors working at the Air Ministry and in the Air Staff had 
successfully convinced other departments and ministers that bombing attack 
would kill up to 600,000 dead and injure 1.2 million injured in the first six months 
of war65.  Richard Titmuss, the post war official historian of the social services 
volume of the civil histories, lays the responsibility for this massive 
miscalculation directly at the feet of the Air Staff.  Titmuss argues that the Air 
Staff persisted in using the calculation of ‘50 casualties per ton of bombs 
dropped’ because it was ‘easily remembered’66.  The result was that a simplistic 
calculation ‘acquired a validity’ to which it was ‘hardly entitled’67.  Titmuss was 
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the first critic to highlight the appalling lack of intellectual rigor that permeated 
Air Ministry thinking on strategic air war.  Based upon the flawed advice of the 
Air Ministry and Air Staff the British government prepared to supply and man up 
to 2.8 million hospital beds and find 20 million square feet of coffin wood per 
month at a cost of £300,000 to bury the dead68.  Plans were made to burn the 
bodies in lime instead69. 
 
Looking back, it appears odd that the British government accepted these figures 
without challenge.  Churchill later defended the government’s unquestioning 
acceptance of the Air Staff’s figures pointing out that Government ministers were 
dependent upon their professional advisors and that by the mid-1930s bombing 
had ‘become obsessive in men’s minds, and also a prime military factor’70.  This 
process forced government ministers ‘to imagine the most frightful scenes of ruin 
and slaughter in London if we quarrelled with the German dictator’71.  Churchill 
later went on to place in writing his view that the Air Staff’s pre-war advice ‘was 
so exaggerated it had depressed the statesmen responsible for pre-war policy’72 
and so undermined the government in its efforts to confront Hitler.  The British 
Government accepted the professional advice that any bombing would be 
effective73.  The British Government was also subject to public and parliamentary 
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pressure from Trenchard, Moore-Brabazon and Wing Commander Archibald 
James74, which reinforced the effectiveness of strategic bomber75.   
 
The above evidence clearly shows that the British Air Staff did not rigorously 
evaluate bomber capabilities.  Further evidence for a lack of intellectual rigor is 
also apparent in the interpretation of the results of air exercises in the early to 
mid-1930s76.  In these exercises, the Air Staff and exercise umpires consistently 
favoured the attacking bombers simply on the basis that they were attacking.  For 
example, in one exercise, the umpires awarded Red forces the victory over Blue 
on the basis that they had conducted offensive operations whilst Blue had only 
defended77.  In a 1931 exercise, the umpire, Major C.C. Turner, judged the 
attacking bombers had won as they had attacked and damaged ‘London’s 
nerves’78.  Major Turner apparently was unmoved by the fact that other umpires 
judged that 84 out of 112 attacking bombers had been destroyed.  The expectation 
was that any degree of bombing would have an enormous impact upon the urban 
working class. 
 
The air exercises conducted by the RAF did not test the doctrine of an Air Staff 
dominated by a belief in the effectiveness of bombing.  The failure to test the 
doctrinal orthodoxy handed down by Trenchard was a major failure of policy.  
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Tami Davis Biddle argues that the RAF leadership was ‘often resistant to 
grappling with details in advance of events’ and that their preference for ‘general 
principals’ and ‘improvisation’ would prove ‘increasingly risky’ in an age of 
growing mechanisation79.  This evaluation of the Air Staff and the Air Ministry is 
supported by no less a figure than Air Marshal, Sir John Slessor, who had served 
as the Deputy Director and Director of Plans from May 1937 until January 1939.  
In his book, The Central Blue, Slessor states that the Air Staff approach was 
‘intuitive-a matter of faith’80.  It took the operational experience of World War II 
to show that the Air Staff had been ‘too optimistic’ on the ability of a strategic air 
offensive’81. 
 
It is worth noting how close the Air Staff’s expectations were to H.G. Wells’s 
vision of civilised life collapsing under the impact of aerial attack.  In March 
1938, the Air Staff identified morale, what they called the ‘will to win’, as the 
leading factor in a nation’s ability to prosecute war.  The nation would collapse 
when sufficient ‘houses, water, gas, electric and food supplies, communications, 
power stations and certain social services, e.g. the medical, sanitary and 
distributing organisations’ had been destroyed, making ordinary life impossible82.  
This unequivocal statement suggests that, despite their stated reservations, the 
British Air Staff still saw the civilian population as a primary target in any 
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strategic air offensive.   Ironically, the Air Staff’s own predictions generated 
enough fear in both the French and British governments that bomber attacks were 
restricted to isolated targets where there was little chance of inflicting civilian 
casualties and, as a result, when the war broke out Bomber Command found itself 
attacking remote naval bases on the North Sea83.   
 
War and Strategic Bombing 1939 to 1945 
 
Bombing attacks on German cities were not to begin until 11th May 1940, over 
eight months after the outbreak of the war.  The sudden knockout blow had not 
eventuated and the raids, when they did start, were small affairs, which inflicted 
little damage.  The Air Staff patiently waited for the new heavy bombers to be 
ready and for Bomber Command to build up sufficient infrastructure and 
resources for a sustained bomber offensive.  Planning for the strategic air 
offensive continued throughout this initial period of the war and operational 
information from both British and German raids was analysed to provide useful 
lessons for Bomber Command.  An example of this process was the work of the 
Bombing Committee, which, at a meeting in February of 1941, considered the 
optimum size of bomb and method of fuzing required to do as much damage as 
possible to the ‘ordinary town target’84.  The Committee concluded that industrial 
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targets were highly resistant to damage from blast and fragmentation bombs and 
that using incendiary bombs would provide a better return.   
 
The problem with incendiary bombs was that they were highly inaccurate and 
were therefore not particularly useful against small targets such as factories.  
However, their lack of accuracy was not a problem if the target was something as 
large as a small city.  The concept that was developed was to use blast bombs to 
remove roofs, windows and doors to provide openings into which the small 
incendiaries could fall and start fires.  In this way, an attacking bomber force 
could create large-scale fires within a metropolitan area85.  Two of the strongest 
proponents of this method of attack were the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Sir 
Arthur Harris and the Senior Air Staff Officer from Bomber Command, Sir 
Robert Saundby86.  Although the British were never to use the mustard gas attacks 
that Douhet had envisaged, they held both the stocks of gas and the munition 
containers for conducting such attacks.      
 
The strategic objective of the Air Staff, as detailed at the Bombing Committee by 
Harris and Saundby, was that of area attack against civilian housing.  This 
strategy, which was solely directed at civilians, was seen by the Air Staff as ‘the 
decisive factor in [causing] the German collapse’87.  The evaluation was based 
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upon a belief that there was ‘considerable fear of intensified RAF bombing’ in 
Germany.  Information coming out of Germany from ‘neutral observers’ 
suggested ‘that intensified and concentrated bombing might have tangible effects’ 
and it was suggested that bombing for morale effect ‘must be severe’88.   
 
The United States was not as comfortable with the idea of deliberately attacking 
civilian populations.  In a staff paper dated 30th July 1941, the Air Staff bluntly 
stated that as the strength of Bomber Command grew it would ‘pass to a planned 
attack on civilian morale with the intensity and continuity which are essential if a 
general breakdown is to be produced’89.  The Americans replied to this statement 
by pointing out that ‘it is not enough to set forth the “destruction of morale” as a 
military objective’90.  The American reaction caused sufficient concern for the 
War Cabinet American Liaison Section to intervene to calm American concerns.  
In a note explaining that the term ‘morale’ was being used for want of a better 
word, the Liaison Section strongly emphasised that killing civilians was not the 
objective, although ‘the fear of death’ was ‘unquestionably an important factor’91. 
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The Americans were not alone in their unease over the deliberate bombing of 
civilians.  Within the British government and the military there were many who 
only supported such attacks, because there was no other way for them to carry the 
war directly into the heart of Germany.  Even within the Air Ministry and the 
RAF there was concern over the prevailing doctrinal view.  Amongst those who 
expressed such concerns were the scientist Sir Henry Tizard and the Minister for 
Aircraft Production, Mr. Moore-Brabazon.  These men were closely associated 
with promoting air power and the impact of their open criticism caused 
consternation within the Air Ministry.   
 
In addition, the report by Mr. Butt of the Cabinet Office on the lack of bomber 
accuracy had seriously undermined the credibility of Bomber Command.  The 
findings of the Butt Report and the open questioning of strategic bombing 
provoked a quick response by the Air Staff and Air Ministry.   Throughout the 
period from September to December 1941, Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air 
Staff, sent a number of minutes on accuracy to Churchill in an attempt to diffuse 
the impact of the growing criticism of bomber accuracy92.  Portal attempted to 
defuse the critical analysis of bombing by talking up Bomber Command’s 
growing superiority in navigation over Germany93.  Unfortunately, in his 
eagerness to answer this criticism, Portal overplayed his hand and he pushed 
Churchill for support in obtaining 4,000 heavy bombers for Bomber Command in 
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order that it might ‘obtain decisive results against German morale’ in ‘about six 
months’94.  Portal’s rationale for this request was that the strategic bomber 
offensive was an ‘adaptation, though on a greatly magnified scale, of the policy of 
air control’ which had proved ‘so outstandingly successful in recent years in the 
small wars in which the Air Force has been continuously engaged’95.  Apparently, 
Portal and the Air Staff believed that Germany would be as easily intimidated by 
bombing, as were the lightly armed semi-nomadic tribesmen in Somalia, Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
 
The minute from Portal provoked a blistering reply from Churchill.  The fact that 
Churchill took three weeks to compose and send his reply strongly suggests that 
he consulted widely on the issue.  Churchill bluntly told Portal that the physical 
and moral effects of bombing are ‘greatly exaggerated’ and that if Bomber 
Command increased its accuracy by 100 percent it would increased the weight of 
the British bomber force attack ‘to four times its strength’96.  The best that 
Churchill could say was that Bomber Command’s attacks on Germany ‘will be a 
heavy and I trust a seriously increasing nuisance’97.   
 
In a second minute, dated the 7th October 1941, Churchill returned to the attack, 
telling Portal that he deprecated ‘placing unbounded confidence in this means of 
                                                 
94   PRO CAB 120/300, Minute CAS to Prime Minister, 25th September 1941 
95  PRO CAB 120/300, Development and Employment of the Heavy Bomber Forces, 22nd 
September 1941 
96  PRO CAB 120/300, Minute Churchill to CAS, 27th September 1941 
97  PRO CAB 120/300, Minute Churchill to CAS, 7th October 1941 
attack and still more in expressing that confidence in terms of arithmetic’.  He 
went on to point out his view that bombing was simply the ‘most potent method 
of impairing the enemy’s morale we can use at the present time’98.  The invasion 
of Europe by armoured forces combined with bombing and other forms of 
warfare were the only sure way that Churchill saw for success.  The Prime 
Minister again accused the Air Staff of misleading the government ‘by the 
pictures they painted of the destruction that would be wrought by air raids’.  This 
action, says Churchill, ‘was so exaggerated it depressed the statesmen responsible 
for pre-war policy’99.  As far as Churchill was concerned, the Air Staff 
compounded their incompetence by convincing the government that ‘our position 
would be impossible owing to air attacks’, if Germany gained control of the Low 
Countries and France100.  Churchill told Portal that Britain had managed to 
survive ‘by not paying too much attention to such ideas’101. 
 
To make matters worse, in February and March 1942, Sir Henry Tizard returned 
to the attack with a full-scale criticism of strategic bombing.  Tizard, in a minute 
to Moore-Brabazon, the Minister for Aircraft Production, painted an unflattering 
comparison between the achievements of Bomber Command and those of the air 
forces operating obsolescent aircraft against the enemy in the Mediterranean102.  
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At a cost of one Swordfish and two Blenheims destroyed and five other 
Blenheims damaged, the RAF in the Middle East had sunk three submarines, a 
20,000-ton liner and two barges, and had seriously damaged four merchant ships, 
two tankers, one submarine, a destroyer and another naval vessel, as well as 
lightly damaging six other vessels103.  Bomber Command, in the same period, had 
conducted 2,080 sorties and lost 52 aircraft with another 19 damaged for no 
appreciable gain104. 
 
On 25th March 1942, Moore-Brabazon used Tizard’s analysis in a report to Major 
General Ismay at the War Cabinet Offices.  Moore-Brabazon accused the Air 
Staff of failing to support the other services and other theatres of the war and of 
risking losing the war.  This potential outcome would become reality, Moore-
Brabazon claimed, unless ‘the RAF is compelled to get off its perch and help the 
general effort’105.  By this time though the debate had petered out and Ismay, in 
his 30th March response gently let Moore-Brabazon know that his foray into 
bombing policy was not welcome.  The ramifications of the internal debate may 
have concerned Churchill.  The implication for the government was that they 
faced accusations of having ploughed enormous resources into an ill-conceived 
campaign.  In April 1942, following the long string of disasters earlier in the year, 
Churchill re-entered the arena with a minute to the Secretary of State for Air 
telling him that ‘we must spare no pains to justify the large proportion of the 
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national effort’ that had been devoted to the bomber offensive106.  Churchill 
wanted bombing accuracy and navigation improved and he wanted blast bombs 
and incendiaries used as well.  The government desperately needed the successes 
that Bomber Command under Harris would now begin to deliver. 
 
Given the level of criticism directed at the strategic air offensive, it is unsurprising 
that the first thing Sir Arthur Harris did on taking over at Bomber Command was 
to order a series of thousand bomber raids in May and June of 1942.  The need to 
justify the strategic air offensive against accusations of failure was important to 
the Air Staff, the government and the Prime Minister.  Seen from this perspective, 
the series of heavy bomber attacks launched by Sir Arthur Harris in early to mid-
1942 may have been nothing less than an attempt by the Air Staff and the 
government to divert attention away from the string of military disasters being 
inflicted upon Britain.  As a public relations exercise, the thousand bomber raids 
were very successful and they gained public support both in Britain and abroad, 
particularly in then United States.  As a result, the bomber programme remained 
in place and the strategic bomber offensive against Germany continued. 
 
Throughout the rest of World War II debate continued over the way in which the 
Air Staff were conducting the strategic air offensive.  This argument was not 
concerned with the usefulness of strategic bombing but with the particular targets 
that should be bombed.  The debate circled around whether Bomber Command 
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should concentrate its main effort on German oil production, aircraft factories, 
transportation links, military formations or cities.  At some time or other during 
the last 22 months of the war, Bomber Command attacked all of these targets.  
The fundamental outcome was that Bomber Command was unable to win the war 
in its own right.  From April 1944, the major military effort of the western Allies 
was the invasion of France and Bomber Command found itself subordinated to 
General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Northern 
Europe.   
 
The changing priorities imposed upon Bomber Command after early 1944 made it 
impossible for a unified doctrine of strategic bombing to be developed so that 
when the war ended in May 1945, the Air Staff were in no better position than 
they had been in 1939.  What they did know though was that strategic bombing 
had required massive resources, that civil populations were more robust than had 
been thought and that final victory had required the combined efforts of all 
available military forces.    
 
Conclusion 
 
In 1945, the British public still drew its expectations of strategic bombing from 
the ‘imagined possibilities’ of the Edwardians.  The advocates of air power were 
able to sweep aside any suggestion that the strategic air offensive had failed when 
the atom bomb demonstrated its destructive power in Japan.  Now a single 
bomber could destroy a whole city.  The vision of H.G. Wells was again possible 
and the airforces could deliver it.  All of these events make assessing the validity 
of the British Air Staff’s strategic doctrine difficult but not impossible.  The 
evidence suggests that there was no doctrine but rather only expectations.  The 
failure of the city attacks during World War II represents a failure of the strategic 
air offensive envisaged by Britain’s Air Staff.   
 
As World War II began, the British Air Staff had only a vague idea of how they 
would achieve victory through a strategic air offensive.  The Air Staff derived its 
strategic concepts from the Social Darwinist writings of many authors including 
H.G. Wells.  The expectation was that aircraft could intimidate urban populations 
by destroying their homes, places of work and disrupting their lives.  The success 
enjoyed by the RAF in its imperial policing role gave impetus to these ideas.  In 
this role, the RAF was able to subdue large areas of the Empire by using ‘air 
control’, a form of bombing demonstration, which worked on the tribes of 
Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Air Staff believed that the industrial workers 
in advanced countries did not have the fortitude, character or stamina to withstand 
air attack.  World War II proved this assumption wrong107. 
 
The British Air Staff’s assumptions about the weakness of industrial workers 
coloured its advice to government.  The bleak picture that the Air Ministry 
painted of the effects of air attacks coloured the ideas and plans of the other 
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organs of government and it undermined the confidence of the government itself 
at a critical juncture in European affairs.  This led to gross over-estimates of 
casualties with the government and local authorities expecting 600,000 dead and 
1.2 million injured in the first six months of war108.  The way in which the Air 
Ministry arrived at these figures displayed the lack of intellectual rigor that they 
applied to their assessment of operational capability shown during their annual air 
exercises. 
 
The air exercises that the RAF conducted during the 1930s showed that bomber 
aircraft were more vulnerable than the Air Staff believed.  The appointed umpires 
interpreted the results of the exercises in such a way that the results would always 
be in favour of the attacking bomber formations.  The outcome was that the Air 
Staff deprived itself of any chance it had of obtaining an empirical basis for its 
theory of strategic air warfare.  If the results of these exercises had been 
interpreted correctly, the heavy losses suffered by Bomber Command in its early 
daylight raids may have been avoided and the need to prepare for a night only 
bomber offensive would have been predictable.  When the bombers did come in 
1940, they were German bombers and though they did get through they suffered 
grievous losses.  The workers and citizens of the bombed cities and towns 
remained calm and continued their way of life as the First Sea Lord, Admiral of 
the Fleet, Sir Charles Madden, had argued they would.   
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The crisis came in 1941 when objective analysis showed that in spite of all of the 
predictions and promises made by the Air Staff and all of the money, men and 
resources provided to it, Bomber Command had failed as a decisive weapon.  The 
best that Britain could hope for, said Churchill, was that the strategic air offensive 
would become a heavy and ‘seriously increasing annoyance’109.  The failings of 
Bomber Command led to open criticism of the Air Staff’s strategic conception.  
By mid-1943, there was a closing window of opportunity for the Air Staff to 
achieve their goal of defeating Germany before large-scale ground forces were 
committed on the continent.   
 
In the years after 1945, the RAF and its supporters fought to maintain that the 
government was to blame for the lack of success enjoyed by the strategic air 
offensive during World War II.  In their view, the British government had not 
financed the development and construction of the advanced aircraft that were 
essential to this type of warfare and abetted by the other military services, the 
British cabinet had rejected the obvious utility of strategic bombing.  The result 
was that Bomber Command was unable to bring the weight of attack to bear on 
Germany, which would have resulted in her quick defeat.  As this chapter has 
shown, this argument is spurious.   
 
In 1939, Britain faced a war with the leading industrial power in Europe believing 
that this war threatened to result in massive civilian casualties and widespread 
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destruction.  Unsure of how to counter this threat, Britain placed faith in the 
promises made by the Air Staff and the Air Ministry.  What the British did not 
know was that in turn the Air Staff had placed their faith in what was a policy 
based on a concoction of ideas drawn from a profound belief in the power of 
technology to overcome adversity.  It also incorporated a fervent attachment to a 
Social Darwinist analysis of human behaviour.  The class consciousness, even 
racist bigotry, of many British military thinkers of the inter-war period blinded 
them not only to the resilience of the human spirit when faced with adversity, but 
also to the more practical fact of the size of the resources which would be 
required to damage seriously the infrastructure of Germany.   
 
The subsequent chapters will evaluate the financial cost to Britain of the strategic 
air offensive, which the Air Staff, Air Ministry and the RAF anticipated would 
win the war for Britain.  The importance of this evaluation lies in the size of the 
resources that finally had to be committed to the strategic air offensive.  
Historians have not yet fully evaluated the size of the economic commitment that 
Britain made to the strategic air offensive.  The importance of identifying the 
costs associated with conducting the strategic bombing of Germany lies in the 
damage that meeting this commitment did to the capacity of the British people to 
recover from the economic and financial demands of World War II.  The 
suspicion is that the strategic air offensive may have damaged the economic 
viability of the Britain more than it damaged the economic activity of Germany.  
 
Chapter 3 
THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 
On Empire Air Day 20th May 1939, C.G. Grey, the editor of The Aeroplane and 
long-time critic of British aviation policies, estimated that ‘about a million’ 
British people visited 78 aerodromes, of which the RAF operated 601.  Public 
interest in aeronautical activity was high in Britain, as it was in many other 
western nations2.  The histories of the period frequently refer to the general 
interest in air power and note the almost equal play between the attraction of the 
adventure in air travel and the fear of the consequences of attack from the air.  
The literature of the strategic air offensive includes coffee table books, works by 
enthusiasts of obscure detail, such as the paint schemes of individual squadrons 
and the fate of individual aircraft as well as serious historical analysis.  In all of 
this writing, a major omission has been the economic cost for Britain in 
conducting the strategic air offensive.  
 
The economic impact of the strategic air offensive on Britain is important because 
there has been almost no serious quantitative analysis of the total economic cost 
to Britain of building, operating and maintaining Bomber Command and its entire 
infrastructure.  The size of the investment made by Britain in the strategic air 
offensive was large enough in the end to have seriously weakened the British 
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economy and delayed the post-war recovery of the nation well into the 1980s.  As 
a first step in the quantitative analysis of the financial and economic cost of the 
strategic air offensive to Britain, my study lays out how this took place and how 
the intellectual ideas behind strategic bombing led the British government to 
dedicate a large proportion of the wealth of the country to a single military 
campaign.   
 
As part of a quantitative analysis, it is important to survey the British aircraft 
industry prior to World War II in order to compare its technical proficiency with 
its foreign rivals.  This permits a realistic evaluation of the British aircraft 
industry’s strengths and weakness in comparison with its foreign competitors.  It 
also allows a quantification of the government’s involvement in the development 
of the British aircraft industry.  Such an evaluation is essential in order to address 
the larger debate on the decline of British education, industry and society since 
the end of the Victorian era.  Because of the innovative and technical nature of the 
aircraft industry, the proponents of British technical and educational decline have 
used it as a yardstick and an example of this decline.   
 
My analysis does not support the conclusion that Britain was technically or 
economically in a decline before and during World War II.  The evidence, I will 
argue, shows that the British aircraft industry was highly efficient, ably managed 
and a commercial success between the wars.  Instead, after 1945, the relative 
decline of Britain as an aircraft manufacturer was due to the nation’s bankruptcy 
caused by the cost of the war.  The strategic air offensive contributed greatly to 
this bankruptcy.   
 
This chapter applies the accrual method to the British aircraft industry in order to 
examine the capital costs of building factory space at government expense as well 
as the indirect and opportunity costs of importing the necessary raw materials 
needed for the manufacture of bomber aircraft, including the cost of losses of these 
materials to enemy action at sea.  As part of the analysis, I will also identify the 
approximate costs for subsidiary activity such as research and development 
conducted at government expense on behalf of the aircraft industry, in addition to 
the costs of transporting and storing materials and finished aircraft. 
 
The history of British aircraft production began in 1949 with the publication of 
the first volume of the official civil histories of the Second World War 
commissioned by the British Government3.  The editor of the series W.K. 
Hancock wrote the first volume in co-operation with M.M. Gowing, and 
established a high standard of scholarship for subsequent writers in the series.  
The second volume of the history, written by M.M. Postan, became available in 
19524.  These were the first works to address the economic cost of the war for 
Britain and they are somewhat pessimistic, and indeed Postan is distinctly more 
pessimistic about and critical of Britain’s wartime economic and industrial 
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performance than Hancock and Gowing5.  Later writers including Ely Devons6, Sir 
Alec Cairncross7, Sir Roy Fedden8 and Correlli Barnett9 added to the pessimism. 
 
The importance of Devons, Cairncross and Fedden is that they were significant 
actors in the management of British aircraft production during and after World 
War II.  Devons and Cairncross both worked in the Directorate General of 
Planning and Statistics of the Ministry of Aircraft Production.  The significance of 
this unit on the state of post-war Britain is unknown, but a number of 
subsequently prominent men, including the future Labour Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, worked within it.  The Directorate constituted a major part of the central 
planning machinery established by the British wartime government and its 
members would have experienced the problems presented in managing an aircraft 
industry that gladly took government money while resisting any element of 
government interference.   
 
Devons, who along with many of his colleagues were in tune with the prevailing 
mood supporting a centrally planned economy, expresses a significant degree of 
exasperation at the inefficiencies of the aircraft industry and its unwillingness to 
undertake rational planning.  The post-war Labour Government implemented a 
                                                 
5  Ritchie, ‘A New Audit of War’, War and Society, p.125 
6  E. Devons, Planning in Practice: Essays in Aircraft Planning in War-Time, Cambridge University 
Press, 1950, p.21. 
7  Sir A. Cairncross, Planning in Wartime: Aircraft Production in Britain, Germany and the USA, 
MacMillan & St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, London, 1991 
8  Fedden, Britain’s Air Survival, p.18 
more centrally planned economic model and its maintenance by later 
Conservative governments is an acknowledgement of the popular desire for 
government intervention to achieve greater equality in British society.  The 
experiment in social democratic government survived until Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative Government in the 1980s. 
 
M.M. Postan is a useful reference for identifying the extent of government 
expenditure on the RAF and the aircraft industry in the late 1930s and provides a 
good summary of the government’s expenditure on fixed capital infrastructure for 
war purposes.  Postan was co-author, with D. Hay and J.D. Scott, of another 
volume of the official history dealing with the design and development of 
weapons10.  In it too, the mood of pessimism persists.  It is a useful work in terms 
of providing detail on the number of aircraft produced, structure-weight produced, 
man-hours used, resources and technical developments in the weapons systems.  
Unfortunately, it provides very little information on the costs of designing and 
developing aircraft. 
 
The series of official histories continued with Richard Sayers’s volume on 
financial policy 11, Peter Inman’s volume on labour in the munitions industry 12  
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and William Hornby’s excellent description on factories and plant13.  There is 
enough detail in these three volumes to provide most writers with the information 
they needed to support their descriptions of aircraft production, air operations, 
specific aircraft or the general conduct of the war.  The lack of footnotes and 
sources in all of these books reduces their usefulness on decision making in the 
British Government.  They are however essential reading for anyone working on 
the British wartime economy.   
 
Sir Roy Fedden, between 1918 and 1960, was one of the most significant figures 
within the British aircraft industry.  The Chief Engine Designer, and a significant 
stockholder, in the Bristol Aircraft Company, he was also the most successful of 
Britain’s engine designers.  Between 1921 and 1942, his radial engines dominated 
the world aviation market.  Fedden was a strong critic of the British government 
over its failure to prevent the decline of the British aircraft industry.  In 1957, he 
wrote a book strongly critical of Britain’s failure to duplicate the American 
aircraft industry’s approach to research and development14.  The idea that 
Britain’s aircraft industry, abetted by government, failed to respond effectively to 
the growing strength of the American industry appears to have its roots in 
Fedden’s ideas.   
 
In the post-war assessment of the relative efficiency of the British aircraft 
industry, the influence of Fedden has been profound.  From the early 1920s to the 
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1950s, Fedden was a highly successful engine designer, businessman and advisor 
to government.  He was also very well connected and respected within the 
American aircraft industry.  His air-cooled radial engines were almost a 'standard 
power-plant' for commercial flying in the United States15.  In one anecdote about 
him it is claimed that in 1931, when the United States Army’s carburettor 
specialist Luke Hobbs was asked why he had not yet made a two-row engine he 
replied  “Because Fedden hasn’t” 16. 
 
Because of this, the British government commissioned Fedden on two occasions 
during World War II to conduct a comparative analysis of the British and 
American aircraft industries.  The theme running through Fedden’s findings was 
that the British educational system, unlike its American counterpart, was failing to 
produce the technically-educated personnel the British aircraft industry needed.  
He also emphasised the large size and importance of design departments within 
the American aircraft firms compared with British firms.  The critical 
comparisons contained in Fedden’s reports are identical to those reproduced in the 
official histories and later published by Fedden. 
 
Recently, Eric Lund has questioned the premise on which Fedden based his 
arguments17.  By contrast, Lund argues that Britain was producing relatively more 
technicians and engineers for the aircraft industry than were Germany and the 
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United States.  He points out that Fedden and the subsequent critics do not take 
into account the flow-on effect for the British aircraft industry of the Air Ministry 
training young men as apprentices in the RAF.  After their service was over, they 
sought employment within the commercial aircraft industry18.  Also according to 
Lund, British government funding of research establishments shouldered much of 
the design burden that in America was borne by individual firms.  Finally, Lund 
suggests that Fedden simply misunderstood the organisation of design 
departments within American aircraft firms19.  
 
The pessimistic view of the British aircraft in the early histories has greatly 
influenced later writers.  Correlli Barnett20 more strongly took up Peter Fearon’s21 
original argument on the disruptive role of government funding of the aircraft 
industry22.  Barnett is much more critical than Fearon and uses the aircraft industry 
as an example of unsatisfactory British education leading to poor economic 
performance23.  Barnett’s book injected a substantial amount of passion into the 
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discussion of British industrial decline.  The debate has resulted in a crop of 
revisionist writers who have refuted both Fearon’s and Barnett’s conclusions24. 
 
Richard Overy’s comparative analysis of British, German, United States, Russian, 
Italian and Japanese aircraft production25 informed David Edgerton’s critical 
assessment of Barnett’s thesis on British industrial decline26.  Overy’s work was a 
seminal step in the analysis of the British aircraft industry’s wartime performance.  
Overy’s student, Sebastian Ritchie, provides what is currently the most detailed 
survey of Britain’s aircraft manufacture during the early years of the war27.  
Latterly the American Erik Lund has entered the fray with a paper claiming that 
rather than being backward Britain’s aircraft industry was more ‘flexible, 
technologically sophisticated, and effective’ than those of America or Germany28. 
 
Alongside Overy in importance is Peter Fearon, a prolific writer on all aspects of 
the British aircraft industry in its first forty years.  He is probably the most 
influential writer arguing that the British aircraft industry was adversely affected 
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by poor government policy making29.  Fearon’s and Edgerton’s reach is broader 
than that of Overy and Ritchie in that they address the wider social and political 
roles of aircraft and the aircraft industry.  Fearon provides a detailed analysis of the 
interaction between the state and industry in the formation and operation of the 
aircraft industry and that Britain saw an effective aircraft industry as essential to its 
standing as a leading world power.   
 
Significantly, as this chapter will show, Britain’s aircraft manufacturers became 
world leaders in aircraft manufacture by selling licences to foreign companies and 
governments.  For a neo-conservative historian, Barnett is surprisingly ignorant of 
how an open market operates and the ways in which, if there is any chance of 
making a reasonable profit, commercial companies will find ways around 
government regulation.  Rather than being poorly managed, the evidence 
indicates that the British aircraft industry was innovative, well informed and 
versatile in its efforts to make profits from the manufacture of aircraft and aircraft 
parts.  The thesis that Britain at this time was in industrial decline may be more of 
an expression of the British national character that betrays ‘a liking for criticising 
ourselves’30, than it is of careful historical analysis.  The evidence in this chapter 
indicates that the pessimistic view of the British aircraft industry’s performance in 
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the 1920s and 1930s lies in the insular view of industrial activity of many of the 
earlier writers.  In reaching their conclusions they have simply drawn upon 
figures relating to domestic production and exports rather than looking at the full 
range of the industry’s commercial activities including joint venture investments 
with overseas competitors.  
 
In addressing the issues in this debate, I have opted to take the broader view of the 
British aircraft industry’s activities and have looked at the way in which British 
aircraft firms operated their commercial activities, particularly their financial 
investments in the aircraft industries with other nations.  What this approach 
shows is that whilst the exports of British aircraft and aircraft parts may have been 
low, British firms dominated the world industry.  They did this by investing in 
joint ventures or by licensing foreign manufacturers to produce their products 
locally.  The reason for this lay in the desire of governments to develop domestic 
aircraft industries.  By investing in joint ventures with foreign governments and 
firms, or issuing manufacturing licences, British aircraft firms facilitated the rapid 
growth of domestic aircraft industries in a number of countries and reaped the 
financial rewards of these investments throughout the 1920s and 1930s.   
 
The insular viewpoint also fails to acknowledge the inevitability of British 
economic decline relative to other nations.  The fact that British companies were 
exporting aircraft technology provided her international partners with the 
competitive advantage of quickly obtaining already developed technology.  
Foreign firms in joint ventures with British companies or manufacturing under 
licence also enjoyed the potential benefit of having a larger pool of untapped 
investment.  Britain’s industrial advantage, established during the industrial 
revolution and the later nineteenth century, declined, not because of a failure of 
British education or industry but because of the improvement in foreign industrial 
output.  This relative decline came into sharper relief when the financial and 
economic cost of World War II began to affect in an adverse way Britain’s post-
1945 recovery.    
 
Having placed the argument on decline into a clearer perspective it is now 
possible to set aside the question of British decline and move onto the analysis of 
the cost of the strategic air offensive.  The state of the British aircraft industry and 
the financial outlays required to prepare it for war is central because the prices 
paid to manufacturers for aircraft excluded all costs that the government had 
already funded through loans or capital grants.  The true cost of the aircraft 
includes the value of these investments and it is necessary to consider how much 
it cost to set the aircraft industry on its war footing. 
 
The Aircraft Industry 1910 to 1939 
 
Britain was not slow in creating an aircraft industry.  In Edwardian England, the 
dominant cultural trend was for industrial, scientific and technological progress 
and the new aircraft and motorcar industries epitomised the promise of science and 
technology31.  Prior to 1914, five aircraft companies, Fredrick Handley-Page 
(1908), Robert Blackburn (1910), A.V. Roe (1910), T.O.M. Sopwith (1911) and 
Noel Pemberton-Billing (1913) 32, were beginning to produce aircraft.  Of course, 
these new firms had to source components such as magnetos and engines from 
overseas as such products were not available in Britain33.  The speed with which 
the British Government developed a national approach to the development of the 
aviation industry reflected the British people’s widespread interest in aircraft and 
air power.  
 
The government was quick to respond.  By 1909, the Royal Aircraft Factory at 
Farnborough was operational34, although the private firms like Blackburn, 
Handley-Page and A.V. Roe were not inclined to be too supportive of a 
government-funded manufacturer.  They thought they were dealing with an 
aeronautical version of the Admiralty’s shipyards and therefore worked to keep 
Farnborough out of large-scale production.  This resulted in it becoming a 
specialised factory producing and testing prototype machines. In 1914, only 24 out 
of the 122 orders for aircraft by the War Office went to Farnborough35. 
 
The potential for profit in the aircraft industry attracted a significant number of the 
existing and well-established armaments firms.  These included Vickers, 
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Armstrong-Whitworth, Breadmore, The Coventry Ordnance Works, Bristol 
Tramway Ltd, later the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company and Short 
Brothers.  Other companies followed, amongst them The Aircraft Manufacturing 
Company, formed by G. Holt, publisher of the Graphic and Daily Graphic, and 
the boat-builders, S.E. Saunders and J.S. White36. 
 
Motorcar companies, including Austin Motors, Brazil Straker, Daimler, Napier, 
Siddeley Deasy, Sunbeam, Bentley and ABC also became involved in aircraft 
manufacturing37.  Even furniture makers, Boulton Paul of Norwich, and 
architectural decorators, H.H. Martyn of Cheltenham became aircraft builders 
forming the Gloster Aircraft Company as a joint venture with The Gloucestershire 
Air Company38.  In addition, start-up firms such as Westland (1915) and Fairey 
Aviation Company (1918) were formed during World War I39.   
  
The end of World War I resulted in a substantial contraction of the world economy 
and the almost complete cessation of British government orders for aircraft.  
Effectively, the market for new aircraft disappeared overnight and governments 
dumped large amounts of surplus aircraft onto the second hand market.  The 
impact on the aircraft industry was profound.  Highly profitable companies quickly 
fell into financial difficulties.  The effect was little short of catastrophic and the 
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industry suffered from disillusion as the economy fell into recession and 
depression40.  Whatever the aircraft industry may have felt it is worth recalling that 
the British Government via the Air Ministry worked hard to ensure that the 
industry survived the re-adjustments in economic fortunes.   
 
The frequently claimed idea that the British government abandoned the aircraft 
industry grew out of the disillusionment that pervaded the industry and the 
country at this time.  Perhaps it is unfortunate that the later official historians, 
particularly M.M. Postan, accepted this idea and it has passed into the broader 
historical literature of the period.  Postan uses the idea that the British 
Government failed to finance adequately the aircraft industry and RAF to argue 
that the government overlooked the importance of air power to Britain and that this 
led to Britain being unable to meet its plans for expansion in time for 193941.   
 
Sebastian Ritchie provides a salutatory reminder against generalising the bad 
financial outcomes of some aircraft firms into an industry wide experience42.  The 
financial support provided to British aircraft firms via Air Ministry orders and 
funding was part of the commercial opportunities available to astute companies.  
However, it was only one source of income and a number of the more successful 
aircraft manufacturers and engine makers between the wars looked to overseas 
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opportunities that were to make them the dominant players in the international 
aviation market. 
 
The aircraft industry experienced a period of normal post-war contraction during 
the interwar years.  It imposed stresses on the industry and some firms failed to 
survive.  The subsequent histories of the period have been heavily influenced by 
these failures which in turn downplay the success of the British aircraft industry 
in maintaining four aero-engine and sixteen airframe manufacturers in what has 
been called the ‘Air Ministry Ring Companies’.   
 
A great number of the sources attributed the success of these companies to the 
financial and other support provided by the Air Ministry and not to the 
technological and managerial prowess of their owners, managers and workers.  
This viewpoint reflects the reliance of much of the history on official Air Ministry 
sources, which always tend to emphasise the importance of government 
assistance to industry.  It also reflects the aircraft industry’s own tendency to cry 
poor in an attempt to obtain public funding of their development of the domestic 
aircraft and air transportation industries.  By contrast historians have paid little 
attention to how British aircraft companies organised their commercial activities.   
 
The survival of eighteen aircraft manufacturers in Britain, which had almost no 
internal air transportation, suggests that there were profits being made somewhere 
other than in Britain.  British aircraft companies were amongst the first in the 
world to invest in and draw profits from foreign interests to whom they had 
licensed their technologies.  They were also doing what any commercial 
enterprise would do, they were exploiting government funding as much as they 
could and using this to reduce the risk incurred in their overseas activity.     
 
The Air Ministry Ring Companies 
Ser. Company Location Activity 
1. Armstrong-Siddeley Coventry Engines 
2. Armstrong-Whitworth Coventry Airframes 
3. Blackburn  Yorkshire Airframes 
4. Boulton-Paul  Norwich Airframes 
5. Bristol  Bristol Airframes & Engines 
6. De Havilland  London Airframes & Engines 
7. Fairey  London Airframes 
8. Gloster  Gloucester Airframes 
9. Hawker  London Airframes 
10. Napier  London Engines 
11. Handley-Page  London Airframes 
12. Avro  Manchester Airframes 
13. Rolls Royce  Derby Engines 
14. Saunders Roe  Isle Of Wright Airframes 
15. Short Brothers  Kent Airframes 
16. Supermarine  Southampton Airframes 
17. Vickers  London Airframes 
18. Westland  Yeovil Airframes 
 
Fig. 3.1:   Source: D. Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane, p.24 
 
The companies in the Air Ministry ring underwent substantial internal changes 
between the wars.  A lot of this change was consolidation within the industry as 
the more profitable companies acquired smaller companies that became 
vulnerable to take-over.  In a new industry where the market is limited to a few 
powerful consumers like governments, the best way for a company to increase its 
share of the market quickly is to acquire its competitors.  If take-over decisions 
are made logically, the most attractive targets are those companies with good 
technological advantages that are under capitalised; or those that have existing 
contracts that cannot be serviced.  Between the wars the British aircraft industry 
underwent what can only be described as a normal period of rationalisation.  Such 
rationalisations upset those displaced from the industry, but, economically, they 
are actually a sign of health. 
 
In 1928, the attraction of the aircraft industry led the large armaments 
manufacturer Vickers to acquire the Supermarine Company43.  Supermarine had 
been investing in developing modern aerodynamic airframes to carry large 
powerful engines.  The technological development undertaken by Supermarine 
was expensive and it quickly used up the capital resources available to such a 
small company making it a likely target for a larger company like Vickers, 
particularly once the technology proved itself.  For Supermarine the Schneider 
Trophy proved the value of their design work and it made them a target for 
takeover by Vickers.   
 
In May of the same year the Armstrong Siddeley Development Company, owned 
by Armstrong Whitworth and Armstrong Siddeley, acquired A.V. Roe, and the 
manufacturer of piston components, Peter Hookers Ltd, which was renamed High 
Duty Alloys44.  This may have been a defensive measure designed to ensure that 
Vickers did not become dominant within the industry.  This type of commercial 
activity is both normal and logical, as companies attempt to gain control of as 
much of the available market as they can.   
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 A final pre-war consolidation occurred in 1935 when John Siddeley took 
advantage of Bristol’s withdrawal from a possible merger with Hawker to sell his 
holdings to T.O.M. Sopwith of Hawker who had been in the process of acquiring 
both Gloster and Bristol45.  All of this activity demonstrates an industry that was 
both vigorous and well managed.  The reliance on technology alone as an 
indicator of an industry’s vigour and success is too simplistic to be useful.  
Successful companies are those that balance all of their activities, internal 
management, technological innovation, domestic capitalisation and foreign 
investment, and achieve innovation across the majority of these activities.  During 
the inter-war years, the British aircraft industry had a number of companies 
operating within it who demonstrated these qualities.   In 1934, there were 
eighteen firms listed as part of the Air Ministry Ring giving the impression that 
many small operators were surviving on the money provided by the Air Ministry.  
The reality was that six major company groups existed.  These were Hawker 
Siddeley, Vickers Supermarine, Handley Page, Bristol and de Havilland and, in 
aero-engines, Rolls Royce.  These groups were maximising their access to 
government funds and reducing the impact of commercial failure on the parent 
company by maintaining the original companies after they had taken them over. 
 
Technological Prowess 
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In the debate over quality versus quantity, the emphasis has been on technology 
and the way in which British companies implemented technological change in 
their aircraft designs.  This emphasis occurs because there is an assumption that 
innovation is a technological process rather than a way of reacting to the overall 
environment.  The analysis of the British aircraft industry has tended to exclude 
consideration of the industry’s overall commercial performance both domestically 
and more importantly overseas. 
 
Aircraft manufacturing, and particularly aero-engine manufacture, requires the 
investment of substantial financial and other resources in order to develop leading 
edge products that will claim significant market share.  The problem with 
designing and developing aircraft is that it is only when the prototypes fly that 
technological problems with the aircraft are recognised.  It is only when 
prototypes move to production that technological problems with mass-producing 
the design are identified.  All of these problems combine to make the design, 
development and production of aircraft a highly risky business. 
 
From the very beginning historians and commentators have criticised Britain for 
having produced ‘too many duplicates’.  The argument is that the resources spent 
in developing unsuccessful aircraft types were wasted and this waste prevented 
Britain from maximising the production of the successful aircraft designs46.  This 
simplistic argument rests heavily upon hindsight.  It is only with the benefit of 
                                                 
46  See Postan, Hay and Scott, Design and Development of Weapons, p.19 
such hindsight that successful aircraft designs can be identified.  In October 1940, 
no one within the Air Ministry envisaged Avro’s Manchester as anything other 
than an unmitigated disaster.  The Air Ministry intended to cancel all orders for 
the aircraft47.  It was only when Avro’s proposal for a four-engined version of the 
Manchester was accepted and tested that the Lancaster success story began. 
 
The idea that it is important to ensure redundancy in aircraft design was well 
established prior to the outbreak of World War II.  Prime Minister Chamberlain, 
on 25th May 1938, told the House of Commons that ‘in order to get the best 
results’ from the rapid nature of technological change within the aircraft industry 
of the time ‘the inventive genius of our people in manufacturing and design’ 
should be left unrestricted48.  Chamberlain defended the development of large 
numbers of aircraft against individual specifications on the basis that at worst one 
of these designs would be a success.  Events justified Chamberlain’s argument.  
 
The decision to allow the aircraft industry to continue with its competitive 
approach to the design and development of its products paid dividends well 
beyond those expected.  Bureaucratic organisations are concerned with ensuring 
certainty and reducing conflict.  This leads to two characteristics in the 
specifications laid down by bureaucratic organisations.  First, they rarely write 
specifications that go beyond proven technology and they always attempt to 
ensure that these specifications appease the demands of as many stakeholders as 
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possible.  Like many bureaucratic requirements, the specifications issued by the 
Air Ministry suffered from their moderation.  
 
The Air Ministry and RAF were no different from any other government 
bureaucracy.  They issued specifications that were technologically feasible, met 
the multiple requirements of stakeholders and were within the constraints dictated 
by budgetary imperative.  The aircraft derived by this process were mediocre.  In 
terms of technological innovation, the main impetus came from competition 
between the manufacturers who worked hard to outdo one another in the way in 
which their design met the issued specifications. 
 
The examples of the Mosquito and the Lancaster, the two most successful aircraft 
used by Bomber Command during the Second World War, provide evidence of 
the problems posed in attempting to pick winners.  Neither of these aircraft would 
have seen operational service if the Postan view of efficient aircraft development 
had been in place.  He admits as much in the official history49.  If there had been a 
government ban on modifications or new design work, the RAF would never have 
had the Lancaster, which developed out of the poorly performing Manchester50.   
 
The design of the original Manchester was carried out to meet Air Ministry 
Specification P13/36, which had called for an airframe structure capable of 
sustaining the loads incurred in catapult launching.  To meet the specification, 
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Avro engineered the aircraft with heavier wings and used thick aluminium alloy 
sheets to absorb catapult-launching stresses.  This heavy structure made the 
Manchester too heavy for the two engines that the specification required.  The Air 
Ministry and RAF knew the Manchester was a failure, but used it on operations 
until its small bomb load and high losses finally sealed its fate.  If A.V. Roe did 
not improve the Manchester there was a strong likelihood that the company would 
be faced with the prospect of having to build Handley Page’s Halifax.  In order to 
avoid this outcome A.V. Roe redesigned the Manchester by lengthening its 
fuselage and replacing the two Vulture engines with four Merlin engines51.  The 
result was the Lancaster, the most effective British strategic bomber to serve in 
World War II.   
 
Another example of the creative interplay between official specifications and 
commercial reality was the de Havilland Mosquito.  This aircraft was a private 
venture which was taken up by the Air Ministry after the Vice-Chief of the Air 
Staff, Sir Wilfred Freeman, ordered 50 on the 1st March, 194052.  The aircraft had 
not received official sanction in its early design and development stages because it 
was made of wood and only had two engines.  Despite this, the Mosquito was 
built in substantial numbers throughout World War II and was to become one of 
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the most successful and versatile of the aircraft used by Bomber Command and 
the RAF53.   
 
Technical Developments in Aeronautics: a Comparison – The Boeing 
Monomail and the Bristol Type 142  
 
 
The first truly modern-looking aircraft designed and developed in the west was 
the Monomail Model 200, designed by Boeing in the late 1920s and finally built 
in 192954.  Designed as a high-speed mail plane, the Monomail design became the 
standard adopted by aircraft industries throughout the world.  It was the first all 
aluminium, monocoque fuselage aircraft with low set, fully cantilevered wings 
with no struts.  The aircraft also had retractable landing gear, and, in keeping with 
its smooth, streamlined fuselage, an engine covered by an anti-drag cowling55.  It 
also used tubular trussed-type spars, which became the standard construction 
system for all later Boeing aircraft56.   
 
The Monomail was 41 feet long with a wingspan of 59 feet.  It had a range of 600 
miles carrying a payload of 2,300 pounds57.  The top speed of the Monomail, 
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though, was a modest 158 mph.  This low speed was the result of the low power 
produced by the single 525-hp Pratt and Whitney Hornet radial engine58.  The 
Monomail made its first flight on 6th May 193059.   
 
Fig. 3.2:  Monomail 200  (Courtesy of Boeing Corporation) 
 
One of the more prosaic but important advances in the Monomail was the all-
metal engine cowling.  It reduced drag and shielded the engine, preventing 
ignition interference with radios carried by the aircraft.  The cowling was 
included to meet the requirement of the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC), 
who wanted improved radio reception transmission from aircraft60.  The 
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Monomail also included electrical wires wrapped in metal and earthed to the 
metal fuselage.  It was the first electronically friendly aircraft61.   
 
The Monomail led to the development of the Boeing 247, which appeared before 
the Douglas DC-2.  The designers wanted these aircraft to appeal to long distance 
American travellers by providing faster transcontinental travel than the railways.  
The 247 cut the travel time between New York and Los Angeles to 20 hours and 
seven stops62.  The DC-2 established 19 American speed and distance records63.  
In 1934, KLM purchased the DC-2 and this helped make it the first American 
aircraft to be a commercial success outside of the United States.  It was also the 
first American aircraft to challenge the comfort and space provided by British 
aircraft such as the Handley Page HP-364.  In addition, the DC-2 reduced the 
vibration and noise produced by engines strongly fixed to the fuselage by 
mounting both the engines and the passengers’ seats on rubber plugs, carpeting 
the cabin floors and placing insulation material to reduce noise in the walls of the 
fuselage65. Boeing exported five 247s to Deutsche Lufthansa in Germany and a 
single aircraft went to a private owner in China66. 
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At first glance, the British industry’s response to the development of Boeing and 
Douglas aircraft was slow.  It was a full five years before a British company built 
an all metal-stressed skin, cantilevered monoplane.  There were good reasons why 
British companies took so long to adopt the new American design features.  First, 
the British Parliament imposed no laws forbidding the construction of wooden 
aircraft and there was no imposed urgency on the adoption of the new American 
designs.  A second reason was the natural tendency of existing manufacturers to 
see how the new designs performed commercially, before they committed to 
changing their production methods.  Commercially, these were significant 
disincentives.  The adoption of stressed metal aircraft involved moving from 
woodworking to metalworking and this entailed new plant, equipment and a new 
workforce.  These are not easy changes to accomplish in an established industry. 
 
The first modern British aircraft was The Bristol Aeroplane Company’s Type 142 
and was called ‘Britain First’67.  The Type 142 had a metal framework with 
stressed-metal skin, retractable landing gear, flaps, variable pitch propellers and 
other modern features68.  Roy Fedden envisaged the aircraft in 1934 in response 
to a request from Blos Lewis, the editor of the Bristol Evening News.  Lewis had 
asked Fedden to design the aircraft in an effort to tempt Lord Rothermere, the 
publisher of The Daily Mail and Bristol Evening News, to buy a British aircraft 
instead of the American Douglas DC-2  acquired by Rothermere’s rival Max 
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Beaverbrook69.  Rothermere wanted an aircraft that was faster than Beaverbrook’s 
DC-2 and he demanded one with a speed of over 200 mph70.  Lewis had initially 
approached Fedden about building the aircraft for Rothermere and Fedden had 
agreed before clearing it with his Board, who were less than enthusiastic about the 
project71.  Fedden developed the 142 design from an existing project, the 135, a 
six-seater aircraft powered by Aquila engines.  The fact that Bristol already had a 
design, the 135, shows they had already copied American technological 
developments.  The Bristol Type 142 cost Rothermere £18,50072.   
 
The Rothermere press made much of the aircraft, named ‘Britain First’, and, in a 
grand public display, Rothermere presented the aircraft to the nation for the Air 
Ministry to use as a test aircraft73.  In June 1935, ‘Britain First’ arrived at 
Martlesham Heath for its test acceptance.  The test pilots found it a delight to fly 
and safer than any contemporary RAF aircraft.  At 280 mph at 16,000 ft74 and 307 
mph in level flight, it was faster than the American aircraft75.  To the relief of 
Bristol’s directors, the Air Ministry immediately issued specification B28/35 for a 
medium bomber, based on the performance of the 14276.   
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 Bristol altered the 142 to Type 142M, placed the wings in the mid-fuselage 
position, in order to accommodate the bomb bay, and used of two Bristol Mercury 
VIII engines as power plant77.  The aircraft was capable of carrying 1,000 lb of 
bombs at a top speed of 280 mph, which made it far more effective than any light 
bomber78.  The Air Ministry ordered 150 off the drawing board for immediate 
service, with provision made for a further 450 aircraft79.  The first production 
Type 142M, renamed ‘Blenheim’, flew on 25 June 1936, and underwent its 
airworthiness trials at Boscombe Down on 27 October 193680.  Squadron 
deliveries began on 10 March 193781.  By 1938 a further four squadrons, 44, 90, 
139 and 144 had been equipped with Blenheims82. 
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Fig. 3.3: Bristol Blenheim Mk 1        Courtesy: RAF Historical branch 
 
 
The subsequent poor operational record of the Blenheim led Postan to criticise 
Bristol’s technical capability by insinuating that Bristol was only able to produce 
the Blenheim because the Air Ministry was prescient enough to issue a 
specification for a similar aircraft in 193183.  This specification, which possibly 
led to the Bristol 135 design, gave Bristol the experience needed to build the 
Blenheim84.  The official history claims that this un-named specification created 
the ‘first of the new race of aircraft’85, but only after Bristol had ‘greater official 
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guidance than usual’86.  The official historians criticise British aircraft design of 
the 1930s as being 'merely a brilliant practical development’ grown from 
‘American seeds’87.  They also state that all of the ‘theoretical’ advances in 
aerodynamics and engines were the work of ‘people outside the British aircraft 
firms’, where the ‘practical’ men ruled88.  This view is erroneous, as the 
evaluation of British aero-engine developments will show.  America did not 
dominate aero-engine manufacture in the continental United States, let alone in 
the world market.  As contemporary American sources openly admitted, British 
designed air-cooled radial engines had practically become 'the standard power-
plant for our commercial flying'89.   
 
By the early 1930s, technological innovation and commercial reality was driving 
aircraft manufacturers into new processes including metallurgy, metalwork, 
electronics and petrochemicals.  Developments in engine design were increasing 
the need for more fundamental metallurgical knowledge and were demanding an 
increasing understanding of chemistry as fuels improved and components 
changed.  Electrical engineering became important as both civil and military 
aircraft operators added more electronic gadgets to their aircraft.  Electronics also 
became important as aircraft and engines grew in size and number of engines.  
The time and energy needed to hand crank large multiple engines were 
                                                 
86  Postan, Hay & Scott, Design and Development of Weapons, p.92 
87  Postan, Hay and Scott, Design and Development, fn, p.34 
88  Postan, Hay and Scott, Design and Development, fn, p.34 
89  G.L. Meade, Inline Liquid Cooled versus Air Cooled Engines, SAE Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 
August 1930, p.427 
unacceptable and electronic ignition became a standard.  By the mid-1930s, 
aircraft manufacturers in Britain and throughout the world had to increase their 
levels of technical expertise in areas where they had never previously ventured.  
These technical changes placed considerable strain on the industry and individual 
firms.  Yet, by 1935, Britain was operating three metal bi-plane aircraft, the 
Fairey Swordfish, Gloster Gladiator and the Gloster Gauntlet, as frontline combat 
aircraft.   
 
The British Aircraft Industry Measured by Commercial Success 
 
In the 1920s and 30s, the British industry played a leading role in the world 
aviation marketplace by developing strong ties with foreign aircraft companies in 
order to penetrate national aircraft industries.  The major strategy they used was to 
transfer British technology to the foreign partner in return for equity or financial 
rewards through royalty payments.  In the international industry, the most 
aggressive British firm was the Bristol Aeroplane Company.  Roy Fedden, in 
association with Wallace Devereux of High Duty Alloys, drove this activity and 
aggressively pursued markets through whatever means were available90.  Where 
Fedden sold his Bristol licences, Devereux signed contracts for the supply of light 
alloy forgings and, in some cases, the building and development of a local factory 
to manufacture light alloys91.  In February 1927, Fedden made the first of 50 
visits to the USA, where he established a firm reputation as one of the world’s 
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leading aero-engine designers92.  A great believer in licence agreements, Fedden 
had designed his entire system of design to make the selling of these licences 
more attractive.  Bristol’s design system used standardised drawings and 
standardised formatting of drawing for each part to enable licensees to comply 
more easily with Bristol’s quality assurance systems93.  Bristol was selling a 
franchise system for the construction of aircraft. 
 
Bristol was not alone in pursuing international commercial opportunities.  The 
Blackburn Aircraft Company designed aircraft for a number of foreign firms 
including Piaggio, Boeing Canada and Nakijima and, from 1925 until 1930, ran 
the Greek National Aircraft Factory for the Greek Government.  In 1929, 
Blackburn unsuccessfully attempted to expand its operations into the United 
States by opening a subsidiary94.  The Wall Street crash badly affected the 
initiative and it failed when its initial venture capital was used up.  
 
Other British aircraft companies were busy as well.  Fairey Aviation, which 
obtained the manufacturing rights for the Curtiss D12 engine, found itself stymied 
by the Air Ministry.  Following the development of the Fox, the Air Ministry 
ordered 12 aircraft and promptly issued a specification based on the Fox95.  This 
allowed Rolls Royce to develop the F engine, which resulted in the Hawker Fury 
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displacing the Fox96.  Richard Fairey then took his Fairey Fox and its Curtiss 
engines to Belgium where he set up production and won a ‘fair return’ in foreign 
orders97.  In this way, a British aircraft company, Fairey, established itself as the 
dominant aircraft manufacturer in Belgium when it put an American engine into a 
British airframe.   
 
Internationally, the most successful British aircraft firm remained Bristol.  Until 
1927, Bristol built the majority of its Jupiter engines overseas under licence and 
this accounts for the poor export figures which some commentators have used to 
justify their arguments of poor performance.  Amongst those holding licences 
overseas for the Jupiter were Gnome et Rhône in France; E.W. Bliss in the USA 
and Nakijima in Japan.  Amongst the governments were the Italian Government 
and Alfa Romeo and Societa Piaggio in Italy, the Swedish Government and 
Nydqvist & Holm and Trolhätten in Sweden.  In Germany Siemens und Halske 
held a licence as did SA Saurer, Arbon in Switzerland.  Soc. J. Walter a Spol in 
Czechoslovakia; SABCA in Belgium; IAMR in Yugoslavia; SA des Acières 
Manfred Weiss in Hungary; Sociedad Union Naval Levante in Spain; parquet de 
Material Aeronautico d’Alverca in Portugal; Trust d’Estat de l’Aviation in the 
USSR; the Polish Government and Skoda Co. in Poland; Bristol Engines of 
Canada and Linne-och Jern-Manufaktur AB of Finland98. 
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Bristol obtained over £10 million in royalties in the ten years from 1925 to 
193599, and Fedden, as well as receiving a ‘handsome’ salary, received 0.5 
percent commission on every engine of his design that Bristol sold100.  The £1 
million in annual royalties paid to Bristol does not include the financial returns 
from the extra business generated by the supply of support equipment, training, 
accessories and other items and services101.  In dealing with the international 
marketplace, Bristol adopted a very versatile approach that ensured its radial 
engines penetrated smaller markets or were built under licence or through 
subsidiary companies in the larger markets102.   
 
Licensing allowed foreign companies to obtain government approval to use 
Bristol engines as the holding of a manufacturing licence meant that even if a 
country went to war against Britain it could fight using British aeronautical 
technology.  It was a cost-effective approach to national security and one which 
Germany, the exemplar of the advances in the theoretical sciences of aeronautics, 
seemed to prefer.  Bristol engines powered even the Junkers K37 bomber and 
K47 dive-bomber, both clandestinely built in Sweden for the Germans103.  
 
In contrast, the United States was drawing heavily upon British innovation in 
engine design and between the wars there was a net transfer of technology from 
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Britain to the United States104.  Well-informed American engineers agreed that 
British designed radial air-cooled engines had practically become 'the standard 
power-plant for our commercial flying'105.  The high value of British engine 
technology led to Pratt and Whitney, in collusion with the United States 
Government, reverse engineering a Bristol Jupiter V engine in order to improve 
their own designs.  Fedden discovered the illicit copying of Bristol’s technology 
during a visit to Pratt and Whitney’s experimental design workshop, where he 
found the Jupiter V engine that the British government had given the United 
States Government for official evaluation completely stripped down106.   
 
In France, Bristol achieved an immediate success with the Jupiter engine at the 
Paris Aviation Salon of 1921.  Because of this, the French engine maker Gnome-
le Rhône bought a licence to manufacture the Jupiter, making France the first of 
16 countries to manufacture the Jupiter under licence107.  The dominant position 
which the Jupiter achieved in the 1920s was such that the French aeronautical 
newspaper, L’ Aero, complained of a ‘Scandale Jupiter’, when their correspondent 
discovered that seventy percent of the aircraft on display at the 1929 Paris 
Aviation Salon were powered by Jupiter engines108.  At the Paris Aviation Salon 
of 1930 out of 66 aircraft on display only three were British, an Armstrong 
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Whitworth Atlas bi-plane, a Bristol Bulldog and a de Havilland Pussmoth.  
However, the majority of the other aircraft, 3 German, 4 Italian, 2 Dutch, 2 Polish 
and 52 French, used British engines or were British designs manufactured under 
licence109.   
 
Foreign companies also drew upon the expertise of British technicians and 
executives.  One of the most notable was the British aero-engine designer S. D. 
Heron, who invented the American sodium-cooled exhaust valve, a system that 
immensely improved the transference of heat from valve heads to stems.  The 
sodium-cooled exhaust valve was one of those technological advances, according 
to the declinist view, which indicate the second rate nature of the technical 
competence of the British aircraft industry110.   
 
Bristol was not the only British aero-engine manufacturer to find success abroad. 
Armstrong Siddeley and Rolls Royce were also working very successfully.  
Armstrong Siddeley was Bristol’s major competitor in the highly profitable air-
cooled radial engine market111.  Between 1918 and 1932, Armstrong-Siddeley 
produced 16 engines, ranging from the 246 hp Puma of 1918 to the 840 hp Tiger 
of 1932112.  One technical advance that Armstrong-Siddeley made was the 
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development, in 1921, of a remotely guided Bristol F2B fighter using Sperry’s 
gyroscopic principles and pneumatically controlled servos to operate the controls.  
Armstrong-Siddeley went on in 1927 to build the Larynx, a larger and more 
powerful remotely guided aircraft for use as a flying bomb and target aircraft for 
air defence gunners.  In co-operation with Airspeed, Armstrong –Siddeley 
continued to work in the area of remotely piloted aircraft until the 1990s113.   
 
In 1922, Armstrong-Siddeley obtained a £40,000 contract from the Greek 
Government for the supply of Jaguar engines for 25 Gloster Mars Mark VI 
aircraft114.  The contract was a ‘considerable coup’ as the rival bidder had been 
Bristol with its Jupiter engine115.  The elation lay not just in winning a good 
contract but also in beating Fedden of whom the Chief Designer at Siddeley, 
Major F.M. Green, was an implacable professional competitor116. 
 
Relations between Government and Industry  
 
The British Government may not have created Britain’s aircraft industry, but, 
during the First World War, it financed its expansion and showed businessmen 
that there was a market for aircraft.  By 1916, the aircraft industry comprised both 
new companies and the older established armaments manufacturers.  All of these 
companies were accustomed to working with government.  The close relationship 
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between government and the aircraft industry was a function of a broad belief that 
aircraft were as important to national defence as were ships117.   
 
In Britain, the state and the industry were equal partners in designing, developing 
and producing aircraft118.  The aircraft industry depended upon government as a 
customer but it also depended on government to supply the primary research, 
which it appears they were selling abroad for profit.  The research was conducted 
at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough, at the Aeroplane and 
Armament Experimental Establishment at Boscombe Down, at the National 
Physical Laboratory and, during the war, at the Directorate of Scientific Research 
at the M.A.P119.  This  primary research was important as it provided the British 
aircraft industry with what appears to be a competitive advantage and it was 
readily adopted by United States firms, who had few similar resources at their 
disposal120.   
 
The British government enjoyed a dual relationship with the aircraft industry.  In 
one form, it was a client and in the second, it was co-venturer.  Different branches 
of government managed this duality.  The client relationship existed between the 
officers of the RAF, who set Air Ministry specifications for aircraft and judged the 
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performance of the respective designs.  The co-venturer relationship was exercised 
between the various government research organisations and the aircraft industry.  
This relationship provides an example of how government involvement with an 
industry can benefit that industry.  The benefit derived by the British aircraft 
industry was that they were able to pass the expensive work of proving the 
theoretical science through experimental work.  This enabled all British firms to 
benefit from a competitive advantage which their American competitors lacked.     
 
United States aircraft companies had to make up for the shortfall in government 
support in basic aeronautical research by having larger project teams involved in 
their design processes and by being net importers of aircraft technology and 
aerodynamic research.  During a visit to the United States, in 1934 a British 
official, George Bulman, the Chief Inspector of Engines of the Aeronautical 
Inspection Division of the Air Ministry, found that the Americans had only a 
passing understanding of the science underpinning current British aero-engine 
developments121.  As well, he found that the American aircraft industry was 
subject to far greater government control than their British counterparts122.  
Bulman also was amazed at the arcane budgetary practices used by the US Army 
which placed a one-year limit on the time taken to deliver a finished product.  This 
meant that American aircraft companies could only supply existing and therefore 
obsolescent aircraft, because the manufacturer had to deliver within one year from 
the date the Army had placed the order.  He also found that the US imposed a 
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stifling level of secrecy on all activity that adversely affected the development of 
new ideas by preventing open discussion123.   
 
Adding to the difficulties of the American system was the fear that the US 
Congressional oversight system seemed to generate amongst government officials 
and the broader American aircraft industry .  Bulman concluded that it took more 
strength of character and dedication to drive any change through the ‘fog, and bog, 
of officialdom’ than it did in Britain124.  However, Bulman found that the 
Americans had one significant advantage; plenty of money to finance their 
operations and develop their aircraft industry125.  
 
The Cost of Preparing the Aircraft Industry for War 
 
The technology that Britain’s aircraft manufacturers and government research 
institutions developed enabled the country to consider using air power as a 
significant part of military preparedness.  The aircraft that British aircraft firms 
were developing showed a full understanding of the advances in aerodynamics, 
engine development, fuel technology and all of the associated areas of hydraulics, 
electrical engineering, metallurgy and chemistry.  The combined effort of all of 
these allowed Britain to become a major manufacturer of aircraft during World 
War II. 
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 Between 1935 and 1945, Britain produced 139,318 aircraft weighing 724,140,000 
pounds in structure weight126.  In 1935 the annual production of aircraft was 893 
and, at the peak of production in 1944, 26,461, a production increase of 2,963 
percent over 10 years127.  In order to accomplish this type of growth the British 
Government had to fund the aircraft industry.  The decision to undertake the 
expansion of the aircraft industry was not straightforward.  There were a number 
of significant impediments to expansion and not all of them were financial.  
However, the first impediment was financial.   
 
The worldwide economic depression and the significant drop in Britain’s 
economic activity led to a significant reduction in tax collected.  The shortfall in 
taxation combined with increased welfare payments for the growing number of 
unemployed reduced the funding that the government could make available for 
re-armament.  The ability of the government to raise loans was also limited 
because Britain had already defaulted on US loans which originally were obtained 
for the supply of goods during World War I.  A further impediment was that the 
government adhered to classical economic theory. 
 
In classical theory, governments kept the books balanced, never ran deficit 
budgets and kept taxation to a minimum.  Classical economics did not provide a 
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mechanism for stimulating economic activity by running deficit budgets.  
Consequently, the effects of depression were exacerbated, as the government did 
not stimulate activity by pumping money into the economy.   P.R. Shay lays a 
large part of the blame for the slow growth in Britain’s pre-war armaments 
production at the door of the Treasury128.  There is little doubt that the financing 
of defence expenditure was the subject of a furious debate within the government.  
Treasury opposition received substantial support from Sir Neville Chamberlain, 
first as Chancellor of the Exchequer and then as Prime Minister.  The major 
concern of Treasury, including Chamberlain and an influential section of British 
society, was that increased expenditures on defence would be ‘particularly 
dangerous to the capitalist states of Western Europe with their depressed incomes, 
their high taxation and their excessive national debts’129.  The danger was that 
increased taxation would remove disposable income from people leading to 
increasing poverty and social unrest.  They did not consider that the money taken 
by government in tax would return to the economy as payments, salaries and 
wages, which, in turn, would have stimulated a recovery.   
 
The result was that government capital investment in defence remained low, 
reaching a cumulative total of only £12,700,000, in 1939.  The low rate of 
government investment suggests that aircraft firms may have re-invested profit 
into their businesses to accomplish the initial jumps in aircraft production130.  
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William Hornby supports this conclusion when he suggested that some 
managements were concerned that they would be creating an over-capacity in 
production that would only be met by a war131.  In order to address these concerns 
the government, through the Air Ministry, introduced capital clauses in their 
contracts.  From 1936 onwards, expansion of the industry’s manufacturing 
capacity was overwhelmingly at government expense132.  
 
A second impediment to the rapid expansion of British aircraft production was an 
Air Ministry fear that if they placed large orders for existing aircraft the RAF 
would be left with a large inventory of obsolete types133.  The United States Army 
Air Corps was also concerned that it could end up with a similar problem134.  In 
the mid-1930s, the technical development of airframes and aero-engines was 
progressing rapidly.  For political reasons, the Air Ministry ordered some aircraft 
types such as the Fairey Battle, Blenheim, Whitley and the Hampden.  None of 
these aircraft served in Bomber Command beyond 1941.    
 
The correctness of the reservations about rushing to order aircraft in the mid-
1930s is borne out by the problems encountered in later aircraft types.  The earlier 
Stirling, Manchester and Halifax aircraft did not perform as well in Bomber 
Command as did the Lancaster and the Mosquito.  The Hurricane was another 
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example and it did not perform as well as the Spitfire.  The lag arises from the fact 
that by the time an aircraft is designed and a prototype built for testing it is, from 
a technical perspective, approaching obsolescence unless valuable time and effort 
are expended in continuously modifying it.  The most valuable aircraft were 
those, like the Lancaster, Mosquito and Spitfire, that could absorb technical 
upgrades without having to be massively re-engineered.  
 
The restraints placed upon British re-armament during the 1930s were significant 
and it is arguable whether any British government could have overcome them.  
Under Chamberlain, the government continued to adhere to classical economic 
concepts.  The pump-priming fiscal policy being implemented in the United States 
under the ‘New Deal’ and the theoretical modelling being done by Keynes held 
little appeal for Chamberlain or Treasury.  The fear was that increased government 
expenditure would lead to increased taxation and the subsequent reduction in the 
money circulating within society would lead to an outbreak of unrest.  Britain also 
faced the problem that she had defaulted on her loans when few other governments 
had money to spare.  At the time that the decision to re-arm was made, there were 
no examples of capitalist governments successfully using spending as a means of 
stimulating the wider economy.  There was little likelihood that the British 
government could have increased its spending much beyond the £12.7 million that 
it managed up until 1939. 
 
Building the Infrastructure 
 
As war approached, the British government abandoned the commitment to 
classical economics and decided that the funding of the nation’s defences had to 
take priority.  The defaulting on the American loans would lead to significant 
difficulties for Britain in raising capital from that quarter.  The US Lend Lease 
Act partially overcame this difficulty, but that was not available in 1939.  In 
Britain, by 23rd September 1939, the government had made commitments to 75 
firms totalling £61,893,366 through the Air Ministry135.  The amount was 
divided into £30,048,866 for the extension of manufacturing capacity in 53 
firms136; £7,435,000 to 24 aircraft industry companies under the provisions of the 
‘Capital Clause’ scheme for capital extensions to buildings, plant and machinery; 
and £24,409,500 was given to 13 companies to build Shadow Factories to 
produce airframes, aero-engines, airscrews, bombs, carburettors and petrol 
containers137.  By 19th December 1939 the list had grown to 146 companies 
receiving £109,604,984, broken down into £50,968,134 for the extension of 
manufacturing capacity in 125 companies; £7,459,000 for the 24 companies  
under the provisions of the ‘Capital Clause’ scheme; and £51,177,300 for 20 
companies to operate 27 Shadow factories138. 
 
FIRMS FINANCED BY GOVERNMENTAL CAPITAL SCHEMES 
JUNE 1943 
ACTIVITY NUMBER OF FIRMS EXPENDITURE 
(Millions £) 
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Airframes a. 665 93 
Engines And Accessories 120 117 
Propellers 57 16 
Bombs 123 - 
Guns 43 8.5 
Turrets 9 - 
Instruments 88 3.3 
Aircraft Equipment 244 6.2 
Radio and Radar 55 10 
Light Alloy Fabrication 81 70 
Aluminium 16 - 
Magnesium 27 - 
Engine Repairs 23 b. - 
Airframe Repairs 146 b. - 
 a. Including undercarriages 
 b. Includes many firms involved in airframe and engine manufacture. 
Fig. 3.4: Source:  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.252 
 
If there were concerns in the Chamberlain Government about the escalating cost 
of the war, they were justified.  The cost of financing private production 
escalated throughout the war.  In June 1943, 1,697 firms had received 
£324,000,000 in government financing139.  Figure 3.4 above details the number 
of firms receiving government finance in the various areas of production activity 
at this time. 
 
Hornby estimates that by September 1944, Britain had committed £370.8 million 
to building the factories and plant necessary to produce aircraft for the war 
effort140.  By September 1945, he conservatively concludes, Britain had spent £425 
million141.  This estimate did not include money spent on government owned 
establishments and ‘certain other schemes’142.  Given that bomber aircraft 
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accounted for 52.5 percent of all aircraft production by structure weight, it is a 
conservative estimate that they consumed a similar proportion of the total 
government expenditure on factories and plant143.  The strategic air offensive 
would therefore have consumed £212.75 million, or 52.5 percent of the £425 
million reported by Hornby. 
 
The government incurred further costs in four schemes to put aircraft production 
underground in September of 1940144.  Despite a Cabinet ban on such activity in 
other than special cases, the Secretary of State for Air, Max Beaverbrook, ordered 
the four schemes145.  The cost of the four schemes justified the objections made to 
placing factories underground and all of them were overtime and over-cost and 
much more expensive than comparable factories built in the normal manner.  The 
underground projects were unsuccessful, the first Browning gun barrel did not 
appear until August 1942; and the first Bristol engine took until September 1943.  
The overall cost of this activity was around £4,250,000146.  Bomber Command’s 
portion of this amount, 52 percent, would have been £2,210,000. 
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144  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.206 
145  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.206 
146  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.207 
 
Figure 3.5: Source: Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.211 
 
The plans for increasing floor space for aircraft production relied heavily on the 
dispersal of component manufacture.  Parent companies could contract out the 
manufacture of everything from nuts and washers to engines and entire wing and 
tail assemblies.  This allowed productive capacity to be utilised well away from the 
parent firms’ factories.  The value of this capacity must have been very substantial; 
but the spread and small size of the firms involved makes it very difficult to 
estimate the value of this activity.  As a result, the figures for the overall costs 
established for plant in this chapter do not include the value of the contribution 
made by these small operations.  There was an enormous, and un-measured, 
amount of existing factory floor space incorporated into the aircraft industry at no 
additional capital cost to the government or industry.  Figure 3.6 below provides a 
listing of the floor space required per assembled aircraft and gives a good 
indication of the very large volume of the buildings needed. 
CUMULATIVE TOTAL OF CAPITAL COMMITMENT FOR 
BUILDINGS AND PLANT Dec 39-Sep 45 
(Millions £) 
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AIRCRAFT TYPE LENGTH 
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SPAN 
(feet) 
NET AREA 
REQUIRED 
(square feet) 
Mosquito 48 x 34 1,600 
Spitfire 37x 30 1,110 
Hurricane 40 x 32 1,280 
Lancaster 102 x 70 7,140 
Whitley 84 x 72 6,046 
Anson 56 x 42 2,352 
Sunderland 112 x 85 9,520 
Halifax 104 x 71 7,384 
Beaufort 58 x 44 2,552 
Blenheim 56 x 44 2,646 
Fig.3.6: Source: W. Hornby, Factories and Plant, p. 237 
 
 
An increase in the cost of transportation was one cost that sub-contracting did 
increase.  It is impossible to evaluate the impact of the increased cost of 
transporting the raw materials, components and parts around the country because 
they were absorbed without attribution by the government funded transport 
system.   Neither were the costs of improving or extending the roads and rail lines 
that dispersed factories required147.   
 
As to the cost of floor space in factories, Hornby estimates that the per-foot cost of 
a wartime aircraft factory was between 15/- and £2 pounds, without taking into 
account the cost of plant which was usually larger than the cost of the buildings148.  
Using these estimates the average cost of a heavy bomber factory would have been 
                                                 
147  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.208 
148  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.232 
between £1,241,250 and £3,310,000, and for a fighter factory, between £1,020,000 
and £2,720,000. 
 
The use of smaller factories in Britain had provided one means of quickly and 
cheaply increasing manufacturing floor space.  It was also recognition of the fact, 
not often mentioned by the critics, that Britain was running out of room.  Britain 
could not simply erect American style plants in the closely populated British Isles.  
The government had already made significant demands upon the rural population 
by seizing land for airfields, military establishments, ordnance stores and other 
wartime uses.  There was little room for more and even larger factories to be 
established.  Of course, another factor with which Britain had to contend, and the 
US did not, was the direct threat posed by German air attack.   
 
ALLOCATION OF FLOOR SPACE FOR AIRCRAFT  PLANT 
(Square Feet) 
PROCESS BOMBER 
FACTORY 
FIGHTER 
FACTORY 
Flight Sheds For Flight Assembly  180,000 130,000 
Final Assembly Of Airframe  130,000 80,000 
Component Assembly   400,000 300,000 
Fitting And Sub-Assembly  130,000 - 
Stores 400,000 450,000 
Machine Shop And Tool Room 125,000 100,000 
Other Process Work 100,000 120,000 
Administrative And Drawing Office 130,000 180,000 
Factory Service And Engineering 60,000 - 
Total 1,655,000 1,360,000 
Fig. 3.7: Source: W. Hornby, Factories and Plant, p. 237 
 
 
The use of small factories enabled a quicker initial expansion of capacity at a 
reasonable cost and the lack of available land close to large conurbations of skilled 
industrial workers and the threat posed by enemy air attack, reinforced the appeal 
of smaller, less critical targets which were widely separated.  The major 
consequence of dispersal was a decrease in efficiency and an increase in the 
expense of manufacturing aircraft.  The logistics alone would have been a 
significant and constant headache.  Any disruption in the flow of raw materials to 
parts manufacturers, or finished parts to component manufacturers, or assemble 
components to the aircraft assembly area, would have forced halts in production.  
It is little wonder that the productivity of British aircraft workers contrasted badly 
with their American counterparts.   
 
Hornby finds that the dispersion and smaller factory size limited the efficiency of 
the British industry by imposing smaller economies of scale per production unit.  
Factories with longer runs of production per month, say 50 to 60 fighters or 20 to 
30 bombers, were able to achieve levels of unit of production close to the best of 
the American plants149.  Part of the problem, Hornby suggests, was that the 
problem of low productivity in British airframe plants compared to their United 
States counterparts was due to an oversupply of assembly facilities in relation to 
the manufacturing capacity of the parts and component makers.   
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Raw Materials - Aluminium 
 
In the first of its ‘Monthly Supply and Production Reports’, the Air Ministry 
mentioned the supply of aluminium, ‘in the form of sheet, strip and extrusion’ as 
essential for the manufacture of aircraft150.  Increased capacity was planned 
through the extension of Northern aluminium’s factory at Banbury in South 
Wales and their taking over of a disused steel works at Rogerston for Aluminium 
production under Northern’s management151.  These two plants were to produce 
an expected 20,000 tons of aluminium annually152.  One company, High Duty 
Alloys, would use the old Beardmore Works at Motherwell to produce an 
expected 7,500 tons per annum.  The Air Ministry also funded a Canadian plant  
capable of producing 5,000 tons153 per year at a projected cost of between 
£2,250,000 and £2,750,000154.  North America was an important source of 
aluminium for Britain155 and between 1938 and 1945, Britain imported 1,375,600 
tons of bauxite and 812,900 tons of aluminium from these countries156.  The 
figures for imports of aluminium do not include the aluminium lost at sea.  Hornby 
estimated the cost of purchasing bauxite and aluminium and of building aluminium 
capacity in Canada at £17,000,000157.   
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156 Central Statistical Office,  Statistical Digest of the War, Table 96, p.110 
157  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.213 
These supplies were supplemented by secondary (used) aluminium, scavenged 
from old pots and pans or the remains of crashed and written off aircraft.  This 
latter source provided 448,860 tons of aluminium158.  The total amount of 
aluminium imported or produced from imported Bauxite in Britain from 1938-
1945 was 1,521,190 tons159.  The aircraft industry consumed a substantial 
proportion of this aluminium and bauxite.  Of the aluminium used by the aircraft 
industry, it is reasonable to say that Bomber Command consumed 794,000 tons, 
52.5 percent of it, at a cost of £8.9 million.  
 
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCED IN BRITAIN
1935-1945
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Year
N
um
be
r o
f A
irc
ra
ft 
Pr
od
uc
ed
 
Fig. 3.8:  Source: central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, p. 152 
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159  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War , Table 97,  p.111 
Airframe Construction 
 
Aluminium was the major raw material for airframes and the production of these  
has been the subject of much research into the relative efficiency of the industry 
overall.  As already noted, from1935 until 1945 Britain produced 139,318 aircraft 
with a total structural weight of 724,140,000 lbs160.  A significant amount of this 
aluminium went into heavy bombers.  Of the aircraft built in British factories, 
14,706 were heavy bombers destined for Bomber Command.  They accounted for 
10.5 percent of all aircraft manufactured in Britain between 1935 and 1945, and 
13.5 percent of all aircraft manufactured between 1940 and 1945161.   
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Fig. 3.9:   Source:  Statistical Digest of the War, p.153 
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161  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, Tables 130 and 131, pp. 152-153 
Numerically, the number of heavy bombers does not appear to be large.  
Measured in terms of structure weight the heavy bomber becomes far more 
significant.  Between 1940 and 1945, the three British heavy bombers - the 
Halifax, Stirling and Lancaster - accounted for 45.81 percent of all British aircraft 
production.  When medium bombers are included, many of which served in 
Bomber Command, the percentage rises to 52.2 percent162. 
 
The hope that Britain would be able to supplement her domestic production with 
US imports from the US was never realised.  During the period of the war, Bomber 
Command received 1,253 aircraft from this source, a small contribution given the 
size of British production of similar aircraft.  However, the subject of these aircraft 
and their costs will be dealt with in Chapter 4. 
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Fig. 3.10:  Source: Statistical Digest of the War, p.156 
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Aero-engines 
 
Sebastian Ritchie claims that the aero-engine lay ‘at the heart of aircraft design, 
production and programming’163.  According to Sir Alex Cairncross, the aero-
engine dictated aircraft production because of the length of time it took to develop 
a working engine and to get it into mass production164.  In terms of its aero-engine 
capability, Britain was in the lucky position of having what was probably the most 
advanced aero-engine manufacturing sector in the world.  British aero-engine 
firms dominated the world aircraft industry from the early 1920s until the mid-
1930s and the technological and competitive advantages that they enjoyed put 
them in a good position to develop further highly successful engines.  The most 
famous of these were the large liquid cooled inline engines of Rolls Royce.  The 
technological advantage that Rolls Royce built up using the wartime support of 
government strengthened the company so that it was positioned to dominate the 
aero-engine market after the end of World War II.  
 
Today Rolls Royce engines are widely used by United States manufacturers and 
by other countries including France and Germany.  In September 1940, the 
Packard Company of New Jersey began the process of setting up production of the 
Merlin variant, the V-1650 liquid-cooled engine.  The capabilities of the first two 
Packard ‘Merlins’ were demonstrated in Detroit on August 2, 1941, when a group 
of senior government officials and industry representatives observed a test run of 
                                                 
163  Quoted in Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, p.113 from Cairncross, Planning in Wartime, p.15 
164  Quoted in Ritchie, Industry and Air Power, p.113 
the engines.  Full production began in 1942165.  The time lag of over 18 months 
for a United States engine firm to accomplish mass production of an already 
developed engine gives some indication of the complexity of setting up engine 
plants.  It also shows that there was little difference between British or American 
firms when it came to incorporating new technology, and it is evidence that 
perhaps Britain’s aero-engine manufacturers were as efficient as were their 
United States counterparts. 
 
By 1945, Rolls Royce had produced 100,000 Merlin engines in 24 marks in the 
United Kingdom alone, along with 10,000 Griffons in 17 marks by Rolls Royce 
and its shadow factories166.  The Merlin accounted for 32.56 percent of all aero-
engines manufacture in Britain during World War II167.  A further 16,000 Merlins 
were produced in the U.S.A and numbers of them were exported to Britain for use 
in Spitfire, Mosquito and Lancaster production168.  In order to ensure a timely 
supply of engines, the Air Ministry decided to build shadow factories, one to 
manufacture 400 Bristol engines a month, and another to manufacture 2,000 
Napier engines a year.   
 
 
 
AIRCRAFT ENGINES 
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Year Engines 
Produced 
Engines 
Imported 
Engines Repaired 
1939 12,499 - - 
1940 24,074 - - 
1941 36,551 2,704 20,082 
1942 53,916 3,145 27,563 
1943 57,985 9,441 35,832 
1944 56,931 11,327 44,594 
1945 22,821 4,528 26,689 
Total 275,896 31,145 154,760 
 
Fig. 3.11: Source: Statistical Digest of the War, p.155 
 
Motorcar makers, Rover, Standard Motorcars, Austin and Rootes respectively 
made and repaired Armstrong Siddeley, de Havilland and Rolls Royce engines.    
These companies contributed 34 percent of all engines manufactured during 
World War II169. 
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Fig.3.12: Source: Statistical Digest of the War, pp.152, 155 
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 As can be seen from Figure 3.12 above, engine production and supply from repair 
and import remained ahead of requirements and grew rapidly from 1940 onwards.  
By 1943, the British Government had spent £117 million financing the expansion 
of the aero-engine industry.  This represented 27.5 percent of the total amount of 
£425,000,000 expended on all aspects of the aircraft industry at that time (see 
Figure 3.4 above)170. 
 
TOTAL ENGINE DELIVERIES JUNE 1939 TO DECEMBER 1945* 
Engine Deliveries Number Of Types 
Bristol  100,932 6 
Rolls Royce  112,183 5 
Napier 5,267 2 
Armstrong Siddeley 32,868 1 
De Havilland 10,905 1 
Total 262,155 15 
* Excluding Jet engines of which Rolls Royce delivered 661, in 2 types, and de Havilland 85 of one type 
Fig.3.13:   Source: Hornby, Factories and Plant , p.252 
 
Aero-engine Accessories  
 
The Ministry of Aircraft Production also substantially extended the use of sub-
contractors to make components of engines under the supervision of existing 
motorcar or aero-engine manufacturers who had the engineering expertise required 
for the tooling up the production of engines.  Other components, such as 
carburettors and magnetos, were manufactured by specialist firms such as Hobsons 
of Wolverhampton, Standard in Coventry (both carburettors) and B.T.H. of 
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Leicester for magnetos171.  The provision of these products, as well as of spark 
plugs, was centrally controlled by the Air Ministry and, later, the MAP and they 
were issued free of charge to the manufacturing firms on receipt of their orders172.  
 
The Supply and Production Reports in September and December 1939 show 
Hobsons allocated £30,000 for extensions of plant and £215,000 for the 
construction of a shadow factory for carburettors173.  Standard also had £267,000 
allocated for the building of another shadow carburettors factory and B.T.H. 
received £421,000 for its shadow magneto plant.  Another company, Simms Motor 
Units, received £25,000 for magneto production174 and Rotax received £230,000 
under the ‘Capital Clause Scheme’175.  The two largest employers in these areas, 
B.T.H and Rotax, employed approximately 7,000 and 6,000 workers respectively 
at about 10 plants, showing that considerable resources and manpower were 
invested in the production of these essential products176. 
 
As with engine accessories, the Air Ministry and the MAP carefully controlled 
propellers.  The government purchased all propellers and then issued them upon 
demand, at no charge, to aircraft construction firms.  The reason for this was that 
the manufacture of variable pitch airscrews was much more complex.  This 
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activity demanded a very skilled workforce and highly specialised milling 
machinery177.  The British variable pitch propeller arose out of a joint venture 
between Bristol and Rolls Royce, which in 1937 came, to be the Rotol 
Company178.  Rotol finally developed its hydraulic variable pitch propeller from 
the Hele Shaw and by 1939 both Rotol and de Havilland, which persisted with its 
own design, had their respective propellers in large-scale production179.  In order to 
achieve this outcome the British Government invested £1.257 million in the period 
between September and December 1939180.  As a result of this investment and the 
both companies were able to develop modern plants and de Havilland’s plant at 
Boulton went on to become the most self-contained and automated in the 
country181.  
 
Workforce 
 
At its peak in June/July of 1943, the Air Ministry and MAP had approximately 
3,619,500 civilian workers under their direct or indirect control182.  This figure 
represents 20.7 percent of the total civil work force available at the time; or over 
one in every five people.  The demands of the Air Ministry, Air Staff and the MAP 
                                                                                                                                  
176  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.266 
177  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.267 
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179  Bulman, An Account of Partnership, pp. 209-211 
180  PRO CAB 68/1, Supply and production First report by the Air Ministry, 23rd Sept 39 and PRO CAB 
68/3, Supply and Production Report by the Air Ministry, 19th Dec 1939 
181  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.268 
182  Compiled from manpower tables in the Statistical Digest of the War, pp. 8-29 
was to be a major problem as demands for more and more workers for the various 
aircraft production programmes strained the available workforce.  The crux of the 
problem lay in the inability of the aircraft industry to meet the optimistic 
production targets that had been set.  A lack of manpower was one of the major 
reasons given for the continued shortfall in production and the obvious answer was 
to increase the workforce available to the MAP.  On the other hand, the size of the 
Air Ministry and MAP demands on available labour was having adverse effects on 
the other services and the overall economy.   
 
The figure of 3,619, 500 is twice as much as the 1.8 million suggested by 
Cairncross183 and more than double the 1.5 to 1.6 million identified by Hornby184.  
The major reason for this is that both Cairncross and Hornby confined their 
analysis to the number of people directly working within the airframe, aero-engine 
and closely associated industries.  The problem with this approach is that it serves 
to minimise the size of the manpower resources that the Air Ministry and MAP 
used as they worked to build and administer the entire infrastructure needed to 
support manufacturing and operations.   
 
The figures supplied by Hornby do not take into account male workers aged over 
65 years or females over 60 years; and neither do they take into account work 
done by workers under 16185.  A further group not counted are the employees of 
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sub-sub-contractors, that is, those people employed in carrying out small work in 
small factories employing less than 100 persons, of which there were a 
considerable number.  These omissions make Hornby’s calculations conservative, 
as the total numbers employed in the aircraft industry were probably much larger 
than previously accepted. 
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Fig.3.14: Source: Statistical Digest of the War, pp.8, 9, 20 
 
 
The distribution of workers within aircraft manufacturing shown above is at the 
peak of activity in 1943.  Hornby estimates that the 18 pre-war airframe-
manufacturing firms employed approximately 243,769 workers186.  Amongst the 
largest employers was the Hawker Group, which employed 100,000 people.  Of 
these, Hawker had 65,000 workers in its own plants and another 35,000 people at 
A.V. Roe187.  Despite employing such large numbers, Hawker, like many of its 
competitors, deployed its workforce in a large number of small factories spread 
around the country.  This dispersal of workers and productive capacity in small 
factories is often criticised as an example of British inefficiency.  These criticisms 
are based on the higher per capita costs associated with providing facilities for 
smaller numbers of workers.  Hornby suggests that the labour costs in a factory 
employing 3,000 workers were half those of a factory with a work force of 
1,000188.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In the last forty years, a debate has developed between historians of the British 
aircraft industry about the relative efficiency and technical prowess of Britain’s 
aircraft manufacturers and the wisdom, or otherwise, of the Air Ministry and 
government officials who supported the industry.  While this debate has produced 
a great deal of useful information, it has led historians of the aircraft industry into 
a wider controversy over the decline of Britain as an industrial power.  The debate 
itself is rather pointless.  The claims and counter claims over such esoteric matters 
                                                 
186  Hornby, Factories and Plant, p.241 
187  Hornby, Factories and Plant, pp. 239-240 
188  Hornby, Factories and Plant, pp. 247 
as how long it took an individual British, German or American worker to add 
another pound of structure weight to an aircraft is technically irrelevant and 
detracts from the commercial reality in which the industry was operating. 
 
The conventional view that the British aircraft industry emerged from World War 
I as a second rate performer is based on an idea that the industry was completely 
dependent upon orders from the Air Ministry.   A reassessment of the evidence 
suggests that this was not the case.  The support offered by successive British 
governments was undoubtedly important to the aircraft industry, but it only relied 
on orders from the Air Ministry to maintain profitability in their UK based 
operations, or in those divisions of their companies that manufactured aircraft.  
From my analysis, it appears that the British aircraft industry was shrewdly 
managed to make full use of its opportunities and advantages. 
 
One of the most important facets of the relationship between the British 
government and its aircraft industry was the unfettered access that the latter had to 
the output of basic research from the government-owned research organisations.  
The basic and applied research undertaken by these establishments removed a 
significant overhead from the account books of British aircraft firms and enabled 
some of them to dominate the world aircraft industry by exporting British 
government technology for profit.  One of the outstanding characteristics of the 
interwar British aircraft industry was the extent of its involvement in the aircraft 
industries of other countries.  Outside of the Commonwealth nations, British 
aircraft firms were heavily involved in the domestic aircraft industries of 
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, the USA, the USSR and Yugoslavia.  This did not 
include their involvement in South America or other parts of the world including 
Africa.  Far from being overly dependent on the government, the evidence 
suggests that the British aircraft firms used the government’s support to position 
themselves as suppliers of modern aircraft technology to a large number of 
foreign governments, including some that Britain may have regarded as less than 
friendly.    
 
The technology that British firms like Bristol were transferring to other nations 
was also of an excellent standard.  Many American authorities of the day publicly 
admitted the importance of the British technology to their own industry.  The 
significant contribution of Sir Roy Fedden to the American aero-engine industry 
of the time was probably the best example of this dependence but there were a 
number of other British firms involved in the American marketplace. 
 
The interaction between these groups enabled the British to produce aircraft that 
met the operational requirements of the RAF.  The problems that were 
encountered in British aircraft in the early part of World War II were not due to a 
failure of British technical capability or to a lack of government funding or an 
over supply of government short-sightedness.  Instead, as Colin Sinnott has 
identified, the Air Staff had not foreseen a war against Germany in the early 
1920s and subsequently the aircraft that they specified did not have the 
characteristics necessary for such a war189.  The identification of Germany as the 
most likely enemy led to the rapid expansion of the aircraft industry and the 
production of a remarkable range of aircraft of which three were to be amongst 
the most advanced in the world until 1944/45. 
 
The British aircraft industry was not a second rate industry operating in a nation 
in decline, rather it was a commercially astute industry that managed to have the 
British government finance a large part of its basic research and supply it with a 
source of trained technical labour.  The British aircraft industry was an 
imaginative, ruthless and commercially successful group of firms who knew how 
to exploit their governments’ sensitivities and the sensitivities of foreign 
governments to obtain the funds they needed to dominate the world aviation 
market.  In Britain, the industry was to produce the aircraft that Bomber 
Command was to use to carry out the strategic air offensive against Germany.  
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C h a p t e r  4  
THE AIRCRAFT OF THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE 
 
Britain created her aircraft industry in order to have access to the modern aircraft 
that she needed to conduct a strategic air offensive as part of her military 
campaigns in a European war.  Early fears that the RAF may not have had the 
power to resist the Luftwaffe proved to be ill founded.  These concerns arose out 
of the fear generated by poor intelligence assessments of German strength and the 
faith of the Air Staff in the psychological effects of bombing.  When the war 
came in 1939, the British aircraft industry and the government had advanced the 
preparations necessary to deliver the heavy aircraft needed to conduct a strategic 
air offensive against Germany.   
 
Britain’s self-sufficiency in the manufacturing of aircraft is the strongest evidence 
of the capabilities of the aircraft industry during World War II.  Over the period of 
the war, Britain manufactured 43,322 bombers of which 16,266 were heavy 
bombers1.  The majority of these aircraft served in Bomber Command where 10, 
949 of them would be destroyed in action or in operational crashes2.  The 
remaining aircraft were also an economic write-off.  Heavy bombers have no 
usefulness outside their roles as heavy bombers and the rapid disappearance of 
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aircraft like the Lancaster and the B-17 at the end of the war would seem to bear 
this out3.  Effectively, the bomber programme was a wartime necessity from 
which Britain would derive no fundamental long-term economic benefit.  In 1945, 
the British aircraft industry experienced a second post-war downturn but this time 
there was a booming American industry with the experience, money and domestic 
market that would enable it to become the dominant aircraft industry in the world. 
 
In researching the material for this analysis, the most important sources of 
information were the Ministry of Aircraft Production’s Price Books, held at the 
RAF Museum Hendon, and the on-line details of aircraft types and prices on the 
website of the United States Air Force (USAF) Museum.  In only two cases, 
Armstrong Whitworth’s Whitley Bomber and Lockheed’s B-34 Ventura, were 
these sources deficient in detail on prices.  In both these cases, I have used an 
estimate of prices4.  The estimated prices for the Whitley and Ventura are the 
average cost per pound of structure weight of similar aircraft built at the time.  In 
any event, these two aircraft account for only 2.78 percent of all Bomber 
Command sorties and were not major contributors to the cost of the strategic air 
offensive5.   
 
One useful clue provided by the above sources was that the prices paid by the 
British government for British manufactured aircraft was substantially less than 
                                                 
3  Compare the rapid disappearance of the bomber aircraft with the continued use of the DC-3 
4  US Air Force Museum, www.wpafb.af.mil, 23rd October, 2002 
5  Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p.707 
that paid by the US Government for similar aircraft made in the USA.  This fact, 
underlined by the frequent changes in British aircraft prices, indicates that the Air 
Ministry constantly adjusted the price paid for aircraft in order to offset the value 
of government investment.   
 
The analysis provided here is the first quantitative measurement of the overall size 
of Britain’s spending on the strategic air offensive aircraft during World War II 
and the prices paid for the 15 types of aircraft constituted a significant part of the 
overall cost.  The direct cost of bomber aircraft supplied to Bomber Command 
during World War II is conservatively assessed here as being £1.3 billion in 1942 
prices.  The evidence supporting £1.3 billion as being conservative lies in the 
marked disparity between the recorded prices of American and British aircraft 
types of the period.  The documentary evidence suggests that American aircraft 
and aircraft parts were, on average, over twice as expensive as a similar aircraft of 
British manufacture.  For example, the USAF Museum reports the price of a 
Boeing B-17 as being equivalent to £64,6376.  Technologically, the Boeing B-17 
was an equivalent aircraft to a Lancaster7, yet the average price paid by the MAP 
for a Lancaster during World War II was £31,985, £32,652 less than the cost of 
the B-178. 
 
                                                 
6  US Air Force Museum, www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/engines/eng33.htm, 23rd October, 2002 
7  Ministry Of Aircraft Production, Price Books, Contract No. Aircraft/239 (W.22550) plus 7,000 lbs 
payload 
8  Ministry Of Aircraft Production,  Price Books,  Average of all prices paid for all Lancasters listed 
The discrepancy is also seen in the difference in price between a Martin B-26G 
Marauder, a two engined aircraft costed at £53,4119, and a Wellington at 
£20,60610.  It is unlikely that the price discrepancy is due to technological 
differences.  These aircraft were technologically very similar with neither nation’s 
aircraft industry enjoying a significant lead in technology.  The difference cannot 
be put down to inefficiency in the American aircraft industry as its size, 
organisation and capitalisation are acknowledged as being well above that of its 
British counterpart.  It is also unlikely that the American aircraft firms were able 
to profiteer to the degree where they could double the price of a finished aircraft.  
The evidence indicates that the American price reflects the true values of a B-17 
and Liberator whereas the MAP Price Books reflect the values of the Lancasters 
and Wellingtons after the British government had taken into account the subsidies 
and capital grants provided to the manufacturers.    
 
A comparison of the price of a finished Merlin engine provides more evidence 
that British prices took into account the government’s investment in industry.  
The price quoted for the Packard Merlin during World War II by the USAF 
Museum is $US25,000.00.  Using a conversion factor of $US4.25 to £1.00, this 
equates to £5,952.3811 or £3,452.38 more than the £2,500.0012 British price for a 
                                                 
9  US Air Force Museum, http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/air_power/ap19.htm 
10  Ministry of Aircraft Production,  Price Books,  Average of all prices paid for all Wellingtons listed 
11  US Air Force Museum,  www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/engines/eng33.htm, 23rd October, 2002 
12  Target Costs in War Savings, Vol 3, No.11,  Feb, 1943, p.25 
Rolls Royce engine quoted by the Royal Air Force Museum at Hendon13.  The 
Merlin engine built by Packard and Rolls Royce was the same design and Packard 
benefited from the fact that Rolls Royce had completed the design and 
development of the Merlin.  The more expensive price for the Packard-built 
Merlin is most likely a simple reflection of the true cost, plus profit than the Rolls 
Royce price. 
 
The documentary evidence available in the PRO and through the RAF Museum at 
Hendon gives prices that take into account the investment of public money in the 
expansion of the aircraft industry.  This means that the true cost of a Lancaster 
consists of the price paid to Avro for the aircraft and a proportion of total 
government expenditure in factories, plant and government supplied goods and 
services.   
 
In the case of the price of a Lancaster, the MAP Price Book may be as much as 50 
to 60 percent below the true cost.  Harry Holmes estimates that the average price 
for a Lancaster Bomber was £58,97414.  If Holmes’s figure is correct, the total 
cost of 7,377 Lancaster aircraft would have been £435 million, a figure almost 
twice the £235.9 million estimated here.  Despite this, the estimate derived in this 
chapter is conservative as I have opted to separately identify the cost of factories 
and plant in the last chapter and will separately analyse the cost of government 
                                                 
13  Attachments to letter from P.J.V. Elliott, Keeper of Research and Information, RAF Museum, 
Hendon,  5th Sep 96.  It appears that RAF Museum Hendon drew their information from a wartime 
publication, ‘Target Costs’, War Savings, Vol 13, No.11, Feb 1943, p.25 
supplied goods and services later in this chapter.  As the subject of this thesis is 
the overall cost of the strategic air offensive, and not the cost of individual 
aircraft, this approach is better than simply assigning an inflated price to 
individual aircraft based on my estimate of the proportion of expenditures the 
British government may have made on that aircraft type.   
 
The analysis will cover the aircraft used by Bomber Command during World War 
II before detailing government expenditure on equipment such as machine guns, 
radars and radios and, finally, spare parts supply.  The description of the 15 
aircraft used by Bomber Command during the strategic air offensive has been 
broken into three groups, in order of the overall contribution of each to the 
strategic air offensive.  The groupings reflect the contribution made by the aircraft 
in terms of the overall offensive.  The first group consists of five aircraft: the 
Wellington, Lancaster, Halifax, Mosquito and Stirling.  Britain built 34,436 of 
these aircraft and between them they carried out 88.9 percent of Bomber 
Command’s wartime sorties15.  The Lancaster was responsible for 40.1 percent 
(156,192 sorties) of all sorties during World War II16.  These aircraft dominated 
the strategic air offensive.   
 
The second group comprises the five early wartime models, 8,886 individual 
aircraft, which Bomber Command had used before the heavy bombers became 
                                                                                                                                  
14  H. Holmes gives a figure of £58.974 for a Lancaster.  See H. Holmes, AVRO Lancaster: The 
Definitive Record, Airlife Publishing, Shrewsbury, 1997, p.35 
15  Middlebrook and Everitt,  Bomber Command War Diaries, p.707 
available.  The Battle, Hampden, Blenheim, Whitley and Manchester carried out 
10 percent of all sorties and made a small contribution to the overall campaign.  
The final group of aircraft that served in Bomber Command were the five 
American imports, the Boston, Boeing B-17, Ventura, Liberator and Mitchell, 
which totalled 2,217 aircraft17.  These American aircraft conducted 4,656 sorties 
in Bomber Command.  This represents 1.1 percent of all sorties within the 
Command for the war and it clearly shows that Britain’s aircraft industry was able 
to supply the nation’s requirements for bomber aircraft. 
 
The analysis lays out the prices paid for the bomber aircraft, their equipment and 
their spare parts during World War II.  The costs identified here are conservative 
but the analysis of government investment in factories and plant provided in 
Chapter Three serves to identify the components of cost that are not reflected in 
the prices that the British government paid to British aircraft manufacturers for 
the aircraft that would carry out the strategic air offensive.     
                                                                                                                                  
16  Middlebrook and Everitt,  Bomber Command War Diaries, p.707 
17  PRO AVIA 15/2023, Letter from C. Fairey with British Air Mission in Washington to 
Minister of Aircraft Production, 14th July 1944 
The Aircraft  
 
Both the Vickers Wellington and Handley Page’s Hampden arose from Air 
Ministry Specification B.9/3218, which sought the development of a twin 
engined heavy bomber weighting approximately 6,500 lbs empty19.  The 
specification attempted to keep the resulting aircraft within the limits the Air 
Ministry feared the Geneva Conference on disarmament might impose20.  Of the 
two aircraft, the Wellington was the more successful.  By 1946, Vickers had 
produced 11,460 Wellingtons21, at an average cost of £14,367.77 per aircraft22.  
The total cost of this aircraft type was £164,654,753 which makes this aircraft 
the second most costly after the Lancaster.   
 
The Wellington had an all-metal geodetic framework and fabric skin, which 
gave it exceptional durability on operations.  The aircraft could carry a 
substantial bomb load of 4,500 lbs over a range of 1,540 miles at an average 
cruising speed of 180 mph23.  The length of the Wellington’s service is a 
reflection of its utility and its roles including carrying freight, reconnaissance, 
                                                 
18  Postan, Scott and Hay, Design and Development of Weapons, p.11 
19  C. Bowyer, Wellington at War, in Halifax and Wellington, Promotional Reprint Company, 
Leicester, 1994, p.135 
20  RAF And Bomber Command Association,  www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft/ 
Wellington.html, 23rd October, 2002 
21  Bowyer, Wellington at War, in Halifax and Wellington, p.135 
22  Ministry of Aircraft Production,  Price Books 
23 RAF and Bomber Command Association, www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft/Wellington.html, 
23rd October, 2002 
maritime patrol, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) and strategic bombing24.  
The Wellington was the longest serving operational British bomber aircraft of 
World War II.  The first operational sorties of a Wellington took place on 3rd 
September 193925 and it went on to fly 47,409 sorties, or 12.16 percent of 
Bomber Command’s 389,809 sorties identified to date26.  The wide spread use 
of the Wellington in other theatres, including the Middle East, Mediterranean, 
East Africa, India, and in Coastal and Transport Commands, means that only a 
proportion of its cost is attributable to the strategic air offensive27.  If the value 
of the Wellington used by Bomber Command is restricted to the 1,727 
Wellingtons (15.06 percent of all Wellingtons manufactured) that were lost on 
Bomber Command operations28, the cost is £24,813,139.00.  This is a 
conservative cost, as it does not include the Wellingtons written off within the 
Command or transferred to other Commands after serving in Bomber 
Command. 
 
Avro Manchester and Lancaster 
Although the Manchester did not play a significant role in the strategic air 
offensive, it did provide the basis for the Lancaster, which was to become the 
mainstay of the campaign.  A.V. Roe designed the Manchester in response to 
                                                 
24  Postan, Scott and Hay, Design and Development of Weapons, p.15 
25  Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p.21 
26  Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p.707 
27  Postan, Scott and Hay, Design and Development of Weapons, p.15 and C. Bowyers, Wellington at 
War, p.135 
Air Ministry specification P.13/36.  The aircraft had two Vulture engined 
aircraft and an all-up weight of 45,000 lbs, as against the four engines and 
55,000 lbs of the Lancaster29.  The original intention was for 1,500 Manchesters 
before April 194230.  The size of the order was beyond the productive capability 
of Avro and the Air Ministry formed a group of companies into a production 
group led by Avro Ltd.  The Manchester Group included Metropolitan Vickers, 
Sir W.G. Armstrong Vickers and Vickers Armstrong Ltd. at Castle Bromwich31.   
 
The major problem with the Manchester was the Rolls Royce Vulture engine, 
which was an indifferent attempt by Rolls Royce to avoid diverting design and 
development resources from the Merlin to other projects32.  The Vulture was 
highly complex as it combined two Rolls Royce Kestrel engines mounted on 
one crankshaft33.  The resulting Vulture was extremely unreliable and difficult 
to maintain due to constant over-heating34.   
 
                                                                                                                                  
28  Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p.707 
29  Postan, Scott and Hay, Design and Development of Weapons, p.92 
30  Postan, Hay and Scott, Design and Development of Weapons, p.125, n6 
31  PRO AVIA 15/1466, Programme and Policy of the Lancaster Group, 1943 
32  Bulman, An Account of Partnership, p.273 
33  Bulman, An Account of Partnership, p.273 
34 RAF and Bomber Command Association, 
www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft/manchester.html, 23rd October, 2002 
The problems with the Manchester were obvious from the beginning and the 
RAF officers who inspected the prototypes were quick to express their concerns.  
Amongst these officers were Air Marshals Lord Tedder and Sir Wilfred 
Freeman.  On their visit to Avro, they flew in the second prototype of the plane 
and afterwards discussed the failings of the aircraft with Avro Chief Designer, 
Sir Roy Dobson.  Dobson asked Freeman about Avro having future access to 
Merlin engines for the Manchester.  Freeman assured Dobson that there were 
plenty of Merlins and Dobson then produced two wings with four engines, 
attached them to a model of a Manchester, and asked the two RAF officers, 
‘How’s that?’35. 
 
The average cost of a Manchester was £36.812.25, or £7,362,450.0036 for the 
total 200 aircraft manufactured.  The higher than usual average price paid was 
due to the small production run of the aircraft.  Of the 200 aircraft that were 
manufactured, 76 (38 percent)37, were destroyed whilst on charge to Bomber 
Command.  The financial value of these losses was £2,797,731.00.  In the face 
of the Manchester’s failure, the quick thinking by the designers and access to 
the Merlin engine allowed A.V.Roe to retrieve the situation, as they 
                                                 
35  Lord Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, 
Cassell and Company, London, 1966,  pp. 9-10 
36  Ministry of Aircraft Production,  Price Books 
37  Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p.707 
incorporated the vast majority of the materials, components and parts produced 
for the Manchester into the Lancaster38.  
 
A.V. Roe’s Managing Director, Sir Roy Dobson, and Chief Designer, Roy 
Chadwick, salvaged the Lancaster from the wreckage of the failed 
Manchester39.  The task was not easy and Avro faced some hostility from within 
the Air Ministry and MAP, whereby not everybody was convinced that A.V.Roe 
could salvage the Manchester project.  The Air Ministry initially denied A.V. 
Roe access to the additional materials; particularly the four Merlin engines that 
they needed to develop the prototype aircraft40.  Although it is difficult to 
establish how strong the resistance was, it did not stop E.W. Hives at Rolls 
Royce arranging for A.V. Roe to have the Merlins41.  
 
The Lancaster bomber was the most effective British strategic bomber of World 
War II.  This aircraft conducted 40 percent (156,192) of the 389,80942 sorties 
and dropped an estimated 650,000 tons of bombs between 3rd of March 1942 
and 3rd of May 1945.  This equates to 68 percent of all bomb tonnage dropped 
                                                 
38  PRO AVIA 15/1466, Programme and Policy of the Lancaster Group, 1943 
39  See above, and Harris, Foreword in M. Garbett and B. Goulding, Lancaster at War, Promotional 
Reprint Company, Leicester, 1992, p. 7.  Also, see Postan, Scott and Hay, Design and Development 
of Weapons, p. 94 and Bulman, Account of Partnership, p.273.  Bulman suggests that Hives and 
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40  H. Holmes, AVRO Lancaster: The Definitive Record, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1997, p.10 
41  Holmes, AVRO Lancaster, Shrewsbury, 1997, p.10 
during the entire war by Bomber Command.  The cost of these operations was 
the loss of 4,26543 of the total production of 7,366 Lancasters built in Britain 
and Canada44.  These figures, 58 percent, are the largest losses incurred by any 
aircraft type that served in Bomber Command during World War II.   
 
The reason for this high casualty rate amongst Lancasters was the high 
operational tempo of these aircraft against the most difficult targets attacked 
during the strategic air offensive45.  The Lancaster undertook 40 percent of 
Bomber Command’s offensive sorties with a loss of 57.9 percent of the total 
number of Lancasters produced.  This loss rate, which appears high, was 
actually quite good when compared with an aircraft like the Hampden.  In the 
case of the Hampden, which undertook only 4.25 percent of Bomber 
Command’s operational sorties46, the loss rate was 43.56 percent (633) of the 
1,453 aircraft manufactured. 
 
Sir Arthur Harris lauded the Lancaster as the most successful British strategic 
bomber of the Second World War.  It also won the respect of the men who 
served in Bomber Command.  Harris referred to the Lancaster as ‘that shining 
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sword’ that was ‘beyond doubt, a major factor in beating the Nazi enemy’47.  As 
Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command Harris stated in his Despatch, ‘the 
Lancaster, measured in no matter what terms, was, and still is, incomparably the 
most efficient.  In range, bomb carrying capacity, ease of handling, freedom 
from accident and particularly in casualty rate it far surpassed the other heavy 
types’48.  Harris admired the Lancaster so much he later stated that he was 
willing to forego ‘a year’s industrial production from the Halifax factories if the 
government forced the conversion of these factories to the production of 
Lancasters’49.  In order to build the required number of Lancasters the MAP 
simply renamed the Manchester Group the Lancaster Group and these firms 
incorporated the necessary modifications into the existing production to produce 
the new aircraft.  This strategy enabled A.V. Roe to make use of existing 
productive capacity that had been organised in the smaller firms making the 
component parts of the Manchester.    
 
This organisation produced the 6,944 aircraft manufactured by the Lancaster 
Group between December 1941 and December 194550.  The Lancaster Group 
were contracted to produced 6,944 aircraft of which 6,918 were delivered, the 
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deficit of 26 aircraft being outstanding from Austin until December 194551.  The 
group accomplished this production using bi-monthly meetings of a Group 
Committee, chaired by Sir Roy Dobson.  It operated a variety of sub-
committees, including materials, bought out parts, spares and sub-contractors.  
In this way, Britain was able to expand rapidly the manufacture of the Lancaster 
without disrupting the flow of other aircraft already in service.  
 
Fig. 4.1:  Source:  PRO AVIA 9/51, D.D.G.P.S. 20.3.44 and AVIA 10/391 D.D.G .Stats P. 2.4.42 
 
Another indicator of efficiency was the number of man hours required to build 
an aircraft.  In March 1945, the MAP estimated that it took A.V. Roe 
approximately 20,000 man-hours52 to build a complete Lancaster.  This was 
almost a quarter of the time it took to build a Lancaster Mk I in 194253.  From 
the perspective of the MAP, this meant that there had been a substantial 
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reduction in labour, the major cost to the private industry, and they subsequently 
reduced the price paid per aircraft.  
 
A review of the prices paid to the manufacturers for their aircraft has resulted in 
a large number of differing contract prices for Lancasters.  The average of these 
prices is £31,985, which is the figure used here to estimate the total cost of 
providing Lancaster aircraft to the RAF.  The reason for rejecting the higher, 
and probably more accurate estimates of cost, is due to the risk of double-
counting aircraft costs.  Given this, the estimated cost of providing the RAF 
with 7,377 Lancasters during World War II was £235,952,091.  The value of the 
4,26554 aircraft destroyed within Bomber Command was £136,416,02555.  This 
figure does not include the price of government-supplied equipment ranging 
from engines to radios, to machine guns, to escape equipment, toilets, radars and 
so forth.   
 
Handley Page Halifax 
 
Handley Page designed the Halifax in response to Air Ministry Specification 
P.13/36, which also brought about the Manchester.  As was the case with the 
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Lancaster, the Halifax was produced by a group of companies under the 
direction of the designing company, Handley Page.  Amongst these were Rootes 
Securities, English Electric, London Passenger Transport Board and Fairey 
Aviation56.  All operated under the direction of Handley Page57.  There were 
also a large number of sub-contractors supplying raw materials, components and 
parts to the group members.  The Halifax Group manufactured 6,176 Halifaxes 
for the RAF58.   
 
 
Fig. 4.2:  Source:  PRO AVIA 9/51, D.D.G.P.S. 20.3.44 and AVIA 10/391 D.D.G .Stats P. 2.4.42 
 
The MAP Price Books show London Passenger Transport building 710, English 
Electric 2,470 and Handley Page and Rootes assembling the remaining 3,696 
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aircraft59.  Based upon a calculation of the prices listed in the MAP Price Books, 
the average cost of a Halifax during the war was £23,35460.  Given this price, the 
full cost paid to the Halifax Group for 6,176 aircraft was in the region of 
£140,819,964. 
 
The early Halifaxes suffered from a number of design flaws, the worst of which 
involved the rudders failing under violent or sudden manoeuvring.  Early 
models of the Halifax had a tendency to veer unexpectedly leading to crashes 
during take-off, which were often serious due to the full fuel tanks and bomb 
loads.  The Halifax also suffered overbalancing and tipping at low speeds and, if 
power became asymmetrical because of a damaged engine, the aircraft was 
prone to tipping out of control in the sky or on the ground.  Many aircrews died 
before Handley Page identified and fixed these flaws.   
 
The Halifax was less attractive to Bomber Command than was the Lancaster, 
which outperformed it in load characteristics, range and operating height.  In an 
effort to make the Halifax as effective as the Lancaster, Bomber Command 
stripped down the defensive armament and removed all non-essential external 
projections.  Further improvements included the replacement of the Bristol 
Hercules engine with a Rolls Royce Merlin.  These efforts produced a marginal 
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increase in the operational altitude of 2,000 ft, but the aircraft was unable to 
achieve parity with the Lancaster, which continued to perform better on the high 
profile missions into Germany61.  One advantage that the Halifax had over the 
Lancaster was that it was easier to escape from and a higher proportion of its 
crews survived being shot down.  For this reason, it was a popular aircraft 
amongst flyers.   
 
Over 1,421 Halifax aircraft were lost through ‘wastage’, because of either 
crashes or being written off for a range of reasons62.  The average cost of a 
Halifax during the war was £23,35463 and the value of the loss of these 1,421 
aircraft is £33,186,034.  Wastage from accidents and other causes equalled 23 
percent of all Halifax production and this is for only a 14-month period of the 
war.  In addition, 1,884 Halifaxes were lost in Bomber Command on 
operations64.  The total number of Halifaxes lost was 3,504 or 56.7 percent of 
total production.  The total value of the 3,504 lost Halifaxes was £81,832,416.   
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De Havilland Mosquito 
 
The de Havilland Mosquito was probably the best-known example of the private 
venture aircraft developed in the late 1930s.  Designed by the de Havilland 
Company against the opposition of the Air Ministry, but with the support of the 
Chief of the Air Staff and a number of other RAF officers, the Mosquito became 
the most versatile and successful military aircraft of World War II65.  The credit 
for the official recognition of the value of this aircraft lies with de Havilland and 
Air Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman, the then Air Member for Research and 
Development, and on whose initiative 50 of these radical aircraft were ordered 
off the drawing board66.   
 
The concept behind the de Havilland Mosquito was for a very fast intruder 
capable of conducting bombing raids deep within enemy territory.  In order to 
ensure high speed the aircraft was to be lightly constructed and unarmed.  In 
November 1940, when Geoffrey de Havilland took the prototype Mosquito into 
the air for the first time, few within the Air Ministry or the RAF would have 
predicted its success.  The Mosquito performance was impressive: its two 
Merlin engines produced a bomber that had the speed and agility of the best 
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fighters.  Initially, the Air Ministry envisaged it as a reconnaissance aircraft 
only.  Subsequently, it was adapted into a fighter, a night fighter, an armed 
intruder and lastly, a fast bomber, the role that de Havilland had originally 
designed for it67.  The growth in orders for Mosquito aircraft reflected the 
versatility of the aircraft68. 
 
The proof of de Havilland’s conception lies in the operational performance of 
the aircraft.  The first Mosquitos were sent into action with Bomber Command 
on the 31st of May 1942, when they conducted a daylight reconnaissance of 
Cologne.  During this operation, one Mosquito was hit by flak and subsequently 
crashed into the North Sea, killing its crew69.  Despite this, it was an auspicious 
beginning.  A daylight raid on Cologne by any other aircraft in Bomber 
Command would have resulted in significant losses for the entire attacking 
force.  The first five sorties over Cologne in May 1942 were the first of the total 
of 39,795 sorties, 10.20 percent of the Bomber Command total, making the 
Mosquito the fourth most used aircraft in the Command70.   
 
Bomber Command increased its use of the Mosquito because it was fast and 
accurate.  In 1944, the United States Air Force estimated that it took an average 
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of 188 tons of bombs to destroy a V Weapon site.  The average tonnage of 
bombs used varied from 165 tons for a Boeing B-17 to 182 tons for a B26 
Marauder and 219 tons for a B25 Mitchell71.  The Mosquito took 40 tons to 
destroy these targets.  The Mosquito was also a very safe aircraft with only 310 
(4.61 percent) of the total production of 6,710 being lost to enemy action or 
other causes72.   
 
The cost of building a Mosquito was £9,829 making the total cost of 6,710 
Mosquitos £65,949,571.  Of this, £3,046,850 worth of Mosquitos was lost in 
Bomber Command73.  Whether from versatility, performance, operational 
effectiveness or economy the Mosquito was one of the most notable wartime 
successes of the British aircraft industry.  It was also one of the few British 
aircraft that the United States acquired for its own use, obtaining 40 Canadian 
variants and 100 British aircraft under reverse Lend-Lease74. 
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Bristol Blenheim 
 
On the 3rd of September, 1939, a Blenheim Mark IV, serial Number N6215, of 
139 Squadron was the first RAF aircraft to fly over Germany.  It conducted the 
armed reconnaissance of German naval units in the vicinity of Wilhelmshaven75.  
The story of the development of the Bristol 142 and its subsequent 
transformation into the Blenheim Mark I have been dealt with in Chapter 376.  
Bristol built 2,450 of these aircraft at an average cost per aircraft of £9,88077.  
The total cost of this aircraft to the British Government was £24,206,24578.   
Although at the start of the war the RAF considered the Blenheim out-of-date, it 
was available for service and carried out 12,214 sorties for Bomber Command79.  
These constituted 3.13 percent of the Command’s total wartime sorties80.  The 
use of the Blenheim in the operations led to a relatively high loss rate with 541 
Blenheims destroyed, due to crashes or enemy action81.  The figures indicate 
that 22.08 percent of all Blenheims manufactured were lost within Bomber 
Command activity at a cash value of £5,345,134.00.   
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Handley Page Hampden 
 
Handley Page designed the Hampden as a medium bomber intended to operate 
during daylight.  It was one of the few British aircraft influenced by German 
design principles.  The source of the German influence was probably a German 
designer at Handley, Dr. Lachmann, who introduced these principles from 
Messerschmitt where he had previously worked82.  The Hampden was not a 
particularly good aircraft and reportedly suffered from poor manoeuvrability 
and inadequate defensive firepower due to its use of hand held machine guns, a 
distinctly German feature.   The first flight by a Hampden occurred on 21 June 
1936, six days after the Wellington.  Subsequently, the Air Ministry placed an 
order for 180 Hampdens and the first aircraft entered service with 49 Squadron 
in August of 1938.  The Hampden was the first British aircraft to bomb Berlin 
when 67 British bombers, 30 Hampdens and 37 Wellingtons, attacked the 
German capital on the night of 25th August 194083.  
 
By the time of the thousand -bomber raids of May/June 1942, the Hampden was 
nearing the end of its service.  The final operation by Hampdens took place in 
mid-September 1942 when No 408 Squadron RCAF was in action over 
Wilhelmshaven.  Of the 389,809 sorties conducted by Bomber Command, the 
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Hampden carried out approximately 16,541, or 4.24 percent of the total84.  The 
total number of aircraft lost on these operations was 633, representing 43.64 
percent of the 1,453 aircraft that had been manufactured85.  The price paid by the 
MAP for a Hampden was £10,571.8586, giving a total value for the aircraft 
manufactured of £15,360,908.00.  At these figures, an estimate of the value of the 
lost aircraft is £6,691,981.00. 
 
Armstrong Whitworth Whitley 
 
The Whitley was an adaptation of an earlier Armstrong Whitworth design 
intended for the export market.  In July 1934, when the Air Ministry issued its 
heavy bomber specification, B.3/34, Armstrong modified their design and put it 
forward87.  The Air Ministry ordered the Whitley off the drawing board and 
issued a contract for 80 aircraft in 1935.  The Whitley first flew in 1936 and was 
capable of carrying an impressive 7,000 lbs of bombs 1,650 miles at an average 
cruising speed of 185 mph88.  Although the RAF soon considered the Whitley 
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obsolete, Armstrong Whitworth delivered 1,812 aircraft out of the 1,932 
ordered89.  
 
Whitley bombers cost an average of £11,160.00 per aircraft and the total output 
of 1,812 aircraft cost the British Government around £20,221,92090.  Of the total 
number of Whitleys 458 (26.27 percent) were lost whilst serving in Bomber 
Command, a capital loss somewhere around £2,111,280.00.  These losses are 
high, given that the majority of Whitleys never left aircraft storage91 and that 
Whitleys carried out only 9,858 sorties, 2.52 percent of the Bomber Command 
total92. 
 
Short Stirling 
 
Short Brothers built the Stirling against Air Ministry specification B.12/36 
which set a requirement for four engines and an empty weight of around 55,000 
lbs93.  Unlike the Lancaster or the Halifax, the Stirling was the only heavy 
British bomber whose initial design included four engines.  The Stirling was 
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also the tallest, longest and slowest bomber built by Britain during World War 
II.  It also had the shortest wingspan of any bomber94.   
 
The Stirling entered squadron service on or around the 2nd of August 194095.  As 
suspected from Falconer’s description, the Stirling was not a good aircraft.  Due 
to its short wingspan, it needed very long take-off and landing distances96.  The 
answer that Shorts came up with was to double the wing angle of incidence 
which then required the lengthening of the undercarriage making an already 
high aircraft even higher.  Whilst this enabled the Stirling’s wings to bite into 
the air at a more acute angle, it led to unwieldiness on the ground, which 
resulted in a significant number of these aircraft suffering severe damaged 
through the failure of their undercarriage.  The undercarriage design also 
imposed a heavy maintenance burden and the aircraft suffered a much higher 
degree of down time than the other aircraft used within Bomber Command97.  
The Stirling carried out 18,440 sorties, 4.73 percent of all Bomber Command’s 
wartime sorties98.   
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 Figure 4.3:  Source:  PRO AVIA 9/51, D.D.G.P.S. 20.3.44 and AVIA 10/391 D.D.G .Stats P. 2.4.42 
 
During the war, Bomber Command lost 684 Stirlings due to crashes or enemy 
action99.  These 684 aircraft comprised 25.04 percent of the 2,731 Stirlings 
built100.  The total cost to the British government of buying 2,731 Stirlings was 
£64,153,124.00, based on an average figure of £23,490.70 per aircraft.  The total 
cash write-off for the 684 aircraft £16,067,639.00.  This does not include the 
loss of 11 of these aircraft destroyed in successful Luftwaffe raids on the Short’s 
factories at Rochester and Belfast in September 1940101.   
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Fairey Battle 
 
The Battle was developed and built by Fairey Aviation in response to Air 
Ministry Specification, P.27/32, which the official history claims was issued as 
‘little more than a tentative project’, to provide a single engined aircraft for 
comparative purposes with the twin-engined aircraft expected to eventuate 
under Specification B.9/32102.  The Battle was to be a reasonably robust aircraft 
in that it had a standard life flying life of 900 hours, substantially above the 
more successful Wellington at 540 hours103.  Approximately 2,200 of these 
aircraft were built but most of them did not see service in Bomber Command.   
 
In 1932, when the specification was written, the Fairey Battle represented a 
significant step forward in aircraft technology.  It was an all-metal monoplane, 
with retractable undercarriage and it had all of the modern features that the RAF 
would have been seeking in 1932.  The problem was a lack of engine power and 
the Battle was not the only early 1930s aircraft affected by this.  The Boeing 
Monomail suffered the same problem of being underpowered: the single Rolls 
Royce Merlin powering the Battle was not sufficient for the weight of the 
aircraft104.  Changes of specification, including the addition of a third 
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crewmember, increased the weight of the aircraft and exacerbated the problem 
of its marginal performance105. 
 
Of the 2,200 Fairey Battles built, 44 were lost due to enemy action and of these, 
only four were lost on Bomber Command operations in 1940 against the 
Channel Ports106.  At an average cost of £9,722.04 per aircraft for the various 
production runs, the cost of building 2,200 Battles was £21,388,491.00107.  The 
cost of the four aircraft lost due to Bomber Command operations is £38,888.16.  
Although the vast majority of these aircraft did not see active service, they 
contributed to the strategic air offensive serving as target tugs and Battles made 
up a significant proportion of the 800 aircraft supplied to the Empire Air 
Training Scheme in Canada108. 
  
The American Bombers 
 
Five American bomber aircraft saw service in Bomber Command.  These were 
the Douglas Boston, the Boeing B-17, the Consolidated Liberator, the Lockheed 
Ventura and the North American Mitchell.  The Douglas Boston was originally 
designated the Douglas A-20 Havoc and orders were placed by the French 
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government at the start of World War II.  With the fall of France, the French 
order of 270 aircraft was diverted to Britain and the aircraft was re-designated as 
the Boston.  The first Bostons entered service with Bomber Command in July 
1941, and performed reliably as a light day bomber.  In June 1943, the Air Staff 
transferred the last of the Bostons to the Second Tactical Air Force when No. 2 
Group transferred from Bomber Command to the Tactical Air Force.  These 
aircraft continued to serve as ground support aircraft until April 1945, when the 
RAF replaced them with Mosquitos109.  
 
 
In an effort to make up for the shortfall in long-range bomber aircraft Britain 
purchased 20 Boeing B-17C, which came into service with Bomber Command 
in May 1941110.  The Boeing was a high flying, long range aircraft that seemed 
to meet Bomber Command’s requirements.  The RAF found that the B-17C 
lacked the bomb-carrying capacity that Bomber Command needed.  It also 
found that the B-17 suffered from a number of technical problems that kept its 
altitude lower than expected111.  For these reasons, and probably Treasury 
concerns about buying outside the sterling block, Britain purchased very few 
Boeing B-17s. 
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 Another concern that Bomber Command had about the aircraft was the manual 
defensive armament.  Bomber Command had insisted on power operated turrets 
for all of its aircraft and saw the manual defensive system in the B-17 as being a 
serious flaw.  The first operational deployment of the B-17C was a raid by three 
Fortresses on Wilhelmshaven on 8 July 1941112.  The aircraft did not impress 
Bomber Command and the B-17 subsequently saw most of its service in the 
Middle East and Coastal Command.  Flying Fortresses later returned to Bomber 
Command where they served as electronic countermeasures aircraft in 100 
Group.  Their main task during this phase of their career was the jamming of 
German radar defences. 
 
Britain imported 109 Boeing B-17s of which 18 (16.51 percent) were destroyed 
in Bomber Command113.  The average cost of a Boeing Flying Fortress is 
reported as £64,637.00 ($US126,000.00)114.  The cost of buying the 109 aircraft 
was approximately £7,045,466.00.  The value of the 18 B-17s destroyed whilst 
in Bomber Command was therefore around £1,163,466.00. 
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The Air Ministry ordered the Ventura Mk.I aircraft from Lockheed in February 
1940 as a replacement for the Blenheim day bombers serving in No. 2 Group115.  
By May of 1940, Britain increased its order to 300 aircraft, ordering 375 more 
towards the end of that year.  Significantly, Lockheed consistently failed to meet 
the orders and the Ventura I did not fly until 31 July 1941.  By the time 
Lockheed put the Ventura into production the United States had entered the war 
and began to divert completed aircraft for its own use.  The records show that by 
June 1944 Britain had imported 406 Venturas116.   
 
The Ventura entered British service in May 1942, a lot later than planned.  By 
this time, the aircraft was out-of-date and its poor handling characteristics made 
it unpopular with those flying it.  Of the 406 Venturas imported into Britain 41 
(10.09 percent) were destroyed in Bomber Command, 11 of these losses 
occurring on a single raid when German fighters shot down 10 of the 12 
attacking and seriously damaged another.  The Ventura flew only 997 sorties, 
0.25 percent of the total, for Bomber Command and ceased to operate within the 
Command after September 1943117.  The cost of importing the 406 aircraft was 
£7,064,400.00 with the average cost of each aircraft being approximately 
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£17,400.00.  The cost of the losses within Bomber Command was 
approximately £713,400.00.   
 
Of the 18,000 Liberators built by Consolidated, Britain obtained 785.  The aircraft 
had a reported range of 2,850 miles118, but RAF sources only rated it as being 
2,100 miles with a bomb load of 5,000 lb119.  The Liberator did not see much 
service within Bomber Command, carrying out only 662 sorties, 0.16 percent of 
the total.  Only 0.38 percent of the 785 Liberators were lost while in Bomber 
Command at a cost of £237,174.  The cost of a Liberator is reported as being 
£79.058.00 ($US336, 000.00) making the cost of the total number of aircraft 
£62,060,530.00120. 
 
 
 
The Mitchell Bomber was one of the more successful American aircraft with 
9,800 manufactured by North American during World War II.  It became famous 
following the Tokyo raid of April 1942, led by Colonel Doolittle.  Despite this 
success, the relatively small payload of a Mitchell made it unattractive to Bomber 
Command.  A Mitchell cost £22,588.00 ($US96,000), and Britain imported 537121 
of these aircraft by June 1944 at a cost of £12,129,756.00.  Mitchells carried out 
84 (0.02 percent of the total) sorties on behalf of Bomber Command, making it a 
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minor contributor to the strategic air offensive.  The entire career of the Mitchell 
in Bomber Command lasted from 22 January 1943 until the 31st of May 1943122.   
 
Additional Costs to New Aircraft 
 
Outside of naval vessels, bomber aircraft were the most sophisticated weapons 
systems used by the Allies during World War II.  Their task was to carry multiple 
man crews long distances, find a small target area and accurately drop their 
bombs on target whilst defending themselves against attacks by the defending 
German aircraft and avoiding anti-aircraft fire from the ground.  In order to meet 
these tasks the aircraft had to be provided with engines, internal and external 
communications systems, navigational systems, bomb aiming equipment, heating 
systems for crew and weapons, and other capabilities such as a hot drink 
dispensers and Elsan toilets.  They also had to be provided with machine guns, 
ammunition channels, life rafts and a variety of other equipments. 
 
The government supplied this equipment, which did not form part of the aircraft 
price, although the aircraft manufacturer might install it during construction.  The 
Air Ministry and the MAP met the cost of this government equipment.  The items 
supplied by the government were dinghies, parachutes, machine guns, wireless 
sets and cameras.  The costs of these items added around 2.5 percent to the cost of 
a finished aircraft and the total costs of providing this equipment for the 47,457 
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aircraft considered here was £33,136,035123.  The cost for those aircraft destroyed 
or written-off whilst in Bomber Command would have been around £9,079,197, if 
no salvage were involved.  Figure 4.4 below outlines the average cost for 
government equipment in each aircraft type. 
 
Government Equipment Costs 
Aircraft 
Estimated 
Cost per 
Aircraft 
Total 
Number 
Built 
Total Cost of 
Government 
Equipment 
Number 
of 
Aircraft 
Lost in 
BC 
Cost of 
Government 
Equipment in 
Lost Aircraft 
Whitley £640.00 1,812 £1,159,680 458 £293,120.00 
Blenheim £605.00 3,421 £2,069,705 541 £327,305.00 
Battle £465.00 2,200 £583,000 44 £25,652.00 
Hampden £570.00 1,453 £486,755 633 £360,810.00 
Wellington £815.00 11,460 £9,339,900 1,727 £1,407,505.00 
Stirling £900.00 2,731 £2,457,900 684 £615,600.00 
Manchester £710.00 200 £142,000 76 £53,960.00 
Halifax £935.00 6,176 £5,959,840 2,083 £1,947,605.00 
Mosquito £395.00 6,710 £2,650,450 310 £122,450.00 
Lancaster £900.00 7,377 £6,639,300 4,265 £3,838,500.00 
Ventura £815.00 406 £330,890 41 £33,415.00 
Mitchells £675.00 537 £362,475 20 £13,500.00 
Boston £745.00 380 £283,100 46 £34,270.00 
Boeing B-17 £935.00 109 £101,915 18 £16,830.00 
Liberator £725.00 785 £569,125 3 £2,175.00 
Total  45,757 £33,136,065 10,949 £9,092,697 
Fig. 4.4 Source: War Savings, Wings for Victory Issue, February, 1942, pp.25-27 
 
 
The prices paid for the aircraft above covered a range of items and services 
carried out by the manufacturers.  For example, under Contract Number 
Aircraft/239, the Air Ministry paid Sir W.G. Armstrong Whitworth to supply 
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1,650 Lancasters at prices between £23,548 and £37,778124.  This price did not 
include the cost of fuel for test and delivery flights, although the cost of non-
bought out materials made redundant by modifications was included125.  On 
contract number Aircraft/2221/C.4(a) with Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Co., 
the price of £17,200 paid for each of 108 Lancaster Mark I type aircraft had been 
adjusted to take account ‘for savings in the labour efficiency, offset to some 
extent by the wages award (555) to women’126.  The detailed adjustment of the 
prices relating to individual batches of long production runs would suggest a very 
close monitoring of the activity within the aircraft firms. 
 
This minute tweaking of prices within production runs by the MAP shows a level 
of day-to-day monitoring that is rare in today’s world.  Nevertheless, this level of 
detailed costing suggests that the MAP financial officers were alert to any saving 
on cost that might influence the price of a finished aircraft.  This willingness of 
the MAP, and presumably Treasury, is shown in contract Aircraft/2221/CB.6 (a) 
where the cost of jigs and tools used in the manufacture of the Lancasters at 
metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company is specifically excluded from the final 
payments as these had already been paid for in the preceding batches of 
aircraft127.     
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A similar exclusion exists in earlier contracts such as Contract Number 763825/38 
with Short Brothers for the supply of 350 Short Stirling Bombers.  In this 1941 
contract, the costs of jigs, tools and flight tests were met by the manufacturer, 
presumably on the basis that theses costs had been paid for in earlier batches of 
the aircraft.  The prices paid include an amount to pay for the replacement of parts 
damaged by the Luftwaffe raid on 14th May 1941128.  This level of detailed 
analysis of the costs incurred in manufacturing the aircraft lends further weight to 
the belief that the prices quoted in the MAP Price Books specifically excluded 
any element of payment as recompense for the capital investments in buildings 
and plant, probably on the justifiable basis that the government had already paid 
these costs.  The significance is that the MAP Price Book figures seriously 
underestimate the true cost of building the aircraft used by the RAF. 
 
Modifications 
 
Modifications to aircraft in production were expensive in terms of both money 
and lost production.  The need for modifications occurred as a resulted from the 
operational problems encountered by Bomber Command; from problems that 
existing design caused in production or from the needs of the aircraft 
manufacturers to improve their processes.  Thus, modifications were routinely 
sought by the firms in the production group, from the MAP or from the RAF.  
The modifications that were approved, whether from within the designing firm or 
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the production group, were mostly concerned with changing the aircraft to allow 
for faster production.  This was not always the case and the firms were 
responsible for identifying a number of modifications needed to improve the 
performance of the aircraft129.  The MAP appears to have been strategic in the 
changes in design it brought forward.  Many of these were suggested in an effort 
to manage problems such as shortages of strategic materials, including aluminium 
and rubber, or the need to meet changes in the types of equipments being 
provided or even shortages of labour130.   
 
There were four classifications of modifications.  Class One was used to designate 
those modifications needed to correct extreme safety precautions and such 
modifications took priority over operational requirements.  These were directed at 
the safety of the aircraft and not at the safety of the crew, as the failure to modify 
the Lancaster escape hatches attest to.  Class Two modifications were for reasons 
of operational or safety urgency and had to be to be incorporated into production 
lines as soon as practicable.  Class Three modifications were discretionary and 
Commands could decide to have them or not.  Class four modifications were the 
lowest priority and would only be implemented if they did not interfere with 
production schedules or lead to a scrapping of materials. 
 
The modifications recommended by the RAF were mostly concerned with 
improving the operational effectiveness of the aircraft or in reducing the 
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maintenance and repair overheads inflicted upon operational units131.  The RAF 
also recommended modifications where safety or the comfort of the crew was 
concerned, although the RAF made no effort to modify the escape hatches of the 
Lancaster, which many have held responsible for the poor survival of crew from 
Lancasters that were shot down132. 
 
In order to see the impact of these modifications upon aircraft production the best 
example is the Lancaster.  From its inception as the Manchester to its final 
characterisation as the Lincoln, the aircraft had 1,402 modifications133.  Of these 
391 were adjustments to drawings and blue prints or to drawing adjustment 
sheets.  Other than occupying the time of the drawing office they had little impact 
upon the aircraft’s production.  A further 400 of the modifications related to the 
Manchester were discarded when the decision was made to produce the 
Lancaster.  This leaves 611 modifications of substance. 
 
By 5th March 1945, of the 611 modifications 336 had already been incorporated in 
the production line, 101 had been superseded or cancelled, 23 related to special 
requirements for small numbers of aircraft to be modified to carry special 
ordnance, like ‘TALLBOY, UPKEEP or special radar’134.  A further 87 
modifications were in hand, either in the design or production phase and the final 
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64 had not yet been started.  A further 37 were outstanding and were awaiting 
official acceptance135.  
 
The MAP estimated the cost of modifications to Lancasters in early 1945 was 
equivalent to the production of 231 new Lancasters, or a financial cost of 
£7,388,535136.  The impact on man-hours was an increase on the production line 
of 1,020 hours per Lancaster/Lincoln and an additional 4,621,240 man-hours of 
labour spread across the manufacturing group, RAF maintenance and civilian 
repair organisations.  The estimates of the man-hours and costs above do not take 
into account the cost in man-hours or cash of the work needed for the production 
of embodiment loans or bought out parts, such as turrets, heaters etc137. 
 
The government was well aware of the adverse impact of modifications on the 
output of finished aircraft.  Mr. E.I.G. Jacob of the Cabinet Office advised that the 
size of the modification problem was very large and long-term.  Jacob found that 
despite the large number of modifications the Air Ministry and MAP were 
exercising ‘strict control’ on the amount of effort diverted to this activity and 
everything possible was being done to limit the impact of modifications on 
production and that modifications were going to continue138.   
 
Parts 
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 As important as new aircraft and fuel was a ready supply of spare parts which 
were essential for the repair and maintenance of existing aircraft.  In early 1940, 
the Air Ministry identified the importance of having an adequate number of 
spares.  At that time, the Air Ministry had directed an increase in the production 
of spare parts in an effort to keep as many existing aircraft as airworthy as 
possible.  The Air Ministry imposed this policy even at the cost of aircraft 
production139.  This policy persisted until the formation of the MAP and the 
appointment of Max Beaverbrook, as the Minister for Aircraft Production.  
Beaverbrook instituted a production drive that sacrificed production at the 
expense of all other activity, including spare parts production140.   
 
The untrammelled requisitioning of spare parts by the Beaverbrook MAP is 
described by the Director of Engine Development, G. Bulman, as ‘looting’ which  
produced a ‘miserable squabble’ between Beaverbrook and the Air Marshals141.  
Bulman’s own judgement is that the Air Ministry team Beaverbrook had inherited 
worked very hard to protect the fundamental machinery of production from the 
depredations of Beaverbrook and ‘his boys’.  Bulman dismisses Beaverbrook’s 
claims to have increased aircraft production.  He notes sourly that ‘Rome 
(increased production) was not built in one day or by the genius of one man’142.   
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 Cost of Parts 
Spare Part Price Twin 
Engined Bomber 
Price Four Engined 
Bomber 
Engine £2,000  £2,500  
Undercarriage £1,000 £1,500 
Wheels £60 £120 
Control Column £30 £30 
Tail Plane £200 £300 
Tail Wheel £10 £10 
Tyres £30 £50 
Tyres with Wheels £95 x no. required £95 x no required 
Instruments £300 £400 
Turret £500 £500 
Machine Gun Browning £45 £45 
Propeller £350 £350 
Wireless £200 £250 
Oxygen Apparatus £15 £15 
Fuel Tank £80 £100 
Parachute £35 £35 
Camera £35 £35 
Bomb sight £60 £60 
Dinghy £30 £30 
Pilot’s Seat £15 £15 
Ailerons £100 £100 
Oil Tank £40 £40 
Through Type Spinner for Propeller £35 £35 
Nose Cap Spinner for Propeller £8 £8 
Fuel Gauge £4 £4 
Clock £3 £3 
Thermometer £1 £1 
Sparking Plug £0.8.0 £0.8.0 
Rivets £0.0.6 £0.0.6 
Automatic Pilot £200 £200 
Figure 4.5: Source: War Savings, Wings for Victory Issue, February, 1942, pp.25-27 
 
 
Beaverbrook’s regime at the MAP increased the production of new aircraft whilst 
reducing the capability of workforces, the RAF or anyone whom he could rob in 
order to achieve success.  After his departure from the MAP, the production of 
spare parts was increased and by February 1944, 18 percent of the labour 
employed in airframe manufacturing was working on making spare parts143.  
Figure 4.6 below shows an example of spare parts production at one plant. 
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Fig. 4.6: Source:  S. Ritchie, ‘Industry and Air Power’, p.240 
 
Similar increases occurred at the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB), 
where the parties agreed to a fee of £21,319,693 for the supply of 710 Halifax 
aircraft, 450 Mk II and 260 Mk III.  15.68 percent (£3,966,147) of the total 
contract paid for spare parts144.  Although some of the manufacturing firms, such 
as LPTB above, did manufacture spare parts, it was usually the role of the parent 
firm in the group to supply spares.  For example, in the Lancaster Group A.V.Roe 
managed the supply of spares very closely145. 
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The total cost of spares to the government is almost impossible to estimate.  This 
difficulty comes from the way in which spares were arbitrarily moved within 
production groups and between firms, the RAF and the MAP itself.  The best 
estimate possible is that spare parts production was equivalent to 25 percent of the 
cost of manufacturing an aircraft type.  The Director of Engine Development, 
George Bulman, reports that Beaverbrook issued a ‘Ukase’ demanding an 
increase in the production of engine spares from 10 to 20 percent of engine 
output146.  Whilst this placed strain on the manufacturers, Bulman concedes that it 
was a wise move147.  
 
The cost of the spare parts provided under the above contract with LPTB above 
appears to have been 23.9 percent of the cost of a delivered Halifax bomber.  This 
would mean that the potential costs of spares provided to both repair and maintain 
aircraft for the strategic bomber offensive may have been in the region of 
£251,399,329.  Given the wide use made of the aircraft under discussion here, not 
all of the above cost is attributable to the strategic air offensive.  However, given 
the large number of highly complex aircraft used by Bomber Command it is 
reasonable to attribute 75 percent of the cost to the offensive, giving  a value of 
£188,549,497 as the cost of spares to the strategic air offensive. 
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Repair of Aircraft 
 
Between the second quarter of 1940 and the third quarter of 1945, the RAF, MAP 
and commercial industry returned 71,109 damaged aircraft to the RAF for 
operations in the United Kingdom.  Of them, approximately 6,333 were medium 
and heavy bombers148.  Around 2,030 repaired aircraft re-entered service prior to 
14th January 1941149.  The repair organisation returned 4,303 heavy and medium 
bombers between December 1941 and September 1945150.  At an average cost per 
bomber aircraft of £19,386, the total value of the repairs undertaken is 
approximately £122,771,538151, a figure that represents 12.2 percent of the 
estimated total cost of £1.5 billion paid to all manufacturers for bomber aircraft 
and accessories. 
 
Responsibility for repairs rested with the Director of Repair and Maintenance of 
the MAP.  The impact of the heavy bomber on Bomber Command added to the 
problem of repair and maintenance.  These aircraft were larger and more complex 
than previously and represented, as seen above, a significant and growing 
investment.  The repair system instituted supplied Bomber Command with 6,333 
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149  PRO CAB 120/299, Answers to Mr. Justice Singleton Questions  14 Jan 41 
150  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, p.154  The figure for medium bombers, 
which were progressively moved out of Bomber Command, was obtained by taking the percent of 
repaired heavies, 14 percent, and applying it to the number of mediums repaired up till mid 1944. 
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aircraft at a substantially reduced cost, making the repair of aircraft a major value 
adding activity throughout the strategic bomber offensive.   
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Fig. 4.7:  Source:  Statistical Digest of the War, pp.152, 154 
 
 
 
Servicing and Maintenance 
 
It is almost impossible to provide an accurate breakdown of the cost of servicing 
and maintaining the aircraft of the strategic bomber offensive.  Servicing and 
maintaining aircraft was the core activity for a large percent of the personnel 
serving in Bomber Command.  The demands placed upon Bomber Command 
personnel and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) by the changeover to heavy 
bombers was substantial.  Sir Arthur Harris notes that practically all of the ground 
handling equipment would not work with the new larger aircraft and that the 
increase in size was accompanied by an increase in complexity that made the 
scale of workshop, power plant and technical accommodation totally 
unsuitable152. 
 
The change in aircraft increased already pressing problems on Bomber 
Command’s airfields.  In order to deal with them, the Command organised a 
completely new servicing structure as part of the re-organisation of bomber 
stations.  In November 1943, servicing and maintenance functions on Bomber 
Command’s stations were removed from the control of the operational squadrons 
and centralised in a Servicing Wing commanded by the Base Chief Technical 
Officer, who reported directly to the Base Commander153.  The Servicing Wings 
were organised into a Headquarters, Daily Servicing Squadron and a Repair and 
Inspection Squadron.  The function of the Daily Servicing Squadron was to 
command the groundcrew and servicing equipment used to carryout the routine 
and daily servicing of the operational aircraft.  In reality this meant that, with the 
exception of the HQ, all of the personnel posted to the Daily Servicing Squadron 
worked in an operational squadron.  The major benefit of this system was that the 
Servicing Wing could move the servicing personnel and their equipment from 
their assigned squadron to another of the operational squadrons on the base 
without the normal wrangling over command and control that previously had 
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arisen.  This enabled a much higher degree of versatility and provided a much 
greater surge capability in servicing154. 
 
Deprived of the need to assist in the daily routine maintenance of aircraft, the 
Repair and Inspection Squadron could concentrate on carrying out the ‘deep’ 
servicing of aircraft on charge to the squadrons155.  Deep servicing of equipment 
is a routine cycle of inspection and servicing applied to all aircraft and equipment.  
The RAF had a strict policy of deep servicing on its bases.  This required a wide 
range of engine and airframe inspections to be undertaken and for considerable 
technical services to be immediately available.  The benefit was that Bomber 
Command kept control of aircraft requiring substantial inspections which 
prevented the repair organisation retaining heavy bombers once the inspection, 
modification or repair was completed. 
 
Teams of tradesmen and technicians supplied by the firms who had designed 
particular aircraft supplemented the Repair and Inspection Squadrons, although 
this was probably to a small extent.  The main work of the manufacturers’ teams 
was on modifications during repairs on bomber stations or in the Civilian Repair 
Depots (CRD)156.  The role undertaken by these teams relieved RAF groundcrew 
of some workload associated with modifications.  Vickers Armstrong and Bristol 
were the two most active firms in providing mobile teams for modification work.  
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Both companies established teams and they staffed them with specialist workers 
who could be sent away to work on their own.  Other companies, such as Handley 
Page, A.V.Roe and Supermarine tended to take personnel off their production 
lines in order to work in ad hoc mobile teams.   
 
Equipment Cost 
Crash Tender £950.00 
Ambulance £750.00 
Tractors £1,000.00 
Trolley Accumulator £250.00 
Servicing Platforms ? 
Cranes £1,500.00 
500 Gal Fuel Tankers £850.00 
450 Gal Fuel Trailers £250.00 
Air Compressor £75.00 
Tracjac Salvage Trolleys ? 
Bedford Truck ? 
Queen Mary Trailer ? 
Engine Erection Stand ? 
Oil Primer Mk 2 ? 
Oil Filling Rig ? 
Hydraulic Test Set ? 
Engine Test Stands ? 
Fig. 4.8: Source: War Savings, Wings for Victory Issue, February, 1942, pp.25-27 
 
The equipment supplied to bomber stations was substantial, as was the cost of 
obtaining and maintaining it.  An idea of this equipment and its costs can be seen 
at Figure 4.8 above.  The amount of equipment held on each station reflected the 
type of aircraft flying from that station.  Nevertheless, most of the aircraft 
operating from bomber command stations had multiple crews, usually between 
five and seven men.  In order to deal with the potential casualties from the 
crashing of one of these aircraft at least two ambulance vehicles would have been 
required as well as two crash tenders or fire engines.  The bill per station for this 
equipment alone would have been £3,400.00 per station.  Given that Bomber 
Command had 125 stations under its control, this would have produced an overall 
bill of £425,000, for ambulances and fire engines. 
 
Bomber stations used many tractors, particularly the Fordson and David Brown 
Taskmasters.  Tractors were the main means of moving aircraft, bombs, trailers 
and heavy equipment.  The average cost of a tractor during the period was 
somewhere around £500 and there were significant numbers of these vehicles 
operating within Bomber Command at any one time.  At this stage, there is not 
enough hard information to estimate the cost of tractors on bomber stations but 
there was definitely more than one.   
 
Although an estimate of the full cost of the above equipment is difficult to 
establish, the listing of it provides some idea of the costs involved.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In looking at the prices paid for bomber aircraft by Britain it has been necessary 
to survey the type of aircraft involved in the strategic air offensive and the role 
each played.  This survey has shown that five aircraft, the Lancaster, Halifax, 
Wellington, Mosquito and Stirling, carried out 88.9 percent of all Bomber 
Command sorties.  The cost of these aircraft alone was £613 million.  The total 
cost of supplying Bomber Command with approximately 43,322 operational 
bomber aircraft during World War II was £1.3 billion, including a cost of £224 
million for the value of factories and plant.  The cost of £1.3 billion is 
conservative.  It does not reflect a number of hidden costs incurred during 
production such as transportation and storage.  Nor does it include the full cost of 
repair and maintenance, or the cost of transportation of the aircraft and their 
component parts or of storage during their operational life.   
 
During World War II, Britain manufactured or imported 43,322 bomber aircraft, a 
large proportion of which served in Bomber Command.  Of these aircraft 10, 949 
were lost due to enemy action or crashes at a financial cost of £288,049,591.  The 
figure represents 26.6 percent of the total of £1.5 billion paid to the makers of the 
aircraft and suppliers of some aircraft equipment, such as machine guns, wireless 
sets, parachutes and dinghies.  The £1.5 billion paid for bomber aircraft represents 
3.75 percent of all British Government expenditure during the years 1939-1945; 
and 4.7 percent of all spending on defence for the same period.  This is a 
substantial outlay in any terms.   
 
The analysis of aircraft losses within Bomber Command also shows that these 
have been understated.  In the official records of operational activity, reproduced 
by Middlebrook and Everitt in Bomber Command War Diaries157, the emphasis 
has been on operational losses and that these figures have excluded aircraft lost 
due to misadventure whilst on Bomber Command’s own stations.  Harry Holmes 
in Avro Lancaster indicates that a further 588 Lancasters were destroyed or 
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damaged beyond repair whilst on the ground158.  The extra Lancasters lost in this 
way constitute 7.9 percent of all Lancasters produced and the equivalent of 15.99 
percent of the 3,677 Lancasters lost or crashed because of operational activity159.  
If a similar number of accidents occurred amongst other aircraft types, it is likely 
that another £40 million worth of aircraft was lost to Bomber Command during 
the period of the strategic air offensive. 
 
The importance to this analysis of the value of aircraft losses in Bomber 
Command during the strategic air offensive is low.  This is because the bomber 
aircraft produced for the offensive had very little intrinsic worth at the end of the 
war.  After 1945, only a very small number of the aircraft in Bomber Command 
remained on the peacetime establishment.  The government sold the vast majority 
of these aircraft for scrap.  Even those aircraft that remained provided Britain with 
little in the way of economic value due to the limited role that heavy bombers 
could play in peacetime military operations within what remained of the Empire.  
On the basis that these aircraft soon ceased to have any value, this thesis argues 
that the total cost of the heavy bombers is attributable to the strategic air 
offensive.  
 
In order to get a clearer idea of how much the strategic air offensive cost Britain it 
is necessary to evaluate the costs incurred in providing the infrastructure and 
manpower necessary to operate these aircraft during World War II.  The 
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implications are that the cost of manpower is a significant component part of the 
costs associated in maintaining the aircraft involved in the air offensive.  These 
costs will be surveyed in Chapter 8.  Of more immediate importance is the cost of 
infrastructure in the form of the airfields without which the bombers would not 
have been able to operate.  
 
 
 
 
C h a p t e r  5  
AIRFIELDS 
 
When Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air, addressed Parliament 
during the Estimates Debate on 29th February 1944, he took the opportunity to 
acknowledge the sacrifice and effort of the British people in supplying the Royal 
Air Force (RAF) with the resources needed to conduct the war.  The biggest 
challenge that Britain had met was building the airfields.  Sinclair said, ‘Four and 
a half years ago, we started the most gigantic civil engineering and building 
programme ever undertaken in this country’1.  This engineering marvel had 
required the government to ‘dispossess people of their land, their houses, and their 
crops, often with little notice and with no reprieve’2.  He went on to say, ‘It has 
not been a pleasant thing for the people of this country to have had their land 
turned into an air base’ and he was ‘glad to say that we have almost reached the 
end of our territorial demands’3.  
 
Sinclair’s speech is one of the few public acknowledgements of the enormous size 
of the Air Ministry’s airfield building programme.  The construction effort needed 
to provide enough airfields for the RAF and American 8th Air Force was immense 
with more than one million buildings constructed and enough pavement laid for a 
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25m wide road from London to Peking4.  Of the resources that went into this 
programme, Sinclair estimated that ‘the largest share is given to Bomber 
Command’5.  His estimates provide a useful starting point for an evaluation of the 
economic costs to Great Britain of building the operational infrastructure needed 
for the strategic air offensive against Germany.  Given that the government of the 
day readily acknowledged the enormous size of this undertaking and the sacrifices 
made, it is important that we produce an effective estimate of the cost of building, 
maintaining and operating Bomber Command’s airfields.  This chapter traces the 
building of the airfields in order to estimate the direct and indirect financial cost 
of this effort, including those incurred in providing the infrastructure, 
consumables and labour necessary to operate the bomber fleets during the 
strategic air offensive.   
 
In conducting a bomber offensive, airfields were to prove as important as bomber 
aircraft.  Without all-weather airfields that could enable the rapid take-off and 
landing of large numbers of heavy aircraft in all weathers, the strategic air 
offensive would never have reached the size it did during World War II.  
Evaluating the costs arising from the construction of airfields and the other 
facilities needed by Bomber Command are complex.  The list of activities 
examined in this chapter is by no means complete.  Amongst the costs not 
attributed to Bomber Command in this analysis are those associated with the 
maintenance and repair of aircraft, the transportation and accommodation of 
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service personnel and the transportation and storage of munitions, petroleum and 
general stores.  The problem encountered in these areas is the impossibility of 
accurately quantifying the percentage of shared facilities dedicated to Bomber 
Command from the available documentary records.  As a result, the overall costs 
of these facilities and services that could be credited against Bomber Command 
cannot be evaluated at this time.  Suffice it to say, the inability to identify the full 
costs makes it probable that they were substantially higher than this chapter 
suggests. 
 
The first part of this analysis is concerned with the description of airfield design 
and development during the war.  The airfields that Britain built between 1939 
and 1945 were revolutionary.  Prior to World War II, no nation had built runways 
of the size that Bomber Command would subsequently require.  The needs of 
Bomber Command were to grow so much that they forced the Air Ministry 
Department of Works to design and build the first modern airfields, their 
pavements, traffic control systems and ancillary services from scratch.  The 
control systems, airfield layout that we today see in the larger airports arose out of 
the wartime activity of the RAF and Bomber Command.    
 
The second part of this chapter deals with the resource implications of developing 
and operating the air traffic management systems that were needed to control the 
large number of aircraft movements that arose out of wartime operations.  
Because of the dominant role of Bomber Command in generating aircraft 
movements, the national air traffic control system was a part of Bomber 
Command during World War II.  The final area considered in this analysis is the 
cost of providing the accommodation and utilities for the personnel and aircraft 
that served within Bomber Command.   
 
The historical literature dealing with the construction of airfields in wartime falls 
into three categories.  The first comprises first person and participant accounts by 
individuals intimately involved in the conduct of the strategic air offensive and 
the contemporary official records such as the House of Commons Debates.  The 
second category consists of works dealing with the technicalities of planning and 
building airports and pavements.  The third category is the later analyses of the 
building programme and comprises only three books.   
 
Among the primary materials, the most important source is the House of 
Commons Debates.  It was in parliamentary debate that Sir Archibald Sinclair, the 
then Secretary of State for Air, described the size of the airfield construction 
programme and answered the questions of members in the House of Commons6.  
For example, on 24th September 1943, the Member for Abingdon, Sir Ralph Glyn, 
queried the work ethos of Irish labourers employed on government airfield 
construction7.  As well, Sir Arthur Harris’s official report on the strategic air 
offensive of 1948, Despatch on War Operations, surveyed the development of 
Bomber Command’s airfields.  This report has been used heavily by the later 
histories on the subject. 
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 Sir Arthur Harris rated the shortage of airfields as one of the most significant 
restrictions on the expansion of the striking power of Bomber Command, and 
placed it even before the shortages of aircraft and manpower8.  While 
acknowledging that the introduction of heavy bombers led to requirements for 
longer airstrips, paved taxiways, hard standing and a multitude of traffic control 
systems, Harris sheeted home blame for delays in making airfields operational to 
poor planning9.  In his view, the Air Ministry mismanaged airfield construction 
and in one case, he even claimed an airfield was ready for operations a year 
before it was completed10.  In these matters, Harris displays what was a typical 
disregard for the effort already expended to provide his command with resources.   
 
Harris’s analysis also overlooks the unexpected arrival of the USAAF and their 
need to have Air Ministry airfields allocated to them.  In the case of airfield 
construction, he completely ignores the engineering innovation in constructing 
large paved airfields11.  There is also no acknowledgement of the fact that 
Bomber Command was the source of most of the requests for modifications to 
runways and areas of hard standing for parking aircraft on.  The need for 
extensive modifications to existing airfields was caused by the arrival of the larger 
and heavier bombers and the increased operational tempo as the strategic air 
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offensive grew in size.  All of these developments led to demand for larger 
airfields and better layouts as increasing numbers of aircraft made use of the 
available airfields.  
 
The second category of literature on this subject is the technical writings dealing 
with the design and construction of airports.  The major sources comprise a small 
number of pre-war works, including the German Carl Pirath, whose earlier 
German language papers were translated in 1938 into an English edition titled, 
Aerodromes, Their Location, Operation and Design12.  Pirath’s work covered 
airport locations, the design of terminal buildings, runways and ancillary taxiways 
and hard standing parking areas.  In Germany, airport design had become 
important at an early stage because Hitler was interested in legitimising air travel 
as a means of domestic transportation and in the design of the airport buildings 
themselves13.   
 
The other writings in this category are all post war and they describe in detail the 
engineering of airports and pavements.  The bulk of the technical writing of the 
period is American, and Charles Froesch and William Prokosch were amongst the 
first to write on the subject with their 1946 book, Airport Planning14.  This work 
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is a technical description on how to plan and build airports.   The usefulness of 
this text is the information it provides on the difficulties of airfield construction 
and the importance of the knowledge and experience gained in building all 
weather airfields during World War II.  A second American text, Airport 
Engineering, published in 1948 and written by three engineers, H. Oakley Sharp, 
G. Reed Shaw and J. A. Dunlap, supplies a similar description of airfield 
development to that given by Froesch and Prokosch15.   
 
The Institution of Civil Engineers, Airport Engineering Division, published the 
first British text on the subject of airfield design in 194816.  This work, written by 
W.J. Cozens, describes the specific details of airfield construction and the 
experience gained by British engineers during World War II.  In 1951, an official 
publication, written by E.H. Davis, dealt with the construction of pavements for 
roads and airfields and also acknowledged the importance of the developmental 
work carried out during the building of military airfields in Britain during World 
War II17.  Davis’s work is a technical description of engineering calculations and 
directions on the selection of suitable ground for pavements and the preparation of 
the ground for the laying of the pavement system.  It describes how British 
engineers used the limited experience of American highway engineers in the 
construction of the Air Ministry’s airfields during World War II.  Davis also 
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describes how British engineers developed their understanding of pavement 
design by trial and error during the war18.   
 
This body of material describes how British engineers drew on the limited 
information available from American highway projects in the late 1930s to 
develop concrete and macadaming as load bearing layers for airfields.  The 
airfields used by the RAF and the United States Army Air Forces during the 
Second World War were to be the testing ground for these new engineering 
techniques as they were the first large scale paved structures to be erected for 
heavy wheeled traffic.  The contemporary and technical nature of these sources 
makes them essential reading for anyone attempting to establish how technically 
innovative the building of pavements was in 1939.  The general history of the 
period completely ignores the innovative nature of pavement design and the 
enormous size of the Air Ministry’s airfield programme. 
 
In contrast to the large volume of work that deals with the military aspects of the 
air war there is little historical work available on airfield construction during 
World War II.  Of the official histories, the most useful is Charles Mendel 
Kohan’s volume of the Civil Series, Works and Buildings19.  Kohan’s volume 
provides a mine of information on wartime labour and resource costs in general 
and it is one of the most readable of the volumes of the official history.  Aside 
                                                 
18  Davis, Pavement Design, pp. 1-14 
from Kohan, none of the other official historians pays attention to the construction 
of airfields.  Webster and Frankland, in their 1961 military history of the strategic 
air offensive20, state only that the Air Ministry built the necessary airfields21.   
 
Other more recent works on airfield construction during World War II include 
Bruce Robertson’s 1977 work on airfield archaeology22 and Roger Freeman’s 
1978 work on the airfields used by the American Eighth Air Force in Britain23.  
Freeman provides interesting detail on the cost of building the airfields and 
maintaining these airfields and is a useful source on British airfield construction 
during World War II.  Later works include David Smith’s Britain’s Military 
Airfields24 written in 1989, and Robin Higham’s 1998 Bases of Air Strategy: 
Building Airfields for the RAF 1914-194525.  Of the four works Higham’s is the 
most useful and is less of a ‘buffs’ book.  Higham details the technical and 
economic cost of airfield construction in all theatres of operations during World 
War II, including the strategic air offensive against Germany.  The book is a 
comprehensive and detailed evaluation of this area to date and provides a wealth 
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of information on construction techniques, problems and costs.  To date, it is the 
best available general source on this subject. 
 
Before 1938, few engineers really understood the technical challenges of building 
concrete or paved airstrips26.  Based on the experience of road building the civil 
engineering profession knew that building a large paved airstrip would be a major 
project.  What they did not know was that building airstrips on the scale needed to 
conduct the strategic air offensive would present problems of space.  Britain was 
not going to be large enough for all of the activity required to conduct an air war 
on the scale that eventuated.  The most significant problems were a scarcity if 
large areas of stable soil and a shortage of clear airspace.  In siting airfields, the 
first requirement was to find a large enough area of stable soil that would support 
a large flat concrete surface.  Once found, such an area was had to take as many 
airfields as possible and this required clear flight paths, approaches and sufficient 
airspace for the operation of large numbers of aircraft.  Putting these two 
requirements together ruled out substantial parts of the United Kingdom.  This 
lack of airspace was significant and it is unlikely that the British air war could 
have been as large as it was if the main part of the air training scheme had not 
been located in Canada27. 
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It is most probable that British engineers picked up their information from the 
United States, where road building led to the first technical innovations in 
pavement design28.  One piece of evidence for this is the widespread use by 
British engineers of O.J. Porter’s California Bearing Ratio Method (CBRM), 
which Porter had developed while working for the California State Highway 
Department prior the World War II29.  British engineers throughout World War II 
used the CBRM and in Britain it remained the most widely used method for 
designing flexible pavements until well after World War II30.  British engineers 
publicly admitted the debt they owed to their American colleagues for the initial 
developments in the pavement designs that enabled the building of ‘economical 
but stable runways for the heavier aircraft which first came into general use 
during the last war’31.  In turn, the engineers later used the new airfield 
developments in road building as heavy motor vehicle traffic increased and led to 
a need for more robust road surfaces32.   
 
The programme of construction confronting the Air Ministry Directorate of 
Works presented a host of challenges not just in size and expense, but also in the 
development of new engineering and industrial techniques.  In addition, the 
imperative to build airstrips as quickly as possible did not allow time for 
experimentation or testing and, as a result, there were some serious faults with the 
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work done33.  However, given the demand for rapid construction, it is most 
surprising that so little went wrong and it is a mark of the Air Ministry’s success 
with this programme that it was able to construct enough airfields to meet 
American needs as well as its own.  At the end of the war, airfield construction 
was one activity where, under the lend lease arrangements, Britain supplied the 
United States with resources that were regarded as reciprocal aid and credited 
against Britain’s liabilities34.  It was a startling success and an example of British 
engineering excellence and industrial expertise. 
 
A Bomber Airfield 
 
In 1939, the typical Bomber Command airfield varied very little from those used 
during World War I.  Such airfields occupied an area of approximately 250 
hectares and provided the facilities and accommodation for the 1,134 personnel 
who maintained and operated one squadron of 12 aircraft35.  Each of these 
stations had a single satellite station manned by a further 586 personnel which 
duplicated some of the essential services found on the main station.  Of the 27 
airfields in Bomber Command in 1939, only nine had limited paved landing 
strips36.  The low number of paved airfields did not cause major problems during 
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the earlier part of the war because the aircraft available at the time could easily 
operate from grass airstrips.  Until late 1940, the largest aircraft operated by 
Bomber Command was the Wellington.  The Wellington weighed 14,500 kg at its 
heaviest37.  By comparison, the Stirling, Halifax and Lancaster had loaded 
weights of 30,000 lbs38 and could not operate off a grass strip.   
 
Amongst the services provided by a main station were facilities for maintenance, 
flying operations, personnel and utility supply.  Maintenance facilities included 
hangars, workshops, administration offices, stores and the mechanical and 
electrical engineering installations needed to maintain the aircraft.  For flying 
operations there were control towers, metrological offices, briefing rooms, gun 
butts, bomb dumps, armouries, petrol, oil and lubricant (POL) storage facilities 
and rudimentary lighting systems at some airfields39.  For personnel there were 
water reservoirs and pumping systems, sewage systems, sleeping quarters, 
messes, kitchens, medical centres, churches, cinemas, offices and rest facilities for 
both air and ground crews.  In order to operate all of the above facilities and to co-
ordinate them as part of a military campaign each airfield required electricity, gas 
and telecommunications.  All of these had to be planned, designed, manufactured 
and constructed before a single aircraft could begin military operations against the 
enemy. 
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Selecting the Site 
 
The first step in preparing an RAF airfield was the engineering assessment of the 
prospective site carried out by the Air Ministry Directorate of Works.  For the 
engineer there were four basic problems:  First, maximum safety in take off and 
landing; second, minimizing taxiing distances so as to expedite take off and 
landing; third, efficient handling and loading of aircraft on the ground; and fourth, 
arranging the runways to provide suitable air separation in the air traffic patterns 
of landing and taking off aircraft40.   
 
In addressing these four problems the engineer also had to consider general 
topography, slope and soil analysis.  In selecting an airfield, the surveyors and 
engineers paid careful attention to surrounding topography.  Given the intention to 
place large numbers of quickly trained volunteers into large, heavily loaded 
aircraft and have them fly great distances into enemy territory, it was essential 
that the terrain around a bomber airfield provided large expanses of flat land41.  
Heavily laden or damaged bombers of the size and construction of a Halifax, 
Stirling and Lancaster required a very large airspace to allow for the long, clear 
flying approaches so that aircraft could make safe approaches from a large variety 
of directions42.  It comes as no surprise that suitable sites were very quickly 
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developed leading to more and more unsuitable sites having to be utilised43.  
Despite all attempts to overcome these problems, Bomber Command faced 
significant congestion of its airspaces due to the placement of its airfields in South 
Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Huntingdonshire, Cambridgeshire and Norfolk44.   
 
The type of airfield that the RAF required dictated the geographical location in 
which the Directorate of Works would build it.  A fighter airfield had to be close 
to areas of expected threat, so that quick intercept and turn-around times (landing 
for refuelling and re-arming) could be obtained.  A 1940s bomber airfield had to 
have a large area due to the wider wingspans creating a need for much bigger 
spaces to taxi and park such aircraft; a training station required open flat areas 
free of housing and interference from other air traffic45.  Given the above 
requirements, it is not hard to see why the RAF deployed Fighter Command to the 
Southern and Eastern coasts and placed the Empire Air Training Scheme in 
Canada. 
 
Once the Directorate of Works staff had identified a site as suitable they carried 
out the quantity survey, conducted detailed investigations and undertook other 
preliminary operations until the Air Ministry issued the contracts for construction.  
In order to do this job the Directorate of Works had to keep abreast of 
developments in the techniques of airfield building, changes in RAF policies and 
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the resources available.  This was, as Kohan puts it, ‘an arduous and exacting 
duty’46.  Adroitness in technical and administrative manoeuvre and good liaison 
between the technical branches of the Ministry, surveyors, contract branches and 
contractors did much to smooth the way47. 
 
The Runway 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 Source: B. Baxter, http://www.bomber-command.info/afl.htm 
 
The engineering profession was well aware that the construction of an airfield 
runway had now become a major engineering work and that even a simple grass 
strip required careful siting.  The selection of an airstrip site involved the survey, 
testing and analysis of the ground upon it was to sit and the topography of the 
region.  The major concerns were drainage, gradient of the ground and the type of 
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soil and grass that covered it48.  Careful selection of the site was vital to limit the 
cost of development.  Drainage was important because of the need to remove 
large quantities of water that sealed runways would collect.  Soil type was also 
important because of the need for a solid weight-bearing sub-stratum for load 
bearing.  Slope was also important because of the need to have exact gradients for 
aircraft to land upon and any variation from these gradients would require 
excavation to achieve the correct gradient.  The building of a landing strip was no 
minor technical problem and the Air Ministry soon found that obtaining good 
sites became more and more difficult as the number of stations increased and 
there was an increasing use of less appropriate sites leading to greatly increased 
excavations and rising costs49.   
 
After the surveying and detailed investigations were completed the Air Ministry 
obtained the potential site for an airfield either through direct compulsory 
purchase or forced renting through administrative orders for the duration of 
hostilities.  Once the Air Ministry had control of the site, the contractor excavated 
the airfield and installed the drainage system.  At the same time, the trenches, 
conduits, access points and manholes of the electrical and communications 
systems were constructed.  Once these sub-surface services were installed, the 
sub-base soil was compacted and a stone sub-surface put down and compacted.  
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After all of this was completed, the wearing surface of concrete paving was laid 
and the airstrip was complete.   
 
In 1940, the standard dimensions of a bomber airfield were three runways 915 m 
long by 45 m wide (1,000 by 50 yards) with dispersed buildings and 
accommodation blocks and services such as water and sewage all being 
incorporated into the site.  By 1944, Bomber Command’s airfields had grown 
with one 1,830 m long by 45m wide, (2,000 by 50 yards) main runway and two 
subsidiaries of 1,281m long by 45m wide (1,400 by 50 yards)50.  The sizes of 
these airfields increased when hangars of even greater size and more 
accommodation for the larger numbers of personnel based on the airfields were 
added.   
 
One negative impact of airfield construction was the opportunity costs associated 
with the displacement of the normal activity previously conducted on the site.  
One of the leading opportunity costs associated with the building of the airfields 
was the displacement of agriculture51 and this problem was significant enough for 
the Secretary of State for Air, as noted above, to tell Parliament in 1944 that he 
was glad that ‘we have almost reached the end of our territorial demands’52.  
Sinclair’s sensitivity over the displacement of agriculture may have been due to 
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the number of questions directed to government ministers about the timing of the 
release of land from the Air Ministry back to agricultural and other uses53. 
 
Sinclair had good reason to be concerned over the amount of land being taken up 
by the Air Ministry.  In 1942, the average size of a Bomber Command airfield 
was 1.6 Km x 2.4 Km, an area of 320 hectares or 988 acres.  In that year Bomber 
Command had 79 such airfields, by 1944 the number of these airfields had grown 
to 13154.  These figures give a total area for Bomber Command airfields alone of 
78,052 acres in 1942 increasing to more than 129,428 acres by late 1944.  In 
terms of opportunity cost measured as a loss of potential crop production, this 
represented either 3,792,023 tons of potatoes, 542,308 tons of wheat or 4,807,223 
tons of sugar beet, depending on the crop sown on the land55.   
 
In relation to overall British production of these crops during the war, the loss due 
to the diversion of agricultural land for use by Bomber Command represents 
enough land to have grown either 7.5 percent of the total potato crop, 3.2 percent 
of the wheat crop or 19.4 percent of the sugar beet crop56.  Although the 
significance of these losses to the war effort is unclear there is no doubt that 
Britain’s economic health was damaged as imports, particularly of flour, refined 
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sugar and animal products, were increased and the exports of such products 
almost ceased57.   
 
Based on an average export price of £52.0058 per ton for British wheat, and if 
wheat had been the crop sown on the land, then the opportunity cost of Bomber 
Command’s airfields in wheat production was around £28.2 million over the 
period of the war.  Even if the much lower ‘Farm Gate’ price of £14.5 per ton59 
paid to the farmer under the governments pricing system is used, the financial loss 
for the same period was £7,863,466.   
 
Estimated Potential Crops Losses  
Due to Bomber Command Airfields 
Year Potato 
(Tons) 
Wheat 
(Tons) 
Sugar Beet 
(Tons) 
1939 19,740 24,809 27,476 
1940 304,304 35,766 383,334 
1941 414,960 52,759 551,304 
1942 569,780 79,613 725,883 
1943 746,928 106,170 971,006 
1944 854,225 126,192 996,597 
1945 882,086 116,998 1,151,613 
Total 3,792,023 542,308 4,807,223 
Fig. 5.2:   Source: Based on figures in Tables 59 and 60 Statistical Digest of the War, p.60 
 
 
If potatoes had been planted instead of wheat the loss at the farm gate would have 
been £6.65 per ton, giving us a loss in the order of £25,216,952, without taking 
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into account any value adding or export premiums60.  For sugar beet, the farm 
gate loss was £15, 046,60861.  Aside from the financial value of this potential loss 
is the cost of importing wheat and other produce to make up the national deficit.  
From 1940 until 1944 Britain was forced to import 21.13 million tons of wheat 
(£1.09 billion in equivalent value), 31.1 million tons of flour and meal and 1.7 
million tons of potatoes62.  This need to import basic foodstuffs added to the 
shortage of shipping and, as almost 5 percent of all wheat imported into Britain 
during the period 1940-1945 was lost at sea63, the cost is measured in lives as well 
as cash. 
 
Excavation 
 
As already mentioned above, the design of an airfield requires the landing strips 
to be oriented to minimise the dangers of cross winds and to enable 
omnidirectional take off and landing64.  Landing of aircraft also requires a slope 
with a grading of no more than 7.5 cm65 and a surface and supporting structure 
that can rapidly transmit the stresses imposed by the landing of heavy aircraft 
through the airstrip structures into the surrounding earth66.  In order to achieve 
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this effect the runway is built in several layers, each with its own function67.  In a 
concrete runway, the concrete slab is the wearing surface and its function is to 
distribute loads over as wide an area as possible.  An underlying layer of 
compacted stone chippings or stabilised soil acts to distribute the loads and to 
provide a satisfactory surface upon which to lay the concrete.  Under these layers 
is the soil sub-grade.  The sub-grade is levelled and compacted to increase the 
speed of transmission of landing forces on the wearing surface. 
 
In order to prepare the ground for these layers it has to be excavated.  The amount 
of excavation required for an average Bomber Command airstrip varied from 
38,250m2 in 1939 to 229,500m later in the war2, although as the war progressed 
and the available sites became more difficult the amount of excavation required 
increased with some stations requiring the removal of up to 764,555 m3 of spoil68.  
This activity placed an immense burden on the already stretched transport 
resources available within Britain.  If it is accepted that the average four ton truck 
of the time was able to carry approximately 3-4m3, depending on moisture 
content, then the above figures would roughly suggest that the average Bomber 
Command airfield required 9,562 truck loads of spoil moved in 1939 rising to 
57,375 later in the war69.  This estimate is conservative, as it does not include the 
return trip of empty vehicles.  For the period of the war, and using the figures 
above as a basis, it is reasonable to estimate an approximate total of 3.5 million 4 
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ton truck loads of spoil removed and dumped on behalf of Bomber Command.  
This would give a daily average of 1,687.5 loads or round trips. 
 
Excavation of the area also had to take into account the need for underground 
structures, particularly the placement of up to 81 Km of drains needed to remove 
approximately 950,000 litres of water that paved runways could collect on the 
surface of the concrete70.  The rapid removal of such large volumes of water was 
essential to keep a paved landing strip operational in the wet weather so common 
in Britain.  It was also important to remove water as rapidly as possible from the 
area of an airstrip so that it did not penetrate the small cracks in the structure and 
cause structural damage through the cycles of freezing and melting of water 
trapped within the layers of the airstrip71.  The engineers had to plan carefully the 
diversion of such large amounts of water, as, even in 1939, the impact on the local 
county side had to be minimised.  Local authorities were proactive in ensuring 
that the diversion of airfield runoff into existing watercourses did not cause 
flooding or damage to the surrounding waterways or catchments72.  As well as 
drains, the builders had to install conduit for telephone and extensive electrical 
cable required to operate an all-weather, night time airfield73.  After the 
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contractors had installed all of these services, the ground could be prepared and 
the landing strip pavement put down. 
 
Laying the Pavement 
 
Although engineers had been working on the rational design of pavements from 
as early as the first two decades of the twentieth century, it was the necessity of 
‘providing economical but stable runways for the heavier aircraft’ that brought 
about the adoption of widely accepted methods of design and construction in 
Britain74.  As noted above runways usually consisted of several layers with each 
having a special function.  The concrete slab provides the wearing surface and 
distributes the load.  Where the sub-grade soil is poor then a base of compacted 
stone or stabilized soil is required to distribute the load and to provide a 
satisfactory surface upon which to construct the slab75.  Most structural failures in 
this type of paving arose out of excessive traffic stress, moisture or temperature 
damage to the layers (including the concrete) and failure of the adhesive bonds in 
the concrete or bitumen due to poor workmanship76.   
 
For Bomber Command the impact of the speed of the programme prevented 
engineers from experimenting to find the most effective way of constructing 
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paved surfaces77.  This caused ‘an enormous amount of repair work to runways 
and perimeter tracks’ to be undertaken78.  One of the causes of this large rate of 
failure is identified by Higham as being due to the speed of construction lowering 
quality assurance79, poor drainage, the lack of the ‘ironing effect’ by constant 
traffic80 and the use of unwashed ballast81.  The areas most affected by this wear 
and tear appear from the available evidence to have been the taxiways and hard 
standing around the periphery of the airfields82.   
 
Airfield Construction 1939-1945 
Year Airfields 
Provided with 
Paved Runways 
Bomber 
Command 
Airfields 
Airfields on Which 
Extensions to Runways 
were Carried Out 
1939 9 27* - 
1940 40  14 
1941 143  49 
1942 136 79 63 
1943 78 105 31 
1944 38 128 16 
1945 - 121 - 
Fig. 5.3: C.M.Kohan, Buildings and Works, p.284, * Harris, Despatch, 153, 
 
The taxiways were the areas of an airfield that were subjected to the most use and, 
as the engineers explained, taxiways and hard standing were also badly affected 
by the vibrations created by the running of aircraft engines as part of warm up 
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procedures and routine maintenance83.  In 1948 the recommended thickness for 
such areas was ‘at least 12 inches’ of material which is ‘non-capillary in nature’84, 
otherwise the pavement would crumble.  This factor, combined with the lack of 
time British engineers had in which to experiment, is the most likely explanation 
for the serious problems affecting taxiways that caused Sir Arthur Harris 
complaints.  
 
Another factor affecting the design and construction of Bomber Command’s 
airfields was enemy activity.  The need to secure the collected bomber aircraft 
from damage due to enemy raids led to a large number of dispersal schemes.  The 
major source of these changes was Bomber Command itself and approximately 
2,600 such schemes were prepared for implementation on its airfields85.  The 
threat was real and the Luftwaffe made 877 actual attacks against what they 
thought were Bomber Command airfields, 434 made against operational airfields 
and the 443 attacks against decoy airfields86.   
 
The need to disperse aircraft increased the amount of paved taxiway required to 
4.8Km per bomber station.  Added to this was an increased need for added hard 
standing to park growing numbers of aircraft87.  With the introduction of the 
heavy bombers, all of these taxiways, hard standing and runways needed 
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strengthening through thickening88.  From 1943 until the end of the war in 1945, 
the Air Ministry works Department resurfaced 30,810,000m2 of pavement in 
order to strengthen them.  This work appears to have been in addition to an 
‘enormous amount of repair work’ which Harris comments upon in The 
Despatch89. 
 
Cost of Extensions to Existing Airfields 1943 
CCRC  £27,000,000 
OTU £3,500,000 
Fighter Command £4,000,000 
Coastal Command £2,000,000 
Army Co-Operation Command £50,000 
Minor Extensions £50,000 
  
Fig. 5.4:  Source:  C.M.Kohan, Buildings and Works, p.298 
 
The design of taxi tracks and hard standing had to balance dispersal with the fast 
and efficient movement of aircraft on the ground and to take account of larger 
aircraft.  For example, the 1939 Wellington had weighed no more than 14,500Kg, 
it was 18.54m long and it had a wingspan of 26.26m90.  In 1942, the Lancaster 
weighted 30,909 Kg, it was 21.08m long and it had a wingspan of 31m91.  These 
later aircraft not only required thicker paving, they also required greater surface 
area for turning and parking and taxiways wide enough to allow for the fast 
taxiing essential if a Bomber Command station was going to get its 32 aircraft 
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airborne in a reasonable time, which was set at 45 seconds92.  Bomber Command 
was more generous with landing, allocating three minutes to each returning 
aircraft93.   
 
When Harris changed Bomber Command’s tactics from independent flight to 
bomber stream in 1942, the importance of rapid movement and take-off increased 
substantially.  Using the above figures the fastest that the 32 aircraft at an 
individual station could become airborne was 24 minutes.  It would be interesting 
to see how often this happened.  If all 32 aircraft returned, it took, at best, 1 hour 
36 minutes for them all to land.  This dwell factor affected bomb loads, fuel 
consumption and aircrew exhaustion, although Harris makes no comment on the 
latter effect94.  It would be equally interesting to note if there was a higher 
incidence of crashes amongst later landing aircraft than amongst those landing 
first. 
 
The construction of runways, perimeter tracks and hard standings at a standard 
Bomber Command station required an enormous amount of materials, such as 
crushed stone (metal), cement and ballast.  Although it is unknown how the 
engineers managed the logistics of this activity, perhaps the empty trucks that had 
taken away the useless spoil were loaded for the return journey.  C.M. Kohan 
estimates that the average Bomber Command station used approximately 
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688,099m3 of ballast, usually in the form of stone chippings, and 18,288 tonnes of 
cement.  The total mass of these two materials was 132,086 tonnes.  With the 
average lorry of the period being only 4.06 tonnes, it would have required 
approximately 32,512 one-way trips to remove waste soil and replace it with 
stone chips and other building materials.  The total amount of materials moved as 
part of constructing Bomber Command’s 131 stations was 17,303,266 tonnes in 
4,259,113 trips95.    
 
Airfields Under Construction 1943 
Category More than 25 
percent  
Complete 
Less then 25 
percent 
Complete 
Total 
Bomber 28 29 57 
Emergency Runway 1 0 1 
Fighter 3 2 5 
Advanced Landing 
Grounds 
0 8 8 
Coastal 5 0 5 
Army Co-Operation 1 0 1 
Transport 2 0 2 
Flying Training 1 1 2 
Ferry Command 0 1 1 
Fig. 5.5: Source: C.M. Kohan, Buildings and Works, p.298 
 
To make these figures more understandable the construction of landing strips, 
taxiways and hard standing (excluding all building construction) for Bomber 
Command alone required the movement of 8,477 tonnes in 2,087 4.06 tonne lorry 
trips of up to 100 miles every day of the Second World War96.  Added to the trips 
to remove waste soil there was an average of 3,754.5 daily round trips by four ton 
                                                 
95  Calculated from figures given in Kohan, Works and Buildings, p.285 
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lorries.  This represented a considerable problem for Britain, as lorries were in 
short demand from the very beginning of the war when the impressment of 
contractors’ vehicles by other departments slowed work on RAF bases97. 
 
Kohan has estimated the financial cost of constructing a 1942 triangular airstrip 
with it attendant taxiways and hard standing as being ‘more than £500,000.0098.   
Harris in Despatch reports that the average airfield in 1944 had doubled in price 
from £500,000 in 1942 to £1,000,000 in 194499.  Robin Higham, in Bases of Air 
Strategy, gives a much higher figure of £1,800,000 for a bomber airfield, ‘not 
including buildings, water supply and sewage’100.  The problem with the figures is 
that there is no agreement in any of the sources regarding the costs of building an 
airfield.  It is likely that the figure given by Kohan is too low and that Higham’s 
figure is too high.  The average of the three figures is £1,100,000 and this figure is 
probably reasonably close to the actual cost of constructing the airstrip runways, 
taxiways and hard standings built for Bomber Command during World War II.    
 
In 1942, figures in Kohan give a cost for the 79 operational stations used by 
Bomber Command at around £39,500,000101.  This includes the cost of upgrading 
the 27 operational airfields Bomber Command held at the beginning of the war.  
The upgrading of these stations during war operations can only have increased the 
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100  See Higham, Bases of Air Strategy, p.40 
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complexity and cost of such work.  In 1943, the Air Ministry spent £36.6 million 
on extending existing airfields and of this figure £33,300,000 went to extending 
Bomber Command airfields102.   
 
In 1943, which was not the peak year for airfield construction, Kohan gives a 
figure of £126,000,000 for actual expenditure on Air Ministry construction103, 
including 82 airfields of which 69.5 percent were for Bomber Command104.  The 
cost of £126,000,000 given by Kohan is £4 million higher than the £122,000,000 
that the Central Statistical Office gives for military construction work carried out 
in the United Kingdom that year105.  Given the central role of airfields in the war 
operations of the RAF it is reasonable to assume that if 69.5 percent of the 
airfields were for Bomber Command approximately that percentage flowed into 
all other aspects of RAF construction.  If so, 69.5 percent or £87,600,000 of the 
Air Ministry’s 1943 expenditure on construction was for Bomber Command.  
This percent would be in line with the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald 
Sinclair’s, statement to the House of Commons that; ‘Of the resources allocated to 
the air war the largest share is given to Bomber Command’ 106.   
 
 
 
                                                 
102  Kohan, Works and Buildings, p.298 
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Expenditure on Buildings 
Year Expenditure 
1935 £750,000 - £1,250,000 
1938 £25,000,000 
1939 £50,000,000 
1940 £75,000,000 
1941 £125,000,000 
1942 £145,000,000 
1943 £126,000,000 
1944 £40,000,000 
1945 - 
Fig. 5.6:  Source: C.M.Kohan, Buildings and Works, p.281 
 
Kohan provides a total figure of £587,250,000.00 for Air Ministry construction 
between 1939 and 1945.  Based on a percentage of 69.5 percent, the total cost 
allotted to Bomber Command is £408,138,750.  This is the equivalent of 
£3,108,584.00 per station.  This figure makes the £1,100,000 average cost for the 
construction of an airstrip and paving derived from the figures given by Sir A. 
Harris and C.M. Kohan in the official histories107 and quoted by other sources 
such as R.A. Freeman in Airfields of the Eight108 and Robin Higham, to be a 
reasonable figure.  The total cost of paving the 128 Bomber Command stations is 
therefore around £140,800,000.  
 
The Air Ministry spent a further £5.25 million on three large emergency runways 
at Carnaby, Woodbridge and Manston.  These emergency landing strips came 
under the control of Bomber Command, which was responsible for all air traffic 
control in the UK, although all Allied aircraft in distress used them.  These 
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airfields had a 2,745m long by 225m wide concrete surface, roughly equivalent to 
64.36 kilometres of main road’109.  Finally, in early 1945, three Bomber 
Command stations had runways widened from 45 m to 90 m in width and 
lengthened by one third, from 1,830 m to 2,745 m.  The cost of these extensions 
for each station was £1,750,000, another £5,250,000 on the overall bill110.   
 
The calculations made here lead to an estimate of the cost for building Bomber 
Command’s airstrips and pavement of something in the order of £151,500,000.  
This cost does not include the £99,000,000 spent on building airfields for Bomber 
Command that the Air Ministry later transferred to the United States Army Air 
Forces111.  Nor does it take into account the cost of repairing and maintaining 
these airstrips once they became operational.   
 
Having now established the approximate size of Bomber Command’s pavement it 
is necessary to identify the cost associated with building all of the facilities and 
services required to house and support the 59 different functions carried out on 
such an airfield112.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109  Kohan, Works and Buildings, p.284 
110  Kohan, Works and Buildings, p.160 
111  Kohan, Works and Buildings, p.286 
Airfield Lighting and Traffic Control 
 
In order to keep a logical progression this section will describe the various 
facilities required for a bomber station by working from the airstrip out and 
starting with the lighting systems used on those airstrips.  In 1939, Bomber 
Command had no airstrip lighting and did not foresee a need for more than a 
rudimentary system.  Following the initial losses inflicted by the German 
defenders over the North Sea and the need to change from day to night operations 
lighting became an urgent requirement.  As the war continued and the complexity 
and size of Bomber Command’s operations increased, the complexity and size of 
the aerodrome lighting systems increased as well.   
 
The vital importance of effective aerodrome lighting and control systems came 
from the need to prevent the unnecessary loss of valuable aircraft due to such 
simple accidents as running off the taxiway into soft wet earth.  Within Bomber 
Command, Harris estimated that the wastage rate of aircraft within the boundaries 
of its own airfields was as high as one aircraft damaged per 227 flying hours113.  
Airfield accidents were so bad that by March 1942, the Air Ministry standardised 
airfield markings and lighting, local landing and taxiing procedures and the 
creation of a central air traffic control organisation under the control of Bomber 
Command.  At the beginning of 1942, the intended increase in the operational 
intensity proposed by Harris was under threat from the simple fact that it took one 
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hour to land 12 aircraft, or six minutes per aircraft114.  Harris states that this was 
due to the primary consideration given to safety and the poor lighting and radio 
communications available to pilots.  By 1944, the timing for landing an aircraft 
had dropped by 66 percent to two minutes, which was essential if the large 
number of aircraft being despatched were to land and accidents on and near the 
airfields kept to manageable levels.  Harris contends that without these 
improvements in lighting and air traffic control the bomber offensive ‘could never 
have achieved the scale it did’115.  
 
When the war started in 1939 the RAF used a ‘primitive form of flare path, 
composed of small battery fed electric lamps laid out on the grass by hand’116.  
This early flare path could be ‘supplemented in poor visibility by paraffin flares 
of the road-mender variety’117.  A massive and clumsy floodlight was also 
available for use118.  By May 1944, 95 percent of all Bomber Command airfields 
were equipped with Drem Mark II airfield lighting, 75 percent had sodium 
funnels, 71 percent had SANDRA searchlights119, 52 percent had sodium flare-
paths and 45 percent had SBA and contact lighting120.  The effort required to 
quickly assimilate the lessons of war operations and to design, engineer, 
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116  Harris, Despatch, p.186 
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manufacture and install these lighting systems in less than four and a half years 
was a remarkable achievement and it produced a remarkable system which is still 
the standard today.  
 
Similarly, the ‘Hooded’ contact lighting system that replaced the battery-operated 
contact lighting remains the track lighting system used at airports today.  This 
type of lighting works off mains electricity and the cables to supply this electricity 
had to be buried under the existing pavement.  This was one other reason why so 
much existing pavement had to be lifted and replaced during the war and this 
modification added to the cost of building airstrips and paved areas.  All 131 
Bomber Command airfields had Hooded Contact Lighting installed before the end 
of the war in 1945121.  The contact lighting system consisted of individual hooded 
lights placed every 61m on the airstrip itself and every 91m on taxiways and 
boundary roads122.   
 
In 1941, a new form of guidance lighting, the Mark I and Mark II Drem123 
systems came into operational use at 80 Bomber Command stations124.  The Mark 
II Drem system comprised landing strip contact lights, outer circuit lights, funnel 
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lights, totem poles, Glim and floodlights, fog funnels125, angle of approach 
indicators, taxying track lights, dispersal signs and portable Glim lights etc., all 
controlled from the Watch Office of a station126.  A further 21 Bomber Command 
stations received the MK III Drem system in order to limit the number of aircraft 
being damaged by running off the taxiways and hard standing onto soft ground.  
The Mark III system provided different lighting on the inside and outside of 
tracks, illuminated dispersal signs, and closer spacing of lights on curves.  With 
the arrival of the USAAF arrival ID beacons flashing a two letter code and radio 
beacons were then needed so returning aircraft could identify their group and 
home airfields127.  All of these lighting systems developed for use on RAF 
airfields, particularly Bomber Command’s airfields, became the standard lighting 
system for post-war airfields all over the world128.  
 
The importance of effective lighting to bomber operations cannot be over-
emphasised.  Amongst the problems facing Bomber Command were flying 
congestion and aircraft accidents on or in the immediate vicinity of airfields.  
Good lighting and traffic control systems were vital to limit the impact of this 
congestion on operations129.  Surprisingly, the underlying cause of these problems 
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was a lack of space.  There were not enough suitable locations for bomber 
airfields in the British Isles leading to a concentration of such stations in South 
Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Huntingdonshire, Cambridge and Norfolk130.   
 
The congestion caused by the concentration of Bomber Command’s stations into 
the mid-eastern seaboard of Britain was mad worse by the training and testing 
flights that aircraft were required to undertake as well as the operational sorties 
that formed the primary reason for the whole organisation.  Harris lists the 
installation of the Mark II Drem system along with advances in flying control and 
the provision of the three emergency airstrips at Woodbridge, Manston and 
Carnaby as helping to overcome this problem.  This problem was so severe at 
some stations that their airfield circuits overlapped leading to the relegation of 
such airfields to training activities131.    
 
The problem of congestion increased as the size of the aircraft fleet available to 
Bomber Command increased.  A significant part of the problem lay in the 
movement of an aircraft from its parking area along a taxiway to the end of a 
runway for take off132.  Sir Arthur Harris believed that 32 to 45 aircraft was a 
reasonable number of aircraft to operate from a single station133.  By 1942, the 
average time allocated to each heavy bomber to complete its take off was 45 
seconds.  If nothing went wrong, the shortest period of time in which 32 aircraft 
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could get clear of a runway was 24 minutes134.  With the adoption of bomber 
stream tactics the need to reduce the time taken to get aloft became even more 
important.  Landing was, as already discussed, even more problematic with 32 
aircraft taking more than 90 minutes to land.  This should have meant more 
casualties due to damage, fatigue and injury amongst returning aircraft and 
crews135.  That it did not was due to the efficiency with which Bomber Command 
and the Air Ministry’s Works Directorate met the challenges posed by the rapidly 
changing face of the strategic air offensive.  
 
In 1943, 23 aircraft were damaged for every 10,000 flying hours in Bomber 
Command.  By 1944, the rate had fallen to 15 aircraft and by 1945 only eight 
aircraft were being damaged for the same period of flying136.  These figures look 
good when viewed by themselves, but they need to be seen against the 1,170 
percent growth in traffic density on Bomber Command’s airfields that over the 
same period.  Under these conditions, the improvements in safety achieved by 
Bomber Command are startling and they show a level of professionalism and 
organisation that few military forces have been able to achieve.  This 
improvement also demonstrates that Britain was highly capable in operating 
military forces during World War II.   
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Air Traffic Control 
 
The congestion that afflicted Bomber Command as it grew between 1942 and 
1945 posed significant threats to the ability of Bomber Command to sustain the 
strategic air offensive.  For Bomber Command the loss of an aircraft and crew 
was serious and it did not matter whether enemy action or accident caused the 
loss.  Bomber Command had more control over the causes of accidents than it did 
over German defences and it expended a lot of effort in addressing these causes. 
 
The answer to the problem of a vast increase in operational intensity and the need 
to concentrate large force over enemy targets was the effective control of 
airspace.  Prior to 1942, operational intensity and tactics did not require an 
extensive system of air traffic control and, although there was a rudimentary 
system, it did not play a critical role until 1942.  After February 1942, the 
introduction of the bomber stream led to the problem of landing these aircraft.  
One answer to this problem was the airfield lighting systems discussed above.  A 
second was getting aircraft back to the vicinity of their home airfield and landing 
them in a rapid and orderly manner.  To accomplish this, the Air Ministry 
established a system of air traffic control by extending the authority of the Flying 
Control Organisation (FCO) and placing it under the command of the C-in-C 
Bomber Command.   
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The Air Ministry established the FCO in 1939 as an all-command, RAF wide 
entity designed to assist aircraft in distress137.  Bomber Command took over the 
FCO, as it was the largest user of the skies and airfields in Britain.  The FCO 
became part of Bomber Command by having its Central Flying Control (CFC) 
function moved to the HQ at High Wycombe138.  This was necessary because the 
FCO was the only organisation with the necessary structure and facilities capable 
of carrying out both local and nation wide air traffic control139.   
 
Local air traffic control was the responsibility of the Flying Control Staff (FCS) at 
each station and it was their job to get returning aircraft down in as quick and 
orderly a manner as was possible140.  The need for a system covering the entire 
British Isles and surrounding seas was due to the unpredictable nature of British 
weather, which could result in local fog or rain conditions leading to the diversion 
of a large number of aircraft to stations that could accept landings.  This required 
the national level CFC at High Wycombe.  Communication from the airfield FCS 
and the CFC went through a Group FCS (G-FCS) so that when aircraft from an 
airfield within a Group needed to divert to airfields outside of that Group the CFC 
coordinated it.  If the diversion was to an airfield within the same Group then the 
G-FCS controlled the activity141.  
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Emergency Assistance to Aircraft in Distress 
 
Despite the re-orientation of the FCO to general air traffic control, priority went to 
assisting aircraft in distress142.  The importance of providing this assistance lay in 
the necessity of maintaining aircrew morale.  The risks faced by Bomber 
Command aircrew were significant enough and the men flying these operations 
needed to know that everything possible would be done to get them back alive.  
Any failure to supply such assistance would have almost certainly entailed a 
dramatic and sustained drop in morale amongst aircrew.  Due to a lack of accurate 
figures, it is difficult to evaluate the contribution that the FCO made to the 
strategic air offensive and the crews of Bomber Command.  Sir Arthur Harris 
places a high value on the value of the FCO.  He reports that the number of 
Bomber Command aircraft that the FCO assisted to a safe landing numbered 
‘many thousands’ and that many Bomber Command aircrews owed their lives to 
the efficiency of this organisation143.  The actual numbers involved were very 
high and 11,250 Bomber Command aircraft in some degree of distress were to 
land at the three emergency runways at Carnaby, Woodbridge and Manston144.  
Added to this achievement was the planning of 95,000 diversions of which 20,000 
actual diversions occurred145. 
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Sir Arthur Harris attributes the success achieved by the FCO and its management 
of air traffic control to the ‘wide inter-command’ nature of the FCO and the close 
co-operation of an extensive range of civilian and other service agencies146.  It 
took 2,700 personnel to man the FCO and they saved the equivalent of 31,250 
distressed aircraft, at an approximate value of £625 million147, from crashing on 
return and they controlled 660,000 take-offs and landings by achieving a 300 
percent increase in the speed of control between 1942 and 1945148.  Harris rightly 
states that ‘without the FCO to get the bomber force safely onto the ground again 
on its return, the massive scale of the offensive could never have been 
achieved’149.  The evidence fully supports this claim. 
 
Camouflage 
 
Once constructed an airfield required accommodation for aircraft and people and 
the estimated 59 different activities that were undertaken on a Bomber Command 
station150.  Amongst these buildings were barracks, messes, communal buildings 
(cinemas, churches etc.), institutes, hangars, workshops, stores, ground staff 
facilities, administrative buildings, sick quarters, mechanical and electrical 
installations, wireless stations, operational planning areas, control towers, fire 
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stations, vehicle parks, water supply, sewage, roads and other services.  The need 
for dispersal and camouflage increased the cost of providing these amenities. 
 
Although the Director of Works had identified a need for a national camouflage 
scheme in 1935, very little happened until 1939 when the Air Ministry appointed 
the artist, Norman Wilson RA, as an Honorary Air Commodore with the 
responsibility of establishing a national camouflage scheme and applying it to 
RAF establishments.  There was a lot of work for Hon. Air Commodore Wilson.  
 
In 1938, the RAF establishment had had one officer charged with the 
management of camouflage.  By 1942, Air Commodore Wilson commanded 330 
officers and 1,000 men involved in the planning and application of camouflage 
schemes for the RAF151.  In the same year, Wilson’s men used 22 million gallons 
of paint, 6,700,000m2 of steel wool and untold amounts of Stadistall slag chips 
and, until Malaya fell, large amounts of scrap rubber.  All of this work was to 
disguise the bomber stations and runways from the air152.  The cost of this activity 
was £8,750,000153, of which Bomber Command’s proportion would have been 
approximately £6,037,500.  This figure excludes the construction of a number of 
dummy airfields, which contributed to the war effort by attracting 443 out of the 
877 enemy air attacks carried out against RAF airfields154.  
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 Accommodation 
 
The provision of accommodation for aircraft was one problem that continued to 
plague Bomber Command throughout the war155.  Accommodation shortages 
existed in all areas of Bomber Command and affected domestic facilities and 
sleeping accommodation for personnel, as well as workshops and hangars for 
aircraft.  Interestingly, Harris claims the hangar problem was finally resolved in 
1944, but the personnel problems increased in the later months of 1944 ‘as the 
casualty rates decreased’156.  The reason for the decline in casualty rates is well 
known.  The ending of the hangar shortage probably lies in the fact that a 
considerable number of Type T hangars were built on Bomber Command stations 
for the storage of Horsa Gliders which were expended in the invasion of 
Europe157, leaving the hangers to be utilised by the squadron and base repair 
organisations.  
 
Accommodation for Aircraft 
 
The average hangar accommodation provided on a Bomber Command airfield 
depended on when the airfield had been built.  Pre-war stations such as Binbrook 
(see map 2 below), were designed like airports with all of their service 
accommodation clustered at the end of a taxi circuit leading off the landing strips.  
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The advent of German air attack on RAF bases forced the re-consideration of this 
approach so that the dispersal of buildings and services became essential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.7: Binbrook Airfield  Courtesy: MOD.RAF 
 
 
The pre-war stations also had 5 Type C hangars.  The Air Ministry had designed 
these hangars for the smaller Battles, Blenheims and Wellingtons of the pre-war 
period.  The Type C hangar was 45.7m wide by 91.4m long and had doors up to 
10.7m high which had gravel filling up to 6m high158.  This size of hangar could 
take a Lancaster wingspan but the height of the hangar remained a problem in 
terms of fitting lifting devices above such a large aircraft. 
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Fig. 5.8: Type C Hangar at Binbrook;  Courtesy of D. McKenzie, Airfield Research Group 
 
Another problem created for the Directorate of Works by the Air Staff was the 
small size of the early hangers.  The small size of early angers had arisen from an 
Air Staff requirement that hangers needed to be light to allow easy transportation.  
The first of these hangars, the Bellman or Type B, designed in 1938, was 29m 
wide by 55m long and, at this size; it was totally inadequate for the heavy 
bombers then coming off the drawing boards and into the testing stages of their 
development.  Of the 101 stations described on the RAF Bomber Command 
Commemoration site 51 had Type B hangars159.  This gives some indication of 
the extent of the accommodation problems that beset Bomber Command. 
 
With the advent of the heavy bombers, a larger temporary hangar was required 
and Teesside Bridge and Engineering Works Ltd. developed these.  The Type T 
hangar had two variants, a Type I and Type II.  These hangars were 35.1m wide 
by 73.2 m long and 7.6 m high and some 906 were erected160, of which 199 Type 
T2 are listed as having been built on 76 Bomber Command stations161.  Although 
a number of these were for storing Horsa gliders for the invasion, there is little 
doubt that Bomber Command made at least partial use of their resources, 
particularly after the Horsas had made their one-way trips to the continent.  The 
standard fit-out of hangars for a Class A airfield was two T2 type hangars plus 
one Type B.  If so, then the 131 airfields operated by Bomber Command would 
have required approximately 200 Type T hangars.   
 
 
Fig. 5.9: Type T2 Hangar at Sculthorpe;  Courtesy of Airfield Research Group 
 
This fits closely with the listing of 199 hangars published on the RAF’s Bomber 
Command Commemoration page.  Also listed are 52 Type B hangars, 16 Type J 
                                                                                                                                  
159  Ministry of Defence, www.RAF.MOD/BomberCommand/stations 
160  Higham, Bases of Air Strategy, p.52 
161  Ministry of Defence, www.RAF.MOD/BomberCommand/stations 
and 84 Type C162.  The numbers above equate to 38,933,544 m3 for the storage of 
aircraft in Bomber Command.  The breakdown of this figure shows 3,905,200 m3 
in Type T hangars, 630,344 m3 in Type B and 34,398,000m3 in Type C. 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
In order to conduct bomber operations a large number of ancillary facilities 
ranging from control towers to fire stations to bomb dumps and petrol, oil and 
lubricant (POL) stores were required.  Chapter 7 details the subject of POL, its 
manufacture, supply, storage and use.  This leaves a brief description of the types 
of ancillary services and structures that the Air Ministry provided to Bomber 
Command’s stations. 
 
Each operational station required a control tower and these housed not only the 
Flying Control Organisation elements on the airfield but also the watch office and 
the control systems for the lighting systems.  In a number of these towers, there 
was also facility for a radio control room.  However, the radio facility was often 
housed remotely from the tower, in a van or hut of its own.  In addition to the 
tower, there were buildings for the necessary fire tenders and ambulances so that 
aid to crashed and injured crews could be quickly despatched onto the landing 
strip.  An example of a control tower is shown here; 
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Fig. 5.10: Control Tower Courtesy: Airfield Research Group 
 
 
Fig. 5.11: Control Tower Courtesy: Airfield Research Group 
 
 
Fig. 5.12: Air Ministry Fire Section Building circa 1939-42 Courtesy of D. McKenzie, 2001 
 
Not all operational facilities and activities could be housed on the actual site of 
Bomber Command’s airfields.  The most obvious of these were the POL and 
bomb stores.  Bomb stores had to be placed in isolated areas, preferably in open 
countryside at a good distance from other structures.  This ensured that any 
accidental explosion in a store could not seriously harm the station, surrounding 
buildings or civilian houses.  In 1936, the Air Ministry estimated that the RAF 
would use 98,000 tons of incendiaries and general-purpose bombs and storage for 
this amount of ordnance was put in place.  The estimate resulted in Bomber 
Command stations having 12 by 12-ton stores giving a maximum storage capacity 
of 144 tons163.  The problem was that actual usage rapidly overtook the 1936 
figures leaving most of Bomber Command’s stations with insufficient bomb 
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storage and handling facilities164.  Over the peak period of the strategic air 
offensive, Bomber Command’s average monthly consumption of bombs was 
more than 3,841 tons per month in 1942, 12,759 tons in 1943, 42,275.5 tons in 
1944 and 37,204 tons in 1945165.  The amount of bomb storage supplied to 
Bomber Command and to all elements along the supply links never met the needs 
of the campaign.  The above figures indicate the dependency of the strategic air 
offensive on the continuous supply of ordnance in sufficient quantity to maintain 
the weight of attack decreed by Harris and his staff.   
 
Human Accommodation 
 
For Sir Arthur Harris, another significant problem facing Bomber Command 
throughout the war was the lack of what he called ‘domestic accommodation’.  
This included messes, kitchens, recreational facilities and sleeping 
accommodation.  Towards the end of the war, this problem worsened as casualty 
rates fell whilst the number of replacement aircrew remained at the level that the 
Air Staff had estimated as being required.  Life for the average member of 
Bomber Command during the war never approached the level of deprivation 
suffered by the millions of men who served in front-line army formations and 
would not stand any comparison of the conditions, which were the norm for the 
front-line infantry.  Nevertheless, the life of Bomber Command aircrew was not 
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easy; the normality of life between missions can only have accentuated the shock 
of the myriad deaths that these men experienced. 
 
Prior to the war the RAF had prided itself on providing above average domestic 
accommodation for what it saw as above average servicemen.  The concept was 
that being a member of the RAF entailed being at the front of modern living and 
this included living conditions for all personnel.  Even the British Arts Council 
had been involved in ensuring that the buildings erected by the Air Ministry 
conformed to the Art Council’s standards for the countryside.  This resulted in 
pleasant redbrick buildings that suggested something Georgian in their 
appearance.   
 
 
Fig. 5.13: Officers Mess Courtesy: Ashley Bailey Collection, 2001 
 
The problem was, nice buildings took too long to build and with the increased 
urgency of the expansion scheme, the RAF had to put up with Nissan Huts and 
other prefabricated buildings.  In order to meet this demand the Air Ministry built 
3,110,000m3 of pre-fabricated huts on RAF stations to meet the accommodation 
needs for personnel166.  Higham provides figures of 84,711m2 of hut floor space 
supplied to the RAF in 1939, 432,922m2 in 1940 and 3,051,209m2 in 1941 giving 
a total of 3,568,842m2 over the three years167.  The actual amount of huts supplied 
to Bomber Command is not available, but as much as 60 percent or 2,145,900m3, 
of this hutting may have gone to Bomber Command. 
 
 
Fig. 5.14: Nissan Hut Courtesy of the Airfield Research Group. 
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Initially most of this hutting was wooden168.  The intention behind using wood 
was, surprisingly, to minimise the impact of such accommodation on the local 
countryside, presumably in an attempt to stay within the Arts Council’s standards.  
Higham estimates that the Air Ministry spent approximately £4.5 million on the 
provision of this hutting between 1935 and 1939169.  By 1939, shortage of timber 
plus the need to construct large amounts of accommodation quickly led to the 
development of the Nissan Hut, shown above.   
 
Even the provision of accommodation for personnel was not a simple task.  
Sleeping accommodation had to be placed well away from the airfield because of 
the noise created by a busy airfield and because of the need to protect personnel 
from the risks associated with enemy air attacks and crashes of damaged or badly 
handled aircraft upon their return from flights.  On the other hand, the messes and 
kitchens needed to be close to the airfield so that personnel did not have to travel 
far to eat during working hours.  This necessary dispersion made the bicycle king 
and imposed further inefficiencies upon the smooth operation of stations.  The 
most obvious impact of the dispersal of domestic accommodation was that it 
required larger areas of land than those within the boundaries of the station.  For 
example, at Alconbury the Air Ministry requisitioned Alconbury House and built 
18 personnel accommodation blocks near this location and to the South of the 
A14 road towards Little Stukeley170. 
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Fig. 5.15:  Little Stukeley Courtesy: MOD/RAF 
 
At other stations, personnel were billeted into requisitioned housing or were 
billeted upon the local population.  It is not known with any precision how many 
Bomber Command personnel found themselves housed in requisitioned buildings 
or billeted in other people’s homes.  Because of the lack of data on requisitioned 
housing, the figures provided here do not take into account the cost of this 
activity.  Also unknown is the amount of accommodation that was taken up by 
those married personnel who officially or unofficially moved their wives and 
families to the vicinity of their stations.  This latter activity was often at the 
personal cost of the service member because Bomber Command did not approve 
of having wives close to the stations where their husbands were serving171.  
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By 1944, the average Bomber Command station had living accommodation 
provided for around 2,300 personnel172 and with a total of 131 stations being in 
the Command during 1944 it is estimated that there was sufficient 
accommodation for over 301,000 persons.   This figure is well above the estimate 
of 250,000 provided by Sir Arthur Harris (see Chapter 8) 173.  The reason for this 
discrepancy may simply be that each Bomber Command station had a significant 
number of personnel assigned to it who did not officially come under Sir Arthur 
Harris’s command.  If so, this means that the manning of Bomber Command was 
substantially above the figures provided via the official strength states for the 
Command.     
 
One substantial group that falls into this category were the navvies employed on 
stations to extend or refurbish damaged roadways, hard standings and airstrips.  In 
1942, large numbers of navvies and construction personnel, all of whom required 
housing in the local area, were working on 29 of Bomber Command’s operational 
airfields174.  There is little information available on whether they were billeted in 
Bomber Command facilities, or were billeted out by their own organisation or 
found their own accommodation.  Whichever method was used it imposed a cost 
directly attributable to Bomber Command but which is almost impossible to 
measure at this time.   
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Fig. 5.16: Airmen’s Restaurant Courtesy: D. McKenzie, 2001 
 
 
As well as providing somewhere to sleep, the Air Ministry had to supply the 
various categories of RAF personnel with somewhere to eat, entertain and occupy 
themselves.  As is still the case in all military organisations, there was a clear 
distinction between officers, non-commissioned officers and ordinary serving 
members.  In addition, there was strict segregation of female and male personnel.  
This separation increased costs and, because each individual facility was of a 
reduced size, it limited any benefit that could be gained from the increased 
economy of scale that larger centralised messes would have allowed.   
 
On each station, the Air Ministry had to provide boilers, cookers, ovens, cold-
rooms and storage for handling, cooking and serving up to 7,000 meals per day.  
The cost of providing these meals came to around £8,000 per month for an 
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average Bomber Command station175.  Over the period 1942 to 1945, it is 
possible, using an average of 112 operational stations, to estimate a total food bill 
for Bomber Command of £36,736,000.00.  Added to this is roughly between £6 -
£10 million for the period 1939 to end of 1941 giving a total of between £43 and 
£47 million for feeding alone. 
 
Water and Sewerage 
 
Putting aside the management of storm water runoff from the airfield, each 
bomber station had to have a water system capable of supplying a small town and 
providing the water necessary to wash down the aircraft.  In addition to water, 
these stations also needed to remove copious amounts of dirty water and sewage 
through their own disposal systems.  Each of these stations used an average of 
140-150,000 litres of water per day to supply the 2,300 personnel and to provide 
for other functions, such as fire fighting and the washing down of aircraft176.  In 
relation to fire fighting, each station had to maintain a fire reservoir of about 380-
760,000 litres.  At the peak of operations in 1943, the daily water consumption for 
Bomber Command’s airfields would have been approximately 74,670,000 litres.  
This figure does not include the requirements for HQs or ancillary depots or off -
station support operations.  Higham states that in 1939 the RAF used 20,500,000 
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litres per day rising to 182,000,000 litres per day in 1945 of which RAF reservoirs 
supplied 54,600,000 litres177. 
 
 
Fig. 5.17: Water Tower Courtesy of Airfield Research Group 
 
To supply this amount of water the RAF built reservoirs on stations, sunk bore 
holes and drew on local water supplies via the mains.  Little information is 
available on the percentage of airfields that drew upon the local water mains but 
Higham does report that the Air Ministry had to sink 800 boreholes to provide 
RAF stations with water.  It is probable that a large number of these bore holes 
were for Bomber Command stations.  Interestingly, only 1 percent, or 8, of these 
bore holes ran dry178.   
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As well as supplying water to airfields, the Air Ministry had to ensure that dirty 
water was disposed of via an effective sewage system.  Bomber Command 
stations were forced to have their own sewage systems.  This was due to the 
simple fact that they tended to be built a reasonable distance from local 
communities and therefore from the sewage systems serving those communities.  
To meet the need of up to 2,300 personnel the Air Ministry Directorate of Works 
designed a standardised system utilising humus tanks and drying beds179.  This 
standardised system was mass-produced and the components shipped to stations 
where the building contractors assembled and installed them during the 
construction phase.  The initial designs were not capable of handling the increased 
population of the larger Class A stations and a completely new sewage system 
had to be developed and installed as part of the upgrades180.  
 
Once again, it is virtually impossible to identify the cost associated with the 
construction of individual sewage systems for bomber airfields.  The lack of 
records and the fact that such works were often part of the overall contracted price 
of the station makes isolating information very difficult.  It is also unclear how 
many stations were connected to mains water and sewage and whether any 
accounts were raised for these services.  The evidence to date suggests not. 
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Electricity 
 
Electricity came to play a major role in the operations of Bomber Command and 
it was not until the end of 1943 that the electricity grid began to meet Bomber 
Command’s minimum power requirements, or so at least Sir Arthur Harris 
claims181.  The Directorate of Works had known of the need to provide for the 
supply of electrical power to RAF stations prior to the war182.  However, as in 
many other cases, such as camouflage mentioned above, knowing something 
would be needed was not the same as knowing how much of that thing will be 
needed.   So it was with electrical power.  At the start of the war, the average RAF 
station had the necessary electrical supply to provide power to its accommodation 
blocks and hangars but that was all.  With the move to night operations and the 
growing attrition rate from airfield accidents more effective and complex lighting 
and other control systems were required.  All of these required dependable 
electricity supplies and this led to a need to supply cabled power supplies beyond 
the area previously occupied by barracks, messes, hangars and offices.  
 
As well as the need to power lighting and supply the needs of living and working 
areas, the increasing complexity of the aircraft led to a massive increase in the 
level of industrial capacity needed to carry out routine maintenance and repair of 
operational aircraft.  Power was needed for the heavy lifting equipment being 
installed in hangers so that the multiple engines and other parts of large aircraft 
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could be winched onto and off aircraft.  The ability of the power supply to keep 
pace with this expansion in machinery remained an area of substantial difficulty 
for Bomber Command right up until the end of the war183.   
 
 
Fig. 5.18: No. 4 Squadron Servicing Hanger Courtesy of www.raf.mod.uk 
 
Amongst the specialised work undertaken with the Command was metalwork, to 
replace areas of structural damage on aircraft, spark plug cleaning, battery 
recharging, engine removal and rebuilding and tyre removal and repair.  These 
operations required power, as did the supporting activities like machining, fitting 
and turning, compressing air, and so on.  It is not surprising that the demand for 
electricity grew so substantially over the period 1939-1945.  On an average 
Bomber Command station, electrical demand could vary between 600 kW and 
could peak at 2,500 kW but sometimes the load could reach 5,000 kW at a 
peak184.   
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 The electrical power requirements of bomber stations, as with the majority of 
RAF stations, was drawn from the national grid, which was, given the shortage of 
fuel, the most economical way of obtaining the necessary electrical power.  
Whatever the level of actual consumption, the lack of accurate records makes it 
impossible to estimate the value of the electricity consumed in carrying out the 
strategic air offensive.  Indeed, it has been impossible to identify whether the Air 
Ministry received accounts for any electricity usage during the war or whether the 
supplying authorities wrote off this cost.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The 131 bomber stations that Britain built for Bomber Command were a 
fundamental part of the strategic air offensive, as fundamental in fact as the 
aircraft and the aircrew that flew from them.  It is odd, to say the least, that the 
history of the strategic air offensive has for so long overlooked the vital 
importance of this infrastructure and filed to appreciate the effort, skill and wealth 
that building the bomber stations required.  As Sir Archibald Sinclair told the 
House of Commons, it was one of the greatest engineering works undertaken in 
modern Britain and without it Bomber Command could not have conducted the 
strategic air offensive. 
 
The airfield construction programme constrained the growth of the strategic 
bomber offensive as much as the availability of heavy bombers.  Even if the 
Lancaster and Halifax had been available in 1940 their numbers could have 
grown only as fast as airfields were built for them.  As the heavy bomber aircraft 
arrived in Bomber Command at the 1942 the airfield construction programme was 
struggling to keep up with the needs of Bomber Command.  Only in mid-1943 
were adequate numbers of large airfields available to allow significant increases 
in the weight of the attack that Bomber Command could deliver using its 
increasing number of heavy bomber aircraft. 
 
The complexity that night bombing by large formations imposed on the operation 
of airfields was another factor of which the pre-war planners were unaware.  The 
heavy losses suffered by Bomber Command aircraft over the North German coast 
in 1939 demonstrated the strength of the defences that could be brought to bear on 
attacking bombers.   The Air Staff had thought that Bomber Command would be 
able to win sufficient control of the air to operate in daylight and that any night 
operations would be supplementary to the main daytime effort.  As a result, the 
original plans identified a need for a preponderance of basic airfields.  This 
presented a major problem when Bomber Command’s entire operational effort 
moved to night raiding and there were inadequate lighting systems and only 
rudimentary air traffic control, which could not cope with the demand placed 
upon them. 
 
A further problem was that the weight of attack required to inflict substantial 
damage on Germany had also been vastly underestimated by the Air Staff.  This 
led to a demand for larger and heavier bombers that could carry the required 
weight of bombs the necessary distances to Germany proper.  These larger and 
heavier aircraft changed the whole specification for a bomber station leading to a 
complete overhaul and upgrading of existing stations and the expansion of 
proposed stations.  All of this change came at a cost.   
 
The initial lack of large all-weather airfields and air traffic systems was due to the 
Air Staff’s decision to make France their doctrinal enemy for planning purposes.  
Just as this decision adversely affected the design and development of the RAF’s 
aircraft in the mid-1930s, so it also affected the design of airfields.  The use of 
France as the ‘planning enemy’ had occurred in the early 1920s and was, at that 
time, a logical assumption.  The problem for the Air Staff was the lead times 
involved in setting specifications for aircraft to operate against France and then 
designing, developing and building the operational aircraft.  It was not until the 
early 1930s that the strategic assumptions of the Air Staff changed to reflect the 
German threat and it took almost ten years for the appropriate aircraft to become 
operational.  The same problem affected the design and development of airfields.  
The grass strips that would enable small bombers to launch daytime air raids on 
France could not cope with night time operations by large numbers of heavy 
bombers in all weathers.   
 
The total cost of the airfield-building programme, including the provision of 
buildings, was £247.3 million.  This price includes £155.5 as the cost of building 
and paving airstrips, £36.4 million for buildings and £6.04 million for camouflage 
of those facilities and indirect costs of £53.4 million for lost crops.  The £247.3 
million added to the £1.4957 billion for the development of the aircraft industry 
and the purchase of aircraft used by Bomber Command during World War II 
makes the total cost of the strategic air offensive at this point £1.7430 billion.  
 
 
C h a p t e r  6  
ARMAMENTS 
 
On 12th of July 1941, Winston Churchill sent a memo to his close associate and 
scientific advisor, the Paymaster General, Lord Cherwell, telling him that ‘the 
criterion of bomber strength is the weight of bombs deliverable per month on the 
reasonably foreseeable targets in Germany and Italy’1.  The offensive demanded 
by Churchill and carried out by Bomber Command and the USAAF killed between 
250,0002 and 400,000 German civilians and  injured approximately 420,0003.  It 
also destroyed 20 percent (3,600,000) of Germany’s pre-war housing stock4, 
rendering 7,500,000 people homeless5.   
 
The subject of this chapter is the cost of manufacturing, handling and accurately 
dropping high explosive and incendiary bombs during the strategic air offensive.   
The analysis will begin with a description of the types of bombs, pyrotechnics and 
mines developed for strategic bombing.  Under this heading both conventional and 
non-conventional ordnance will be described, as will the arrangements made by 
Britain to develop and manufacture the Mustard Gas bombs which, in April 1943, 
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Churchill offered to use against the German civilian population if the Germans 
used Mustard Gas against the Soviet Forces on the Eastern Front6.   
 
The analysis will also endeavour to identify the percentage of British bombs that 
failed to operate as expected.  The subject of ordnance failure was a significant 
complaint made by Sir Arthur Harris in his post-war report on the offensive7.  
Harris’s complaints over unreliability of bomb fuses is acknowledged in the Air 
Staff reply to his criticisms and this suggests that there was a significant problem 
associated with British bombs that may have led to a significant percentage of 
them failing to explode8. 
 
The analysis also extends to identifying the amount of money that the British 
government invested in expanding armaments manufacture for Bomber 
Command.  The financial assistance provided to armaments firms was small by 
comparison to that made available to the aircraft industry, none the less, it added to 
the total cost of the strategic air offensive.  Included in this analysis will be the 
costs of developing and providing the aircrafts defensive systems including 
machine guns, turrets and small arms ammunition supplied to all aircraft at 
government expense.   
 
                                                                                                                                  
5  USSBS, Report 31, p.3 
6  PRO CAB 120/858, Head of State Telegram to Marshal Stalin, T.540/3, 18th April, 1943 
7  Harris, Despatch on War Operations, pp. 91-97 
8  Air Staff Memorandum on the Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, GCB, OBE, AFC 
on Bomber Command’s Operations 1942/1945, The Despatch on War Operations, 23rd February, 
1942 to 8th May, 1945, Frank Cass, London, 1995, p.209 
The most important sources on the extent of bombing and the damage inflicted on 
Germany are the 208 reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
(USSBS), which the USAAF compiled at the end of World War II.  The Air Staff 
also attempted to conduct a similar survey but Churchill stopped it because he saw 
it as a waste of time9.  As a result, the British Bombing Survey Unit (BBSU), 
which the Air Ministry established in 1945, produced a report, which was unable 
to conduct much independent research, and is therefore heavily reliant upon the 
USSBS reports.  A second problem associated with the BBSU report was that Sir 
Solly Zuckerman played a significant role in its preparation and writing.  
Zuckerman was a central player in the wartime argument over the validity of 
attacking cities, oil or transport targets.  He advocated very strongly for 
transportation and it is likely his partisan views have overly influenced the findings 
of the BBSU10.  
 
The lack of resources put into the BBSU makes the USSBS the most significant 
body of data available on strategic bombing.  The USSBS had 1,159 civilian and 
service personnel, who were able to enter Germany in early 1945 with the follow-
up elements of the western Allied ground forces11.  The major motive for 
commissioning the USSBS was to collect evidence on the effectiveness of 
strategic bombing to bolster the argument of US air force commanders for the 
establishment of an independent air force in the United States.  The political 
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imperatives of the USAAF had an impact upon the subsequent reports.  J.K. 
Galbraith claims that the USAAF leadership attempted to modify the findings of 
the Area (Urban) Studies Reports.  In his 1981 autobiography, Galbraith describes 
how senior USAAF officers attempted to influence the findings of the economic 
reports12.  However, the reports remain the most detailed body of research ever 
collected on the effectiveness of air warfare and they clearly show that air power, 
as a whole, made a significant contribution to the allied victory.  However, the 
USSBS findings on the strategic air offensive were less clear and indicated that 
such an offensive was substantially less effective than air force commanders had 
expected. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.1: Exploding Bombs   Source:  Crown Copyright 
 
The histories of the strategic air offensive have very little to say about the design, 
development and manufacture of the explosive ordnance used by Bomber 
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Command to inflict destruction upon Germany.  Like airfields and fuel, few 
historians have devoted attention to how Britain produced the ordnance for 
strategic air war.  There appears to be an acceptance that the effectiveness or 
otherwise of Britain as a modern technological power between 1939 and 1945 can 
be simply measured by looking at the amount of man-hours it took to construct 
one pound of aircraft structure weight.  As with airfields, the amount of ordnance 
that would be needed to inflict substantial damage on Germany had been seriously 
underestimated.    
 
Between September 1939 and May 1945, Bomber Command despatched a total of 
988,281 tons of bombs and sea mines to targets on the Continent or in the seas 
around the Continent.  The economic cost of producing these bombs, mines and 
pyrotechnics has never been subjected to examination and nor has the 
effectiveness of the investment been closely examined.  To date, the most 
extensive work on the production and distribution of ordnance to the RAF has 
been confined to the Despatch on War Operations, written by Sir Arthur Harris 
and the official histories, particularly The Design and Development of Weapons, 
written by M. Postan, D. Hay J.D. Scott13.  Of these two sources, Sir Arthur 
Harris’s is the most revealing and useful.  In his report, Harris details the technical 
development of bombs, pyrotechnics, mines and other ordnance and describes the 
technical difficulties encountered in using these weapons.  Postan, Hay and Scott 
allocate no space to the production of the explosive and pyrotechnic devices used 
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in the strategic air offensive and nor do they discuss the apparent significant 
problems associated with poor fuse design.   
 
The chapter will also draw upon the little information that is available from the 
official records, held at the Public Record Office in Kew and from the Royal Air 
Force Museum, Hendon.  The official records provide information spread 
throughout a number of files from departments and ministries who held joint 
responsibility for the production and distribution of explosive ordnance.  The most 
important of the ministries involved were the Ministry of Supply, Admiralty, the 
Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production.  The official documentation 
provided comprehensive information on the manufacture of ordnance over the first 
nine months of World War II.  This reflects the close co-ordination of the war 
effort by the Chamberlain Cabinet.  However, these reports stopped in May 1940, 
when the newly elected Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, wound up the 
committees.   
 
Churchill concentrated as much power in his hands as he could.  The promotion 
and demotion of the Chancellor in and out of the War Cabinet suggests Churchill 
was limiting the influence of Treasury on wartime decision-making.  Churchill 
relegated Treasury from its central position in policy formulation to a supporting 
role.  Treasury represented the greatest threat to the way in which Churchill was 
conducting the war. That is, he made decisions based upon military necessity and 
regardless of the long-term consequences that these would pose to Britain. 
Churchill, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, with advice from the service 
Chiefs of Staff and the service ministers, handled all military operations, foreign 
affairs, major shipping issues, production issues and imports, as well as serious 
internal economic or social issues,14. 
 
The Lord President's Committee handled home affairs and domestic economic 
issues and the Ministry of Production, along with the Supply Ministers and their 
staffs, handled the general issues of the supply programmes with the Defence 
(Supply) Committee coming in on major questions.  The War Cabinet discussed 
foreign policy, major military policy, and any social, economic, or production 
questions that the Lord President or the Ministry of Production could not deal with 
alone.  
 
The evidence suggests that significant technical problems with British bombs 
seriously undermined the effectiveness of the strategic air offensive.  If this is so, a 
significant proportion of the £2.7 billion that Britain spent on creating the 
equipment and infrastructure for Bomber Command was wasted.  Bomber 
Command dropped 955,044 tons of bombs during the war and suffered 73,741 
casualties, including 55,500 dead.  It cost one casualty for every 12.9 tons dropped 
and one aircrew killed for every 17.2 tons15.  If only 10 percent of all bomb 
tonnage dropped by Bomber Command failed to operate, it means that 95,500 tons 
of bombs and the resources put into dropping them on Germany were completely 
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wasted.  If the percentage of failure was closer to 30 percent, over a third of 
Bomber Command’s wartime effort was wasted.  And this does not take into 
account the bomb tonnages dropped on open countryside due to inaccuracy.   
 
The evidence suggests that much more than 10 percent of British bombs failed to 
explode properly.  The Air Staff would have considered a 10 percent failure rate 
for explosives during operations as high but within expected limits.  The strength 
of Harris’s criticism, plus the Air Staff’s acceptance of a significant problem, 
suggests that the failure rate was much higher than 10 percent16.  The Air Staff 
acknowledged Harris was correct and that problems did exist, due to ‘an incorrect 
outlook in the inter-war period’, which resulted in a ‘state of affairs too deep 
seated to be rectified without the most far reaching measures’17.  The Air Staff do 
not state who was to blame18.  The implication of what Harris revealed in his 
official despatch and the Air Staff’s reply to these criticisms shows that the 
reliability of British bombs was a significant concern and that this lack of 
reliability cost money and lives during the campaign. 
 
 
 
 
Types of Ordnance Used 
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 The ordnance used by Bomber Command during World War II fell into four 
categories: bombs, including high explosive and incendiary; sea mines; 
pyrotechnics; and small arms ammunition for the defensive armaments of the 
bombers.  The supply of Bomber Command’s ordnance was co-ordinated by the 
Armament Section of the Command, but the design, development and supply of 
this ordnance lay with the Ministry of Supply and Admiralty, with the Air 
Ministry, with the Ministry of Aircraft Production being subordinate to the first 
two ministries.   
 
The centralisation of all munitions production in the Ministry of Supply was a 
direct result of the munitions shortages that had plagued the British during the 
First World War.  The Government found that the centralisation of munitions 
production in one ministry reduced much confusion and inefficiency.  As a result, 
the principle authority for the production of explosive fillings and munitions was 
given to the Ministry of Supply, whilst the Admiralty retained control of the 
production of maritime munitions, such as mines, torpedoes and gun ammunition.  
Likewise, the Air Ministry retained responsibility for the design and development 
of aerial munition casings, such as bombs and incendiaries.  However, the 
Ministry of Supply controlled the production of explosive fillings and the 
manufacture of casings, fuses and explosive pistols (detonators).  It appears from 
the records that responsibility for the design, development and production of 
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aerial munitions was a co-operative venture between the Air Ministry, MAP and 
the Ministry of Supply or Admiralty.  This division of responsibility may have 
played some part in the problems that afflicted the bomb types supplied to 
Bomber Command that Harris complained about in Despatch19.   
 
Between September 1939 and July 1945 the British armaments industry produced 
948,217 tons of high explosive bombs and 270,363 tons of incendiaries20.  Of 
them, 758,408 tons of HE and 196,256 tons of incendiaries were despatched on 
Bomber Command aircraft21.  In percentage terms, this means that Bomber 
Command consumed 80 percent of the HE bombs and 72.6 percent of the 
incendiary bombs manufactured in Britain throughout the period of the war.  The 
size of this consumption is staggering, as Bomber Command was only one of six 
RAF combat forces operating worldwide.  The size of Bomber Command’s 
allocation of HE bomb production underscores how important the strategic air 
offensive was to Britain.   
 
 
 
 
 
Bombs – High Explosive 
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 Throughout World War II Bomber Command used 17 different types of explosive 
and incendiary bombs22.  These devices ranged from the 4 lb incendiary to the 
22,000lb (9.82 ton) bomb, designed by Barnes Wallis, and shown here below. 
At the beginning of World War II, the bombs used by the RAF were essentially 
the same as those used in 1918, as the planners assumed that sufficient damage 
would be inflicted using high explosive (HE) bombs23.  The experience of the 
Blitz in 1940 and experiments conducted by Solly Zuckerman challenged the 
early assumptions that HE bombs alone would be effective24.  As the war 
progressed, the Air Ministry scientific advisors found that blast effect rather than 
penetrative power was more important in destroying buildings.  The importance 
of this development was that blast bombs, which had lighter containers and 
heavier explosive loads, were easier and cheaper to manufacture than were 
heavily cased armoured piercing types.  A further improvement was in the filling 
of bombs with new chemical explosives that provided more power per given 
weight.  The developmental work on new explosive mixtures was the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Supply and the Air Ministry therefore depended 
upon the researchers at the Royal Ordnances Factories and the chemical industry 
for the necessary improvements in explosives.   
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Fig. 6.2: Cookie Source: Crown Copyright 
 
The earliest bombs used by Bomber Command used an explosive mix called 
‘Amatol’, a mixture of TNT and ammonium nitrate25.  ‘Amatol’ was replaced by 
a newer and more effective explosive filling called RDX (cyclo-trimethylene-
trinitramine) which was later mixed with ‘Amatol’ to produce ‘Amatex’.  
‘Amatol’ was also mixed with TNT and aluminium powder to form ‘Torpex’ and 
‘Minol’, the latter being used as the explosive filling of Bomber Command’s high 
explosive bombs from July 1943 onwards26.  Of these fillings, RDX/TNT and 
Minol were the most commonly used.  The blast of these HE bombs knocked 
down structures, destroyed roofs and smashed in windows and doors27.  This 
allowed the smaller incendiary devices to penetrate inside structures and set them 
on fire.  Most of the killing was done by these small four and thirty pound 
incendiaries.   
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Although incendiaries only constituted 20.5 percent of all bomb tonnage dropped 
by Bomber Command during the entire war period, they were the most important 
type of bomb in creating damage28.  The massive bomb tonnages dropped by 
Bomber Command on German military targets in France from March 1944 
onwards has skewed the figures.  Until March 1944, incendiary bombs accounted 
for 40 percent of all bomb tonnage dropped by Bomber Command.  After this 
time incendiaries dropped in percentage terms because they were not used against 
hardened military targets.  As a result, the proportion of high explosive bombs 
increased in proportion to incendiaries29. 
 
 
Fig. 6.3: Grand Slam Source: Crown Copyright 
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In looking at the cost of bombs, the existing data makes it hard to identify 
accurately the precise cost of particular bombs during the war, but it appears that, 
on average, it cost the British Government £1.00 per 23.4 lb of HE bomb weight 
purchased.  At this price, the total value of high explosive bombs despatched to 
targets by Bomber Command during the strategic air offensive was £72,599,749.  
 
   
Fig. 6.4:  Incendiaries and a 4,000 lb HE Bomb Source: Crown Copyright 
 
 
In one case, that of the 4,000 lb bomb, it is recorded by the Air Ministry that 402 
of this particular type of bomb, the equivalent of 723.6 tons, were dropped during 
194130.  Using the Figure 6.5 below, the cost of the 402 x 4,000 lb HC bombs 
would have been £65,526 for that year.  The following year Bomber Command 
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despatched a total of 13,860 tons of all types of bombs to targets and 4,000 lb HC 
bombs made up 52.6 percent of this total with 4,05531 of these bombs despatched 
at a total cost to the Exchequer of £660,965.  
 
High Explosive Bomb Types Used By Bomber Command 
1939-1945 
Bomb Type Cost Usage 
500 lb Medium Capacity (MC) £23.00 Moderate 
1,000 lb MC £50.00 High 
4,000 lb MC £135.00 Low 
12,000 lb MC £550.00 Low 
22,000 lb MC Approx £950.00 Very Low 
ANM44, 58 and 64 500 lb (US) - Moderate 
ANM 59 and 64 1,000 lb (US) - Moderate 
2,000 lb Amour Piercing (AP) £138.00 Low 
SAP Bombs £49.00 Very Low 
2,000 lb HC £100.00 High 
4,000 lb HC £163.00 Very High 
8,000 lb HC £355.00 Very High 
12,000 lb HC £585.00 High 
4,000 lb General Purpose (GP) £100.00 Low 
Upkeep - Dams Raids 
Johnnie Walker - Used once on Tirpitz 
CS Bomb - Used once or twice 
   Fig. 6.5: Source: Sir A. Harris, Despatch pp.92-95 and Source: War Savings, Wings for  
 Victory Issue, February, 1942, pp.25-27 
 
 
Bombs – Incendiary 
 
The use of incendiary bombs mixed with high capacity, blast effect bombs was an 
idea that the British took from Germany, who, in turn may have gotten the idea 
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from Douhet’s writings32.  On 23rd September 1941, the Air Staff produced a 
report detailing the effectiveness of German incendiary attacks on Britain and 
recommending that incendiaries be a central feature of Bomber Command 
attacks33.  In November 1941, the Chief of the Air Staff informed Churchill of the 
effectiveness of fire-raising attacks34.  Portal proposed the first trial fire attack be 
carried out in December 1941, when it was hoped that clear weather conditions 
and a full moon would coincide35.  The success of the incendiary saw increasing 
numbers of this type of bomb used.  In 1941, approximately 12 percent of the 
total bomb loads despatched consisted of incendiary bombs.  The following year, 
42 percent of bombloads, 5,821 tons, was incendiary devices36.   
 
Sir Arthur Harris and the Director of Bombing Operations at the Air Ministry, Air 
Commodore Sydney Bufton, have both remarked upon the importance of the 
incendiary bomb, particularly the 4lb bomb37 although the British Bombing 
Survey Unit’s report found the usefulness of the 4lb J bombs ‘controversial’38.  
This disagreement probably relates to the wider debate on area bombing, pursued 
by Harris, and precision bombing favoured by Solly Zuckerman.  Bomber 
Command’s incendiary bombs were not accurate and were only effective when 
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33  S.O. Bufton, ‘Notes on Staff College Lecture Review of bombing Policy 1940/1943’, Bufton 
Papers, Churchill College Cambridge. 
34  PRO CAB120/393, Minute from CAS Portal to Prime Minister,  5th November 1941 
35  PRO CAB120/393, Minute from CAS Portal to Prime Minister,  5th November 1941 
36  PRO AIR 14/1951, Bomber Command Quarterly Review, No. 1, Sept 1942 
37  Harris, Despatch, p.94 and S.O. Bufton, ‘Notes on Staff College Lecture Review of bombing 
Policy 1940/1943’, Bufton Papers, Churchill College Cambridge. 
38  British Bombing Survey Unit, The Strategic Air War Against Germany, p.49 
dropped on cities.  Zuckerman, who had considerable influence on the British 
Bombing Survey Unit’s findings, tended to dismiss the usefulness of an 
inaccurate weapon like the 4 lb incendiary whereas Harris did not.  In carrying out 
attacks on cities using incendiaries, Bomber Command was responding to 
‘Incendiary Plan Unison’ issued on 25th October 194139.  The first fire attack 
using incendiaries as the major component of bomb loads occurred on the night of 
28th March 1942 against the city of Lubeck and this particular attack, was, unlike 
its predecessors, a very successful one40.   
 
Of the total percent of bombs despatched by Bomber Command during the war 
20.5 percent (196,256 tons) were incendiary bombs.  This figure is smaller than 
the 42 percent quoted above for 1942, but is due to the dilution of bomb tonnages 
caused by the large amounts of HE bombs used during 1944 against military 
targets prior to the Normandy Invasion and to the numerous operations conducted 
against the flying bomb sites in Northern France and the Low Countries.   
 
By 1944, the percent of total incendiary bomb load in a city attack by Bomber 
Command was around 70 percent41. Even so, the figure of 20 percent of total 
tonnage represents approximately 86 million individual bombs weighing either 4 
or 30 lbs.  The efficacy of incendiary bombs was such that Sir Arthur Harris’s 
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declared the 4 lb incendiary bomb was ‘the mainstay of the Command throughout 
the war’42.  The estimate of the financial cost of obtaining these bombs would 
suggest that Harris’s claim is accurate.   
 
Based on an estimated price of 2s/9d per pound for incendiaries the cost to Britain 
of manufacturing incendiary bombs for Bomber Command was approximately 
£73 million43.  The cost of individual incendiary bombs ranged from 2s/9d for a 4 
lb incendiary to 15s 0d for a 4 lb Magnesium Incendiary Bomb and £3.00 for the 
30 lb Incendiary Bomb 44.  This means that incendiary bombs cost slightly more 
than 50 percent of the total cost of £145.6 million spent on bombs by Britain 
during the entire period of the campaign.  This supports the claims made by 
Harris that the incendiary bomb was the most significant type of munition 
deployed by Bomber Command.  The heavy reliance of Bomber Command on 
highly inaccurate incendiaries shows that fire-raising was a major weapon in the 
strategic air offensive.  
 
Bombs - Special Arrangements 
 
In the 1930s, there was widespread fear in most countries that combatant nations 
would use chemical warfare, in the form of Mustard Gas, against the civilian 
population of their enemy.  There is no doubt that the British Government shared 
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this fear and was concerned that Germany would use chemical weapons in attacks 
against British cities.  In the months leading up to war, these fears led to mass 
issuing of gas masks to the civilian populations of Britain, France and Germany 
and the preparation of stocks of Mustard Gas for use against Germany.     
 
British preparations for strategic air war included the production and stockpiling 
of chemical weapons as early as 1939.  The First Report of the Air Ministry on 
Supply and Production details the payment of £4,500 to T& J Daniels for the 
extension of their Gas Bomb Case manufacturing capacity45.  This suggests that 
the Air Ministry either held stocks of chemical weapons, most probably Mustard 
Gas, or was expecting the imminent delivery of such weapons.  Further evidence 
of Britain’s plans for chemical warfare includes Air Commodore Sydney Bufton, 
the personal papers of the Director of Bomber Operations Policy at the Air 
Ministry during World War II46, telegrams sent by Churchill to Stalin in April 
194347 and Churchill’s, History of the Second World War48.   
 
British policy on the use of mustard gas was that it would use these weapons only 
if the enemy used them first.  The draft documents in Bufton’s private papers only 
ever envisaged retaliatory gas attacks on Germany.  The plans assumed that ‘the 
respective governments have directed the unrestricted use of gas against all types 
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of objectives in Germany’49.  The wording of the draft plans indicates that 
planning for the use of chemical warfare continued throughout the war and that 
the retaliatory nature of such warfare remained official Air Ministry and 
government policy.   
 
The closest that Britain came to using mustard gas during World War II was in 
April 1943, when British Intelligence sources reported rumours circulating in 
Spain of a German intention to use Mustard Gas against Russian troops on the 
Eastern Front50.  Churchill passed this tenuous information to Stalin in a telegram 
dated the 18th April 194351.  Stalin replied within one day of Churchill’s telegram 
stating, ‘your information on the intention of the Germans to use gas on our front 
is corroborated also by our own information’52.  The speed with which Stalin 
answered Churchill’s telegram suggests Churchill had caught him off-guard.  It is 
difficult to accept that the Russian would have kept secret from the British 
information that Germany was planing to use mustard gas against the Red Army.  
Stalin agreed with Churchill that they should inform the German Government 
through intermediaries that the Allies had found out about their intention to use 
gas on the Eastern Front and that this would result in retaliatory gas attacks by 
Bomber Command on Germany.  Stalin told Churchill that, ‘It goes without 
saying that I fully support your intention to warn Hitler and his Allies and threaten 
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with a powerful chemical attack in case they make a gas attack on our front53.  
The episode suggests that Britain had the means of conducting bombing attacks 
using mustard gas and that Churchill was quite prepared to launch such attacks 
against German cities, if the need should arise. 
 
Mustard gas was not a stand-alone weapon.  The Air Staff estimated that such an 
attack would require 25 percent HE bombs and 75 percent mustard gas bombs to 
be effective against German cities54.  The HE bombs would break windows and 
doors to allow the poison gas to enter buildings and do its damage.  Despite all of 
the planning and preparation for the offensive use of mustard and other gasses, the 
European powers did not resort to chemical warfare.  Despite not using such 
weapons, Britain did plan to use poison gas against the civilian population of 
Germany, if the need arose.     
 
The Efficiency of Bombs 
 
The extent of concern with the efficiency of Britain’s aerial bombs is obvious 
from the harshness of Sir Arthur Harris’s criticisms of the designers involved and 
by contrasting this with his praise of the Admiralty design staff working on sea 
mines that Bomber Command laid.  In his criticism of the shortcomings of the 
armaments designers, Harris specifically singles out the service and civilian staff 
of the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production, whom he called 
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‘incompetent’55.  He urged a ‘drastic overhaul of the design personnel’ in order to 
safeguard the national security of Britain56.  By comparison, he praised the work 
of the Admiralty on the design, development and manufacture of sea mines, 
which were ‘without exception’ successful and efficient57.     
 
Harris’s comparison is a little unfair.  The success of the Admiralty in the area of 
sea mines was due to the tight control exercised by the Mine Warfare Branch of 
the Royal Navy at HMS Vernon and to the fact that sea mines that had been 
operationally deployed could be retrieved and examined.  It was not possible for 
the designers within the Air Ministry and the MAP to obtain similar insights 
because as Bomber Command dropped most of its bombs in the dark, there was 
little opportunity to obtain accurate observation of their performance or direct 
effect.  And obviously it was not possible for the Air Ministry and MAP bomb 
designers to retrieve and examine aerial bombs.   
 
What is apparent from the complaints is that the fundamental problem with 
British aerial bombs appears to have been in the area of trigger and fuse design.  
The No. 30 tail pistol (detonator), which was widely used in all medium calibre 
bombs throughout the war, is a good example of the difficulty Bomber Command 
had in obtaining operational feedback on bombing attacks.  Bomber Command 
only became aware that the No. 30 pistol had severe problems when its crews 
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undertook daylight-bombing operations in the autumn of 1944.  During this 
period, bomber crews were appalled to see bombs dropped from accompanying 
aircraft explode as they left the aircraft58.  Subsequent investigations found that 
the nut on the striker spindle was binding and forcing the spindle onto the 
detonator.  In the dark, this fault had not been obvious and crews, if they survived, 
would have assumed that the explosion was German flak.  Attempts to fix the 
problems did not entirely prevent these premature detonations and the designers 
had found no fix for the problem before the war ended.  It is therefore reasonable 
to suspect that a large percent of the medium sized bombs using the No. 30 Pistol 
failed and, worse, they may have been responsible for the destruction of the 
aircraft that carried them. 
 
The failure of the No. 30 Pistol was not unique.  Harris describes the No. 37 Long 
Delay Fuze Mark IV, introduced at the beginning of 1943, as having ‘several 
dangerous features which resulted in the loss of lives of many of our own 
personnel and the destruction of a number of aircraft’59.  Harris also states that 
with the anti-tampering device fitted, 15 percent of these fuzes failed rendering 
the bomb a dud, which would fail to explode60.  This fuze was, until May 1944, 
the only long delay fuze available to Bomber Command and, like the No. 30 
Pistol, its problems were never rectified. 
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In May 1944, Bomber Command began to take delivery of two new long delay 
fuzes, which unlike the No.37 fuze, had no anti-tampering device.  These new 
fuzes were the No. 53 Pistol and the No. 53a one-hour delay pistol.  These fuzes 
suffered the same problems as the No. 37 pistol.  They caused a number of 
accidents and losses within the command.  Sir Arthur Harris considered them both 
dangerous and unreliable61.  Other fuzes used within Bomber Command included 
the No. 845, which was designed to be fitted to the nose of general purpose and 
medium capacity bombs.  This fuze also had an anti-tampering device that ‘was 
apt to become live when it should have remained safe’62.  Harris banned the 845 
when one of them blew up an entire bomb dump in the autumn of 194363.  The 
848 fuze, used in the 4.5-inch photographic flash, was unreliable and was 
replaced by the 849 fuze, which was reliable.  The 42 fuze, used in pyrotechnics 
including target indicators, flares and incendiary bomb clusters throughout the air 
offensive, gave ‘considerable trouble’; the M111 fuze, used in 4.5 inch 
photographic flares, also suffered a high proportion of failure64.  In all, Harris 
only praises the No. 44 Pistol and the 860 and 867 Barometric fuzes introduced in 
194365.  Of the 11 fuzes most commonly used by Bomber Command, nine were 
ineffective, dangerous or unreliable.  This suggests the failure rate of British 
bombs was much higher than the 15 percent suggested for one type of fuze by 
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Harris and it may be that up to 30 percent of all British bombs failed to operate 
correctly because of bad fuzes66.   
 
The major problem afflicting British bombs may have been unreliable fuzing 
systems; however, there were other problems as well.  The next most important 
problem that Bomber Command encountered involved contained design and 
construction.  The lightness of the high capacity HE bomb containers relative to 
their overall weight meant that and knock or bump would produce damage.  The 
heaviness of these bombs also made handling difficult, particularly when it is 
realised that many bomber stations had only hand operated winches and muscle 
power to move these bombs.  The result was that poor aerodynamics and damage 
to bombs during transportation, storage and handling plagued the Command67.   
 
Harris ascribed the problem to poor design and, by implication, a lack of effective 
co-ordination between the operational squadrons and the designers68.  The 
importance of bomb casing design was a case in point.  The design of new bombs 
or the redesign of existing bomb types had a major impact on the capacity of 
Bomber Command to handle them.  The problem was that whilst bomb designers 
designed bombs for a particular job of destruction, no one was co-ordinating the 
design and manufacture of the equipment needed to move and lift these bombs 
into the aircraft.  The result was that Bomber Command had to expend 
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considerable time and resources in designing derricks and manual handling 
systems that would allow ground staff to move and position bombs in aircraft69.  
For example, how did the ground crew load the new 12,000 lb bomb into a 
Lancaster?  The answer appears to have been that they used a lifting device called 
‘Lorraine’ and ‘brute strength’ to lift bombs weighing 5.3-tons into place70.   
 
Throughout World War II, the standard way of moving HE bombs was by rolling 
them along the ground71.  The manual handling of heavy bombs in this way  
resulted in injury to personnel and damage to bomb casings, which would have 
made them even more inaccurate than they already were.  Even the mud thrown 
up by the uncovered wheels of the bomb trolleys as they crossed the open fields 
that separated the bomb dumps from the airfields may have caused failures by 
getting into the fusing systems and coating the bomb containers.   
 
A rigorous programme of experimentation and testing of ordnance may have 
prevented this problem from continuing as long as it did.  The extent of the Air 
Ministry’s experimental programme did not go much beyond testing the effects of 
blast bombs and armoured piercing bombs on buildings.  The responsibility for 
such testing lay with the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment 
(AAEE).  The problem that faced the AAEE was the availability of bombing 
ranges, all of which were in almost constant use by the Operational Training 
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Units and the availability of heavy bombers and crews to take part in the testing72.  
The jealous retention of heavy bombers, bombs, aircrew and bombing ranges by 
Bomber Command may have prevented the AAEE, from successfully 
investigating and correcting the problems associated with bomb pistols and fuzes.  
Ironically, Harris’s jealous conservation of his available force may have allowed 
the ineffective bombs he so vehemently criticised to remain in service for so long.    
 
Prior to the war, the AAEE had suffered from significant internal problems of its 
own.  A Group Captain commanded the organisation, which consisted of a 
Performance Test Squadron and an Armament Squadron, supported by a small 
civilian scientific team led by the Chief Technical Officer.  The rank of the 
commanding officer was relatively junior, making it difficult for him to argue 
with superiors for access to resources, or for the establishment of a more rigorous 
programme of testing73.  On top of this, the AAEE a long-standing dispute 
between the civilian scientists and the RAF officers made the effectiveness of the 
AAEE questionable.   
 
The cause of the conflict lay in the way in which the AAEE evaluated aircraft and 
their armaments.  The professional RAF officers were opposed to the scientists’ 
insistence on quantitative methods at the expense of pilot observation and 
opinion74.  As with all such internecine squabbles most of the AAEE’s efforts 
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went into wining the argument and this reduced the capacity of the organisation to 
contribute to the testing of bombs prior to the outbreak of war in 193975.  The 
outcome of these failures was that there was no systematic evaluation of bomb 
types and therefore no way of identifying and correcting problems.  The failure of 
the Air Ministry to ensure a rigorous research project in bomb design and 
appraisal was a significant lapse.  
 
Whatever the cause, there is little doubt that Bomber Command was unhappy 
with the quality of the bombs and other ordnance that they were supplied by the 
Air Ministry and MAP design organisations.  The testing of armaments that was 
undertaken did not identify significant failures in bomb types and ignored the 
impact of design changes on bomb transportation, storage and handling.  All of 
which were areas of significant concern to the Command throughout the war76.  
The likelihood is that somewhere around 30-40 percent of all of ordnance did not 
function effectively; that is they failed to explode at the right time.  If this is so, it 
is reasonable to suggest that faults, particularly defective fuses, made useless 
somewhere between £43.7 million and £58.2 million worth of ordnance.  It also 
wasted the sacrifices made by many of the men who flew these bombs to their 
targets. 
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Bombing Accuracy 
 
A further negative effect on the returns achieved by the investment made by the 
British Government lies in the lack of accuracy of night bombing.  Bomber 
accuracy in 1943 meant that only 15 percent of the despatched load fell within a 
one-mile radius from the selected point of attack77.  Effectively, this meant that 
only 37,168 tons of bombs fell within one mile of the target area whilst 210, 618 
tons was thinly scattered outside this area78.  At the end of 1942, £20,161,723 
worth of British bombs had been scattered ‘thinly’ over the outskirts of a number 
of German cities. 
 
Accuracy improved as navigational equipment got better and as the German 
defenders lost territory on which their early warning radar systems had operated.   
Towards the end of 1944, 75 Lancasters carrying a bomb load of 70 percent 
incendiaries and 30 percent HE could achieve the same level of destruction as a 
750 Lancaster force in 1943 because, by late 1944, they were able to drop 93 
percent of their bombs into an area of one mile in radius79.     
 
 
 
Pyrotechnics 
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 One of the major problems that afflicted Bomber Command in its operations was 
visibility and the highly inaccurate nature of blind bombing. As we have already 
noted, the accuracy achieved by Bomber Command over Germany was such that 
a large proportion of the resources expended in conducting the strategic air 
offensive fell on empty countryside.  After the war, the Air Ministry found that 55 
percent of the bomb tonnages dropped missed the aiming point by more than 
2,000 yards80.  The major problem facing Bomber Command was one of target 
identification and marking and the major means of overcoming this problem was 
the development of ever more sophisticated pyrotechnics.   
 
The development of pyrotechnics was a natural development stemming from the 
traditional military use of flares to illuminate the battlefield.  The initial 
pyrotechnic was the 4.5 inch reconnaissance flare.  The use of such a flare posed a 
number of problems ranging from the poor illumination of ground targets to 
blinding glare from the burning flare that prevented the bomber crew from seeing 
the ground.   
 
By 1942, Bomber Command took steps to improve the effectiveness of its target 
identification and marking systems.  The impetus was the acceptance by the Air 
Staff of the Butt Report of August 1941.  Mr. Butt’s investigation of photographic 
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evidence found that in Germany only 30 percent of bombs fell within five miles of 
their target.  In the Ruhr, where air defences were more substantial, only 10 
percent of bombs fell within the five-mile radius of the intended target81.  Despite 
Butt’s evidence, improvement was slow.  In November 1941, Sir Charles Portal, 
the Chief of the Air Staff, wrote to Churchill telling him that examination of the 
night photographs taken over the last three months did  not ‘disclose any 
improvement’ on the results in June and July which Butt had examined.  Portal 
placed the blame on the weather, which was ‘consistently bad’82.  
 
The result of the Butt Report was an increase in the resources put into designing 
and developing effective navigational aids and targeting pyrotechnics.  According 
to Harris, between early 1942 and May 1945, Bomber Command used over 40 
different types of flare and marker bombs in a large variety of colours.   The need 
for such a large number of different devices lay in a pyrotechnic version of the 
electronic warfare that the combatants were conducting.  As soon as Bomber 
Command used a set of colours in a marker bomb or target indicator, the German 
defenders would simulate it to divert the bomber attack onto decoy targets set up 
in open fields.  As Harris says, ‘throughout the period that followed there was a 
race between the Development Branches in this country, and those of the 
enemy’83. 
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The first of the true ‘marker’ bombs was the 2,800 lb ‘Pink Pansy’.  This bomb, 
sometimes mistakenly described as a 4,000 lb bomb, because it used the same 
container as the 4,000 lb HC bomb, was one of the more effective markers.  The 
problem for the German defenders was that they could not simulate the pink 
colour obtained when this bomb burst.  Another advantage of the ‘Pink Pansy” 
was its lighter weight which was achieved by using a lower density benzol, rubber 
and phosphorus filling84.  The ‘Pink Pansy’ was quickly followed by ‘Sky 
Markers’, coloured flares and stars, which were used by aircraft carrying Oboe, 
the first generation of ground sensing radar.  Sky Markers were followed by the 
Target Indicator (TI) bomb, which was first used during a raid on Berlin on the 
night of 16/17 January 1943.   
 
The contents of a TI were to be widely varied in an effort to prevent the German 
defenders from decoying the attacking forces.  The TI bomb was a highly 
aerodynamic weapon that was able to release its packages of pyrotechnic candles 
of differing colours.  A single TI bomb could mark an area of approximately 100 
yards diameter and differing fuse settings on the candles allowed some to ignite as 
others burnt out85.  As time went by, Bomber Command used larger 1,000 lb TI 
bombs to swamp the decoy efforts of the Germans, who had become highly 
proficient at simulating the effects of the existing British systems86. 
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Fig. 6.6: Night Raid Source: www.mod/raf/bomber/command 
 
Other pyrotechnic devices used by Bomber Command included the ‘Spot’ bomb, 
which the Pathfinder aircraft dropped to mark turning points on the ground for the 
following bomber stream and a number of smoke bombs, which bombers used to 
mark targets during daylight raids conducted towards the end of the war.  There 
were a number of photoflashes including the 4.5 inch Photographic Flash, Mark 
II, the 848 fuze and the Tri-Cell Chute.  These illuminated targets so that the 
attacking bombers could take photographs87. 
 
The research conducted to date has failed to identify the cost of particular 
pyrotechnics.  This may be a result of the highly specialised nature of these 
armaments and the fact that they were not subjected to larger production runs, 
being manufactured using a variety of different components drawn from existing 
bomb and explosive production.  An example of this is the use of the 4,000 lb 
bomb casing for the 2,800 lb ‘Pink Pansy’88.  Given the constantly changing 
fillings contained with in these pyrotechnic bombs it is likely that the cost per unit 
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produced was much higher than the cost of an equivalent HE bomb or incendiary.  
Despite this, it is unlikely that the overall cost of pyrotechnics would have been 
anything near that of HE or incendiary bombs due to the relatively low number of 
pyrotechnics used per air raid.  The likelihood is that the total cost of these 
devices would have been around £10 million for the entire period of the war.  
Given the lack of reliable information, this figure is an informed guess.  
 
Manufacturing Ordnance - Bomb Cases 
 
The manufacturing of bombs was broken up during the war into three major 
operations:  first, the manufacture of the bomb containers; second, the 
manufacture of the explosive contents; and, third, the manufacture of the fuses, 
which operated the bombs.  Of these three operations, the simplest was 
manufacturing the bomb cases and the MAP dispersed this work amongst the 25 
companies listed in Figure 6.7 below89.   
 
There is little doubt that the 27 firms listed below received financial aid from both 
the Air Ministry and, later in the war, the MAP.  The evidence available indicates 
that six firms obtained financial assistance totalling £2,058,900 for the 
construction of new buildings and plant for the making of bombs90.  The firms 
involved included ICI Ltd., which received £395,250 for the construction of a 
                                                 
89  PRO AVIA 10/211, Bomb Subcontracting Firms. 
90  PRO CAB 68/1, Supply and production First report by the Air Ministry, W.P.(R)(39) 16, 23rd Sept 
39, and CAB 68/3 
new bomb-making factory at Kilmarnock in Scotland and £23,000 for machine 
tools for incendiary bombs at the Linlithgow incendiary bomb plant91.  The 
supply of machine tools indicates that as well as the manufacture of explosive 
filling, ICI was also involved in the manufacture of bomb casings, most probably 
the incendiary type. 
 
Bomb Manufacturing Firms 
Baldwin Ltd P.R. Jackson and Company 
Binns and Speight Jarrow Metal Industries 
Briggs Motor Bodies N.C. Joseph 
Castle Engineering Kryn and Lely 
Gattons and Company Littlewoods Mail Order Stores 
G. Coles and Sons F.H. Lloyd and Company 
Corfield and Buckle Magnesium Castings and Products 
Dobson and Barlow Magnal Products 
Enfield Furniture Manufacturers E. Nicklin & Sons 
Machine Products Platt Bros. & Company 
J. Firth and J. Brown Steel Company of Scotland 
Hadfields Suckling Pty Ltd 
ICI Ltd. Trojan Ltd. Pty. 
Vickers Armstrong  
Fig. 6.7: Source: PRO AVIA 10/211, 7.6.40 
 
 
Three other firms, Machine Products of Cardiff, Hadfields Ltd of Sheffield and 
Jarrow Metal Industries Ltd received government funding of similar size to that 
given to ICI.  Two of these companies, Machine Products and Hadfields, were 
giving funding to establish ‘shadow factories’ with Machine Products receiving 
£306,000 and Hadfields £715,00092.  Jarrow Metal Industries Ltd got £461,000 
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for the extension of plant and buildings for the production of Semi –Armour 
Piercing (SAP) bombs93.  Jarrow Metal Industries received further funding of 
£56,000 in May of 1940 to meet a shortfall of 10,750 in 500 lb SAP bomb 
component sets.  Jarrow obtained this money to enable it to increase their 
production from 1,050 sets of components per month to 7,500 sets per month94.  
Vickers Armstrong received £118,500 for the production of SAP bombs and 
Baldwins Ltd of London received £29,150 to increase monthly production of 250 
lb and 1,000 lb bombs to 5,400 and 1,800 respectively95.   
 
Of the £2 million given to bomb manufacturers, over £1 million was for the 
construction of two ‘Shadow Factories’.  If the finance for the Shadow Factory 
scheme is left out of the analysis then the remaining £600,000 divided amongst 
three companies gives an average amount of government financial assistance of 
£200,000 per company.  This very rough estimate suggests the government 
supplied around £5 to £7 million in financial aid to bomb manufacturers in order 
for them to increase their production levels.  This estimate is qualified by the fact 
that the funding applies to such a small cross section of the munitions industry. 
 
The second process in the making of a bomb is the manufacture of explosives and 
the filling of the bomb containers with this explosive. Between 1939 and the 
second quarter of 1945 the British chemical industry produced 485,078 tons of 
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explosive filling for HE aircraft bombs96.  This represents 51.1 per cent of the 
total weight of HE bomb production of 948,217 tons in Britain between 
September 1939 and July 194597.  Bomber Command used the vast majority, 80 
percent, of this production during the strategic air offensive. 
 
 In September of 1939, the Air Ministry reported to Cabinet that the filling 
organisation already developed would be ‘adequate to meet revised requirements’ 
with the exception of incendiaries98.  This shortfall in incendiaries was to be met 
by ICI Ltd with financial assistance from the government as already noted above.  
The other type of bombs reportedly suffering technical problems were the SAP 
and Anti-Submarine (AS) bombs, whose fuse fittings were not watertight leading 
to a failure of these weapons99. 
 
The chemical industry was the centre of production for the explosive fillings used 
in all bombs and other explosive ordnance.  The explosive fillings favoured by the 
Air Ministry were those such as RDX/TNT, Torpex and Minol100, which provided 
large blast with lower density and therefore less weight.  The Ministry of Supply 
rather than the Air Ministry or MAP managed explosive filling production and 
this led to some disputes over priorities assigned to aerial bomb production.  Over 
all though, the relationship was quite good with the sole exception of the concerns 
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about the reliability of the fusing mechanisms.  The Air Ministry did provide a 
little funding to some of the manufacturers of chemical explosives particularly ICI 
Ltd and Athol G. Allen Ltd, who received £5,000 to extend their TNT plant101.  
Other then these few figures, there is little in the Air Ministry or MAP files 
relating to the financial costs of manufacturing high explosive fillings.  Given the 
predominant role played in this area by the Ministry of Supply, this is not 
surprising. 
 
The other area in which the Air Ministry took a significant interest was the 
production of magnesium, which was used in the production of aircraft alloys and 
the filling for incendiaries, flares and illumination bombs.  The Army and Royal 
Navy also used magnesium in their pyrotechnics but their needs were much less 
than those of Bomber Command102.  In late 1939, the Air Ministry had estimated 
its future demand for magnesium as being up to 15,000 short tons per year103.  
The 4lb incendiary bomb, which was dropped in its millions over Germany, was a 
magnesium bomb that burned at a high intensity.  This bomb and the 30 lb 
incendiary bomb constituted 26 percent (196,256 tons) of the total bomb tonnage 
dropped by Bomber Command during the offensive104.  In order to supply the 
necessary magnesium for these bombs the Air Ministry, MAP and the Ministry of 
Supply had to ensure an increasing supply of magnesium from domestic and 
foreign sources.  In 1939, two firms Murax Ltd and Magnesium Elektron Ltd, 
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were provided with £987,000 for the expansion of their production facilities105.  
As national production of magnesium was in the order of 5,000 short tons per 
year106, the Air Ministry’s concerns about this particular raw material are entirely 
understandable. 
 
The £500,000 provided to Murex Ltd. went to increase production at the 
company’s facilities by 4,000 tons per year107.  The £487,000 given to 
Magnesium Elektron Ltd was to increase their production to about 5,000 tons per 
year108.  Despite these payments, the increase in magnesium supplies was to take 
nearly two years as the amount of magnesium produced in Britain during 1940 
was only 6,100 tons, whilst consumption in the same year was 13,800 tons109.  
The shortfall of 7,700 tons made good by importation from the United States and 
the recovery of magnesium from scrap110.  By 1941, British magnesium 
production has lifted to 10,900 tons before peaking at 23,100 tons in 1943111. 
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 The major ingredient of incendiary bombs, flares, photoflashes and target 
indicators was magnesium powder112.  In 1940, the Air Ministry estimated that 
annual production of this material was about 450 tons whilst the Ministry’s 
requirements were 1,000 tons for 1940 rising to 2,000 tons by 1941113.  The 
shortfall in finely ground magnesium powder, used in incendiary bombs and 
pyrotechnics, led to a further payment of £159,000, with £85,000 going to Murex 
and £74,000 to Magnesium Elektron114.  The Air Ministry also pressured the 
Ministry of Supply to increase imports of raw magnesite and to increase domestic 
production of magnesia using dolomite clay and seawater.   
 
British Magnesium 
Production and Consumption 
1939-1945 (Short Tons) 
Year Production Consumption 
1939 5,000  
1940 6,100 8,000 
1941 10,900 13,800 
1942 18,100 20,800 
1943 23,100 36,100 
1944 18,100 36,000 
1945 6,800 8,600 
Total 88,100 123,300 
Table 6.8: Source: Statistical Digest of the War, p109 
 
The total Air Ministry investment in the development of productive capacity for 
magnesium appears to have been £1,114,000 split between Murax and 
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Magnesium Elektron115.  The only other expenditure being £52,400 paid for 42 
additional presses, each capable of making 1,200 4.5” flare candles per month in 
order to meet an expected monthly demand for up to 50,480 such flares116.  The 
total Air Ministry and MAP funding of pyrotechnic production therefore appears 
to have been £1,166,400. 
 
A final cost that can be added to the equation is the cost of transporting the 
955,044 tons of ordnance from its places of manufacture to the airfields where it  
was loaded onto the aircraft that were to attempt to deliver it to the target.  Based 
on an average journey of approximately 120 miles at a total cost of 1s/6d per ton-
mile charged by railways during, the period the cost would have been around £8.6 
million. 
 
Machine Guns 
 
With the sole exception of the Mosquito and the Photo-reconnaissance Spitfires, 
every aircraft operated by Bomber Command carried a defensive armament of 
.303-inch Browning machine guns.  These weapons were a gas operated, blow 
back system and were widely used by the RAF and the Royal Navy during World 
War II.  Sir Arthur Harris describes the .303inch Browning as having ‘performed 
most reliably throughout the war’ whilst on page 107 he describes the 
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ineffectiveness of the .303inch Browning against the heavily armoured German 
fighters which were also equipped with cannon that out-ranged the .303 inch117.  
This discrepancy may simply be that, whilst outranged and ineffectual, the 
Browning operated reliably, unless it froze in the low temperatures encountered at 
the altitude the bomber formations flew118. 
 
Despite being happy with the reliability of the .303-inch Browning machine gun, 
Sir Arthur Harris’s more fulsome description of the ineffectiveness of these 
weapons is a more telling statement about the usefulness of this defensive 
armament.  The problems faced by Bomber Command crews in defending 
themselves against air attack were enormous.  The ability of the crew to detect an 
approaching enemy fighter relied on the observation of that fighter in the dark.  
Anecdotal evidence in a number of wartime memoirs written by ex-aircrew 
repeatedly make the point that evasion and not firepower was the primary means 
of defence against German fighters119. 
 
The manufacture of machine guns for the RAF had been a concern for the Air 
Ministry in the immediate lead-up to the war in 1939.  Of particular concern was 
the supply of the .303 inch Browning machine guns, which were to be the 
armament of both bomber and fighter aircraft.  The standardisation of the direct 
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fire weapon promised higher production levels sooner rather than later.  The 
problem was that the selection of the .303-inch Browning had a major impact 
upon the design of aircraft, which later reduced their effectiveness in combat.  For 
example, the use of the .303-inch Browning allowed Reginald Mitchell to keep 
the wings of the Spitfire very thin and aerodynamically efficient.  When it was 
realised that the .303-inch weapons were not capable of inflicting the necessary 
damage on German aircraft in the few seconds that a closing target was available, 
the replacement of the .303-inch Browning with 0.5-inch machine guns or cannon 
required a redesign of the airframe.  For the bombers, the .303-inch Browning 
Machine Guns did not offer much in the way of protection; however, the 0.5-inch 
guns festooned over the Boeing B-17 did not provide adequate protection either. 
 
The Air Ministry obtained its supplies of .303-inch machine guns from three 
major arms manufacturers, B.S.A. Guns Ltd, Vickers Armstrong120 and the Royal 
Ordnance Factory at Enfield121.  In order to meet the expected demand, B.S.A. 
Guns Ltd. was given £1,100,000, Vickers Armstrong £500,000 and the Royal 
Ordnance Factory £540,000 (approximately)122 in financial assistance by the Air 
Ministry to purchase machine tools for manufacture of Browning and Vickers K 
machine guns at B.S.A’s  Birmingham and Redditch plants and Vickers Crayford 
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and Openshaw plants123.  This total of £2,100,000 does not include the cost to the 
Government of relocating one of B.S.A. Browning machine gun production plants 
into a 2.2 million square foot underground facility.   
 
Estimated Cost Of Machine Guns For Bomber Command 
Aircraft 
Type 
Number 
of Guns 
Gun 
Type 
Number 
Built 
Total 
Machine 
Guns 
Total Cost 
(£) 
Lancaster 8 .303 inch 7,373 58,984 2,654,280 
Halifax 7 .303 inch 6,176 43,232 1,945,440 
Stirling 8 .303 inch 2,731 21,848 983,160 
Wellington 8 .303 inch 11,460 91,680 4,125,600 
Hampden 4 .303 inch 1,453 5,812 261,540 
Blenheim 5 .303 inch 2,450 12,250 551,250 
Whitley 5 .303 inch 1,812 9,060 407,700 
Boston 8 0.5 inch 270 2,160 97,200 
Fortress 10 0.5 inch 109 1090 49,050 
Manchester 8 .303 inch 200 1,600 72,000 
Ventura 9 .303 inch 406 3,654 164,430 
Liberator 8 0.5 inch 785 6,280 282,600 
Mitchell 5 0.5 inch 537 2,685 120,825 
Totals    268,921 £11,715,075
 Fig. 6.9:  Source: Based on data extracted from Hornby, Factories and Plant, pp.252-255  
  and Statistical Digest of the War, p.144 
 
Added together, the above financial aid cost the British Government £6.6 million, 
of which Bomber Command probably accounted for £3.4 million.  The costs of 
purchasing the guns for Bomber Command added a further £11.7 million to the 
bill bringing the cost of supplying machine guns to Bomber Command to 
somewhere around £15.1 million.  This estimate is reasonably accurate as a total of 
509,190 .303-inch Browning machine guns were manufactured in Britain between 
1937 and 1945124 and, as shown in Figure 6.9 above, the aircraft designed and built 
                                                 
123  PRO CAB 68/3, Supply and Production Fourth Report by the Air Ministry, 19th Dec 39. 
124  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, p.142 
for the strategic air offensive accounted for a total of 268,921, or 51.1 percent, of 
this production.   
 
Small Arms Ammunition 
 
At the beginning of the war in September of 1939, there was real concern in the 
Air Ministry that they might not be able to secure the amounts of .303-inch small 
arms ammunition (SAA) that would be required125.  The reason for this concern 
was the dependence of the Air Ministry on the Ministry of Supply for this type of 
ammunition.  This dependence probably provoked fears that the Army would 
consume most of the output of less than five million rounds per week.  The 
concern of the Air Ministry lay in the fact that it estimated that it would need 
eight million rounds of .303 SAA per week126.  These initial concerns came to 
nothing and production kept pace with consumption with Britain producing 9.4 
billion rounds of ammunition between 0.22 and 0.45 calibres, the vast bulk of 
which was .303 inch127.  At an average cost of 1.8 pence, the total cost of this 
ammunition production was equivalent to £70,500,000128. 
 
Bomber Command was not a large user of Small Arms Ammunition (SAA).  The 
major SAA used within Bomber Command was .303 inch linked in belts of 1,000 
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rounds using a sequence of seven armoured piercing, two incendiary and one 
tracer129.  The average number of rounds taken by each aircraft appears to have 
been about 10,000 and the cost of this was £70.00 per aircraft130.  The only real 
measure of the cost of this type of armaments is £722,470, which is £70.00 for the 
SAA carried in each of the 10,321 aircraft lost by Bomber Command through 
accident or enemy action.  The total cost involved is small by comparison with the 
value of the bombs and pyrotechnics examined above.   
 
There is little doubt that the amount of SAA used by Bomber Command 
significantly exceeded the above figure.  SAA was an expense item and once 
issued was generally not required to be returned.  An unknown amount of SAA 
was lost in aircraft that crashed or were shot down.  Training and test firing of 
weapons in the lead-up to raids would also have used substantial amounts of 
SAA, but again the approximate amounts can only be guessed at.  Within Bomber 
Command, the need to keep air gunners proficient meant that range practices were 
a frequent activity.  This type of training would have been far more intensive 
within the Operational Training Units than within the frontline operational 
squadrons.  But, even within frontline squadrons such training was undertaken.  
The amount of SAA used in this activity would have greatly surpassed that used 
in operations. 
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On operations, most SAA ended up being declared out-of-date or was fired off 
during the test firing of guns.  Ironically, Bomber Command’s aircraft used very 
little ammunition fighting off enemy fighters.  The limited range of the .303-inch 
Browning machine guns made them ineffectual against German night fighters 
armed with long-range cannon131.  German tactics also served to limit the 
effectiveness of Bomber Command defensive armaments as the most common 
German attack technique, which involved firing into the undefended bottom of a 
bomber, frequently meant that the defensive armaments could not engage enemy 
fighters during an attack.  It was also a common practice among bomber crews to 
refrain from firing their defensive weapons because the evasive manoeuvres of 
the aircraft made aiming difficult and the flashes from the firing guns only served 
to show the fighter where the bomber was.   
 
Once airborne and formed into formation the bomber stream would have set 
course for their assigned target.  This course took them over either the English 
Channel or the North Sea. Once over water it was a standard practice for each air 
gunner to fire a two second burst from their guns to check that these weapons 
were operational.  This testing was a standard operational procedure designed to 
reassure the crew that their weapons were operational following pre-operational 
maintenance and loading by the ground crew armourers.  In addition to the risk of 
malfunction due to poor maintenance, the Browning .303-inch machine guns used 
in Bomber Command had a tendency to freeze up and become inoperable at high 
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altitude.  This problem was to remain with Bomber Command throughout the 
war132.  
 
Estimated Ammunition Consumption in Testing 
Aircraft 
Type 
Number 
of Guns 
Gun 
Type 
Cyclical 
Rate of 
Fire 
per 
Minute 
Rounds 
per 2 
Second 
Burst 
Number 
of 
Sorties 
Total 
Rounds 
Lancaster 8 .303 inch 600 160 152,192 24350720
Halifax 7 .303 inch 600 140 82,773 11588220
Stirling 8 .303 inch 600 160 18,440 2950400 
Wellington 8 .303 inch 600 160 47,409 7585440 
Mosquito -    39,795  
Hampden 4 .303 inch 600 80 16,541 1323280 
Blenheim 5 .303 inch 600 100 12,214 1221400 
Whitley 5 .303 inch 600 100 9,858 985800 
Boston 8 0.5 inch 600 160 1,609 257440 
Fortress 10 0.5 inch 600 200 1,340 268000 
Manchester 8 .303 inch 600 160 1,269 203040 
Ventura 9 .303 inch 600 180 997 179460 
Liberator 8 0.5 inch 600 160 662 105920 
Total  51,019,120 
Fig. 6.10:  Ammunition Consumption in Testing 
 
The best estimate for the amount of SAA used in test firing guns is obtained by 
multiplying the number of rounds fired per second by the number of guns carried 
per aircraft and then multiplying the figure derived by the number of sorties per 
aircraft type.  This gives a total of just over 51 million rounds for testing alone.  
At a cost per round of 1.8pence133, the total cost of SAA used by Bomber 
Command is £3,826,434.  Added to the amount of SAA estimated to have been 
lost in crashes above the total cost of the SAA consumed in these two ways was 
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£4,548,904.  This estimate of the cost of the SAA consumed by Bomber 
Command is a gross underestimate, as it does not take into account the financial 
costs incurred because of training activities and the destruction of out-of-date 
stock.  Unfortunately, the lack of records on ammunition expenditure rates make 
it very difficult to ascertain where the SAA was expended and how much was 
used.   
 
A further level of financial cost that has been left out of this analysis is the capital 
investment that the British Government made in the establishing and operating of 
the Royal Ordnance Factories that produced SAA.  In the practice of the time, 
officials did not factor in the cost of such productive infrastructure into the pricing 
of the product.  Thus the £7.10.0 cost of 1,000 rounds of .303 inch will invariably 
not reflect the capital investment or even the value of some of the labour that was 
expended in producing it.  It is likely that the true financial cost of SAA was 
many times that suggested here; however, there is no way that this cost can be 
identified.  
 
Turrets 
 
 Unlike machine guns, the cost of aircraft turrets was included in the price of the 
finished aircraft supplied by the aircraft manufacturer to the RAF.  As was done 
with other parts of the industry supplying aircraft and equipment to the RAF, the 
makers of turrets received generous financial assistance from the Air Ministry to 
enable them to increase their production to meet the expected demands of war.   
 Throughout World War II Bomber Command used two principal types of turret, 
the Fraser-Nash, developed by Parnell Aircraft Company, and the Boulton-Paul, 
developed by the Boulton-Paul Aircraft Company.  Three other firms, 
Brockhouse Engineering Company Ltd, Joseph Lucas Ltd and the Daimler 
Company were utilised by the Air Ministry and the MAP to produce turrets.  
Brockhouse and Daimler formed a group led by the Parnell Aircraft Company and 
the Joseph Lucas Group worked under the supervision of Boulton Paul.  The only 
other company involved in the production of turrets who received government 
financial assistance was Integral Auxiliary Gears Ltd. and they received £14,000 
for machine tools to increase the output of the oil pumps used in the Fraser-Nash 
and Boulton-Paul turrets134.  
 
The total amount of government money provided to the five turret manufacturers 
was £2,930,000.  Of this amount Parnell obtained £990,000135, Joseph Lucas 
£862,000, of which £540,000 was the cost of building a new turret factory at 
Pontypool in South Wales136, Boulton Paul received £319,000 to extend their 
factory at Wolverhampton137, Brockhouse £584,000 to extend their works at 
                                                 
134  PRO CAB 68/5, Supply and Production Seventh Report, 8th March, 1940 
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136  PRO CAB 68/2, Supply and Production, Third Report by the Air Ministry and CAB 68/3, Supply 
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137  PRO CAB 68/3, Supply and Production, Fourth Report By the Air Ministry, 19th Dec 39 
Southport138 and Daimler obtained £175,000 for a plant at Birtley in 
Northumberland139.    
 
The turrets supplied to Bomber Command were, at the time, the most modern 
aircraft defensive systems in the world.  The power for these turrets was either 
hydraulic or electro hydraulic and it was noted by Bomber Command that the 
Boulton Paul electro-hydraulic turret was seven to 13 times less likely to be 
damaged by enemy fire than the purely hydraulic systems made by Parnell140.  
Problems with the turrets included poor heating, which resulted in both air 
gunners and their guns becoming victims of cold at high altitude.  There were also 
problems with the small size of the access doors which, particularly in rear turrets, 
hindered easy entry and escape.  The size of the tail turret also meant that the 
gunner could not wear his parachute and together, these problems made trapping a 
common hazard for tail gunners.  A further problem was that the rear turret door 
would not open unless the gunner could position the turret in a particular position.  
If the electrical or hydraulic systems were damaged whilst the turret door was 
misaligned, the gunner could not escape the aircraft.  Difficulties with the design 
of turrets continued until the end of the war and in November of 1944, in an 
attempt to obtain a better turret, Bomber Command, at Sir Arthur Harris’s 
direction, placed orders with Rose Brothers Ltd. for turrets.  This attempt to have 
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140  Harris, Despatch, p.109 
the Rose Turret financed by the MAP was successful141, but by the time the 
prototypes were available the end of the war was at hand and the Rose turret did 
not play any real part in the strategic air offensive. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The supply of munitions to Bomber Command allowed it to despatch 955,044 
tons of bombs of all types to targets on the continent at an estimated total cost of 
about £183,032,304.  These munitions included H.E. and incendiary bombs, 
pyrotechnics and the machine guns and small arms ammunition, used to defend 
the aircraft from German fighters.  The above estimate of the financial cost of 
these munitions to Britain is very conservative.  It does not take into account the 
bombs and ammunition used in testing and training of bomber crews.  Similarly, 
it passes over the significant costs incurred in transporting, storing and managing 
bombs and ordnance, until Bomber Command used it on operations.  Even 
without these added costs being included, the cost of a ton of bombs during the 
strategic air offensive was £196.85.   
 
The value that the British Government obtained was much less than has been 
previously identified.  Approximately 30 percent of this tonnage, that is 286,513 
tons, may have been defective due to significant problems that existed with fuzes 
through the entire air offensive.  In monetary terms, this means that almost 
                                                 
141  Harris, Despatch, p.109 
£56,400,123 was wasted.  Added to this is the fact that until December 1943 only 
15 percent of the 247,786 tons of bombs dropped by Bomber Command fell 
within a one-mile area in enough concentration to inflict the level of damage 
required.  The cost of the 85 percent of bombs that Bomber Command thinly 
spread around the outskirts of the target city was £41,457,988.  These figures 
suggest that as much as £98 million, about 52 percent of the total estimate of £183 
million paid for Bomber Command’s ordnance may have been lost due to 
defective equipment and inaccurate bombing.    These calculations make the 
strategic air offensive a very costly exercise and one whose returns appear to look 
extremely meagre.  By contrast, Richard Overy argues that the strategic air 
offensive played a significant role in defeating Germany by diverting essential 
manpower and weapons from the fighting fronts to the defence of the 
homeland142.     The total cost of the strategic air offensive, including the cost of 
aircraft, airfields and ordnance used, amounts to £1.926 billion.  
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C h a p t e r  7  
FUEL, OIL AND LUBRICANT: THE COST 
 
Joseph Stalin is reported to have said ‘The war was decided by engines and 
octane’1.  In my analysis of petrol, oil and lubricant (POL), one of the major 
technical advantages that the Allies enjoyed over Germany in terms of air power 
was the availability of high-grade petroleum products, particularly 100-Octane 
plus petrol.  The ability of the Allies to manufacture large quantities of high-grade 
petroleum products provided their aircraft with a performance edge that German 
engineers, despite their great proficiency, could never make up.  In light of this, 
Stalin’s identification of the interplay between engines and octane was correct.    
 
Britain had identified high-grade petroleum as a strategic resource of great 
importance well before the outbreak of World War II.  The performance 
advantage that 100-octane petrol gave to aircraft was such that Britain put in place 
special arrangements for obtaining high-octane fuels from the United States and 
had spent considerable sums of money attempting to establish a domestic 
manufacturing capacity in Britain and the Empire.  The contention of this chapter 
is that high-grade petroleum products were a significant cost for Britain.  In 
establishing the full cost of these products, the analysis provides a description of 
the development of high-octane, particularly 100-Octane, fuel and the advantages 
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Fuel in WW II Mean Victory or Defeat, William Morrow, New York, 1987p.68 
it provided to users.  The evidence suggests that 100-octane fuel was one of the 
major advantages that British aircraft like the Spitfire enjoyed over their German 
opponents.    
   
The analysis of the cost of obtaining the supplies of high-octane petrol, the oil and 
lubricants that Bomber Command needed for its aircraft shows that it was a 
strategic resource and it was expensive to obtain.  Bomber Command was a major 
user of 100-octane fuel and other high-grade petroleum products.  The cost of 
POL used by Bomber on operations has been relatively easy to establish.  In 
attempting to provide the most accurate estimate of the cost of the POL used by 
Bomber Command in carrying out the strategic air offensive this analysis will 
identify the value of POL used in operations and in training.  It will also provide 
an estimate of the value of the POL destined for Bomber Command but lost at 
sea, as well as the cost of the ships sunk while carrying it.  The economic losses 
incurred in shipping POL into Britain for the strategic air offensive are legitimate 
costs of the offensive and need to be assigned against it, if a true evaluation of 
cost is to be ascertained.   
 
The files of both the British and United States governments and those of the oil 
companies contain a wealth of information on petroleum supply during the war.  
A most important source is the Statistical Digest of the War published in 1951 by 
the Central Statistical Office2.  It provides the data upon which the British 
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government based many wartime decisions.  The information contained in the 
Statistical Digest was rounded out with information on prices and shipping costs 
obtained from the archives of British Petroleum Amoco, held at their historical 
section in London and at the University of Warwick.  This archive contains 
information on the prices of the different grades of petrol imported into Britain 
and contains unpublished information relating to the precise amounts of fuels 
imported, the shipping and insurance charges and the exact figures for the 
wartime exchange rates between the £sterling and the $US. 
 
Aside from the above official records and the Statistical Digest of the War, a few 
early works describe the supply of POL to the Allies during the war.  The first of 
these is Brian Bond’s  Peace, Plenty and Petroleum, published in the United 
States in 19443 and J. Frey and H.C. Ide’s 1946, A History of the Petroleum 
Administration for War, 1941-1945, published by the United States Department 
of the Interior4.  It describes the administrative, logistical and technical aspects of 
the expansion of American domestic oil production and refining during the war.  
The wealth of detail covers production, transportation, and the way the United 
States Government organised the supply of petroleum products including aviation 
fuel sent to Britain.   
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4 J. Frey and H. Chandler, A History of the Petroleum Administration for War 1941-1945, United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946 
The first British work on petroleum is D.J. Payton-Smith’s 1971 volume of the 
official history, Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, which deals 
with the way in which the British Government managed its oil resources5.  It also 
contains interesting information on technical developments in the petroleum 
industry.  Other secondary works include Ronald Cooke and Roy Conyers 
Nesbit’s Target: Hitler’s Oil – Allied Attacks on German Oil Supplies, 1939-
1945, which provides an examination of the technical aspects of oil refining and 
the importance of high-octane fuel for aircraft and the military attacks against 
German oil production by the Allies6.  R Goralski and R.W. Freeburg’s 1987 
study, Oil and War, on the technological advantages provided by access to high-
grade petroleum7.  All of these works have as a central theme the importance of 
how access to large quantities of high-grade oil supplies gave the western Allies a 
major technological advantage over Germany.  Finally, Daniel Yergin’s 
extremely readable, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power8 is a 
general history of the world oil industry and provides a few pages devoted to the 
production and supply of petroleum during World War II.   
 
The strategic air offensive was highly dependent upon Britain having access to 
large stocks of high-grade refined petroleum.  The problem for Britain was that 
she had no domestic production of any significance and she was therefore 
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1939-1945, William Kimber, London, 1985 
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dependent on imports.  This presented the British government with two problems; 
the first was paying for the petroleum and the second was getting it past the 
German U-Boat fleet.  The history of 100-Octane fuel in World War II is a story 
of technological prowess, industrial power, sacrifice and luck.  During World War 
II, neither side enjoyed a decided advantage in terms of the technological 
proficiency of their aircraft.  All of the major powers, Germany, Britain, the 
United States, USSR and Japan, were capable of producing advanced and 
effective aircraft.  The advantage that the western allies enjoyed was that they had 
better fuel.   
 
Technical Advantage and the Role of High Grade Aviation Fuel 
 
The official historians of the United States Petroleum Administration, J. Frey  and 
H.C. Ide, describe 100-Octane fuel as ‘the superfuel’ that provided the speed, 
power, range, climb and manoeuvrability, ‘all of the things, that meant the victory 
margin in combat’9.  They did not include` the added advantages of less wear and 
tear on engines, which, in a total war, amounts to a significant advantage when 
factories and repair organisations are stretched to meet the demands of the 
fighting air force.  In order to understand the advantages provided by operating on 
100 as against 87 octane fuel it is necessary briefly to discuss what octane means 
and what high (100 plus) octane does. 
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 The octane rating of a fuel is a number used to describe how quickly petrol burns.  
In octane the lower the number, the faster the fuel burns and with the lower 
octanes, the fuel explodes or detonates rather than burns.  The higher the octane 
number the slower the fuel burns.  The practical result is that a high-octane fuel 
burns relatively slowly in a spreading flame front, which starts at the point of 
ignition at the points of the spark plug within an engine cylinder.  As a 
consequence the forces generated by the burn are more evenly distributed and 
uniformly transferred to the moving pistons, resulting in a more efficient transfer 
of energy from the fuel to the engine.  Engines using 100-Octane fuels therefore 
obtain better power per gallon than if they used fuel with lower octane ratings. 
 
In lower octane fuels, the explosion or detonation of the fuel produces an uneven 
flame front, which causes unequal distribution of temperature within the cylinder.  
It results in hot spots, which damage the metal of the cylinder and lead to uneven 
heating causing a weakening of metals that in turn led to a decrease in the life 
expectancy of the engine.  For a high performance engine, high-octane fuel is 
vital if the best power output is to be obtained from the engine.  100-Octane fuel 
provides approximately 20 percent better performances in acceleration, climb and 
load carrying capacities than can be obtained by using 87-Octane fuel in the same 
engine10.  In consequence, where the engineering of German and Allied aircraft 
was equally effective, 100-Octane gave the Allied aircraft a 20 percent advantage.  
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William Burton began the developmental work on high-octane fuel in 1916 when 
he designed the thermal cracking process, which Standard Oil Indiana used to 
double the yield of gasoline from its refineries from 17.5 percent to 35 percent 11.  
Although thermal cracking of crude oil was an economical way of producing fuel 
for motor vehicles, it was uneconomical for high-grade aviation fuels12.  The next 
big advance in the economic production of large quantities of the higher-octane 
came in the early 1930s, when Eugene Houdry invented the catalytic cracking 
process13.   
 
Although there were some minor problems with the efficiency of the process, 
Houdry’s catalytic process of 1935 allowed the first commercial release of 100-
Octane fuels in the United States14.  Warren Lewis and Edwin Gilliland, who 
jointly developed the fluidised-bed catalytic cracking of petroleum, quickly 
resolved the remaining technical problems with the Houdry method, and Sun 
Oil moved quickly to built the first large scale catalytic cracking plant at its 
Marcus Hook refinery in 193715.  It gave the United States a significant lead in 
the commercial production of anti-knock fuels.   
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The impact of these advances was that 100-Octane immediately became the fuel 
of choice for aero-engines and designers, such as Roy Fedden, who had worked 
hard to ensure that they altered their existing engine designs to take full advantage 
of the power available from this new fuel.  By the late 1930s it was claimed in 
America that the use of 100-Octane was ‘fairly widespread’16.  This claim reflects 
a difference in the way the Americans measured Octane rather than any 
widespread use of the very high-grade fuel.  What the Americans called 100-
Octane was actually equivalent to the 87-Octane that was widely used throughout 
Britain and Europe17.  In the late 1930s, the United States petroleum industry was 
only beginning to establish significant production of true 100-Octane fuel and this 
fuel was still as rare there as it was in Europe18. 
 
The demand for 87-Octane fuel expanded rapidly and, in 1937, a contributor to an 
issue of the SAE Journal quoted Captain F.D. Klein, of the Materials Division of 
the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC), wrote that the USAAC would be 
purchasing approximately 2,841,000 gallons of 100-Octane [87-Octane] fuel 
before July 193719.  The Army would draw this fuel from the total United States 
supply of 155,000,000 gallons (3,690,476 barrels), which sources expected the 
industry to produce that year.  The SAE Journal also quoted Standard Oil, the 
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18  PRO CAB 67/8, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air,  5th November 1940 
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major player in this market, as saying that it would be ‘possible for United States 
production of 100-Octane fuel to quickly reach 340,000,000 gallons per year’20. 
 
In Europe, work on high-octane fuel was also underway, principally at Shell in 
Holland21.  In Britain, Roy Fedden at Bristol used 100-Octane fuel in 1927 to 
power the Bristol Mercury engine during bench testing sprints22.  In Britain, 100-
Octane petrol was regarded as an experimental fuel and it is likely that the fuel 
used by Fedden at Bristol was either obtained from Shell or made by chemists 
using the Burton thermal cracking method23.  The average octane rating of the 
fuel used in RAF aircraft of this period varied from 69 to 77 octanes24.  By 1934, 
the new 87-octane petrol, DTD.230, was available in Britain and engine 
manufacturers, such as Bristol and Armstrong Siddeley, who hoped to supply the 
RAF with engines, began the process of re-designing their engines to suit the new 
fuel.   
 
British engine designers knew of the imminent arrival of 100-Octane fuel and had 
begun to re-design their engines to burn this fuel.  Roy Fedden kept himself well 
informed on the developments in fuels that were occurring abroad and it is likely 
that other engine manufacturers also kept a close eye on these developments.  
Fedden was a frequent visitor to the United States and, given the popularity of his 
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air-cooled rotary engines in that market, he had good access to American 
colleagues and their technical innovations.  In 1937, Fedden gave a paper to the 
Society of American Engineers (SAE) where he described some of the changes 
that were occurring in the industry.  Interestingly, he made special note of the 
negative impact of the high cost of 100-Octane fuel at 2s/6d and fuel oil 1s 2d per 
gallon25. 
 
The American Connection 
 
In September of 1939, the British Secretary of State for Mines reported to the 
War Cabinet that the United States oil market was ‘deluged with inquiries from 
all over the world, including Italy’26.  He was happy to report to his colleagues 
that the American sellers were ‘holding off’, probably in the hope, that prices 
would rise and he hoped that they would sell their fuel to Britain27.  Despite the 
efforts of Britain to plan for her own POL needs through the development of 
domestic refining capacity and the construction of refineries in Trinidad, 
Calgary, Canada and in the Middle East, it became obvious that she would have 
to rely upon the United States for supplies of POL, especially 100-Octane 
petroleum. 
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In 1939, British plans to access American supplies of petroleum faced a 
significant hurdle in that Britain was a defaulting debtor on the war loans she had 
raised from the United States during World War I, and was unable to obtain credit 
from the United States for war stores, including POL.  In order to obtain the 
necessary supplies of POL the British government was forced to liquidate her 
holdings in the western hemisphere.  The Americans took full advantage of this to 
obtain significant British assets at very low prices.  The cost of POL that is 
measured in this chapter does not include the monetary value of these 
transactions,  all of which represented a loss of real wealth and a significant loss 
of prestige as Britain went ‘cap-in-hand’ to the United States in order to obtain the 
POL she needed. 
 
This problem of payment was to continue until the introduction of the Lend-Lease 
Act by the US Congress.  The major advantage of it was that Britain gained 
access to supplies of American petroleum, without having to pay in dollars.  
Before the Lend-Lease Agreement, Britain had to pay the United States for 
supplies of petroleum which was a significant drain of wealth, as the account was 
paid in US dollars or gold.  The efforts of the British Government to build 
cracking plants in the British Isles and at Trinidad and Azerbaijan may have been 
justified to some extent by a desire to locate some POL production within the 
sterling sphere in order to protect holdings of dollars and other foreign currencies.  
The concerns of the British government were well based and by 1940 the national 
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debt was $21 billion, a significant proportion of which was due to her importation 
of petroleum products from the United States28.   
 
The United States recognised Britain as a supplicant partner very early in the 
war29.  The Americans based their decision to support Britain in 1939-1940 on a 
careful evaluation of their national interests and the damage to those interests if 
Britain and France were defeated30.  As the war progressed, many United States 
Government officials believed that the United States Administration was too 
lenient in dealing with Britain.  In 1943, these rumblings increased dramatically 
as British Gold and United States dollar reserves built up to around $2.5 billion.  
Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau, strongly advocated that the President 
place a limit of $US1 billion on Britain31.  Although President Roosevelt sent a 
letter to Churchill requesting that he ‘look at the matter’, the tone of the letter is 
relaxed and intimates that he was asking Churchill to investigate only because he 
had to32.  Roosevelt’s relaxed attitude was firmly supported by the State 
Department and the Lend-Lease Administration.  Despite this, there is no denying 
the status of Britain as a supplicant. 
 
                                                 
28  Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 546-545 
29  Lord Cherwell, Memo to Prime Minister 12th November, 1943, British Diplomatic Files, Box 
36,F.D. Roosevelt Digital Archive,  a330oo01 
30  Cover Letter to Summary of Intelligence Report 3rd March 1939, FDR Digital Archive, Box 
37, A339U03 
31  Cherwell, FDR Digital Archive,  a330oo01 
32  President Roosevelt, Letter to Prime Minister of Great Britain,  22 Feb, 44, Box 36, FDR Digital 
Archive, a331d04 
In the first year of the war, Britain imported from the United States over 12 
million tons of POL33.  The supply of 100-Octane to Britain was of increasing 
concern as the fuel was now recognised as a necessity for operational aircraft 
and the three British plant, Heysham, Trinidad and Thornton, were still under 
construction at the end of 194034.  The estimated cost of the Thornton plant 
alone was £9 million and, by October 1940, the Government had already paid 
out £1.2 million of this amount.  It was expected that Britain would need in 
1942 to find 600,000 tons of 100-Octane from non-British sources, with at least 
350,000 tons of this coming from the United States, which was the ‘main 
outside source of supply’35. 
 
At the beginning of the war it was not certain that the American oil industry 
could expand its production to meet the demand for 100-Octane.  In 1938, 
United States production of 100-Octane was approximately 22,178 barrels per 
day36.  By 1940 it had doubled to 40,000 and five years later had reached 
approximately 514,000 barrels per day, an increase of over 2000 per cent on the 
1938 figure37.  The cost of this achievement was $925 million of which the US 
government provided loans of only $245 million.  The US government spent a 
further $233 million on cracking plant, which the industry then leased and 
                                                 
33  Chart in FDR Digital Archive, Safe, Box 5, a68c02 
34  PRO CAB67/8, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air,  5th November 1940 
35  PRO CAB67/8, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air,  5th November 1940 
36  Cronstedt and Du Bois, SAE Journal, p.225 
37  Frey and Ide, A History of the Petroleum Administration,  p.455 
operated38.  A further $7.3 million went to the industry to compensate some 
companies for extraordinary construction expenses and the industry supplied the 
balance of $439.7 million39. 
 
From 1942 to August 1945, total Allied production of 100-Octane equalled 
410,578,170 barrels of which British domestic and Commonwealth production 
contributed 56,613,340 barrels, 13.78 percent of the total.  Following Pearl 
Harbor the United States seriously addressed the problem of meeting the 
massively increased demand for 100-Octane.  
 
The lack of domestic crude oil supplies and the difficulty of importing crude oil 
limited Britain’s domestic manufacturing capacity, making an uninterrupted 
supply of this strategic commodity a highly problematic outcome during most of 
the Second World War.  Over the period of World War II, Britain manufactured 
6.4 percent of her total aviation and motor spirit needs from the indigenous raw 
materials that she could access40.  In 1940, the Air Ministry estimated that the 
force they were aiming for would consume 850,000 tons of 100-Octane per 
annum41.  At the time, when 53 percent of Britain’s 100-Octane fuel (4,380 
barrels per day) was being supplied by the United States, there were substantial 
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concerns that British requirements for 100-Octane could be adversely affected by 
United States Government decisions.  A further problem was that United States 
100-Octane fuel normally rated only 90-octane against the British standard and 
imports of this fuel from the United States needed testing before they were 
accepted into British stocks42. 
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Fig.:7.1: Source: Statistical Digest of the War, pp. 87-90 
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 Faced with these problems, Britain intended to develop her production of the 
essential fuel.  It is not surprising that the primary impetus for the building of 
domestic catalytic cracking facilities came from the Air Ministry43.  It was hoped 
Britain would be able to manufacture up to 700,000 of the 850,000 tons of 100-
Octane required annually to conduct the air war44.  Production was spread across 
nine plants, three in the UK, one in the Caribbean and the Middle East and two in 
the Dutch East Indies.  The biggest plant was to be Thornton with a proposed 
capacity of 200,000 tons per annum with the Heysham, Billingham and Stanlow 
plants adding a further 220,000 tons annually45.  Another 130,000 tons would be 
available from Trinidad and Abidjan in the Middle East and 150,000 tons were to 
come from Standard Oil in Aruba, Palembang and Pladjoe in the Dutch East 
Indies46.  The total, including Thornton, would constitute around 700,000 tons per 
annum, leaving only 150,000 tons of 100-Octane to be sourced from the United 
States.  Most of these plans failed. 
 
The production of aviation grade fuel in Britain was regarded by the industry and 
by the Government as being uneconomical and the decision not to pursue the 
expensive hydrogenation plants was taken quite early in the war.  The British 
Government was not particularly attracted to this idea even in the dark days of 
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1940, when the need for 100-Octane was critical47.  The only plant that was to 
become operational was Stanlow, and this produced a minute quantity of 720 
barrels of 100-Octane a day48. 
 
By December 1939, the British government had spent £15.8 million on the 
development of domestic 100-Octane production49.  By October 1940, the cost 
had risen to approximately £18 million, after an increase of £2 million in 
construction costs at Thornton50.  All of the money spent on Heysham and 
Thornton was lost, as neither plant was ever completed.  The £8.5 million given to 
ICI for the building of a 100-Octane plant at Billingham also failed as the plant 
never produced any 100-Octane fuel.  As a result, the British Government spent 
around £18 million in unsuccessful attempts to provide the RAF with 
domestically manufactured 100-Octane fuel.   
 
 
The benefits of 100-Octane fuel need to be offset against the very real cost of the 
fuel and other petroleum products to Britain during World War II.  Prior to the 
outbreak of the war the British government identified 100-Octane fuel as a 
strategically important product.  In order to ensure an uninterrupted supply, 
Britain began building modern cracking plants in the United Kingdom and in 
Trinidad and in Azerbaijan.  The development of cracking plants in Britain and 
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48  Goralski and Freeburg, Oil and War, p.44 
49  PRO CAB68/3, Supply and Production, Fourth Report By the Air Ministry, 19th Dec 39 
the Empire were an insurance policy in case of a failure of the supply of high-
grade petroleum from the United States, which Britain always saw as being the 
primary source of the high-grade fuels they would need.   
 
The Problem of Transportation  
 
Of the almost 91 million tons of POL imported into Britain during the war, 42.55 
percent (38,684,000 tons) was aviation and motor spirit51.  Of this latter figure 
33.13 percent (12,817,848 tons) was aviation fuel of which the Air Ministry 
received 90.68 percent (11,624,409 tons)52.  Of the amount delivered to the Air 
Ministry, 77 percent (8,960,295 tons or 2.243 billion gallons) was 100-Octane 
plus fuel53.  As a proportion of total fuel imports into Britain during the war, 100-
octane fuel accounted for about 9.8 percent.  Getting this fuel to Bomber 
Command entailed considerable cost both in shipping losses amongst the tankers 
and in the freighting of the POL through the sorely stretched inland transportation 
system.   
 
From the outbreak of war until November 1943, the United States used a fleet of 
50 US registered tankers to operate a shuttle along the east coast, which ensured 
that oil for Britain was available at the northern ports.  The tankers for this service 
along the United States coast were a cost that has not been counted here though it 
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could be included as part of the cost because these ships were completely 
removed from any other service54.  This system of transportation between the 
Gulf and the terminals along the North Atlantic seaboard of the United States 
shortened by 1,500 miles the distance that British tankers had to steam in order to 
pick up their cargoes55.  The probable reason for this system was to reduce the 
risk to United States coastal shipping posed by German U Boats operating against 
British tankers steaming in American coastal shipping lanes.  The annual cost of 
the scheme was approximately £1.13 million for handling, storage, freight and 
insurance56.  The total cost for the four years 1940 to the end of 1943 would have 
been approximately £4.52 million.   
 
In 1943, the ‘Big Inch’ oil pipeline57, which terminated in New York, removed 
the need for the shuttle system of tanker transport58.  Under an agreement with the 
American Government, the British could draw on the United States Navy’s 
petroleum pool, which the Americans had established at the New York terminal 
of the ‘Big Inch’59.  The use of this system included a surcharge for 
transportation, handling and storage, which increased from 7s/5d per ton in early 
                                                                                                                                  
53  BP Archives, ‘Deliveries into Consumption’, ARC 7439, 4th Sep 39 to 31st Dec 1945 
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56  BP Archive, ‘Special Items of Cost’ ARC 7439 
57  The threat from German submarines to the US oil tanker routes along the eastern seaboard 
led the US Government to build the ‘Big Inch’ and ‘little Inch’ pipelines between Aug 42 
and Mar 44 to deliver crude oil from the Texas oil refineries at Houston and Port Arthur to 
terminals in New York, New Jersey and Philadelphia.   www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/ 
online/articles/view/BB/dob8.html 
58  BP Archive, ‘Special Items of Cost’ ARC 7439 
59 BP Archive, ‘Special Items of Cost’ ARC 7439 
1944 to £1.16s per ton shipped in the first two quarters of 1944 before dropping to 
£1.8s/3d in early 194560.  The surcharge applied to all petroleum products with 
the exceptions of tar oils, aviation fuels and paraffin wax, all of which were 
military stores61.   
 
The Americans completed the first leg of the ‘Big Inch’ pipeline as German U 
Boats moved into American coastal shipping lanes and began to inflict serious 
losses on shipping tankers and other coastal vessels.  The rate at which the 
Germans sank American coastal shipping was so high that it led to a significant 
fall in the amounts of crude oil reaching the refineries along the Atlantic seaboard.  
The unwillingness of the United States Navy to impose a convoy system on their 
coastal trading fleet exacerbated the problem and allowed the German U Boats a 
free rein to sink many more ships than they otherwise would have.  Poor 
communications security on American ships and the refusal of a number of 
coastal cities, like Miami, to impose a blackout allowed U Boat commanders to 
more efficiently locate and destroy American vessels62. 
 
The U Boat offensive along the United States Atlantic coast was very successful 
with POL shipments from the Gulf to United States East Coast ports falling from 
under 450 million barrels a year in 1941 to around 60 million barrels in 194363.  
The situation was so serious that Churchill wrote to Roosevelt in March 1942, 
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expressing deep concern at the immensity of the shipping losses64.  The threat 
posed to the Allied oil stocks by the success of the U Boats was serious and there 
were East Coast refineries in the United States which suffered a 37 percent 
decrease in the size of their crude oil runs65.  This drop then passed downstream, 
resulting in shortages of aviation and other fuels.  Perhaps paradoxically, whilst 
the production of refined POL fell on the United States East Coast, it piled up at 
Gulf Coast refineries to such an extent that they even considered reducing 
production at those plants66.  For a short period, Germany’s U-boats had seriously 
reduced the flow of petroleum supplies to the Allied war effort.  
 
Once POL had arrived at Baltimore or New York, it was loaded onto tankers 
bound for Britain.  Until the United States entered the war in December 1941, 
they were mostly British tankers or non-US tankers operating on behalf of Britain 
as United States tankers refused to enter the zone of hostilities67.  In the six years 
between 3rd September 1939 and 30th September 1945, Britain gained 1,727,000 
gross tons of tankers of over 1,600 gross tons whilst losing 2,063,000 gross tons 
of these vessels to enemy action and misadventure68.  The German U Boats 
claimed 88.6 percent of all the tonnage sunk. 
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Fig. 7.2:  Source: Statistical Digest of the War, p. 180 
 
The remaining losses were due to misadventure, scrapping and the transfer of 
vessels to other flags.  Given that aviation fuel comprised 14.1 percent of all POL 
imported into and manufactured by Britain during the war, it is reasonable to 
suggest that 14 percent of all tanker losses, 280 vessels, were carrying aviation 
fuel of which 69.65 percent would have been 100-Octane fuel69.  At an average 
capacity of 4.5 million gallons of fuel per tanker, a rough estimate of the loss is 
about 1.26 billion gallons (5.8 million tons) of 100-Octane70.  At an average 
wartime cost of 2s/6d71 per gallon, this puts the overall cost in the region of £166 
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million worth of 100-Octane fuel lost.  Of this amount, 37.91 percent, £62.93 
million (470 million gallons) can be written off against Bomber Command and 
the strategic air offensive. 
 
The estimate of £62.93 million in lost 100-Octane fuel does not take into account 
the cost of the lost shipping and other resources.  During the war the average cost 
of a tanker was somewhere around £405,00072.  This figure, the cost of a single 
Liberty ship, is conservative, as these mass-produced American ships were much 
cheaper than many pre-war built tankers.  If the 280 tankers that sank whilst 
transporting 100-Octane fuel are multiplied by the figure above, the cost of the 
shipping lost is about £113 million.  Using the same calculations as for the 100-
Octane fuel, the percentage of the loss that can be made against Bomber 
Command is 37.91 percent, valued at £42.8 million. 
 
Once a loaded tanker had crossed the Atlantic, the fuel was transferred to the 
inland transportation system.  The distribution of POL in Britain was achieved by 
using a mixture of small coastal tankers, rail and road transportation.  On arrival, 
rail wagons, lorries, coastal tankers and barges were used in a unified system to 
                                                 
72  United States Maritime Service Veterans,  ‘Liberty Ships Built by the United States Maritime 
Commission in World War II’, http://www.usmm.org/libertyships.html, 19th November, 
2002It is also of interest to note that the famous United States Liberty Ship was not an 
American invention.  A British design, the original plans were made by a British shipbuilder, 
J.L Thompson and Sons Ltd.72.  Thompson’s original design was for a ship called the 
Dorington Court and it used much of the welding and plate techniques that were to epitomise 
the American ship building industry during World War II.  The design was passed to the 
United States as part of a British Government order for 60 mass produced ships and it was 
hoped that Thompson’s design would ensure a standardised product that could be quickly 
built.  This is further evidence of the weakness of Correlli Barnett’s claims that British 
shipbuilders were not technologically capable of producing cheap, mass produced shipping.  
move POL from ports and oil terminals to its destinations73.  The immediate 
effect of the war on these operations was the movement of the bulk of tanker 
traffic from the east coast of the United Kingdom to the west coast and an 
increase in costs as the two-day voyage from Hull to Aberdeen increased to eight 
days74.  The records consulted provide no insight as to why the trip times 
increased so dramatically, but it is a reasonable assumption that the increase was 
due to fear of enemy action and mines.   
 
In examining the figures available for inland transportation of POL it is difficult 
to separate from the railway statistics the amount of POL transported in the 
consolidated freight miles.  It is clear that such loads were moved an average of 
57.3 miles75.  Robin Higham suggests that the railways increased the amount of 
POL freighted per month from 250,000 tons in 1938, to 350,000 tons in 194376.  
He also reports that the Air Ministry increased its holding of railway tanker 
wagons from 350 in 1939 to 500 in March 194177.  What is of note though is that 
road transport appears to have played a major role in the distribution of POL 
throughout the United Kingdom during the war.  This conclusion is based upon 
the fact that 93.36 percent of all general haulage goods vehicles and 18 percent of 
the total licensed (registered) vehicles were petrol or oil tankers (see Figure 7.3   
                                                                                                                                  
 
73  PRO CAB 68/1, Supply and Production First Report, 23rd Sept 39 
74  PRO CAB 68/2, Supply and Production Second Report,  10th Oct 39 
75  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, p.190 
76  Higham, Bases of Air Strategy, p.32 
77  Higham, Bases of Air Strategy, p.33 
below)78.  This figure does not include such vehicles operated by the armed 
services or by civilian companies operating under defence contracts. 
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Fig.7.3:  Source: Statistical Digest of the War, p. 191 
 
The road haulage industry was one of the more successful industries in fending 
off government controls during the war.  The road freight companies avoided 
direct government control of its activities until March 1943, when a number of the 
larger firms were nationalised and the Minister for War Transport took direct 
control of the 25,000 vehicles that operated over distances greater than 60 miles79.  
The road haulage industry was the only significant part of the transportation 
network to resist centralised government control for so long. 
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Bomber Command and POL 
 
The total amount of POL used by Bomber Command during the strategic air 
offensive is almost impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy.  Despite 
this, it is possible to identify the approximate amount of POL used on operations, 
as there are records of the fuel loads used for various aircraft types flying to 
Berlin, Milan and the Ruhr.  In order to arrive at a workable estimate, these 
known fuel loads were divided by the number of engines on the particular aircraft 
and an estimate of the fuel usage per engine per mile was identified.  These 
estimated figures were then applied to the total number of engines used in the 
aircraft despatched on operations to these targets and to other targets of similar 
distance from the United Kingdom.  This enables us to roughly estimate the total 
amount of fuel expended over the various target areas attacked by Bomber 
Command. 
 
In 1935, as the size of planned operational aircraft and the likelihood of war 
increased, the Air Staff decided to review the whole process of managing POL 
within the RAF.  At this time, operational RAF stations in the United Kingdom 
held 87-octane fuel in 12,000-gallon tanks with a maximum of four such tanks, or 
48,000 gallons, per storage pit80.  The system could only dispense 60 gallons per 
minute for the refuelling of aircraft81.  Refuelling an aircraft with a fuel capacity 
of 2,500 gallons would have taken 41 minutes and with 42 such aircraft operating 
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from a Bomber Command base it would have taken 22 hours to refuel the usual 
number of 32 aircraft that routinely operated from these bases82. 
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Fig.7.4:   Source: PRO CAB 68/6-9 
 
Because of a 1935 review, the Air Ministry retained the 12,000-gallon tanks but 
fitted these with pumps that could pump 90 gallons per unit.  The same review 
also increased the number of installations to a maximum of three dispersed sites 
                                                 
82  Harris, Despatch, p.157 
with their own blast and splinter proof bunds83.  This increased the amount of 
petroleum held on a station to a maximum of 72,000 gallons84.  Engine oil of 
approximately 5 percent of petrol holdings, up to a maximum of 5,000 gallons, 
was also held at each bomber station85. This oil was still dispensed using hand 
pumps with mechanical pumps attached to vehicles being slowly introduced over 
the next three or so years. 
 
Operational Consumption of POL 
 
From the 3rd of September 1939 to the 14th of August 1945, the POL supply 
organisations delivered somewhere between 2.5 and 2.7 billion gallons of aviation 
fuel to the Air Ministry at an estimated total wholesale cost of £295 - £357 
million86.  Information on the amount of POL, including 100-Octane is contained 
in a number of primary and secondary sources and although these figures are only 
partial records of usage, they do provide a workable body of data from which 
more general and useful figures can be extrapolated.  The main sources consulted 
here have been the fuel loadings listed in the AIR files87 at the Public Record 
Office in London and a set of figures obtained from private sources by Norman 
Franks88.   
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Fig.7.5:   Source: BP Archive, ARC 7439 
 
 
Analysis of the available data shows that the average fuel load for a four-engined 
bomber flying to Berlin, Cologne or Hamburg with a bombload between 7,500 lbs 
and 10,000 lbs was around 2,000 gallons of 100-Octane fuel.  In addition, these 
particular aircraft also used 70 gallons of engine oil and five gallons of coolant 
each constituting a total of 2,075 gallons of POL and coolant per aircraft.  The 
usefulness of the above data did not lie in the gallons per mile flown, but rather in 
calculating the fuel needed to lift a given weight of bombs. 
 
 In planning an operation against a target on the continent, the two variables in the 
loads carried by individual aircraft lay in the tonnage of bombs or mines carried 
or the amount of POL used to lift that bomb load.  The amount of machine gun 
ammunition remained the same at 10,000 rounds of .303 inch per aircraft.  As 
well the crews remained the same two for a Mosquito, or seven for a Halifax or 
Lancaster and their consumables such as food, coffee and oxygen did not alter 
either.  Thus, on any raid the amount of fuel required to lift the empty aircraft 
remained almost constant.  What changed was bomb load over distance against 
weather. 
 
In analysing fuel statistics for this chapter the most striking realisation was not the 
performance obtained by a particular fuel whether in terms of miles per gallon or 
power produced, it was the actual weight of fuel needed to fly a bomber from 
Britain to a target in Germany.  The 2,075 gallons of 100-Octane fuel that a 
Lancaster bomber required to reach a Berlin is another figure until it is realised 
that it represents a mass or weight of nine and a half tons of fuel89.  Suddenly, 
with this one conversion, the imperative of Bomber Command’s demand for 
petrol, oil and lubricant becomes stark.  It indicates that strategic bombing was an 
avid consumer of energy in the shape of aviation fuel.  
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Bomber Command’s heavy consumption of POL is highlighted in a statistical 
analysis contained within a secret report compiled by the Command conducted in 
early 194490.  The secret report discussed the resources consumed in launching a 
thousand bomber raid on Germany and, given the date of this report, it is more 
than likely that the raid it was describing was the series of attacks on Hamburg 
that took place in July 194391.  The report details that the raid consumed two 
million gallons of 100-Octane fuel along with 70,000 gallons of engine oil and 
5,000 gallons of coolant.  Converted to mass, these gallon amounts equate to 
9,216.5 tons of petrol, 325 tons of engine oil and 23 tons of engine coolant, a total 
of 9,564.5 tons.  This was the POL required to transport 4,500 tons of bombs, 10 
million rounds of machine gun ammunition, 15 million litres of oxygen, 8,000 
pints of coffee, 27 tons of food and approximately 7,000 airmen to their target in 
Germany92.  The wholesale price of the 100-Octane fuel for one four engined 
bomber was £275 and £275,000 for the entire fleet of attackers.   
 
More interesting even than the financial cost is the tantalising insight the figures 
reveal into the relationship between the tonnage of bombs and the tonnage of fuel 
consumed.  The 4,500 tons of bombs that were despatched to the target used 
9,216.5 tons of 100-Octane fuel, a ratio of over 2 tons of 100-Octane per one ton 
of bombs lifted to this target.  This ratio of around 2 tons of 100-Octane fuel per 
ton of bombs despatched to German and Italian targets is very close to the 
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average figure of 2.34 tons per ton of bombs despatched that can be extrapolated 
from the data supplied by Norman Franks93. 
 
Fuel Loadings for Lancaster Bomber 
Target Bomb Load in lbs 100-Octane Fuel Load 
in Gallons* 
Fuel Required to lift 
One Ton of Bombs 
Essen 9,160   (4 Ton) 1,500  (6.8 Ton) 1.7 Ton 
Hamburg 9,160   (4 Ton) 1,500  (6.8 Ton) 1.7 Ton 
Berlin 10,200  (4.5 Ton) 1,743  (7.9Ton) 1.7 Ton 
Nurnberg 8,260   (3.7 Ton) 1,800  (8.1 Ton) 2.2 Ton 
Berlin 5,360   (2.4 Ton) 1,900  (8.6 Ton) 3.6 Ton 
Berlin 7,960   ( 3.5 Ton) 2,062  (9.37 Ton) 2.7 Ton 
Milan 7,600   (3.4 Ton) 2,062  (9.37 Ton) 2.7 Ton 
Fig.7.6:   Source: N. Franks, The Lancaster, pp. 10-11 
* Fuel loads were varied by the planned route to be taken as well as metrological conditions. 
 
The figure above shows that it took an average of 2.3 tons of fuel to lift one ton of 
bombs or mines94.  If the 988,281 tons of bombs and mines despatched by 
Bomber Command between 1939 and 1945 is multiplied by 2.3 it gives a figure 
of 2,274,304 tons of 100 octane fuel used to fuel the aircraft despatched on 
operations by Bomber Command during the war95.  This result is 149,790 tons 
higher than the figure of 2,124,514 tons obtained by multiplying average fuel 
consumption per mile by the number of engines by total distance to a target.  The 
closeness of the results derived by using two completely different analytical 
techniques provides a high degree of confidence that Bomber Command used 
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loadings for an aircraft varied with the planned height and route of the attacking force and 
fuel consumption was adversely affected by head winds and other climatic factors.  As 
Figure 7.6 above shows the fuel loadings for a Lancaster flying to Berlin varied from 7.9 to 
9.37 Tons. 
95  Harris, Despatch, p.50 
approximately 2.2 million tons of 100-Octane fuel during World War II. This is 
25 percent of all 100-Octane issued to the Air Ministry and 17 percent of all 
grades of aviation spirit used by Britain at home or shipped from Britain to 
overseas theatres of operation96. 
 
In order to arrive at a total financial cost for the 100-Octane that Bomber 
Command used on operations, it is necessary to convert tons to gallons and 
2,174,218 tons equals 475,891,107 gallons.  This amount of fuel multiplied by the 
average wholesale cost of 2s/8d per gallon97 during the war, gives a total 
expenditure of £62,752,139, or almost £63 million as the cost of the 100-Octane 
fuel used by Bomber Command for its various offensive operations. 
 
The analysis of the data shows that Bomber Command attacked approximately 
501 enemy targets by either mining or bombing.  Of these targets 32 percent (161) 
had more than 500,000 gallons of fuel expended in the process, whilst 17 percent 
(86) had more than one million gallons used against them and 1.1 percent of cities 
(Berlin, Cologne, Duisburg, Essen, Hamburg and Stuttgart) had more than 10 
million gallons used in attacks against them.  The total amount of  100-Octane 
expended against this one percent of all targets, the six cities listed above, was 
100,428,142 gallons, or 21 percent of all fuel committed to Bomber Command 
operations.  The cost to Britain was £13.2 million out of the almost £63 million 
spent on obtaining 100-Octane fuel for the strategic air offensive. 
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 In addition to the fuel used, there is also the engine oil, which was used at a ratio 
of 15.5 gallons per ton of bombs carried.  It suggests that the amount of oil 
consumed by Bomber Command during the strategic air offensive between 1939 
and 1945 would have been approximately 15.3 million gallons.  The amount of 
oil, based on the 1937 price of 1s/2d per gallon98, would have cost £893,570. The 
overall price for POL consumed by Bomber Command between September 1939 
and June 1945 is therefore somewhere around £63,645,709.  
 
Non-Operational Usage 
 
The operational activity consumed only part of the 100-octane fuel used by 
Bomber Command during the strategic air offensive.  A significant amount of this 
fuel was also used in training aircrew, moving diverted aircraft and in simply 
maintaining and testing aircraft after maintenance.  In addition, there needs to be 
some evaluation of the cost incurred through simple leakage, spillage and 
contamination of 100-octane fuel.  Aviation fuel in particular has to comply with 
very high standards of purity, as water or other contaminants can result in 
multiple engine failures and the loss of an aircraft.  The importance of ensuring 
aviation fuel is free of contamination was a major aspect of aircraft operations and 
any fuel storages that were contaminated had to be disposed of and this 
represented a cost.  
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 The history of the strategic air offensive is devoid of research on the Air 
Ministry’s management of POL and the official records contain very little 
information, probably because the bulk of the records would not have been 
maintained after the fuel had been issued and accounted for.  The lack of sources 
makes it difficult to analyse the cost of managing this resource.  It also makes it 
difficult to estimate the amount of POL used on supporting activities such as 
training, testing and maintenance.  This thesis will attempt to provide useful 
estimates by averaging the amounts of POL used for these activities.  
 
The first area of activity of operational support is the diversion of returning 
bombers from their home airfield to other airfields from which they would later 
have to relocate themselves.  These diversions were not cost-free activities as the 
relocation of a diverted aircraft from one airfield to its home base imposed a cost 
in POL.  The question is how big this cost was.  Between early 1942 and VE day 
Bomber Command made plans to divert 95,000 aircraft and approximately 20,000 
of these aircraft were diverted99.  The main reason for such diversions was, as Sir 
Arthur Harris put it, ‘The fickle nature of British weather’, which included low 
cloud, rain, sleet, snow and fog100.   
 
Although it has been impossible to identify any records detailing how much POL 
was required to relocate a four-engined bomber over a reasonably short distance, 
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it is unlikely that Bomber Command would let any bomber aircraft take off with 
less than 250 gallons on board.  Given that the bulk of the anecdotal evidence 
supplied by those who served as aircrew in Bomber Command shows that pilots 
and crews made every effort to land at their home airfield, it is most likely that a 
diverted aircraft returning from an operation would be very low on fuel indeed.  
Therefore, it is safe to assume that most of these aircraft would have taken on 
around 250 gallons of 100-Octane fuel at the airfield at which they finally landed.  
It is also probable that these diverted aircraft would not have used much more 
than half of this amount of fuel in the flight back to their own airfields.  If such 
diversions consumed 100 gallons of fuel, it is probable that around 2 million 
gallons of 100-Octane costing of £263,916 were used in returning diverted 
aircraft to their home airfields.  
 
Even where Bomber Command had installed fog dispersal systems, the cost in oil 
remained high.  The fog dispersal systems operated by burning oil and it took 
several tons of oil per minute to successfully disperse fog101.  So even when fog 
could be cleared from an airfield using these systems, it cost an untold amount of 
oil to accomplish.  It has not been possible to estimate the amount of fuel oil used 
up in this way.  
 
Training also consumed substantial amounts of fuel, although it is extremely 
difficult to identify any data dealing with such usage.  Bomber Command had 
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developed its own extensive training system for new crews and for crews re-
training to fly the new heavy bomber aircraft.  Keeping the training organisation 
for heavy bombers within the Command was sensible as it allowed heavy 
bombers to be carefully husbanded so that very few valuable aircraft types, such 
as the Lancaster, were diverted from their operational roles.  It also allowed 
Bomber Command to call upon the aircraft of the Heavy Conversion Units 
(HCUs) and Operational Training Units (OTUs) when there was a need to 
maximise the size of the attacking force.  It also prevented other commands 
siphoning off these valuable aircraft and their skilled air and ground crews for 
other purposes.   
 
The size of the resources dedicated to training within Bomber Command indicates 
the importance that the Command placed on keeping this activity well within the 
authority of the Command.  Despite this implied level of importance it is as 
difficult to estimate as POL usage on diversions is the amount of this fuel used in 
the more prolific support activities of training crews to fly heavy bomber aircraft 
in the Operational Training Units (OTUs) and Heavy Conversion Units (HCUs) 
that were an intrinsic part of Bomber Command.  The average length of this 
training was five months and the number of hours spent flying a four-engined 
bomber at an HCU alone was between 40 and 45 hours, the equivalent of seven to 
seven and a half round trips to Berlin for every crew that undertook this 
training102.  
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 Another very useful indicator, in trying to establish the probable amount of fuel 
used for training within Bomber Command, is the comparative strengths of the 
training and operational squadrons.  In 1943, only 40.5 percent of all aircraft in 
the Command were in operational squadrons.  The remainder were in HCUs, 
OTUs or in the miscellaneous category of aircraft doing photo-reconnaissance, 
supply drops to the resistance or fighters used to simulate attacking Germans for 
the trainees in the HCUs103.   
 
The relationship between training and operations is shown in Figure 7.7.  In 
January 1944, the number of aircraft available in operational squadrons fell, 
reducing the percent of operational aircraft to 38.5 percent of all aircraft available 
in the Command104.  The fall most probably reflected the serious losses inflicted 
on Bomber Command during the Battle of Berlin at the end of 1943.   
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104  Harris, Despatch, p.160 
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Fig.7.7: Source: Sir A. Harris, Despatch, pp. 45, 160-161 
 
 
At the time, as can be seen on Figure 7.7 above, there was a widening gap 
between the number of aircraft available for training and the number of aircraft on 
charge to operational squadrons.  The situation changed from June of 1944, when 
Bomber Command switched its focus from the heavily defended cities of 
Germany to operations in support of OVERLORD.  With the subsequent collapse 
of the German front in France and the capture of much of the early warning radar 
system upon which the German defences depended, the level of attrition on 
operational squadrons was reduced leading to a reduction in the demand for 
trained crews. 
 
In January 1945, the percentage of operational aircraft had increased to 51.4 
percent, before peaking at 55.1 percent in May of that year.  This growth in the 
number of operational aircraft in Bomber Command most likely reflected the 
increased survivability of the bombers as the German defences collapsed under 
the weight of the ground attack and the loss of their fuel supplies and fighter 
forces in the war of attrition that was being fought out in the skies over Germany. 
 
The resources dedicated by Bomber Command to training were substantial but 
there is no easy way of quantifying them.  It is likely that the amount of POL used 
in training was between half to three quarters of those dedicated to operations.  In 
calculating the amount of POL consumed by training, it is assumed that every 
effort would have been made to keep the training overheads as low as possible 
and therefore the estimates are placed at approximately 50 percent of the total 
costs of the operational activities.  The 40-45 hours of flying that was required of 
a pilot during HCU training would have consumed an estimated 14,000 gallons of 
aviation fuel.  This figure if multiplied by the 15,714 pilots that are estimated as 
having undergone this training gives a total of 220 million gallons of 100-Octane 
fuel as being used in HCU training.  This figure is estimated to be under 50 
percent of the amount of fuel used on operations.  This amount of fuel would have 
cost £29,030,305 and when added to £446,500 for engine oil, would give a cost of 
£29.5 million as the total cost of the POL used on HCU training.  Given that this 
estimate does not include the amount of POL used for OTU training it is likely 
that it is an underestimate of the actual cost. 
 
Other support activity not included in the fuel usage figures identified so far 
include such things as the testing of engines on the ground and aircraft in the air, 
as well as the costs associated with the delivery of aircraft from the factories 
directly to Bomber Command airfields.  Test flights for the Hampden cost £11-
12, whilst those for a Wellington were from £17-18105.  The running of engines on 
test beds and all of the other activity associated with maintaining over four 
thousand aircraft would have a substantial cost in fuel and oil alone.  But, again 
there are no figures to inform us on this point and it must be accepted that a cost 
was paid, although it is impossible to accurately tell what it might have been.  The 
best estimate is that it cost around £10 per aircraft delivered to Bomber 
Command.  The total cost of this activity would have been £362,840 with 
£162,840 spent on delivering the Halifax, Lancaster and Stirling heavy bombers 
and £200,000 for the remaining 11 types used within the Command. 
 
The last general area of that needs to be described is wastage through the loss of  
fuel from a variety of causes such as leakage (the loss of fuel volume whilst in 
storage), spillage (the loss of fuel volume during handling operations), 
evaporation, theft and contamination.  Although it is impossible to quantify the 
amount of fuel lost through wastage, it is important to consider its impact as a cost 
factor.  Not only does fuel wastage cost money, but it imposes other costs as well 
particularly if it leaks or spills into the environment.  Even under war conditions 
the Air Ministry had to take account of the impact of its activities on the local 
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environment.  There would not be many farmers who would been happy with fuel 
containing large quantities of lead being spread over their lands.   
 
Contamination of the fuel itself is another major problem, particularly as the safe 
operation of aircraft demands fuel of the highest quality.  Any contamination of 
aviation fuel stocks by dirt, water or other substances makes it instantly unusable 
in an aircraft.  As with leakage and spillage, there are no figures detailing the 
extent of fuel lost through contamination.  This leaves an estimate for the loss of 
fuel through wastage and this is being done in the absence of even a staff-
planning figure used to prepare the Air Ministry fuel requirements.  As a result, I 
argue that a figure of 5 to 10 percent for total wastage for POL is not unlikely and 
given the emergency nature of much of the distribution and storage systems used 
during World War II, it is most likely that the wastage rate was closer to 10 
percent than to five.  At five percent of total POL used this wastage would be 
somewhere around 200,000 tons (43,400,000 gallons) at a cost of roughly £5.7 
million. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Without access to high quality petroleum products supplied through the United 
States and the Middle East, Britain could not have successfully prosecuted the 
war.  The resources dedicated to producing petroleum and petroleum products and 
to transporting them across the world were very large and are a strong indication 
of how important petroleum was to the war effort.  However, Britain and the 
United Nations were able to enjoy access to the highest quality petroleum because 
of the generosity and technical prowess of the United States.   
 
As an island nation Britain had to fight a long and protracted battle in the Atlantic 
to ensure that her lifelines of fuel, food and armaments were kept open.  Amongst 
the most important of the cargoes that were despatched was the POL that the 
tankers carried.  The Germans understood this and the U Boat captains sought out 
tankers above all other ships.  During World War II, Britain imported or 
manufactured a total of 90,902,800 tons of POL for her war effort and people106.  
These POL imports provided chemicals to make explosives, asphalt to pave 
airfields, bunker oil for ships, packing wax for protecting food and ammunition 
from the environment and of course, the petrol to drive the engines of the armed 
services.  Of this petrol, the most important was the 12,817,848 tons of aviation 
fuel brought in or manufactured for the aircraft of the RAF, Admiralty and War 
Office107.  The amount is 14.1 percent of the total POL imported or manufactured 
for all uses during the war by Britain.  Of these 12.8 million tons of aviation fuel 
imported or manufactured, 69.65 percent (8,960,295 tons)108 was 100-Octane fuel 
needed for the fighters of Fighter Command and the bomber aircraft of Bomber 
Command, the latter of which is the subject of this thesis. 
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Having looked closely at the data relating to the use of POL in Britain during the 
war it has been possible to identify with relative accuracy that Bomber Command 
used around 24.2 percent (2,174,218 tons) of 100-Octane plus fuel in its strategic 
air offensive against Germany.  The cost of this expenditure was £63 million.  
Added to this is the cost of training and the other necessary support activities that 
had to be undertaken to conduct the air offensive.  Subsidiary activity, such as 
diverting returning aircraft, training of aircrews, testing and maintaining aircraft 
and the simple handling of POL all resulted in the use or loss of this fuel.  The 
cost of diverting returning aircraft may have been £263,916; the cost of training, 
£29,000,000; the cost of testing and maintenance, a conservative £362,840; and 
then the cost of wastage, £5,723,375.  All together, a total cost of £99 million 
pounds has been estimated for the consumption of POL within Bomber 
Command. 
 
The other indirect costs that must be taken into account include the cost of the 
shipping lost whilst transporting aviation fuel and petroleum products to Britain.  
A percentage of this loss is attributable to the strategic air offensive, because 
Bomber Command would have taken a percentage of the fuel in these tankers.  
The cost of the 100-Octane fuel lost at sea that would have been issued to Bomber 
Command is estimated to be £62.93 million and the value of the sunken tankers 
carrying it £42.83 million.  The total cost of these losses £105.7 million.   
 
Added together the above figures for the use of 100-Octane fuel together with the 
value of losses in both fuel and ships come to an impressive total of 
£223,653,125.   This now gives us a total figure of £2.149 billion for the aircraft, 
infrastructure, ordnance and petrol, oil and lubricants used by Bomber Command 
in the strategic air offensive against Germany.  
 
C h a p t e r  8  
MANNING THE OFFENSIVE 
 
 
The men and women who served in Bomber Command were the most important 
element in the successful creation of the strategic air offensive against Germany.  
Yet the raising, training and work of these men and women has been largely 
ignored in the histories of the campaign.  This chapter focuses on the cost of 
manpower for the 2,074 days of Bomber Command’s offensive.  In order to cost 
manpower, the analysis deals with Britain’s efforts to obtain, train and maintain 
the necessary skilled manpower for Bomber Command.  The effort involved 
proved to be very great and it led to the development of a worldwide recruiting 
and training scheme that consumed massive resources to provide the aircrew and 
ground personnel who made up Bomber Command during the war. 
 
The first step in analysing the cost of manpower involved in the strategic air 
offensive is to identify the approximate size of that manpower.  The most widely 
accepted figures for these are 125,000 aircrew and ‘never…more than 250,000’ 
given by Sir Arthur Harris in his book Bomber Offensive1.  The analysis produced 
here confirms Harris’s figure of 125,000 aircrew as being reasonably accurate but 
it shows his suggestion of 250,000 for the total size of Bomber Command as 
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being 100,000 higher than the establishment figures for manpower authorised by 
the Air Ministry at the height of the strategic air offensive in 1943 and 19442.  In 
analysing the cost of manpower in the strategic air offensive I have retained 
Harris’s estimate for aircrew but used the Air Ministry establishment figures of 
approximately 150,000 for the total size of Bomber Command.   
 
I have also chosen not to include the possibility that up to 300,000 personnel 
worked on Bomber Command Stations.  This last figure comes from an analysis 
of the accommodation provided at bomber stations.  Each of Bomber Command’s 
stations had accommodation for an average of 2,300 personnel.  However, it 
cannot be known whether all of this accommodation was used or if the difference 
for accommodation provided and the numbers of personnel posted onto Bomber 
Command’s strength was due to a large number of support personnel being 
present who were subordinate to or commander by other organisations. 
 
With a reliable estimate of the size of Bomber Command, it has been possible to 
identify the approximate financial costs incurred by Britain in paying, recruiting, 
training and maintaining this workforce.  Each of these is analysed in turn in order 
to provide an estimate of the cost involved.  The result is that the direct cost to 
Britain of supplying, training and maintaining manpower for Bomber Command 
was a little under £647 million, making this the second most expensive activity 
undertaken to carry out the strategic air offensive against Germany.  The 
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identification of the size of the Command’s manpower during the war and the 
direct financial cost involved are a considerable contribution to the existing 
history of Bomber Command.  
 
The histories dealing with the subject of manpower in Bomber Command are few 
in number.  Of those available, Harris’s Despatch on War Operations (1945) and 
Bomber Offensive (1947) are fundamental works for historians working in this 
area.  Harris is the only writer who provides a cost for training a single Bomber 
Command aircrew.  My analysis suggests that Harris’s estimate of £10,000 to 
train one member of an aircrew is excessive and the true cost was probably under 
£5,000.  Nevertheless, he is the only source in a position to know what the true 
costs may have been who has offered a consolidated cost of training.  
 
Other useful sources are F. J. Hatch’s volume of the Canadian Government’s 
Official History of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), 
Aerodrome of Democracy3 (1983) and the Australian J. Herington’s two volume 
Official History, Air War against Germany and Italy 1939-1943 (1954) and Air 
Power Over Europe 1943-1945 (1963) 4.  Hatch describes the Royal Canadian Air 
Force’s operation of the BCATP (as the Canadians called the Empire Air Training 
Scheme (EATS)) and its contribution to Allied victory.   
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 Hatch and Herington provide essential information on the size, complexity and 
costs of training aircrew for service in Bomber Command and, unlike the British 
official historians Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, they were 
uninvolved in the British controversy over the effects of wartime bombing.  Of 
the two Commonwealth historians, Herington provides the frankest appraisal of 
casualty rates, survivability and the way in which the RAF and Air Ministry 
recruited, trained and administered service personnel.  In particular, Herington is 
the only British Commonwealth official historian to blame Bomber Command’s 
casualty rates as being responsible for what he called the ‘phenomenal turnover’ 
of aircrew5.  Webster and Frankland took a more careful approach to these 
subjects, which is unsurprising perhaps given the sensitivity of many serving and 
ex RAF officers who were hostile to the idea of an official history being written 
outside the control of the Air Ministry and the Air Staff6.  Perhaps because of this, 
Webster and Frankland have focussed more on the military aspects of the 
strategic air offensive and have not expended much time or space on the 
discussion of manpower, training and administration. 
 
Because of the large role played by the Dominions in providing and training 
personnel for the RAF, Australian and Canadian writers dominate the subject.  
The Australian, John McCarthy, was the first to examine critically the impact of 
EATS on Australia’s own defence.  McCarthy is the most prolific writer dealing 
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with manpower in the RAAF and has produced two articles, and a book on the 
subject7.  In ‘The Defence of Australia and the Empire Air Training Scheme’ 
(1974) 8, McCarthy concluded that the Australian Government had put at risk the 
nation’s own national interest by sending airmen to serve in the RAF under the 
EATS agreement with Britain.  He is also one of the first historians to examine 
the subject of how Bomber Command handled psychological problems amongst 
aircrew and how the RAF used the administrative categorisation of ‘Lack of 
Moral Fibre’ (LMF) to punish men whose nerve failed them on operations.   
 
The subject of psychological stress and air operations had attracted some earlier 
attention.  Two senior RAF medical officers, Air Marshal Sir Charles Symond 
and Wing Commander Denis Williams, published , Psychological Disorders in 
Flying Personnel of the Royal Air Force 1939-19459 (1947), an early study on 
flying stress.  It is perhaps surprising that there was little interest amongst 
historians in this subject.  McCarthy’s fine study, ‘Aircrew and Lack of Moral 
Fibre in the Second World War’, (1984)10 examined the punishment for perceived 
cowardice in the RAF and particularly in Bomber Command.  Mark Wells has 
                                                                                                                                  
6  N. Frankland, History at War, Giles de la Mare, London, 1998, pp. 87-92 
7  J. McCarthy, The Defence of Australia and the Empire Air Training Scheme, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, Vol XX, No 3, December 1974; J. McCarthy, The “Surrender” of Aircrew to 
Britain 1939-1945, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No 5, October 1984; J. McCarthy, A 
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8  John Mccarthy, The Defence of Australia and the Empire Air Training Scheme’ in the Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, of December 1974 
9  Sir C. Symonds’s and D.J. Williams, Psychological Disorders in Flying Personnel of the Royal Air 
Force 1939 to 1945, HMSO London, 1947 
10  J. McCarthy, Aircrew and ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ in the Second World War, War and Society, Vol 
2, No. 2, Sept 1984, pp. 85-101 
added to this body of work with Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew 
Experience in the Second World War (1995)11 which compares the ways in which 
the RAF and USAAF managed the psychological selection of aircrew and any 
subsequent emotional stress. 
 
The relatively small number of histories dealing with this subject has led to a far 
greater reliance in this chapter on primary sources.  The most important of these is 
the Statistical Digest of the War (1951)12, compiled by the Central Statistical 
Office.  Other sources include the files in the Public Record Office (PRO) in 
London.  The analysis in this chapter draws heavily on the figures identified in the 
PRO files and the Statistical Digest of the War to estimate the financial costs of 
recruiting, selecting, training and maintaining the personnel who served in 
Bomber Command.  The chapter produces a low total estimate of slightly under 
£647 million for manpower in Bomber Command during the strategic air 
offensive.  It was too difficult to assess precisely the amount of money spent by 
the British government in the payment of additional monies for rank, trade skills, 
married status and so forth.  Therefore, the wages component of the estimate is 
low as it adopts a lowest available daily payment for RAF service personnel of 
3s/6d to calculate the cost of wages in Bomber Command during the war.  Even 
with such a reduced amount, the analysis here shows the cost of manpower as 
being second only to the cost of aircraft and aircraft factories.   
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 The Size of Bomber Command 
 
In order to establish the financial cost of manning Bomber Command the first step 
is to calculate the exact numbers of personnel assigned to the Command during 
World War II.  It is a difficult the task to accurately identify precisely the number 
of individuals within Bomber Command at a given point in time.  Unlike aircraft 
and airfields, the number of service personnel within a military organisation like 
Bomber Command changed on an almost hourly basis as personnel continuously 
moved into and out of the organisation during the war.  Such movements were 
part of the friction of war and reflected the death, wounding and capture of 
personnel by the enemy.  It also reflected the transfer of personnel to other 
theatres of operations or to other commands within the RAF, as well as the 
constant flow of individuals onto training courses and even out of Bomber 
Command at the end of their two tours of duty. 
 
My analysis of personnel suggests that the strength of Bomber Command never 
rose to 250,000 men and women and that 125,000 men served as aircrew within 
the Command during World War II13.  Sir Arthur Harris provides the source for 
both statistics and whilst a figure of 125,000 for aircrew appears plausible, the 
figure of 250,000 as an upper limit to the strength of Bomber Command is most 
probably a significant overestimate14.  The evidence for this is in the Air Ministry 
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files which give an establishment size of under 150,000 for Bomber Command at 
the height of the strategic air offensive15.  In July 1943, the official establishment 
of Bomber Command was 147,923 positions of which Bomber Command 
claimed only 91,564 (61.9 percent) were filled16.  The Air Ministry rebutted these 
claims by pointing out that 139,195 of the 147,923 positions were filled and that 
the percentage shortfall was only 5.9 percent17.   
 
In mid 1944, the Director General of Manpower noted that Bomber Command 
had an establishment of 143,171 positions of which 135,607 personnel were 
posted in the Command18.  The establishment figures clearly show that between 
July 1943 and July 1944 the size of Bomber Command fell by 3.22 percent, 
whilst the size of the RAF increased by 2.14 percent, from 1,148,600 to 1,173,200 
over the same period19.  The reduction in the absolute size of Bomber Command 
probably reflects the need of the RAF to supply increasing numbers of personnel 
to the tactical air forces required to support the invasion of Europe in 1944 and 
they indicate that Bomber Command did not enjoy continual growth throughout 
the war. 
 
The figures also show that between 1943 and 1944 Bomber Command contained 
an average of 12.53 percent of the RAF’s total manpower.  If this average is truly 
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18  PRO AIR 8/702, Letter from AMP to C-in-C Bomber Command  31 July 1943 
indicative of Bomber Command’s relative share of RAF manpower, it provides a 
basis for charting the relative strength of the Command throughout the period of 
the war by calculating it at 12.53 percent of total RAF strength20.  The results are 
shown in Figure 8.1 below. 
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Fig. 8.1: Total Strength Bomber Command September 1939 to June 1945    Source:   PRO AIR 8/702, 
Letter from AMP to C-in-C Bomber Command  31 July 1943 and Central Statistical Office, Statistical 
Digest of the War, p.9. 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 8.1, at no time during World War II did Bomber 
Command’s strength ever approach 250,000 as Sir Arthur Harris hints at in his 
history of the offensive21.  It is possible that Harris inadvertently overstated the 
                                                                                                                                  
19  Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, p.9, Tab 10 
20  Note that the figure for 1939 is the September quarter figure and, with the exception of the figures 
for July 1943 and 1944, all establishment figures are estimated as 12.53 percent of total RAF 
manpower listed in Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, p.9, Tab 10 
21  Harris, Bomber Offensive, p.268 
size of Bomber Command by more than 100,000 personnel, but unlikely, as he 
was intimately involved in promoting the claims that Bomber Command was 
undermanned22.  It is hard to be sure about the reason for so large an overestimate 
but a possible explanation may lie in RAF sensitivity over the very high casualty 
rates suffered by Bomber Command.  
 
The casualty figure for Bomber Command is estimated by Richard Overy as 
being 79,172, 25, a few more than the 79,147 reported by Harris in his official 
report23.   Overy’s breakdown of the casualties shows that more than 72.7 percent 
(57,582) of them were deaths, 11.57 percent (9,162) wounded and 16.2 percent 
(12,867) made prisoner of war24.  The high proportion of deaths relative to 
wounding and capture is very uncommon in military operations and indicates that 
service in Bomber Command during World War II was a highly dangerous 
undertaking. 
 
If the casualty figure of 79,172 is considered as a percentage of the 147,923 
establishment positions in Bomber Command in July 1943, it represents a total 
casualty rate of 53.4 percent, of which almost three quarters were killed25.  The 
members of Bomber Command who suffered most were the aircrew.  They 
accounted for 97.2 percent of the deaths, 45.8 percent of the wounded and 98.3 
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percent of the prisoners of war26.  Aircrew losses were disproportionately large 
within Bomber Command with 61.45 percent (76,817) of the 125,000 aircrew 
becoming casualties and 44.45 percent (55,573) being killed27.  These figures are 
most probably an under-estimate as they do not include those aircrew removed 
from flying duties due to psychological breakdown.  In human terms, the cost of 
the strategic air offensive was very high indeed.  John Herington, the Australian 
official historian, estimates that Bomber Command lost 10 percent of its fighting 
men every week28.  The average figure, when adjusted for actual losses, suggests 
that Herington’s estimate may be not too far from the truth.    
 
DEATHS IN BOMBER COMMAND 
Country Aircrew Killed Percent of 
Total Dead 
United Kingdom 38,462 69.3 
Canada 9,919 17.8 
Australia 4,050 7.3 
New Zealand 1,679 3.0 
Poland 929 1.7 
Other Allied Air Forces 473 0.9 
South Africa 34 0.06 
Other Dominions 27 0.04 
Fig.8.2: Source: R. Overy, Bomber Command, pp.204-208 
 
 
The Australian official history tells us that 4,050 Australia airmen were killed 
whilst serving in Bomber Command.  This figure constituted 7.3 percent of 
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Bomber Command’s losses29 but 10.2 percent of all Australian military deaths 
suffered during World War II30.  It is a stark insight into the size of the risk faced 
by the men serving as aircrew in Bomber Command. This finding supports 
McCarthy’s contention that the Australian Government may have placed the 
national interest at risk by being so liberal in providing personnel for the RAF 
through EATS31.  In New Zealand’s case, a similar situation is found with 1,679 
RNZAF servicemen killed in Bomber Command, a loss equating to 14.2 percent 
of the 11,824 New Zealanders killed by enemy action during World War II32.    
 
 
Fig. 8.3:  Wellington Aircrew Source: www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand 
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Casualty figures are one of the areas where Sir Arthur Harris is imprecise.  In his 
memoirs, he cites a figure of ‘some 60,000’ casualties and a total manning 
somewhere below 250,00033.  In the Despatch on War Operations  Harris 
provides two different figures, 57,786 in the text and 79,147 in a table34.  The loss 
of 60,000 casualties out of a force of 250,000 constitutes a 24 percent casualty 
rate which, while quite high, is less perturbing than the actual casualty rate of 
61.45 percent (76,817 out of 125,000) suffered by Bomber Command aircrew.  
The earlier differences over Bomber Command’s manning and casualties figures 
may have been caused by an understandable reluctance to advertise the true size 
of aircrew losses in the strategic air offensive. 
 
Recruitment 
 
Between 1919 and 1939, the RAF was a small technically trained force of 
professional officers and other ranks.  The RAF retained a large number of men 
who had served in its ranks during World War I and who carried their experience 
across when the new service formed in 1918.  During the interwar years, the Air 
Ministry handled recruitment into the RAF for officers and other ranks.  The Air 
Ministry recruited candidates for positions according to their social and 
educational background.  What made the RAF different from the other services 
was its recruitment of middleclass young men who had completed the upper 
                                                 
33  Harris, Bomber Offensive, p.33, and p.61 
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levels of their secondary education and who could cope with the technical training 
they would receive in the RAF as apprentices35. 
 
As the likelihood of war increased towards the end of the 1930s, the Air Ministry 
and the British Government were aware that they would have to look to the white 
Dominions of the Empire for manpower, particularly for aircrew.  In order to 
convince the white Dominions that they should provide air force recruits the Air 
Ministry developed the concept of the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS).   
 
RAF RECRUIT PREFERENCE FOR CATEGORY 
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Fig. 8.4: Source: PRO AIR 41/65 (90532) 301, September 1945 
 
Under the EATS Agreement, Australia, Canada and New Zealand were 
committed to supplying the RAF with aircrew, and, to a lesser extent, with ground 
staff as well.  Other than Canada, which had to provide the ground staff for the 
British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), the other signatories were 
unable to supply significant numbers of ground staff, leaving Britain to supply the 
                                                 
35  Lund, ‘The Industrial History of Strategy’, The Journal of Military History, p.77 
bulk of the ground staff for the war in Europe, South Asia and the Middle East36.  
The Empire Air Training Scheme became the aircrew-training organisation for 
Britain first and then for the Empire.   
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Fig. 8.5: Source: Statistical Digest of the War, p.9 
 
Within Britain, as Figure 8.6 shows, recruitment of personnel for the RAF peaked 
in early 1940 with aircrew recruitment rising to its highest level in October of that 
year.  The significance of these figures is that they clearly show that manpower 
was a significant limitation on the expansion of both the RAF and Bomber 
Command.  The lateness of the recruitment spike means that very few personnel 
would have been ready for active service in squadrons before late 1941.  The 
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delay in expanding Bomber Command’s striking power to late 1942 is therefore 
not simply due to the late arrival of heavy bombers or to the lack of sufficient 
airfields but also to a significant lack of trained personnel.    
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Fig. 8.6: Source: PRO AIR 41/65 (90532) 301, September 1945 
 
 
A further problem for the RAF was that 80 percent of all volunteers for service 
wanted to be ground crew and only 17 percent expressed a clear preference for 
aircrew37.  By mid 1941, the pool of enthusiastic older volunteers had emptied 
and, from that time, none older than 20 expressed a preference for service as 
aircrew38.  The RAF and Bomber Command could only draw upon those young 
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men reaching their 18th birthday to provide replacement.   The change in the 
demography of the recruit base probably explains why after April 1943 more men 
volunteered for aircrew than ground crew. 
 
A further indication of a reduction in the available pool of manpower was the 
rapid increase after mid 1941 in the number of women enlisting into the Women’s 
Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF).  Although they could not serve in aircrew, women 
provided a significant proportion of the RAF’s workforce rising from 3.97 percent 
in September 1940 to 15.5 percent in September 194339.  The figures for the 
recruitment of women clearly show a marked increase from mid 1941, the time 
when the numbers of male recruits dropped markedly.  The Air Ministry made a 
serious effort to fill its manpower needs from the female population of the United 
Kingdom.  Aircrew recruitment was heavily reliant on volunteers coming from 
the Empire but even these sources saw a decline in recruits volunteering for 
aircrew with Canada showing a definite drop and it is likely that both Australia 
and New Zealand experienced a similar drop in volunteers for aircrew service.   
 
In the early stages of World War II, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and 
the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) were more than able to meet their 
commitments to supply aircrew for the RAF.  However, these EATS participants 
had much greater difficulty in supplying sufficient ground staff.  In Australia, in 
September 1940, the Australian CAS reported to his British equivalent that 2,000 
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aircrew trainees were already under training while about 7,300 young men were 
still awaiting enlistment40.   
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Fig. 8.7 Total Strength WAAF Source: Statistical Digest of the War, p.9 
 
 
In Canada, the authorities made additional efforts to increase recruitment, 
including an aggressive campaign to recruit United States citizens for service as 
pilots and aircrew41.  Despite being illegal, the recruitment of United States 
citizens for service in the RCAF and RAF appears to have enjoyed the blessing of 
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the USAAF.  General Hap Arnold, the then Chief of the United States Army Air 
Corps, and the later commander of the United States Army Air Forces during 
World War II, suggested that the Canadians make use of men who had been 
ejected from USAAF pilot training because they had been ‘fractious’, went in ‘for 
low stunt flying’, got ‘drunk one time’, or had been discovered as being 
‘married’42.  Arnold believed these men, who were the ‘kind I’d want to keep’, 
had the United States being fighting a war would be of value to Britain43.  Despite 
Arnold’s helpfulness in arranging the recruitment of pilots, the Canadians faced 
the legal problem of how they could protect United States citizens who had 
volunteered for service.  The United States authorities had already demonstrated a 
distinct lack of understanding for the men and women who had volunteered to 
fight in Spain and the Canadian Government was keen to ensure that none of their 
recruits would be subjected to the $US2,000 fine or risk losing their United States 
citizenship because they were deemed to have ‘expatriated’ themselves44. 
 
In order to minimise these risks the Canadian Government dropped the loyal oath 
so that US citizens did not have to swear allegiance to King George.  The 
Canadians also trod carefully so avoid aggravating Washington by being too 
obvious in their recruitment of aircrew and the system of recruitment that the 
Canadians developed for United States citizens became quite complex.  The 
process for recruiting a US citizen involved failing them as candidates for the 
                                                 
42  Dunmore, Wings for Victory, p.256 
43  Dunmore, Wings for Victory, p.256. 
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RCAF but offering them employment in a Canadian association called The 
Dominion Aeronautical Association, which then supplied pilots for the RAF and 
RCAF45.  The United States Government finally reacted to the Canadian activity 
when the State Department issued a note stating that the Canadian activities were 
an embarrassment and were to stop.  Roosevelt forced the State Department to 
drop the matter and the Canadians continued their activities, but far more 
cautiously.   
 
The cost of recruiting United States citizens for service in the RCAF and the RAF 
is unknown, but Newsweek reported that by March 1940 there were 2,000 United 
States volunteers on the RCAF list already46.  In spring of 1943, the Canadians 
were looking for another 2,500 volunteers47.  Amongst the costs identified for this 
activity were those of staffing the recruiting system in the United States, 
establishing the framework for accepting these volunteers into the RCAF and the 
payment of their expenses, including a $5.00 per day food allowance48.  The total 
amount of this activity is difficult to estimate, but if each American recruit 
received three days of payments, the total amount involved for 2,742 recruits 
would have been $CAN41,130.00.    
 
Added to this activity is the cost of advertising and propaganda, which included 
the Hollywood film production ‘Captains of the Clouds’, starring James Cagney.  
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Warner Brothers made this film at the suggestion of the head of the RCAF’s 
advertising section.  The objective of the production was to promote the EATS 
and the strategic air offensive, and was a box office success returning a profit49.  
All of the EATS signatories actively sought volunteers through advertising and 
these cost money.  From November 1940 to March 1941, the Air Ministry spent 
£125,00050 on advertising to attract 15,805 recruits for aircrew.  The campaign 
attracted 11,000 individuals from which the Air Ministry only expected 3,000 to 
be successful as aircrew.  The cost of recruiting an aircrew candidate in 1941 is 
estimated at £11.7s/2d and the cost for one aircrew member £41.13s/2d.  Applied 
to the 125,000 aircrew who served in Bomber Command, the cost of advertising 
alone would have been £5,207,500. 
 
In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, where similar recruiting activity was 
undertaken, advertising was placed in newspapers and on billboards.  The 
Canadian Government also employed World War I ace, Billy Bishop, to lead a 
recruitment campaign, which found 72,83551 men for aircrew training and a 
further 33,352 personnel to staff the BCATP52.  The recruitment organisation 
within the Canadian EATS had 450 establishment positions of which 105 were 
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civilian53.  Obtaining sufficient personnel in a country where there was no 
conscription was a formidable task and the success of the EATS relied heavily 
upon the efforts of the recruiters and marketers.  A significant proportion of this 
activity is directly attributable to the cost of the strategic air offensive.  
 
Selection  
 
To become a member of an aircrew the potential recruit had to satisfy the 
selection requirements of the Air Ministry.  These covered educational, 
psychological and physical attributes and barrier testing.  Aviation Candidates 
Selection Boards oversaw the process of selection during the initial interview and 
testing of potential candidates.  The types of tests administered were specified in 
the Air Ministry’s pamphlet, Member of Aircraft Crews – Conditions of Entry and 
Service54.  This document also informed the potential recruit of salaries and 
conditions of service and was the Air Ministry’s contract with the recruit.   
 
In 1940, the required educational standard for aircrew candidates was an upper 
secondary level general and technical education55.  For ground staff, a relatively 
high level of education was also required56.  By November 1943, for aircrew 
candidates, who the selection boards considered suitable in all other respects, 
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there were ‘No rigidly fixed educational standards’57.  The Air Ministry even paid 
these men to undertake ‘a course of broad educational character prior to the initial 
period of ground training’, so that they would qualify for aircrew58.  How many 
men undertook the pre-employment education is unknown, but the Air Ministry 
referred to the usefulness of this policy in most of the documents it produced 
relating to aircrew selection. 
 
There is anecdotal evidence to support a drop in the standards applied by selection 
boards.  For example, Jim Lovelace of Sydney, Nova Scotia, failed a medical  in 
January 1940 because he could not blow hard enough to maintain a column of 
mercury at the required height for the required period.  In May of that year, as 
France collapsed, he was passed fit by a medical officer who told him ‘Well I 
suppose they’ll be needing you now’59.  Other Canadians, such as Wally Loucks 
of Ontario, used influence to by-pass the educational requirements by successfully 
lobbying his local MP to gain entry to the RCAF60.   
 
The normal method for joining the RAF aircrew was for men to enlist in the ranks 
of the RAF Volunteer Reserve for training as a member of an aircraft crew.  Entry 
was open to any man, regardless of profession or education and even men from 
reserved occupations, or those with a deferred call-up into other services, could 
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volunteer61.  Direct appointments to commissions for flying duties would only 
occur in exceptional circumstance, with most commissions in General Duties 
coming from the ranks.  Once enlisted, the Air Ministry or its colonial 
counterparts reserved their right to first claim on the individual by placing them 
on deferred service with no emoluments62.   
 
In Britain, and in line with age requirements for service in ground and naval 
combat units, potential candidates for aircrew service had to be over 17 years and 
three months of age before they could register for enlistment.  They could only 
undertake training when they had reached the age of 18 years63.  The upper age 
limit varied with the job category with 39 years of age for air gunners, 31 years 
for pilots and 33 years for navigators, air bombers or wireless operators64.  
Waivers were available for candidates who had special qualifications, but the 
selection board had to recommend these exemptions65.   
 
Once recruited, the individual was committed to serve for an indefinite period 
until the end of the ‘present emergency’66.  For those candidates who were to 
serve in Bomber Command this meant serving till the end of the war and for 
aircrew it meant serving in combat until they had completed the required number 
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of operational tours after which, they were re-categorised into training or 
administrative postings within the RAF or its sister services in the Empire.   
 
Training Aircrew 
 
Sir Arthur Harris proudly asserts that the cost of training each member of an 
aircrew in Bomber Command was £10,000, ‘enough to send ten men to Oxford or 
Cambridge for three years’67.  He claimed that ‘the education of a member of a 
bomber crew was the most expensive in the world’68.  There is no reference in 
Harris’s book as to where he sourced the figure, nor is there any reference in the 
files to this or to any other estimate for the overall cost of training a member of a 
bomber crew.  If Harris is accurate, the cost of training 125,000 men as aircrew 
was £1.25 billion, which is a very great cost for the 18 months it took to train an 
aircrew member69.   
 
The training undertaken by all volunteers for RAF service began with a 
standardised period of four weeks.  Once it was completed, recruits were 
categorised into a mustering (trade), the only restriction on categorisation was that 
he RAF could not force ground crew volunteers into aircrew trade against their 
wishes.  For aircrew, subsequent training varied depending on the job the 
candidate was given.  The course for an air gunner was 18 weeks long and for air 
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gunner/wireless operator, 22 weeks70.  Navigators received the longest training 
with a course of 58 weeks duration71.  The length of training also varied due to the 
need to move students from one course to another around the globe and because 
of the impact of factors such as bad weather.  Problems arising from co-ordinating 
the courses for the five different trade types also often imposed delay and 
confusion. This resulted in the cost of aircrew training being higher than 
planned72.  As a result, the cost of training salaries for 125,000 aircrew graduates 
was over £20 million based upon an average training salary of six shillings per 
person per day over the estimated 18 months it took to train a bomber 
crewmember73.  
 
Once trainees had completed their initial training, they went for more advanced 
training with Training Command and advanced operational training with the 
Heavy Conversion Units (HCU) and Operational Training Units (OTU) within 
Bomber Command.  All operational training involved training pilots to fly the 
four-engined aircraft in the Heavy Conversion Units (HCUs) and then training the 
entire crew in an OTU.  It was at the OTU stage that crews formed up and 
completed the final stage of their training as a team before posting to an 
operational squadron. 
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The concentration of heavy conversion training and operational training of crews 
remained within Bomber Command because this prevented other commands 
poaching experienced crews and heavy aircraft.  It also provided Bomber 
Command with a reserve to bolster the front line squadrons.  Sir Arthur Harris 
made used of this capability to launch the highly publicised thousand-bomber 
raids of 1942 and 1943. 
 
The training of personnel for Bomber Command was one of the more demanding 
activities that confronted the Air Ministry and RAF in the early years of World 
War II.  Training the numbers necessary to meet the demands of the RAF and 
Bomber Command was beyond the resources of the United Kingdom.  It was also 
physically impossible to fit a training organisation of the size of the EATS into 
the geographical area of the UK.  Space limitations were not only due to the threat 
posed by the Luftwaffe, as described in Chapter 5 above, but as well the United 
Kingdom could not fit in more airfields than already existed.  
 
The Empire Air Training Scheme 
 
The solution to the problems of geographical space, manpower shortages, and 
enemy threat was the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS).  By the early 1930s, 
the Air Ministry had put forward the idea of an Empire training scheme and had 
been fostering it through providing training to air force personnel from Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand.  The white Dominions of the Empire were justifiably 
suspicious about establishing a training scheme the main purpose of which 
appeared to be the air defence of Britain.   
 
Resistance to the Air Ministry’s overtures varied.  The Canadians proved the most 
reluctant.  The Canadian government took seven months to consider a British Air 
Ministry offer to extend short service commission positions to RCAF members in 
the same way as they had been for RAAF and RNZAF pilots.  In June 1935, the 
Canadians finally consented to a limited scheme74.  In Australia, the Chief of the 
Air Staff (CAS) put off approaches from his British counterpart because he was 
unsure of the ‘extent of to which our Prime Minister, Treasurer and Minister for 
Defence…are convinced of the necessity for accelerated defence provision’75.  
The British Air Ministry finally obtained Australian participation following their 
agreement to provide 40 Anson aircraft to the RAAF76.  In a letter dated 29th May 
1939 to the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Sir Cyril Newall, the Australian CAS, 
Air Vice-Marshal S.J. Goble, mentions the expansion of the RAAF and thanked 
Sir Cyril for the loan of the 40 Anson aircraft to tide Australia over until Beaufort 
Bombers became available77.   
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The Australians appeared satisfied to obtain free aircraft among other benefits.  
Goble also made special mention of the RAAF’s happiness in being able ‘to buy 
British’ and that the Air Ministry’s action in tying the sale of the Beaufort and 
Bristol aircraft to Sunderland Flying Boats for the RAAF and QANTAS ‘really 
clinched the deal78.  The marginal notations and underlining on the document, 
presumably done by Newall himself, indicates that British Air Staff were mainly 
interested in the progress of the new air training school at Wagga Wagga in New 
South Wales and in the undertaking given by the RAAF to ‘concentrate earlier on 
service training’79.  
 
In New Zealand, the negotiations slowed over who was to pay for what.  The Air 
Ministry, unsure of what the New Zealand Government was demanding from 
Britain, was cautious but appears to have been happy to supply New Zealand with 
100 Tiger Moth aircraft at half price plus another 24 obsolete Oxfords and Ansons 
at no charge80.  A telegram of 8th April 1939 from the British High Commissioner 
to New Zealand reports that, in addition to the 100 Moths, New Zealand might be 
looking for a capital grant of £1,550 per student for 220 cadets for short service 
commissions as pilots81.  There was concern within the Air Ministry that the 
public payment of such a grant might set an unwelcome precedent and bring 
Treasury into the negotiations on the re-armament and war expansion 
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programme82.  The Air Ministry believed that the £1,550 asked for by the New 
Zealanders was ‘very much less’ than what it would cost to fully train a pilot in 
Canada and they recommended an increase in assistance to New Zealand of 
£150.00 per student83.  The rationale was that the original £1,550 figure was to 
pay for New Zealand providing elementary and intermediate training whereas 
they would now be providing fully trained pilots84.  
 
Of the four significant contributors of manpower to Bomber Command, Canada, 
led by Prime Minister MacKenzie-King, was the most cautious.  A complex set of 
political considerations confronted the Canadians including the sensitivity of the 
French Canadian population, memories of the suffering of the trenches of World 
War I and real concerns about Canada’s capacity to finance another major war85.  
Despite his best efforts to avoid his nation’s full-scale commitment to defend 
Britain in another major European war, MacKenzie-King was unable to prevent 
Canada becoming a major contributor to Britain’s war effort. 
 
Discussions between Britain and Canada began in earnest in May 1938, when a 
British delegation led by the British industrialist and Air Ministry advisor, J.B. 
Weir, arrived in Ottawa to negotiate the establishment in Canada of air training 
schools for RAF pilots86.  The Air Ministry gave Weir the authority to commit 
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Britain to pay for the building of initial air training schools and the supply of 
training aircraft, spares and other equipment.  The Canadians would provide the 
locations for the training schools and the personnel to operate them.  MacKenzie-
King discussed the proposals with Weir but remained non-committal and Weir 
returned to Britain with little more than an undertaking from the Canadians to 
consider the proposals in more detail.  It was not until November 1939 that 
MacKenzie-King finally agreed that Canada would play the major role in the 
training of aircrew for the Commonwealth by managing the BCATS87.  
 
Britain made a second attempt in October and November 1939 by sending Lord 
Riverdale to Ottawa to negotiate an agreement on the Empire Air Training 
Scheme with Australia, Canada and New Zealand.  Riverdale, a leading British 
industrialist with good links in Canada, was to obtain Canadian agreement to 
manage EATS and to provide RCAF personnel for service in or alongside the 
RAF in Europe.  The focus on Canada aggravated relations with the Australian 
and New Zealand delegations who threatened to return home unless they were 
involved in the bi-lateral meetings.  The acrimonious nature of these meetings 
exasperated Lord Riverdale who seemed at a loss in understanding the 
reservations of the other nations involved88.   
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The significant issue was money.  The Australian, Canadian and New Zealand 
governments were eager to avoid any commitments to the large expenditures 
which the scheme seemed to entail.  Lord Riverdale’s instructions also included a 
direction to ensure that the Dominions paid a good proportion of the estimated 
cost of $CAN607, 000,000 over three years89.  The British offered to pay 
$CAN187, 000,000 for equipment and freight, whilst Canada would bear 
$CAN68, 000,000 for the cost of initial ground and elementary flying training.  
The remaining $CAN354, 000,000 was to be split between Canada ($CAN285, 
000,000), Australia ($CAN39, 931,000) and New Zealand ($CAN28, 603,200)90.   
 
Personnel Requirements for BCATP 
Schools, HQs and 
Depots 
Officers Airmen Civilians Works 
Pers 
Commands, Groups and 
other HQs  
288 603 134  
Initial Training 39 393  36 
Service Flying 752 11,376 64 320 
Air Observer 250 2,470  100 
Bombing and Gunnery  450 6,920  150 
Elementary Flying 351 4,134  130 
Wireless 96 1,284  80 
Air Navigation 126 1,278  40 
Repair Depots 51 141 1,308 36 
Equipment Depots 66 228 3,318 60 
Technical Training 41 627  30 
Records Office 14 277   
Recruit Depots 28 424  40 
Recruiting Organisation 134 211 105  
Totals 2,686 30,366 4,929 1,022 
Fig. 8.8:  Manning of BCATP Source: PRO AIR 8/280, Oct 39, pp.52-57 
 
 
                                                 
89  PRO AIR 8/264, Enclosure , Fourth Report from Lord Riverdale to the Secretary of State for Air 
90  PRO AIR 8/264, Enclosure , Fourth Report from Lord Riverdale to the Secretary of  State for Air 
A further complication was MacKenzie-King’s determination to ensure that 
Canadian personnel would not serve in a European war.  EATS appealed to him 
because it allowed Canada to support Britain without having to commit large 
numbers of combat forces to a war in Europe.  MacKenzie-King does not appear 
to have grasped that the British intended that EATS included Canada running the 
BCATS in Canada and supplying volunteers to serve within the RAF in Europe91.  
Eventually, Canada gave way on EATS and agreed to the use of Canadian flyers 
in combat under RAF command.   
 
Flying Schools Established Under EATS 
School Type UK Australia Canada NZ Others Total 
Initial  2  1  3 
Elementary 13     13 
Service Flying   18   18 
Air Observer   10   10 
Bombing/Gunnery   10   10 
Wireless   1   4 
Navigation   2   2 
Total at May 
1942 
13 2 41 1  60 
Total 1939-45 153 26 92 6 62 333 
Fig. 8.9: Source:  PRO AIR 8/280, Oct 39, pp.52-57 
 
 
By the end of the war, the Canadian BCATP had expanded well beyond the size 
initially agreed in Ottawa.  Of the 333 flying schools established under EATS, 92 
were in Canada.  Approximately 136,849 men graduated from these schools to 
serve in the RAF and Bomber Command92.  The final cost of the BCATP 
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reflected the increase, being much larger than expected at $CAN2.2 Billion in 
194593.  Of the cost, Canada contributed $CAN1.6 Billion94 plus a further 
$CAN425 million in March 1946, when Britain defaulted on its payments and the 
Canadian Government cancelled Britain’s unpaid debt95.   
 
Canada’s work on training aircrew for EATS was large but did not surpass the 
United Kingdom’s own domestic training effort on behalf of the RAF and 
Bomber Command.  The United Kingdom training establishment had 153 EATS 
schools, by far the largest number of EATS schools.  These schools trained 
80,00096 aircrew and Flight Engineers, along with the vast majority of the ground 
staff used in Bomber and the other RAF Commands.  Canada had the next largest 
training organisation with 9297 schools. Australia had 26, South Africa 25, 
Southern Rhodesia, 10, India, nine, New Zealand and the Middle East each had 
six, five in the USA and one in the Bahamas98.  The 333 flying schools trained 
300,000 aircrew graduates99, with 136,849 in Canada, 80,000 in the United 
Kingdom and 83,151 amongst the others.   
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 Australia provides the best example of flying training provided via EATS outside 
Britain and Canada.  The RAAF had the third largest number (26) of EATS flying 
schools.  By 1941, these schools had trained 3,074 pilots, observers and air-
gunners.  During this period a further 676 Australian pilots were trained in 
Rhodesia100 and then later served in Europe.  Of the 3,074 Australians trained in 
Australia before 1942, only 359 remained in Australia for home defence and 51.7 
percent subsequently served in Bomber Command.  This figure indicates that 
Australia was doing more than its fair share for the defence of the United 
Kingdom.   
 
 
Aircrew Trained in Australia 1939 – 1942 
Category Number 
Trained 
Number Subsequently 
Transferred to Bomber 
Command 
Pilot 1,142 731 
Observers 678 210 
Wireless Operator/AG 1,001 400 
Air Gunner 253 248 
Total 3,074 1,589 
Fig. 8.10:   PRO AIR 14/4, Jan 42, p.432 
 
 
The most reliable figure on the financial cost of the EATS comes from Canadian 
Government sources, which are rightly proud of the effort expended by their 
country in managing the largest part of the EATS outside of the UK.  Since the 
end of World War II, the Canadian Government has calculated the cost of the 
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BCATP element of EATS at $CAN2.2 billion, of which Canada paid about 
$CAN1.6 billion.101  This works out as a cost per aircrew graduate of 
$CAN16,076, or £4,019.00 per student, not including salary and expenses, such 
as the cost of transporting thousands of service personnel around the world.  The 
total cost of the 300,000 EATS graduates was £1.2 billion of which Bomber 
Command’s bill was £502,375,000.  
 
Australian EATS Schools 
 Established as of Sept 
1940 
Target 
Initial Training School 2 3 
Elementary Training School 6 7 
Wireless Air Gunner School 1 2 
Service Flying School 2 6 
Bombing Gunnery School 1 3 
Air Observers School 1 2 
Air Navigation School  3 
Total 13 26 
Fig. 8.11: Source:  PRO AIR 2/1608, 16 Sep 40, p54 
 
 
Ground Staff Training 
 
With the approach of war and the rapid expansion, the RAF could not rely on its 
traditional sources to meet the demand for training.  Existing training 
establishments like Halton could not hope to train sufficient technical tradesmen.  
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Prior to 1939, recruits for ground staff could enter the RAF directly as unskilled 
or semi-skilled tradesmen.  Younger applicants could apply to enter as 
apprentices and received their training at establishments like Halton.  These 
establishments had a reputation for providing demanding training and produced 
the technically qualified NCOs that the Air Ministry saw as essential for the 
future of the RAF.  In the case of Halton, the Air Ministry regarded it as a 
national training centre for both the RAF and the aircraft industry102.   
 
The training at Halton was three years in length and committed the student to a 
return of service obligation of twelve years103.  The career path led the graduate 
into the RAF and from there to the aircraft industry.  Between 1920 and 1938, 
over 12,000 students graduated from Halton, more than the total number of 
aviation engineering technicians that were to be found working in the German 
aircraft industry, Reich Air Ministry and in the Luftwaffe in the years prior to the 
outbreak of World War II104.   
 
During World War II, the large majority of ground staff in the RAF and Bomber 
Command was British.  Australia, Canada and New Zealand were unable to 
provide large numbers of personnel for ground crew105.  These nations did not 
possess large-scale aircraft industries and they had a small pool of qualified 
manpower.  Indeed, the shortage of suitably skilled manpower appeared early in 
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Canada and Australia.  Soon after the conflict had begun, both countries 
experienced shortages of skilled men to train as ground crew and this problem 
persisted with on-going negotiations between the EATS partners until 1943106.  In 
September 1940, Australia had enlisted 18,144 ground staff and had a backlog of 
5,968 men waiting to enlist.  The lack of skilled RAAF instructors was made up 
by using civilian technical schools to meet the need107.   
 
Whatever the technical competency of these new members of the RAAF, 
Australia’s CAS reported that the ‘type offering is, generally speaking, quite 
good’108.  Due to the on-going shortage of skilled ground staff, Australia refused 
to release large numbers of RAAF ground crew for service overseas other than in 
the Middle East and the Pacific.  A similar situation applied in Canada and New 
Zealand.  Britain had to provide the majority of the necessary personnel to fill the 
RAF’s needs for manpower. 
 
Ground staff made up the vast majority of Bomber Command’s strength during 
the war.  Between July 1943 and July 1944, when the average strength of Bomber 
Command was 147,923, the number of aircrew was probably around nine percent, 
or 13,904109.  Based upon this calculation, the July 1943 figure for ground staff 
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numbers in Bomber Command would have been around 134,000.  The problem 
the historian faces here is that ground crew personnel moved in and out of 
Bomber Command as readily as aircrew.  Qualified and experienced technicians 
were in demand throughout the whole of the RAF:  they were required in 
Bomber, Coastal and Fighter commands as well as in the Middle and Far East.  
When the Air Ministry transferred aircraft such as the Whitley and Wellington 
from Bomber Command to Transport Command or the Middle East, the qualified 
and experienced maintenance ground crew were transferred with them.  The result 
was a steady stream of technical personnel away from Bomber Command. 
 
In Bomber Offensive, Harris asked his readers to imagine ‘what it is like to work 
in the open, rain, blow or snow, in daylight and through darkness, hour after hour, 
twenty feet up in the air on the aircraft engines and airframes…’110.  This is one of 
the few times that the work of the men and women of the RAF’s ground crews 
received any acknowledgment.  Harris in fact believed sincerely that his ground 
crew deserved a campaign medal, and he is right.  Between 3rd September 1939 
and 8th May 1945, 1,870 men and women died serving in Bomber Command, 
almost one for every day of the war.  A further 759 ground crew were seriously 
wounded or injured and 78 were listed as missing or prisoners of war before being 
returned safe111.  Although the ground staff of Bomber Command never left the 
United Kingdom there is no doubt that they suffered from the same discomforts 
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and dangers encountered by logistical and support personnel overseas, all of 
whom received the appropriate campaign medals.  
 
Wages 
 
Under the EATS agreement the wages, salaries, allowances and expenses incurred 
by aircrew serving under RAF command were a British liability112.  A significant 
problem for Treasury ad the Air Ministry was the higher salary levels of RAAF, 
RCAF and RNZAF personnel compared to their British equivalents.  Either from 
a desire to keep the cost down or as an attempt to maintain equality in pay within 
squadrons, the British government insisted that all dominion personnel within the 
RAF receive the same rate of pay as their British equivalents113.  This required the 
Dominion governments to withhold a component of the salary of their service 
personnel serving within the RAF.  The individual would then receive the 
outstanding salary when they left the RAF and returned to their national air force.  
 
It was a silly idea that took no account of the accounting dilemmas caused by the 
death of an airman.  The result was an accounting nightmare as nations, such as 
Australia and Canada, attempted to estimate payments to the families of men who 
died on active service.  The Australian Government found the difficulties in 
reconciling the amount of back pay demanded and the amount justified by the 
documentary records just too difficult to manage.  The problems persisted until 
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the matter came to a head in late 1942 and the RAAF, like the RCAF, reverted to 
their own pay-book system and ignored the Air Ministry’s complaints114.    
 
Britain’s liability for the salaries and costs of Dominion airman began as soon as a 
student airman had departed his own nation for service with, or in conjunction 
with, the Royal Air Force.  This liability continued up till the day preceding the 
date of their arrival back in their home nation, Britain had to meet the cost of all 
wages and expenses.  Britain’s liability was for the wages bill of the 147,165 
aircrew graduates who undertook this training outside of their home nation.  The 
estimated total cost to Britain was £24.26 million of which £13,350,000 belongs 
to Bomber Command115.  The £24.26 million estimate only relates to the wages 
element of the bill and does not reflect further costs in terms of allowances and 
expenses incurred.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that the total cost to 
Britain would have been substantially higher than these figures suggest.   
 
The other problem facing the historian is the paucity of information available on 
the numbers of aircrew that served in Bomber Command.  It is impossible at this 
time to allocate a proportion of the training wages of these individuals to Bomber 
Command because of the absence of records relating tho the actual size of the 
Command during the period of the strategic air offensive.  The calculation I have 
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used is based upon an estimate of probable personnel levels extrapolated from the 
July 1943 and 1944 figures.  This approach suggests a figure of 56,515 for the 
size of Bomber Command in December 1941 rising to 183,172 in June 1945. 
 
The calculation for Bomber Command’s wage bill for the war is obtained by 
multiplying the base daily wage rate of 3s/6d by the average strength of Bomber 
Command per year116.  The base daily wage is the amount paid without taking 
into account allowances, payment for rank or qualifications, or any other financial 
payments such as the higher rates paid to Canadian and Australian servicemen.  
The average annual base wage bill for Bomber Command over the period of 
World War II was £6.7 million, a total of £39.1 millions for the five years and ten 
months of the conflict.  This is a substantial underestimate, as it does not take into 
account.  However, it provides a starting point for estimating the cost of wages to 
Bomber Command.  Added to the £13.35 million cost in training wages for 
aircrew the figure obtained for wages in Bomber Command is £52.47 million.   
 
The attempt to identify a precise cost for wages in Bomber Command, as opposed 
to the cost of wages for EATS students, is fraught with difficulty.  The usefulness 
of the figures derived for 1943 until 1945 is that they given an indication of the 
wages bill when Bomber Command was at peak size.  This does not give a sound 
total for the strategic air offensive.  A further personnel cost that is not included in 
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wages is the cost of feeding and clothing the men and women who served in 
Bomber Command.  Luckily, in this case, there are some sound figures available. 
 
Food and Clothing 
 
The provision of meals to the men and women of Bomber Command was another 
significant cost incurred in the conduct of the strategic air offensive.  Each 
member of the Command required the usual three cooked meals per day.  The 
RAF differed a little from the other services in that flying personnel were entitled 
to better rations than were other Britons.  In particular, by wartime standards, they 
received a generous ration of eggs and meat.  The RAF believed such a diet was 
essential to allow them to meet the rigors of flying in European conditions.  In 
addition to the three normal meals per day, RAF messes had to contend with 
supplying food throughout a 24-hour period.  The foodstuffs were of a light meal 
variety and consisted of the ubiquitous tea and sandwiches or cake for ground 
crew.  Aircrew received coffee, soup and sandwiches for their flights.   
 
The cost of feeding was about £8,000 per month for an average RAF station117.  
Based upon this figure, the overall cost of feeding Bomber Command during 
World War II was £48.62 million.  Even though this looks like a very high cost, it 
is not.  At an average strength of 130,000 personnel in the Command over the 
2,074 days of the war, the cost per meal would have been 1s/2d.  This is a more 
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useful figure than it may at first appear.  The fact that the food bill worked out on 
the number of Bomber Command stations can return a legitimate cost per meal 
when divided by the estimated average number of personnel serving within the 
Command over the war, suggests that a total cost of £48.62 million is a reliable 
estimate.   
 
The provision of uniform and clothing was another cost met on behalf of Bomber 
Command.  There were two issues of clothing, the everyday uniforms provided to 
all members of the Command and specialist clothing, such as personal protective 
clothing for ground trades and flying clothing for aircrew.  All personnel in 
Bomber Command received a basic issue of over thirty items of uniform and 
other kit.  This covered everything from trousers to coats, pyjamas, sewing kits 
and steel helmets118.  The cost of it all was £11 6s/3d119 per person, which gives a 
conservative figure of £3,113,542 for all of the personnel estimated to have served 
in Bomber Command.  The breakdown of the cost is £1,525,000 for equipping an 
estimated 120,000 ground staff plus another £1,588,542 for equipping the 
125,000 aircrew who passed through Bomber Command.  Dominion forces 
equipped their own personnel with an initial set of uniform clothing.  As it was 
Bomber Command that obtained the benefit from this issue, it is legitimate to 
assign the full cost to the Command.   
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As well as the normal uniform items, Bomber Command issued aircrew with 
specialised flying kit including electrically heated waistcoats, jackets and suits, 
plus gauntlets, silk gloves, flying boots, helmets and a variety of other specialised 
items.  The cost for each issue was £36 9s/0d.120, at a total cost of £4,556,250 for 
the 125,000 aircrew of Bomber Command.  All together, the cost of initial 
clothing and flying kit to Bomber Command personnel was £7,669,792.  This 
amount does not reflect the added expenses of loss, breakages and the 
replacement of items such as socks, underwear and shirts.   
 
The above calculations suggest that it cost approximately £56.28 million to feed 
and clothe the personnel of Bomber Command during the strategic air offensive.  
This figure appears to be reliable having been calculated using two different 
criteria.  It shows that the food bill was one of the more significant on-costs of 
maintaining the members of Bomber Command.     
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the effort that went into 
recruiting, training and maintaining the men and women who served in Bomber 
Command during World War II.  The analysis highlights the size of the 
undertaking that was required to staff Bomber Command with the trained 
personnel it needed to carry out the strategic air offensive.  Next to the building of 
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factories for the aircraft industry, and the purchasing of aircraft from that industry, 
the recruitment, selection, training and maintenance of personnel was the most 
significant cost incurred by Bomber Command during the strategic air offensive.   
 
The total cost of providing Bomber Command with the 125,000 aircrew and 
300,000 ground staff was approximately £646.87 million.  Of this amount, around 
£5.2 million went on advertising and £20 million on training wages for aircrew.  
The proportion of the EATS expenditure that can be attributed to Bomber 
Command is £502.37 million and a further £108.75 million for operational wages, 
food and clothing.  The estimate of cost here does not include expenditure on 
travel and other incidentals.  Nor does it include allowances or higher rates of pay 
for flying duties, rank or other qualifications.  It also does not address the 
actuarial issues involved in the economic loss caused by the early death of 57,143 
young men.  The total price of £646.87 million for manpower is at the lower end 
of the possible estimates and it is highly likely that the upper end of the cost 
would be more than £1 billion.   
 
In addition to identifying a reliable estimate for the cost of manpower in Bomber 
Command, the analysis conducted in this chapter has shown that the availability 
of trained manpower was as significant a problem in expanding Bomber 
Command as was the availability of heavy bomber aircraft and airfields.  The 
importance of understanding this fact is that it substantially undermines the 
superficial argument that the British government could have substantially sped up 
the strategic bomber offensive if it had committed the necessary resources to the 
development and production of suitable aircraft in the 1930s.  Even if the 
government had been able to get the aircraft, it still would have had to build the 
airfields, and recruit and train the necessary personnel.  Due to the dislocation that 
acquiring and building airfields and the force necessary to carry out strategic 
bombing inflicted on the lives and activities of the wider community neither of 
these activities was achievable within a peacetime context.  Therefore, even if the 
Lancaster had been ready in 1939, it is highly likely that Bomber Command 
would still have had to wait until late 1941 for the airfields to be built and the 
recruits enlisted in 1940 to start flowing in sufficient numbers to man the 
squadrons. 
 
The large influx of recruits into the RAF in the first two years of the war placed 
great strains on the RAF and its training establishments in the United Kingdom 
and placed strains on the Empire Air Training Scheme throughout the 
Commonwealth.  Overall, though, the system coped and the Air Ministry trained 
sufficient aircrew and ground staff to allow Bomber Command to absorb the 
introduction of the heavy bombers in 1942.  The year 1942 saw not just the arrival 
of the heavy bomber but also the construction of sufficient airfields and the arrival 
of sufficient trained personnel to allow the development of a truly strategic air 
offensive.    
 
A further contribution that this research makes to the history of the strategic air 
offensive is that it identifies that the official operating strength of Bomber 
Command remained below 150,000 personnel.  Bomber Command constituted 
about 12.5 percent of total RAF strength during World War II making it one of 
the largest formations within the RAF.  It must be noted though, that the findings 
here do not mean that less than 150,000 personnel were needed to conduct the 
strategic air offensive against Germany.  The findings in this chapter simply relate 
to the official posted strength of Bomber Command and take no account of the 
myriad of RAF and other personnel employed by other functional commands or 
organisations whose work directly supported Bomber Command and its air 
offensive.  The lack of information on the percentage of time dedicated by these 
personnel to supporting the strategic air offensive makes it impossible to estimate 
a cost and therefore there is no valuation of this activity in this analysis.  The 
estimates of cost provided in this chapter must be regarded as being very much on 
the low side.
    
C o n c l u s i o n  
 
The strategic air offensive formed a major part of Britain’s wartime military 
activity during World War II and for this reason alone it has attracted the attention 
of historians.  The histories of the air offensive have centred on two major areas 
of interest.  The first has been the debate about the morality of bombing cities and 
civilian populations and the second has revolved around the relative technical and 
economic proficiency of Britain’s aircraft industry and air force during the war.  
In both areas, the historical record has dedicated a significant amount of attention 
to the impact of the strategic air offensive on Germany but with much less 
attention on estimating the offensive’s impact on Britain.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to help address this imbalance by investigating the financial cost to 
Britain of carrying out the strategic air offensive against Germany during World 
War II.   
 
My study began with a brief overview of the strategic air offensive and the 
background to the intellectual rationale underlying a belief in this form of 
warfare.  The survey showed Britain conducted the air offensive against Germany 
in line with a profound belief in the power of air attack to demoralise a civilian 
population and, by doing so, cause some sort of social collapse which would force 
an enemy government to surrender.  The intellectual basis for this belief was a 
naïve acceptance of the concepts developed by early imaginative writers such as 
H.G. Wells and the more serious, but no less imaginative writers, like Douhet, 
Mitchell and de Seversky.  The examination of the intellectual approach of the 
British Air Staff showed a strong disinclination to scrutinize objectively strategic 
bombing.  Other than an adherence to the value of offensive action, there was no 
unified British theory on how the RAF would conduct a strategic bombing 
campaign.  The present view that the ruminations of military thinkers such as 
Douhet, Mitchell, de Seversky and Trenchard somehow produced theories of air 
warfare is problematical.  Certainly, the evidence evaluated in this work shows 
that military men were thinking carefully about how aircraft could be used in war 
but there was little effort to take the next step and rigorously test the assumptions 
that they were making. 
 
The outcome for Britain was that she entered World War II with a set of 
assumptions masquerading as a theory of air warfare.  The failure to evaluate the 
improvements in defensive power of fighters supported by radar stands out as an 
example of this.  Even more of a failure was the inability of the Air Staff to 
identify the exact weight and types of bombs and to test the bombs to check they 
were effective in the roles given to them.  Based on such a flawed process, it is 
unsurprising that Bomber Command went to war with a single-mindedness that 
was eventually to lead to the widespread bombing of German cities.  It was also 
perhaps the reason why the Air Staff pursued such bombing even as there was 
growing evidence that these attacks were not accomplishing the expected 
outcomes.  The hope was that victory was only just a few raids away is a strong 
indication of a lack of a clear idea on how strategic bombing would work1.   
 
Understanding the way the offensive developed is important as it allows a fuller 
understanding of how military operations were constrained by the economic 
activity undertaken to implement them.  The first thing learnt from this approach 
was that the slow growth in the striking power of Bomber command was not only 
due to the slow delivery of heavy bombers.  The growth in Bomber Command’s 
striking power after early 1942 came about as heavy bombers, airfields and 
manpower became available in sufficient numbers to allow an increase in 
bombing activity.  The ability of Bomber Command to conduct its attacks relied 
on an enormous infrastructure, which was extremely costly to provide in wartime 
and politically impossible to provide in peacetime.  This is something overlooked 
by many writers on the subject of Britain’s preparedness for war in 1939. 
 
The subsequent chapters of this thesis show how Britain spent £2.78 billion on the 
strategic air offensive.  This amount represents around 10 percent of the £28.7 
billion that the British government spent during World War II and 12.19 percent 
of the £22.8 billion Britain spent on defence2.  The £2.78 billion cost of Bomber 
Command’s campaign was also 5.57 percent of Britain’s total National Income 
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for the entire war period3.  Even on the basis of the figures I have provided, the 
strategic air offensive was one of the most expensive military campaigns 
undertaken by Britain in World War II. 
 
The aircraft designed and developed in Britain’s factories were the means by 
which the RAF was to accomplish their victory over the enemy.  In the 
examination of the British aircraft industry carried out in Chapter Three, the 
evidence shows that Britain dominated the world’s aircraft industries through 
licensing production and joint venture operations.  In addition, her domestic 
aircraft industry was probably the largest exporter of aircraft until well into the 
1930s4.  These findings support the contention of A. Robertson5 and David 
Edgerton that Peter Fearon and, later, Correlli Barnett exaggerated their claims of 
British backwardness in aircraft production.  During the 1920s and 1930s, British 
aero-engine manufacturers dominated the American aircraft industry and there is 
little doubt that many British ideas were incorporated into aircraft design in the 
United States just as American ideas were incorporated into British designs.  The 
transfer of technology continued to the advantage of the United States, which not 
only obtained licences to manufacture Merlin engines, but gained access to the 
cavity magnetron valve and the entire British nuclear research programme. 
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As World War II approached, Britain was preparing to fight the strategic air 
offensive envisaged by the Air Ministry and the Air Staff.  The technological 
capacity was available and the expansion of aircraft production and heavy bomber 
aircraft was being organised.  What the Air Staff had not foreseen was the extent 
of the infrastructure that would be necessary to allow the aircraft to operate in the 
numbers required to carry out the offensive.  Partially, this appears to have 
resulted from Air Staff over confidence in the effect of bombing upon civilian 
populations, but it also resulted from over confidence in the capacity of bomber 
aircraft to penetrate enemy airspace.  The result was that large numbers of heavy 
bombers were required and these needed airfields, complex navigation, and air-
traffic control systems in order to enable their safe operation at night.  As Chapter 
Five shows, airfields and their availability placed a significant brake on the speed 
at which Bomber Command could expand.  Even where the airfields were 
available, their size had to be increased to fit the needs of the larger aircraft that 
were coming into service and they needed more sophisticated traffic management 
systems.   
 
With the aircraft and infrastructure dealt with, the final areas examined were the 
consumables, such petroleum and ordnance.  Of these, petroleum was the most 
pressing due to the need to import almost 95 percent of all the high-octane fuels 
and high-grade oils used by Bomber Command.  However, ordnance was also to 
prove highly problematic and it is likely that a high percentage of British aerial 
bombs were faulty.  The faults appear from the evidence to have been in the 
fuzing systems of the bombs.  Either these fuzes failed to explode or they 
exploded the bombs prematurely.  The extent of the problem is unknown but the 
attention given to it by Sir Arthur Harris and the Air Staff suggests that faulty 
fuses may have affected a significant percentage of the bombs dropped.   
 
Of the £2.78 billion that Britain spent in carrying out the strategic air offensive, 
£223.86 million went to the aircraft industry for the expansion of their production 
through the building of new factories and plant.  To this cost must be added £1.5 
billion paid for the bomber aircraft that served in Bomber Command.  The aircraft 
required airfields costing £222.15 million, fuel and oils costing another £223.65 
million and ordnance, which added another £183 million.  On top of the 
expenditure on equipment and facilities was £636.34 million on wages and 
salaries.  The financial costs identified in each of the chapters were arrived at 
using modern accrual accounting methods.  The result has been a more accurate 
estimate of the total financial cost and the proportion of the cost that each major 
area of activity consumed.  
 
Knowing the financial cost of the strategic air offensive allows a more useful 
evaluation to be made of the value of the offensive.  Now historians can begin to 
compare the impact of strategic bombing on Germany with the cost of that 
bombing to Britain.  It is now possible to see how the strategic air offensive 
affected Britain.  The full implications of this remain to be teased out, but the 
work here suggests that Britain derived very little long-term benefit from the 
£2.78 billion spent on mounting the bombing of Germany.  In the first three 
quarters of 1945, the production of bomber aircraft fell by 52 percent on the levels 
for the same three quarters of 19446.  The slump in production continued and 
within a few years, the British aircraft industry would make increasing demands 
on British wealth in a futile effort to maintain Britain as a leading aircraft 
manufacturer.   
 
Bomber Command’s airfields also represented a poor return on investment.  
Unlike shipping ports, bomber airfields did not provide a generic set of services to 
civilian and military craft.  With the end of the war the British government 
retained very few of Bomber Command’s airfields and, with the major exception 
of the new bomber station at Heathrow, they were not attractive as civilian 
passenger terminals.  The vast majority of these airfields were simply 
decommissioned and left to deteriorate.  The cost of ripping up and disposing of 
the extensive runways and taxiways was too high for the government immediately 
after the war.  Even today, a significant number of these disused airfields remain 
and continue to displace agricultural activity.  The cost of the post-war economic 
losses sustained by the continued dislocation of agriculture has not been included 
in the calculations made in this thesis. 
 
Having identified that the strategic air offensive cost £2.78 billion it is now 
possible to place a financial value on the investment it took to achieve the 
outcomes of the bomber attacks launched against enemy targets in Europe.  It is 
now possible to show that it cost approximately £7,131.00 for each of the 389,809 
                                                 
6  Central statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, Table 130, p.152 
operational sorties flown by Bomber Command aircraft during World War II and 
the average cost of each of the 6,259 bomber raids launched by Bomber 
Command was £444,160.00.  The average cost per ton of bombs dropped was 
£2,911.007.  It cost Britain £5,914.00 to kill a German civilian by bombing.  Of 
course, this last figure is questionable because there is no way of separating out 
those killed by American and Russian air attacks from those killed by Bomber 
Command.  It does mean that the actual cost of each civilian killed was 
substantially more than the figure offered here. 
 
Financially, the strategic air offensive was an expensive undertaking as the 
analysis in this thesis has confirmed, and the financial costs were not the only 
costs associated with the strategic bomber offensive.  Bomber Command suffered 
79,172 casualties comprising 57,143 fatalities 9,162 wounded and 12,867 
prisoners or missing amongst its aircrew and ground staff8.  The strategic air 
offensive carried out by Bomber Command resulted in the deaths of a 
considerable proportion of the 410,000 German and 60,000 Italian civilians killed 
by Allied bombing raids9.  The ratio of enemy killed was 5.65 per Allied 
aviator10.  The damage inflicted on Germany is only one side of the balance sheet.  
The other side contains the costs to Britain imposed by developing Bomber 
                                                 
7  Figures derived by dividing £2.78 billion by the figures in Middlebrook and Everitt, 
Bomber Command War Diaries, p.707 and Harris, Despatch, p.51 
8  Overy, Bomber Command 1939-1945, p.204 
9  Overy, Bomber Command 1939-1945, p.202 
10  Based on 57, 143 dead in Bomber Command and 26,000 dead suffered by the USAAF 8th 
Air Force reported in US Air Force, Museum, 
www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/wwii/veday.htm, 23 March, 2003 
Command to the point where it could inflict damage on Germany.  By using an 
accrual method of accounting, the analysis has been able to tease out a little more 
precisely and in a little greater depth the actual cost to the British of the multitude 
of goods and services that the strategic air offensive consumed.  The importance 
of the analysis and its findings lie in the balancing out of the perception that the 
strategic air offensive inflicted damage on the German war effort without causing 
any damage to the British war effort.  The facts as identified by my analysis show 
that the strategic air offensive imposed an enormous cost on Britain and that it 
was a cost that she could ill afford.  It shows that the damage inflicted on 
Germany came at a very high price and it lends weight to the idea that the 
strategic air offensive bombing against Germany was a major contributor to 
Britain’s post-war impoverishment.    
 
          
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Public Record Office Files 
Public Record Office (PRO) Files consulted and used included Air Ministry Files (AIR, 
Ministry of Aircraft Production (AVIA), Cabinet (CAB) and Treasury (T).  The PRO 
file number is quoted followed by the title of the series and the number of the individual 
file consulted. 
AIR 2, Air Ministry Registered Files 
1608, 2940, 3428, 4620, 6252, 6345, 8038, 8040, 8181, 8655, 8812, 
AIR 8, Chief of the Air Staff 
258, 264, 280, 283, 338, 393, 697, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 
AIR 9, Director of Plans 
141, 159, 183, 187 
AIR 14, Bomber Command 
4, 298, 384, 627, 1010, 1951, 1961, 2199 
AIR 18, Judge advocate General’s Office, Court Martial Proceedings 
16, 17, 19, 
AIR 20, Unregistered Papers 
6535, 6539, 
AIR 41, Air Historical Branch Monologues and Narratives 
65, 
AIR 72, Air Ministry Orders 
23, 24, 27, 28 
AVIA 9, Ministry of Aircraft Production: Private Office Papers 
5, 18, 19, 46, 48, 51, 56, 
 AVIA 10, Ministry of Aircraft Production: Unregistered Papers 
211, 269, 270, 271, 274, 391 
AVIA 15, Ministry of Aircraft Production: Files 
1487, 1466, 1852, 1914, 2023, 2024, 3628, 3677 
CAB 21, Committee of Imperial Defence: Sub-Committee on National and Imperial 
Defence, 
260, 261 
CAB 54, Committee of Imperial Defence 
1, Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 3rd Meeting, 29th November 1935, 
3, Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, Sub-Committee of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, 
Bombing Targets Intelligence, 23rd November 1935 
6, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, Spain and China: Intelligence Regarding Air 
Warfare, Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, Report No. 3, Air Attack on 
Industry in Operations in Spain from July 1936 to December 1938 and In China from 
July 1937 to December 1938, Committee of Imperial Defence, Deputy Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
11, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, 
Bombardment Policy, Committee of Imperial Defence, London, 13th August 1939 
CAB 55, Committee of Imperial Defence: Planning 
11, Joint Planning Committee, Germany: A Report on Air Targets, Committee of 
Imperial Defence, 23rd December 1937 
CAB 65, War Cabinet Minutes 
1, 21, 22 
CAB 66, War Cabinet memoranda WP and CP Series 
1 
 CAB 67, War Cabinet memoranda, WP (G) Series 
8, 9, 
CAB 68, War Cabinet memoranda WP® Series 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
CAB 69, War Cabinet Defence Committee (Operations) 
1, 
CAB 102, Cabinet Office: Historical Section: Official War Histories (Second World 
War), Civil Series 
175, 274, 
CAB 108, Central Statistical Office: Minutes and Memoranda 
4, 5, 
CAB 120, Minister of Defence: Secretariat Files 
291, 292, 293, 299, 301, 339, 351, 393, 858, 859-Telegrams 273/63, 381/3, 428/3, 
572/3, 1662/4 
T 171, Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Office: Budget and Finance Bill Papers 
345, 349, 355, 360, 368, 369, 370, 373, 374, 375, 376, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 385, 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Air Ministry,  Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 248, the Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 
1933-1945, Public Record Office, Kew, 2001 
Air Ministry,  We Speak from the Air, Broadcasts by the R.A.F., Ministry of Information, 
His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1942 
Almen, H.V. and Mead, R.K., Aircraft Blueprint Reading, Pitman Publishing 
Corporation, Toronto, 1940 
 Beaverbook, M., ‘Note on American-British Production Programme, 1942’, President’s 
Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State Department, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Digital 
Archives 
Bruce, Eric S., Aircraft in War, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1914  
Bishop, Billy, Winged Peace, McGraw Hill, Toronto, 1990 
Black, Adam and Black, Charles, R.A.F. in Action, Adam and Charles Black, London, 
1941 
BP Amoco,  ‘ARC 7439, Petroleum Statistics of the UK for the War Years’, BP Amoco 
Archive, Amoco PLC, University of Warwick, Coventry, 1939-1945, pp.2,3,106, 107, 
141, 142 and 159 
British Bombing Survey Unit, The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945: 
The Official Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit, Frank Cass, London, 1998 
Brooks, B.T., Peace, Plenty and petroleum, The Jacques Cattell Press, Pennsylvania, 
1944 
Churchill Archives Centre, Bufton Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge; 
BUFT 3/8, Daylight Bombing, 18th July 1941 
BUFT 3/9, Review of the Possibilities and Limitations of the Night Bomber, 25th August 1941 
BUFT 3/12, Formation of a Target Finding Force, 8th May 1942 
BUFT 3/42, R.A.F. Attacks and German Morale, 29th March 1943 
BUFT 3/43, Operation “Thunderclap”:  Attack on German Morale, undated 
BUFT 3/47, Operations “Hurricane I’ and “Hurricane II’, 13th October 1944 
BUFT 3/67, Bombing of Towns, undated 
BUFT 3/64, Strategic Bombing Policy August 1941 to May 1942, undated 
Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War, HMSO, London, 1951 
 Chamberlain, Sir Neville, ‘Letter dates 4th October 1939 to President Roosevelt’, yyc4-
05, President’s Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State Department, 1939, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Digital Archives 
Chamberlain, Sir Neville, ‘Letter dates 8th November 1939 to President Roosevelt’, 
zz01, President’s Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State Department, 1939, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Digital Archives 
Charlton, L.E.O., G.T Garratt and R. Fletcher, Air Defence of Great Britain, Penguin 
Books, Harmondsworth, 1938 
Charlton, L.E.O., Britain at War: The Royal Air Force and U.S.A.A.F. from July 1943 to 
September 1944, Hutchinson & Co., London, 1945 
Cherwell, Lord., ‘Memorandum, dated 26th October 1943, for Prime Minister on 
Britain’s Financial Difficulties in relation to US Dollar and Gold Balances’, a330oo, 
President’s Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State Department, 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Digital Archives 
Colville, John, Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955, Hodder and 
Stoughton, London, 1985 
De Seversky, Alexander P., Victory through Air Power, Simon and Schuster, New York, 
1942 
Sir A. Harris,  Despatch on War Operations, 23rd February, 1942 to 8th May, 1945, 
Frank Cass, London, 1995. 
W. Joynson-Hicks, Command of the Air or Prophecies Fulfilled: Being Speeches 
Delivered in the House of Commons, Nisbet and Co. Ltd., London, 1916 
Liddell-Hart, Basil, Paris; or the Future of War, Keegan Paul, Trencher, Trubner and 
Co., New York, 1925 
Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs, Ivor Nicholson and Watson, London, 1933 
MacMillan, Norman, Chosen Instrument, John Land and Bodley Head, Cambridge, 
1938 
 Mass Observation, War Factory, Cresset Library, Century Hutchinson, London, 1987 
Minister in Charge of National Emergency Services, New South Wales, Protection of the 
Civil Population against Air Attack, T.H. Tennant, Government Printer, New South 
Wales, June, 1939 
Montgomery,-Hyde, H. and G.R. Falkiner-Nuttal, Air Defence and the Civil Population, 
Cresset Press, London, 1937 
Murphy, Paul, Armada of the Sky: The Problem of Armaments, Houghton, London, 
1931 
Narracott, A.H., Unsung Heroes of the Air, Fredrick Muller Ltd., London, 1943 
Pirath, C., Aerodromes, Their Location, Operation and Design, Pitman, London, 1938 
President of the Board of Trade, Final Report of the Committee on Industry and Trade, 
His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1929 
Royal Australian Air Force, These Eagles, Story of the R.A.A.F. At War, Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra, 1942 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., ‘Memorandum, dated 15th March 1944, for Secretary of the 
Treasury Morgenthau dealing with the Issue of Britain’s Accumulation of dollars under 
Lend-Lease’, , President’s Secretaries Files, Safe Files, a331d, State Department, 1944, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Digital Archives 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., ‘Memorandum for General Marshall, Admiral King and Hon. 
Harry Hopkins detailing Instructions for the London Conference – July 1942’, 
President’s Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State Department, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Digital Archives 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., ‘Letter to Winston Churchill with memorandum from Major 
General Patrick Hurley on Iran’, a26cc, President’s Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State 
Department, 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Digital Archives 
Shepherd, E.C., Air Force of Today, Blackie, London, 1939 
 Shirer, William L., Berlin Diary: A Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941, 
Hamish Hamilton, London, 1941 
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 
January 1947, published by Garland, New York, 1976 
Sinclair, Sir Archibald,  ‘Air Estimates, 1944’, House of Commons Debates, House of 
Commons, 29 February 1944, Column 1273-1322 
Spaight, J.M., The Sky’s the Limit: a Study of British Air Power, Hodder and Stoughton, 
London, 1940 
Speer, Albert, Inside the Third Reich, Memoirs, English Translation by Richard and Clara 
Winston, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1970 
Sykes, Sir Fredrick, From Many Angles: An Autobiography, George Harrap & Co., 
London, 1943 
Terraine, John, Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, 
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1945 
Wells, H.G., First and Last Things: A Confession of Faith and a Rule of Life, G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, New York, 1908 
Wells, H.G., History of Mr. Polly and the War in the Air, Odhams Press, London, 1908. 
Winnant, John S., ‘Letter dates 3rd June 1942, Report on Bombing to President 
Roosevelt’, a75h, President’s Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State Department, 1942, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Digital Archives 
Winnant, John S., ‘Telegram dated 27th December 1941, Report on British Security 
Executive’, a75i, President’s Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State Department, 1941, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Digital Archives 
Winnant, John S., ‘Telegram dated 12th January 1942, Report on British Reaction to 
Roosevelt Announcement of Aircraft Production of 60,000 Aircraft’, t06b, President’s 
Secretaries Files, Safe Files, State Department, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Digital 
Archives 
 Woodward E.L. and R. Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 
Second Series, Vol II, 1931, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1947 
Woodward E.L. and R. Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 
Second Series, Vol III, 1931-1932, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1947 
Woodward E.L. and R. Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 
Second Series, Vol V, 1933, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1947 
Woodward E.L. and R. Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 
Second Series, Vol VI, 1933-1934, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1947 
Woodward E.L. and R. Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 
Second Series, Vol VII, 1929-1934, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1947 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Adkin, F.J., RAF Ground Support Equipment since 1918, Airlife Publishing Ltd., 
Shrewsbury, 1996 
Andrews, P.W.S. and E. Brunner, Life of Lord Nuffield, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1955 
Arthur, Max, There Shall Be Wings: Vivid Personal Accounts of the RAF from 1918 to 
Today, Coronet Books, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1993 
Barnett, Correlli, Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation, 
Macmillan, London, 1986 
Barnett, Correlli, Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities 1945-1950, MacMillan, 
London, 1995 
Baumbach, Werner, Broken Swastika, the Defeat of the Luftwaffe, English Translation 
by Fredrick Holt, Robert Hale, London, 1969 
Bennett, Donald, Pathfinder: A War Biography, Fredrick Muller, London, 1958 
 Berghahn, V.R., Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth 
Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982 
Bialer, Uri, Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-
1939, Royal Historical Society, London, 1980 
Biddle, Tami Davis, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and 
American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 2002 
Birch, David, Rolls-Royce Armaments, Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 2000 
Blackett, P.M.S.,  Fear, War, and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences 
Of Atomic Energy, Whittlesea House, McGraw Hill, New York, 1948 
Bond, Brian, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1980 
Bond, Brian, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought, Cassell, London, 1977 
Bowman, Gerald, War in the Air, Evans Brothers ltd., London, 1956 
Bowyer, Chaz, History of the RAF, Hamlyn Books, London, 1977 
Bowyer, Chaz, Halifax and Wellington, Promotional Reprint Company, Leicester, 1994 
Boyle, Andrew, Trenchard: Man of Vision, Collins, London, 1962 
Boyle, Andrew, No Passing Glory: The Biography of Group Captain Cheshire VC., 
D.S.O.,D.F.C., Collins, London, 1955 
Bracher, Karl D., German Dictatorship: The origins, Structure and Consequences of 
National Socialism, Penguin University Books, Harmondsworth, 1980 
Brittain, Vera, Wartime Chronicle: Vera Brittain’s Wartime Diary, 1939-1945, Victor 
Gollancz Ltd., London, 1989 
Broadberry, S.N., Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in International 
Perspective, 1850-1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997 
 Bullock, Alan, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1962 
Bullock, Alan, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives, Fontana Press, London, 1993 
Bulman, George P., Account of Partnership-Industry, Government and the Aero-engine, 
Rolls Royce Historical Trust, Derby, 2001 
Bunker, John G., Liberty Ships, The Ugly Ducklings of World War II, Naval Institute Press, 
Annapolis, 1972 
Butler, J.R.M., Grand Strategy, Volume II, September 1939-June 1941, History of the 
Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Ed. By J.R.M. Butler, Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1957 
Butler, J.R.M., Part II, Grand Strategy, Volume III,  June 1941-August 1942, History of 
the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Ed. By J.R.M. Butler, Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1964 
Buxton, N.K. and D.H Aldcroft, British Industry between the Wars: Instability and 
Industrial Development 1919-1939, compiled and edited by, Scolar Press, London, 1979 
Cairncross, Sir Alexander, Planning in Wartime: Aircraft Production in Britain, 
Germany and the USA, MacMillan & St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, London, 1991 
Calder, Angus, Myth of the Blitz, Jonathan Cape, London, 1991 
Calder, Angus, Peoples War: Britain 1939-45, Pimlico, London, 1969 
Calvocorressi, Peter and Guy Wint, Total War, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979 
Cave Brown, Anthony, Secret Servant: The Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Churchill’s 
Spymaster, Sphere Books, London, 1987 
Charlwood, D.E., No Moon Tonight, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, 1956 
Leonard Cheshire, Face of Victory, Quality Book Club, London, 1961 
Chester, D.N., Lessons of the British War Economy, Ed D.N. Chester, Cambridge 
University Press, 1951 
 Chant, Christopher, Illustrated Data Guide to World War II Bombers, Tiger Books 
International, London, 1997 
Chant, Christopher (ed.), Warfare and the Third Reich: the Rise and Fall of Hitler’s 
Armed Forces, Salamander Books, London, 1996 
Chisholm, Anne and Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life, Hutchinson, London, 1992 
Churchill, Sir Winston, Grand Alliance, Second World War, Vol. III, Cassell and 
Company, London, 1950 
Clausewitz, C., On War, Ed. A. Rapport, Pelican Books, Harmondsworth, 1976 
Conquest, Robert, Stalin Breaker of Nations, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991 
Cook, R., Armstrong Siddeley: The Parkside Story 1896-1939, Historical Series No. 11, 
Rolls Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1988 
Cooke, R. and R. Conyers Nesbit, Target: Hitler’s Oil – Allied Attacks on German Oil 
Supplies, 1939-1945, William Kimber, London, 1985 
Cooper, Alan, Air Battle of the Ruhr: RAF Offensive March to July 1943, Airlife 
Publishing Ltd, Shrewsbury, 1992 
Cornwall, John, Hitler’s Scientists: Science, War and the Devil’s Pact, Penguin/Viking 
Books, London, 2003 
Coulthard-Clark, C.D., Third Brother: the Royal Australian Air Force-1939, Allen and 
Unwin, in association with the Royal Australian Air Force, Sydney, 1991 
Cozens, W.J., Problems in the Selection of Sites for Civil and Military Air Stations, 
Institution of Civil Engineers, Airport Engineering Division, London, 1948 
Crafts, Nicholas and Gianni Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe since 1945, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 
Cross, J.A., Sir Samual Hoare: A Political Biography, Jonathan Cape, London, 1977 
Currie, Jack, Battle under the Moon: The Documented Account of Mailly-le-Camp, 1944, 
Air Data Publications, Trowbridge, 1995 
 Dalton, Hugh, Second World War of Hugh Dalton, 1940-45, edited by Ben Pimlott, 
Jonathan Cape, London, 1986 
Davis, E.H., Pavement Design for Roads and Airfields, HMSO, London, 1951 
Day, David, Politics of War, Harper Collins, Sydney, 2003 
Deighton, Len, Fighter: the True Story of the Battle of Britain, Triad Panther Books, St. 
Albans, 1979 
Deighton, Len, Bomber, Triad Panther Books, St. Albans, 1978 
Deighton, Len, Battle of Britain, Jonathan Cape, London, 1980 
Deighton, Len, Blood, Tears and Folly in the Darkest Hour of the Second World War, 
Jonathan Cape, London, 1993 
Deighton, Len, Blitzkrieg from the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk, Jonathan Cape, 
London, 1979 
Devons, Ely, Planning in Practice: Essays in Aircraft Planning in Wartime, Cambridge 
University Press, 1950 
Dintenfass, Michael, Decline of Industrial Britain, 1870-1980, Routledge, London, 1992 
Dixon, Norman, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Pimlico Press, London, 
1994 
Dobinson, Colin, Fields of Deception Britain’s Bombing Decoys of World War II, 
English Heritage, Methuen, London, 2000 
R.J. Donovan, The Second Victory: The Marshall Plan and the Post War Revival of 
Europe, Madison Books, Boston, 1987, p.21. 
Dunmore, Spencer, Wings for Victory The Remarkable Story of the British 
Commonwealth Air Training Plan in Canada, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1994 
Earle, M., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971 
 Edgerton, David, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and 
Technological Nation, MacMillan London, 1991 
Edgerton, David, Science, Technology and the British Industrial Decline 1870-1970, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 
Ehrman, John, Grand Strategy, Volume V,  August 1943 – 1944, History of the Second 
World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Ed. By J.R.M. Butler, Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, London, 1956 
Ehrman, John, Grand Strategy, Volume VI,  October 1944 – August 1945, History of the 
Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Ed. By J.R.M. Butler, Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1956 
Ellis, John, One Day In A Very Long War, Wednesday 25th October 1944,  Jonathan 
Cape, London, 1998 
Fahey, John, An Examination of the Impact of Allied Control on the Post-War Economic 
and Social Problems of Western Germany, 1945-1947, Bachelor of Arts Honours 
Thesis, School of Social Sciences Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, 1989 
Falconer, Jonathan, Stirling Wings: The Short Stirling Goes to War, Budding Books, 
Stroud, 1997 
Fearon, Peter, ‘Aircraft Manufacturing’, British Industry Between the Wars: 
Instability and Industrial Development 1919-1939, in Compiled and edited by N.K. 
Buxton and D.H. Aldercroft, Scolar Press, London, 1979, pp. 216-239 
Fedden, Sir Roy, Britain’s Air Survival: An Appraisement and Strategy for Success, 
Cassell and Co., London, 1957 
Ferguson, Sheila and H. Fitzgerald, Studies in the Social Services, History of the Second 
World War United Kingdom Civil Series, ed. By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, London 1954 
Fest, Joachim C., Face of the Third Reich, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1970 
Fisher, Klaus P., Nazi Germany A New History, Continuum, New York, 1995 
 Frankland, Noble, Bomber Offensive: The Devastation of Europe, MacDonald and Co., 
London, 1969 
Frankland, Noble, History at War, the Campaigns of an Historian, Giles de la Mare, 
London, 1998 
Franks, Norman, Claims to Fame the Lancaster, Arms and Armour, London, 1995 
Fredette, R.H., Sky on Fire: The First Battle of Britain 1917-1918 and the Birth of the 
Royal Air Force, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966 
Freeman, R.A., Airfields of the Eighth: Then and Now, After the Battle Publications, 
London, 1978 
Frey, J.  and H. Chandler, History of the Petroleum Administration for War 1941-1945, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946 
Froesch, C. and W. Prokosch, Airport Planning, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1946 
Fry, Eric, Airman Far Away: The Story of an Australian Dambuster, Kangaroo Press, 
Kenthurst, 1993 
Galbraith, John K., Life in Our Times: Memoirs, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1981 
Garbett, M. and B. Goulding, Lancaster, Promotional Reprint Company, Leicester, 1992 
Gerbig, Werner, Six Months to Oblivion, The Eclipse of the Luftwaffe Fighter Force, 
English Translation by Richard Simpkin, Ian Allen Ltd, London, 1975 
Gibson, Guy, Enemy Coast Ahead, Michael Joseph, London, 1977 
Gibbs, N.H., Grand Strategy, Volume I, Rearmament Policy To September 1939, History 
of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Ed. By J.R.M. Butler, Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1956 
Gilbert, Martin, Second World War, Phoenix Giant Paperback, Orion Press, London, 
1989 
Gilbert, Martin, Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill1941-1945, Heinemann, London, 
1986 
 Glanville, W.H. , Director of Road Research, Road Research laboratory, Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research,  Foreword in E.H. Davis, Pavement Design for 
Roads and Airfields, HMSO, London, 1951, p.1 
Goebbels, Joseph, Goebbels Diaries: the Last Days, English Translation by Richard 
Barry and edited by Hugh Trevor-Roper, Secker & Warburg, London, 1978 
Gollin, Alfred, Impact Of Air Power On The British People And Their Government, 
1909-14, Stanford University Press, California, 1989 
Goralski, R.  and R.W. Freeburg, Oil and War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in 
WW II Meant Victory or Defeat, William Morrow, New York, 1987 
Grey, C.G., History of the Air Ministry, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1940. 
Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 
1916-18, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996 
Gunston, Bill, Fedden: The Life of Sir Roy Fedden, Historical Series No.26, Rolls Royce 
Heritage Trust, Derby, 1998 
Gwyer, J.M.A., Part I, Grand Strategy, Volume III, June 1941-Ausust 1942, History of 
the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Ed. By J.R.M. Butler, Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1964 
Hancock, W.K., Four Studies of War & Peace in this Century, The Wiles Lectures Given 
at the Queen’s University Belfast, October 1960, Cambridge University Press, London, 
1961 
Hancock, W.K. and M.M. Gowing, British War Economy, History of the Second World 
War United Kingdom Civil Series, ed. By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, London, 1949 
Harvey, A.D., Collision of Empires: Britain in Three World Wars 1793-1945, A Phoenix 
Paperback,  Orion Books, London, 1992 
 Hatch, E.J., Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air 
Training Plan, 1939-1945, Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Directorate of 
History, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 1983 
Hawke, C.P., Economics for Historians, Cambridge University Press, London, 1980 
Herington, John, Australia in the War  of 1939-1945, Air, Air-War Against Germany and 
Italy 1939-43, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1954 
Herington, John, Australia in the War  of 1939-1945, Air, Air Power Over Europe,  1943-
1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1963 
Higham, Robin, Military Intellectuals in Great Britain, 1918-1939, Rutgers University 
Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1966. 
Higham Robin, Bases of Air Strategy: Building Airfields for the RAF 1914-1945, Airlife 
Publishing, Shrewsbury, 1998 
Hinsley, F.H., E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom and R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the 
Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume 2, Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, London, 1981 
Hinsley, F.H., E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom and R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the 
Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume 3, Part I, Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1984 
Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, English Translation by Ralph Manheim, Pimlico Books, 
London, 1992 
Höhne, Heinz, Canaris, English Translation by J.M. Brownjohn, Secker & Warburg, 
London, 1979 
Holmes, H., Avro Lancaster, The Definitive Record, Airlife Books, Shrewsbury, 1997 
Hyde, H. M., British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918-1939, Heinemann, London, 
1976 
Hornby, W., Factories and Plant, HMSO and Longmans Green, London, 1958 
 Hoare, Sir Samual, Viscount Templewood, Empire of the Air: The Advent of the Air 
Age, 1922-1929, Collins, London, 1957 
Howard, M., Grand Strategy, Volume IV, August 1942- August 1943, History of the 
Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Ed. By J.R.M. Butler, Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1957 
Howard, Michael, War and the Liberal Conscience, Temple Smith, London, 1978 
Hughes, Arthur J., History of Air Navigation, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1946 
Inman, P., Labour in the Munitions Industries, History of the Second World War United 
Kingdom Civil Series, ed., By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office and 
Longmans Green, London, 1957 
Jackson, A.J., de Havilland Aircraft Since 1909, Putnam, London, 1962 
Jones, Neville, Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the Development of British Air 
Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918, William Kimber, London, 1973 
Kay, R., New Zealand Section, Oxford Companion to the Second World War, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998 
Keegan, John, Mask of Command, Jonathan Cape, London, 1987 
Keegan, John, Second World War, Hutchinson Australia, Sydney, 1989 
Keegan, John, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, 
Pimlico Books, London, 1992 
Keegan, John, Battle for History, Re-Fighting World War Two, Hutchinson, London, 
1995 
Kennett, Lee, A History of Strategic Bombing, Charles Schribner’s Sons, New York, 
1982 
Kennington, Eric, Drawing the R.A.F. A Book of Portraits, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1942 
Kershaw, Ian, Hitler; 1939-1945, Nemesis, Allan Lane, Penguin Press, London 2000 
 Kiernan, R.H., First War in the Air, Peter Davies Ltd., London, 1934 
King, Cecil, With Malice toward None: a War Diary, edited by William Armstrong, 
Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1970 
Kohan, C.M. , Works and Buildings, History of the Second World War United Kingdom 
Civil Series, ed. By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1952. 
Landes, David S. Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial 
Developments in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, Second Edition, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2003 
Liddell-Hart, Basil, History of the Second World War, Pan Macmillan, London, 1992 
Lindquist, Sven, History of Bombing, translated into English by Linda H. Rugg, Granta 
Books, London, 2001 
Longmate, Norman, How We Lived Then: A History of Everyday Life during the Second 
World War, Arrow Books, London, 1977 
Lukacs, John, Five Days in London May 1940, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998 
Lyall, Gavin, War in the Air 1939-45; an Anthology of Personal Experience Selected 
and Edited by Gavin Lyall, Pimlico Books. London, 1994 
Macmillan, Harold, War Diaries: The Mediterranean 1943-1945, Macmillan, London 
1984 
McCarthy, John, Last Call of Empire, Australian Aircrew, Britain and the Empire 
Training Scheme, Australian War memorial, Canberra, 1988 
McCarthy, John, ‘Douhet and the Decisiveness of Airpower’, The Strategists, edited  By 
Hugh Smith, Australian Defence Studies Centre, University of New South Wales, 
Canberra, 2001, pp.65-73 
McCarthy, ‘Did the Bomber Always Get Through? The Control of Strategic Air 
Space 1939-1945’, War In the Air 1914-1994, edited by Alan Stephens, Royal 
Australian Air Force, Air Power Studies Centre, Fairbairn, Australian Capital 
Territory,  1994, pp. 81-94 
 McIsaac, David, Strategic Bombing in World War Two, Garland Publishing, New York, 
1976 
Meehan, Patricia, Unnecessary War: Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler, 
Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1992 
Menzies, Sir Robert, Afternoon Light Some Memories of Men and Events, Penguin 
Books, Harmondsworth, 1970 
Messenger, C., Bomber Harris and the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939-1945, Arms 
and Armour Press, London, 1984 
Middlebrook, Martin, Nuremberg Raid, Allen Lane, London, 1973 
Middlebrook, Martin, Battle of Hamburg, the Firestorm Raid, Allen Lane, London, 
1980 
Middlebrook, Martin, Peenemünde Raid, Allen Lane, London, 1982 
Middlebrook, Martin, Berlin Raids: RAF Bomber Command, winter, 1943-44, Viking 
Books, London, 1988. 
Middlebrook, Martin, and Chris Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, an 
Operational Reference Book 1939-1945, Midland Publishing, Leicester, 1996 
Moran, Lord Charles, Churchill: Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran, the Struggle 
for Survival 1940-1965, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966 
Morris, R, Guy Gibson, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1995 
Morrison, Wilbur H., Fortress without a Roof: The Allied Bombing of the Third Reich, 
W.H. Allen, London, 1982 
Moyes, P.J., Bomber Squadrons of the RAF and Their Aircraft, MacDonald, London, 
1964 
Murphy, Robert, Diplomat among Warriors, Collins, London, 1964 
Murray, W., Luftwaffe, 1933-45: Strategy for Defeat, Brassey’s, Washington, 1996 
 Musgrove, Gordon, Operation Gomorrah: the Hamburg Firestorm Raids, Jane’s 
Publishing Incorporated, New York, 1981 
Neillands, Robin, Bomber War; the Allied Air Offensive against Nazi Germany, 
Overlook Press, New York, 2001 
Oliver, David, Fighter Command 1939-45, From the Battle of Britain to the Fall of 
Berlin, Harper Collins, London, 2000 
Overy, Richard, Air War, 1939-1945, Europa, London, 1980 
Overy, Richard and Andrew Wheatcroft, Road to War, Macmillan Books, London, 1989 
Overy, Richard, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1991 
Overy, Richard J., ‘World War II: The Bombing of Germany’, War In the Air 1914-
1994, edited by Alan Stephens, Royal Australian Air Force, Air Power Studies 
Centre, Fairbairn, Australian Capital Territory,  1994, pp. 113-140 
Overy, Richard, Why the Allies Won, Pimlico Press, London, 1995 
Overy, Richard, Bomber Command, 1939-1945, Harper Collins, London, 1997 
Overy, Richard, The Battle, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 2001 
Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, New York, 1996 
Powers, Barry, Strategy without Slide Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914-1939, Croom 
Helm, London, 1976. 
Paris, Michael, Winged Warfare: The Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in 
Britain, 1859-1917, Manchester University Press, 1992. 
Payton-Smith, D.J., Oil: A Study of War-time Policy and Administration, HMSO, London, 
1971 
Peillard, Léonce, Sink the Tirpitz!, English Translation by Oliver Coburn, Jonathan 
Cape, London, 1968 
 Pelly-Fry, James, Heavenly Days: Recollections of a Contented Airman, Crécy Books 
Limited, London, 1994 
Postan, M.M., British War Production, History of the Second World War United 
Kingdom Civil Series, ed. By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
London, 1952 
Postan, M.M., D. Hay, D. and J.D. Scott, Design and Development of Weapons: Studies 
in Governmental and Industrial Organisation, History of the Second World War United 
Kingdom Civil Series, ed. By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
London, 1964 
Price, Alfred, Bomber in World War II, MacDonald and Jane’s Publishing Corporation, 
New York, 1976 
Probert, Henry, Bomber Harris His Life and Times, Greenhill Books, London, 2001 
Quester, George H., Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Air Power Background of 
Modern Strategy, John Wiley and Sons Incorporated, New York, 1966 
Radzinsky, Edvard, Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New 
Documents From Russia’s Secret Archives, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1996 
Raleigh, W., War in the Air: being the story of the part played in the Great War by the 
Royal Air Force, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1922-1937 
Rapier, B. J., Halifax and Wellington, Promotional Print Company, Leicester, 1994 
Reader, W.J., Architect of Air Power: The Life of the First Viscount Weir, Collins, 
London, 1968 
Regan, Geoffrey, Air Force Blunders, Carlton, London, 1996 
Richards, Dennis and Hilary St George Saunders, Royal Air Force, Vol I and Vol II, 
HMSO, London, 1953-1954 
Richards, Dennis, Portal of Hungerford: Life of Marshal of the Royal Air Force 
Viscount Portal of Hungerford, KG, GCB, OM, DSO, MC, Heinemann, London, 1977 
 Richards, Dennis, Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War, 
Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1994 
Ritchie, Sebastian, Industry and Air Power: The Expansion of British Aircraft 
Production, 1935-1941, Frank Cass, London, 1997 
Robertson, B., Aviation Archaeology: A Collectors Guide to Aeronautical Relics, 
Stephens Ltd., Cambridge, 1977 
Robertson, Esmonde M. (ed.), Origins of the Second World War, Macmillan Press, 
London, 1981 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on Germany under Occupation 
1945-1954, edited by Beate Ruhm von Oppen, Oxford University Press. London, 1955 
Rubbra, Arthur A., Rolls-Royce Piston Engines – A Designer Remembers, Historical 
Series No. 16, Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1990 
Saundby, R., Air Bombardment: The Story of its Development, Chatto and Windus, 
London, 1961. 
Saward, Dudley, ‘Bomber’ Harris: The Story of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir 
Arthur Harris, Bt, GCB, OBE, AFC, LLD, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 1942-1945, 
Sphere Books, London, 1984 
Sawyer, L.A. and W.H. Mitchell, Liberty Ships: The History pf the ‘Emergency’ Type Cargo 
Ships Constructed in the United States during World War II, Cornell Maritime Press, 
Cambridge, Md., 1970 
Sayers, R., Financial Policy 1939-1945, History of the Second World War United 
Kingdom Civil Series, ed. By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office and 
Longmans Green, London, 1956. 
Sereny, Gitta, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth, Macmillan, London, 1995 
Scholes, David, Air War Diary: An Australian in Bomber Command, Kangaroo Press, 
Kenthurst, 1997 
 Schoenfield, M.P., War Ministry of Winston Churchill, Iowa State University Press, 
Ames, 1972 
Scott, J.D., Vickers: A History, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1962 
Scott, J. and R. Hughes, The Administration of War Production, The History of the 
Second World War, History of the Second World War United Kingdom Civil Series, ed. 
By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1964. 
Sharp, H., Shaw, G.R. and Dunlop, J.A., Airport Engineering, J. Wiley and Sons, New 
York, 1948 
Shay, P.R., British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977 
Shirer, William L., Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, Simon 
and Schuster, New York, 1960 
Sinnott, Colin, Royal Air Force and Aircraft Design, 1923-1939: Air Staff Operational 
Requirements, Frank Cass, London, 2001. 
Sked, Alan and Chris Cook, Post-War Britain: A Political History, Pelican Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1979 
Slessor, Sir John, Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections, Cassell and Co., London, 
1956 
Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Everyman’s Library, London, 1991 
Smith, D., Britain’s Military Airfields, 1939-45, P. Stephens, Wellingborough, 1989 
Smith, M., British Air Strategy between the Wars, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1984 
Spaatz, C., ‘Strategic Air Power’, in Impact of Air Power, edited by E.M. Emme, Van 
Nostrand, Princeton, 1959, pp. 226-236 
Stephens, A. (ed.), War in the Air 1914-1994, Air Power Studies Centre, Fairbairn, 
Australian Capital Territory, 1994 
 Stephens, Alan, ‘The True Believers: Air Power Between The Wars’,  War in the Air 
1914-1994, Air Power Studies Centre, Fairbairn, Australian Capital Territory, 1994, pp. 
47-79 
Stokesbury, James L., Short History of Air Power, William Morrow and Co., New York, 
1986 
Strategic Studies Centre of the Australian National University, Air Power: Global 
Developments and Australian Perspectives, Pergamon-Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 
Sydney, 1988 
Symonds’s, Sir C. and D.J. Williams, Psychological Disorders in Flying Personnel of the 
Royal Air Force 1939 to 1945, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1947 
Taylor, A.J.P., War Lords, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1976 
Taylor, A.J.P., Origins of the Second World War, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 
1981 
Taylor, Geoff, Piece of Cake, Peter Davies, London, 1956 
Tedder, Lord Arthur, With Prejudice: The War memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force, Lord Tedder, Cassell & Company, London, 1966. 
Terraine, John, Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, 
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985 
Titmuss, Richard M., Problems of Social Policy, History of the Second World War 
United Kingdom Civil Series, ed. By Sir Keith Hancock, Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, London, 1950 
Tolland, John, Adolf Hitler, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1976 
Van Der Vat, Dan, Good Nazi: The Life and Lies of Albert Speer, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1997 
Veale, F.G.P., Advance to Barbarism, Nelson Publishing, Appleton, Wisconsin, 1953 
Verrier, Anthony, Grand Strategy: The Bomber Offensive, Pan Books, London, 1974 
 Wainwright, John, Tail-End Charlie, Macmillan, London, 1978. 
Wark, W., Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1985 
Watt, Donald Cameron, How War Came, the Immediate Origins of the Second World 
War, 1938-1939, Pimlico, Random House, London, 2001 
Webster, Sir Charles and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 
1939-1945, Volumes I-IV, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1961 
Weinberg, Gerhard L., World at Arms; a Global History of World War II, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995 
Wells, M.K., Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second 
World War, Cass Series: Studies in Air Power, Frank Cass, London, 1995 
Warner, Edward, ‘Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air War’ in, Makers of 
Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1973, pp. 485-503 
Wheeler-Bennett, John W., Munich Prologue to Tragedy, Macmillan Press, London, 
1966 
Winters, Dennis, Deaths Men: Soldiers of the Great War, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1979 
Wilmot, Chester, The Second World War, The Struggle for Europe, Collins, Sons and 
Co. and The reprint Society, London 1954 
Wilson, Thomas, Churchill and the Prof, Cassell, London, 1995 
Wragg, David, Offensive Weapon: The Strategy of Bombing, Robert Hale, London, 1986 
Yergin, David, Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, Simon and Schuster, 
New York, 1993 
 Youngston, A.J., ‘Great Britain 1920-1970’ in, Fontana Economic History of 
Europe, Contemporary Economies-1, edited by Carlo Cippolla, Fontana Books, 
London, 1978, pp. 128-179 
Zhukov, G.K., Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, Jonathan Cape, London, 1971 
Ziegler, Philip, London at War 1939-1945, Mandarin Paperback, Reed International 
Books, London, 1996 
Zuckerman, Solly, From Apes to Warlords, Collins, London, 1988 
 
Articles 
 
Australian War Memorial, ‘Australian Military Statistics: Australian Casualties in the World 
Wars – A Statistical Comparison’, www.awm.gov.au/atwar/statistics/world_wars.htm, 15th 
February, 2004 
Bialer, Uri, ‘The British Chiefs of Staff and the “Limited Liability” Formula of 1938, 
A Note’, Military Affairs, Vol. 42, Issue 2, April 1978, pp. 98-99 
Beaumont, Joan, ‘Starving for Democracy: Britain’s Blockade of And Relief for 
Occupied Europe, 1939-1945’, War & Society, Vol. 8, No. 2, October 1990, pp. 57-
82 
Beaumont, Roger, ‘The Bomber Offensive as a Second Front’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, SAGE, London, Vol.22, 1987, pp. 2-19 
Biddle, Tami Davis, ‘British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their 
Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 18, no. 1, March 1995, pp. 91-143 
Biddle, Tami Davis, ‘Bombing by the Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942-
1945, International History Review, Vol XXI, No. 3, Sept 99,pp. 626-664 
 Boeing Corporation, ‘The Beginnings’, www.Boeing.com/history/boeing/index.html, 20th 
February, 2004 
Boeing Corporation, ‘The War Years’, www.Boeing.com/history/boeing/chr2_war.html, 20th 
February, 2004 
Booth, Alan, ‘Economic Advice at the Centre of British Government, 1939-1941’, 
Historical Journal, Vol 29, No.3, 1986, pp. 655-675 
Bottomley, Sir Norman, ‘The Strategic Bomber Offensive Against Germany, Journal 
of the Royal United Services Institute Vol XCIII, No. 570, May 1948, pp. 224-239 
Buckley, John, ‘Atlantic Airpower Co-operation, 1941-1943’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol 18, No.1, March 1995, pp. 173-197 
Corum, James S., ‘The Development of Strategic Air War Concepts in Interwar 
Germany, 1919-1939’, Air Power Historian, Vol 44, No.4, winter 1997, pp. 18-36 
Davis, Jeffrey, ‘ATFRO: The Atlantic Ferry Organisation’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, SAGE, London, Vol 20, 1985, pp. 71-97 
Dye, Peter J., ‘Logistics and the Battle of Britain’, Air Force Journal of Logistics, 
Vol.24, No.4, US Logistics Management Agency, web6.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw 
/informark, 2nd June 2002 
Cronstedt, V., and R. N. Du Bois, ‘Engineering for National Defence’, SAE Journal, 
Vol 40, No. 6, June 1937, pp. 255-231 
Edgerton, David, ‘Technical Innovation, Industrial Capacity and Efficiency: Public 
Ownership and the British Military Aircraft Industry, 1935-48’, Business History, 
Vol 26, 1984, pp. 247-279 
Fearon, Peter, ‘The Formative Years of the British Aircraft Industry, 1913-1924’, 
Business History Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1969, pp. 476-495 
Fearon, Peter, ‘The British Aircraft Industry and the State, 1918-35’, Economic 
History Review, Vol. 27, 1974, pp. 236-251 
 Fearon, Peter, “The Vicissitudes of a British Aircraft Company: Handley Page Ltd. 
between the Wars’, Business History, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1978, pp. 63-86 
Fearon, Peter, ‘The Growth of Aviation in Britain’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, SAGE, London, Vol. 20, 1985, pp. 21-40 
Fedden, A.H.R., ‘Next Decade’s Aero-engines will be Advanced But Not Radical’, 
SAE Journal, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1933, pp. 377-400 
Fedden, A.H.R., ‘Trend of Air-Cooled Aero-engines – The Next Five Years’, SAE 
Journal, Vol. 41 , No. 4, October, 1937, pp. 437-454 
Goldberg, Alfred, ‘’Remarks on the Strategic Air Offensive in Europe’, Air Power 
History, Vol 38, No.3, fall, 1991, pp. 39-48 
Gunderson, Brian S., ‘Higher Command Structures and Relationships, 1942-45’, Air 
Power History, Vol 38, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 19-35 
Hays-Parks, W., ‘“Precision” and “Area” Bombing: Who did Which, and When”, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 18, no. 1, March 1995, pp. 145-173 
Heide, Rachel L., ‘The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan: How Canada’s 
Contribution to the Second World War Affects Us Today’, www.vac-
acc.gc.ca/general/sub.cfm?source=history/secondWar/bcatp/page4, 10th January 2004 
Johnston, William, ‘Losses, Loss Rates and the Performance of No.6 (RCAF) Group, 
Bomber Command, 1943-1945’, War & Society, Vol.14, No.2, October 1996, 87-99, 
Kirwin, Gerald, ‘Allied Bombing and Nazi Domestic Propaganda’, European History 
Quarterly, SAGE, London, Vol 15, 1985, pp. 341-362 
Koch, H.W., ‘The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany: The Early Phase, May-
September 1940’, Historical Journal, Vol 34, Issue I, 1991, pp.117-141 
Lund, Eric, ‘The Industrial History of Strategy: Re-evaluating the Wartime Record of 
the British Aviation Industry in Comparative Perspective, 1919-1945’, Journal of 
Military History, Society for Military History, Lexington VA, 1998, pp. 75-99 
 Minshall, R.J., J. K.  Ball and F P. Lauden, ‘Design and Construction of Large 
Aircraft’, SAE Journal, Vol 40, No. 2, Feb 1937, pp. 67-80 
McCarthy, John, ‘Aircrew and “Lack of Moral Fibre” in the Second World War’, 
War and Society, Vol 2, No. 2, Sept 1984, pp. 85-101 
McCarthy, John, ‘The Defence of Australia and the Empire Air Training Scheme’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol XX, No 3, December 1974, pp. 326-
334 
McCarthy, John, ‘The “Surrender” of Aircrew to Britain 1939-1945’, Journal of the 
Australian War Memorial, No 5, October 1984 
MacKenzie, S.P., ‘On Target: The Air Ministry, RAF Bomber Command and Feature 
Film Propaganda, 1941-1942’, War & Society, Vol 15, No. 2, October 1997, pp. 43-
59 
Manzo, Louis A., ‘Morality in War Fighting and Strategic Bombing in World War 
II’, Air Power History, fall 1992, pp. 35-50 
Meade, G.L., ‘Inline Liquid Cooled versus Air Cooled Engines’, SAE Journal, Vol. 
XXVII, No. 2, August 1930, pp. 143-147 
Meilinger, Phillip S., ‘Proselytiser and Prophet: Alexander P. de Seversky and 
American Airpower’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 18, No.1, March 1995, pp.7-
35 
Milward, A., ‘The End of the Blitzkrieg’, Economic History Review, Vol 16, No.3, 
1964, pp. 499-517 
Mierzejewski, Albert C., ‘When Did Albert Speer Give Up?’, Historical Journal, Vol 
31, No.2, 1988, pp. 391-397 
Mowery, David C., ‘Firm Structure, Government Policy, and the Organisation of 
Industrial research: Great Britain and the United States, 1900-1950’, Business 
History Review, Vol 58, No.531, winter 1984, pp. 504-531 
 Overy, Richard J., ‘The German pre-War Aircraft Production Plans: November 1936-
April 1939, English Historical Review, Vol. 90, 1975, pp. 
Overy, Richard J., ‘Hitler’s War and the German Economy: A Re-Interpretation’, 
Economic History Review, Vol. 35, No.2, 1982, pp. 272-290 
Paris, Michael, ‘Air Power and Imperial Defence 1880-1919’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, SAGE, London, Vol 24, 1989, pp. 209-225 
Pedden, G.C., ‘A Matter of Timing: The Economic Background to British Foreign 
Policy, 1937-1939, History, Vol 69, No. 225, Feb 1984, pp. 15-28 
Quester, George H., ‘Strategic Bombing in the 1930s and 1940s’, The Use of Force: 
International Politics and Foreign Policy, Second Edition, edited by Robert J. Art 
and Kenneth N. Waltz, University Press of America, Lantham, 1983, pp. 236-266 
Reichardt, Otto H., ‘Industrial Concentration in World War II: The Case of the 
Aircraft Industry’, Vol 22, No.3, Aerospace Historian, September 1975, pp. 129-134 
Ritchie, Sebastian, ‘A New Audit of War: The Productivity of Britain’s Wartime 
Aircraft Industry reconsidered’, War and Society, Vol. 12, No. 1, May 1994, pp. 125-
147 
Roberts, E.A. and L. M. Hull, ‘Suppressing Ignition Interference’, SAE Journal, Vol 
XXVII, No. 1, July 1930, pp. 78-84 
Robertson, A., ‘The British Airframe Industry and the State in the Interwar Period: A 
comment’, Economic History Review, Vol 28, 1975. 
Royal Air Force and Bomber Command Association, ‘RAF Bomber Command Navigation 
and Target Marking Methods, 1940-1945’, www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft, 12th 
January 2004 
Royal Air Force and Bomber Command Association, ‘Development of RAF Bomber Aircraft 
and Policy, 1918-1939’, www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft, 12th January 2004 
Royal Air Force and Bomber Command Association, ‘Royal Air Force Bomber Command 
Station Histories’, www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft, 21st July 2003 
 Royal Air Force and Bomber Command Association, ‘Royal Air Force Bomber Command 
Squadron Histories’, www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft, 21st July 2003 
Saundby, Sir Robert, ‘Bomber Command’, Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute, Vol LXXXIX, Feb 1944, No.1, pp. 10-20 
Smith, F.M., ‘Metal Airplane Construction: Late Practice in Duralumin Construction 
Described and Low Jig-cost Revealed’ SAE Journal, Vol XXVIII, No. 3, No.161, 
Mar 1931, pp. 387-389 
Stephens, Alan, ‘The True Believers: Air Power Between the Wars’, The War In the 
Air 1914-1994, edited by Alan Stephens, Royal Australian Air Force, Air Power 
Studies Centre, Fairbairn, Australian Capital Territory,  1994, pp. 47-80 
Strauss, E.B., ‘The Psychological Effects of Bombing’, The Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute, Vol XXXIV, No. 534, May 1939, pp. 269-282 
Sunoco Corporation, ‘Sunoco History’, www.sunocoinc.com/aboutsunoco/sunhistoryf.htm, 
15th February 2003 
Tully-Jackson, J. and Ian Brown, ‘Drem Aerodrome’, www.eastlothianatwar.co.uk/ 
Drem.htm, 28th February 2004 
United States Maritime Service Veterans, ‘Liberty Ships Built by the United States Maritime 
Commission in World War II’, www.usmm.org/libertyships.html, 10th February 2004 
United States Air Force Museum, Public Affairs and Research Division, ‘’Air Power Gallery’, 
www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/air_power/ap.htm, 5th February 2004 
War Savings, ‘Target Costs’, ‘Wings for Victory Issue’, War Savings, Vol. 3, No.15, 
February, His majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1943, pp. 24-27 
Werrell, Kenneth P., ‘The USAAF over Europe and its Foes: A Selected, Subjective, and 
Critical Bibliography’, Aerospace Historian, Vol 25, No.4, pp. 231-243 
Williamson, G.W., ‘Aircraft Production for War’, Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institute, Vol XXII, No. 567, Aug 1947, pp. 440-446 
 
